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KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH JOURNAL

[ARTS AND HUMANITIES]

With compliments of D.C. [illegible]

The Vice-Chancellor

KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY KURUKSHETRA

EDITOR

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KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY

KURUKSHETRA

Dec.-Jan., 1968

Publisher
Dr. Buddha Prakash,
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Institute of Indic Studies,
Kurukshetra University,
Kurukshetra.

Price Rs. 10.00 (per volume)

Printed in India by T. PHILIP,
at the Kurukshetra University Press,
Kurukshetra.

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Ancient History, Culture and Archæology

Buddha Prakash

MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL REVOLT IN INDIA IN THE SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

Indian society in the sixth century B.C.

The sixth century B.C. was a period of momentous changes in the social and economic set-up of India. The rapid expansion of trade, industry and commerce had brought into prominence a new artisan, banker and merchant class which overshadowed and eclipsed the old *rājanya* landed artistocracy that had dominated the social life of the country in the later Vedic period. We hear of multimillionaires (*asīti-koṭi-vibhava-seṭṭhī*), like Anāthapiṇḍaka of Śrāvastī, who outwitted the prince Jeta by accepting his offer to purchase his grove by spreading gold coins on it so that their edges met each other (*koṭi-santhāra*),[1] and Dhanañjaya of Sāketa who invited king Prasenajit of Kosala to attend the marriage of his daughter Viśākhā and witness the fabulous wealth he gave as dowry.[2] We also learn of large caravans of merchants, comprising as many as 500 wagons, travelling from eastern India to Kaśmīra and Gandhāra for trade purposes,[3] and of big farm-holders owning landed estates of the size of 1000 Karīsas each worked by as many as 500 ploughs.[4] These developments ensured the growth of urban economy and social mobility, one the one hand,[5] and concentrated the means of production in the hands of the newly rising merchant and landowning class, on the other. As a result there was a unique mental agility, reflecting a spirit of free enquiry, of bold question and candid answer, on the one side, and a torturing process of exaction and squeezing, causing social tensions and turmoils, begetting spiritual unrest and discontent, on the other. The worker, living only by a riceball (*kammāsapiṇḍa*) or barely boiled like rice and a little soup (*appasūpam yavabhattam*) and seeing his master enjoying cooked meat (*pakvamāṁsa*), rice prepared with meat (*māṁsodana*) and cakes and recreating himself in taverns (*pānaśālā*),[6] could not long suppress the urge to question the scale of values, which shaped the pattern of life, in that age of free thought and enquiry. Though full records, enabling us to pry into the inner recesses of the spirit of the common people in that age, are not available, some

1. *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, VI, 4, 9 : *Jātaka*, I p. 92.
2. *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā*, IV, 8 ; *Anguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā*, 1, 7, 2.
3. *Mahāsutasoma Jātaka*, Vide, *Jātakas* ed. *Fausböll*; Vol. V, p. 471.
4. *Jātaka* Vol, IV. p. 276.
5. R.S. Sharma, *Light on Early Indian Society and Economy* (Bombay, 1966), p. 62.
6. *Mahāummagga Jātaka*, *Jātaka* Vol. VI, p. 372 ; vide also *Jātaka* Vol. I, p. 486 ; *Jātaka* Vol. V, p. 383.
7. *Anguttaranikāya*, III 38, 1.

hints and references, giving us glimpses of the working of the springs of their mind, have survived in contemporary literature.

The economic development of sixth century B.C. had brought about a polarisation of social classes. The rich developed and displayed a dislike for manual work, some of them even not knowing the origin of rice,[8] and disparaged and decried the profession of yoke and sickle, branding the peasant as engaged in a mean and violent work and treating the labourer no better than a slave.[9] Among the oligarchies the dominant aristocratic class of the khattiyas (Kṣatriyas) closed the door on all kinds of egress and ingress and reduced the social system to a pigeon-box of stiff and rigid compartments. In their view all the non-aristocratic classes were no better than slaves.[10] Birth alone determined the status of a person. In the monarchies these group frontiers were more flexible and one could to a certain extent ascend up the social ladder. This may be one of the reasons why the monarchical system swept away the oligarchic republicanism so swiftly.

The dislike and distaste for manual work could not but infect the working classes. Hence we find the masters lamenting that their slaves "do another thing with their bodies, say another with their speech and have a third in their mind."[11] More often than not they were burdens on their masters,[12] being indifferent and insouciant in their work.[13] In their heart of hearts they grumbled at the social inequity of divisions between the high and the low without reference to merit or work. Their sentiment underlies the questioning of a slave as follows :—

"Here is this king of Magadha, Ajātasattu, he is a man and so am I. But the king lives in full enjoyment and the possession of the five pleasures of the senses—a veritable god, methinks—and here am I, a slave, working for him, rising before him and retiring late to rest."[14]

Though religious preaching sought to explain away these social discrepancies through virtue and vice inherited from previous births, the conscience of the masses could not be fully satisfied with it and sometimes erupted out in the form of revolts and uprisings. A queer instance is that of the picnic of Śākya ladies in the jungle in course of which the slaves became violent and robbed, ravished and kidnapped them.[15] What came

8. *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā*, I, 135.
9. J.C. Jain, *History of Prākrta Literature* (In Hindi), p. 57.
10. D.R. Chanana, *Slavery in Ancient India* (New Delhi, 1960), pp. 39, 107.
11. *Majjhimanikāya*, 51.
12. *Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā*, II, 104-5
13. *Therīgāthā*, XI, 606 ; *Manusmṛti*, VI, 45 ; *Mahābhārata* (Śāntiparvan), 237, 15.
14. *Dīghanikāya*, I, p. 52 अयं हि राजा मागधो अजातसत्तु वेदेहिपुत्तो मनुस्सो, अहंपि मनुस्सो। अयं हि राजा पञ्चहि कामगुणेहि समप्पितो समंगीभूतो परिचारेति देवो मञ्ञे। अहं पनम्हि रञ्ञो कम्मकरो पुब्बुट्ठायी पच्छानिपाती।
15. *Vinaya Piṭaka*, IV, 181, I.B. Horner, *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, Vol. XIII, Part III, p. 115.

out of these riots we do not know, but they must have posed a problem which compelled the Buddha to plead for a humane treatment of the slaves and led to the étatist tendencies which culminated in the Kauṭilyan polity in which all sections of the people came under the férule of the centralised bureaucratic administration and no class could tyrannise over another and exploit it in an arbitrary manner.[16]

This spirit of unrest and revolt found an expression, not only in occasional outbreaks, the full records of which have not come down to us, but also in drastic convulsions of thought leading to the growth of what may be called materialistic philosophies some traces of which have escaped the process of suppression and repression. These philosophies, reflecting and enshrining social revolt, registered a protest against the scheme of values which sought to justify the status quo under the guise of moralism, activism and spiritualism. We propose to study some of them here.

Pūraṇa Kassapa, the slave prophet

Buddhaghoṣa in his commentary, entitled *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, on *Dīghanikāya* I, 1,2, gives us the story of the slave Kassapa. His master had ninety-nine servants and, on acquiring Kassapa as the hundredth, thought that the number 100 had been completed and so called him *Pūraṇa* (the completor), according to that idea. One day that Pūraṇa Kassapa fled from the family with only a piece of cloth on his body and was relieved of the same also by the thieves in the way with the result that he had to hide his nudity with grass and in that state reached a village. However, the villagers, finding him naked, considered him a great ascetic and treated him with adequate respect. This encouraged him to really become a teacher and he began to preach. Five hundred people followed him and proclaimed his greatness He even attracted the notice of the great king Ajātasattu, who paid a visit to him and solicited his opinion on some problems, particularly that of the reward of becoming a recluse, and this is what he preached :

"To him, who acts, O! King, or causes another to act, to him, who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him, who punishes or causes another to punish, to him, who kills a living creature, who takes, what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity or robbery or highway robbery or adultery, who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If, with a discus, with an edge, sharp as a razor, he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges, giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In

16. P.C. Jain, *Labour in Ancient India* (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis approved by the Kurukshetra University), p. 227.

generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor increase of merit."[17]

Hardly can a criticism of social values be more trenchant than this one coming from a slave whose mind and heart were rent by the torments and tensions of his social milieu. His doctrine that the earth rules or sustains the world, mentioned in the *Milindapañho*, smacks of stark materialism.

Maṅkkhali Gosāla, the servant teacher

Another notable figure of that age was the teacher Maṅkkhali or Maṅkkhali Gosāla. The Jaina text *Bhagavati Sūtra* (XV, I) states that he was the son of Makkhali, who was a mendicant, living by showing pictures from house to house (*maṅkha*), and his wife Bhaddā. He was born in a cow-shed and so was called Gosāla. He followed the profession of his father. According to Buddhaghoṣa he took service in his youth. One day he desired to slip away. His master sent him to bring oil. The way was muddy. The master asked him to be careful, lest his feet should slip. But he slipped and ran away from his master, who, following him in a rage, pulled the end of his dhoti, which was left in his hand, and Maṅkkhali ran away naked. Being naked, he was also hailed as an ascetic by the village people, like Pūraṇa Kassapa, and so became a teacher. In his thirtieth year he met Mahāvīra and lived with him for six years. But Mahāvīra's teaching did not appeal to him. So he separated from him, practised penance for two years and proclaimed himself a prophet (*jina*). For sixteen years he preached. He is said to have died of fever caused by the curse of Mahāvīra.[18] He also attracted the notice of Ajātasattu, king of Magadha, who paid a visit to him. He preached to him as follows :

"There is no cause for the sufferings of beings; they, therefore, all suffer without any cause, there is no cause for the purity (*viśuddhi*) of beings; they all become pure without any cause; there is no efficiency in one's own deeds or in the deeds of others or in one's free efforts; there is no power, no energy, no human strength or heroic endeavour. All vertebrates, all animals with one or more senses, all lives, emanating from eggs or ovaries, all vegetable lives, are without any power or efficiency. They become transformed in various forms by their inherent destiny, by their manifestation in various life-forms, and by their different natures, and it is in accordance with their six kinds of life-states that they suffer pains or enjoy pleasures."[19]

Gosāla divided beings into six classes corresponding more or less to the six leśyas of the Jainas. These six classes differ according to the working of their senses. But he refused to distinguish between animate and inanimate beings as the Jainas did. According to him the whole

17. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, pp. 69-70.
18. A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, Ch. I.
19. T.W. Rhys Davids, Op. Cit.

scheme of being is instinct with life. Nature is life, self-evolving, working through *pravṛtti*, the process of becoming, and *nivṛtti*, ceasing to be. Thus Gosāla explained the world, society and life as a natural process.

Gosāla is known to be living with the potter-woman, Halāhalā, and held that there is no sin in having intercourse with women :

"As the squeezing of a blister or boil causes relief for sometime, so it is with (the enjoyment) of charming women. How could there be any sin in it ? As a ram drinks the quiet water, so it is with (the enjoyment) of charming women. How could there be any sin in it ?"[20]

But this does not mean that he advocated an amoral or immoral way of life. He refused to accept food which was specially prepared for him. He did not accept food from people, when they were eating, lest they should go short or be disturbed. He did not accept food collected in times of drought. He did not accept food where a dog was standing by, or flies were swarming around, lest they should lose a meal. He did not eat fish or meat and abstained from intoxicants.[21] However, he shunned external authority and had a deep sense of freedom, as is clear from the remark of the *Majjhimanikāya* that an *Ājīvika* never incurred the guilt of obeying another man's command.[22] The social outlook of the Ājīvikas has been admirably summed up by B.M. Barua as follows :

"It teaches that, as man is predestined in certain ways and as he stands highest in the gradations of existence, his freedom, to be worth the name, must be one within the operation of law, and that the duty of man as the highest of beings is to conduct himself according to law, and so to act and behave himself as not to trespass on the rights of others, to make the fullest use of one's liberties, to be considerate and discreet, to be pure in life, to abstain from killing living beings, to be free from earthly possessions, to reduce the necessaries of life to a minimum, and to strive for the best and the highest *i.e.* jinahood, which is within human power."[23]

Gosāla's advocacy of family life and the belief in a natural law driving everybody, prince or pauper, rich or poor, irrespective of social station or position, towards an inevitable destiny, echoes the twitchings of a revolting spirit, bent on repudiating the distinctions of social life as fundamental truths.

Ajitakesakambalin, the proletarian heretic

Another teacher of this type was Ajitakeśakambalin. Buddhaghoṣa, explains that he used to wear a garment, made of human hair, which was hot in summer and cold in winter and, thus, a source of suffering.

20. Hermann Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, II. 70.
21. *Dialogues of the Buddha* Vol. II, pp. 227–229.
22. *Majjhimanikāya* Vol. I, p. 238.
23. B.M. Barua, *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy* p. 317.

But, as his doctrine, given below, shows, he could not uphold such a life of abnegation and suffering. His name rather seems to suggest that he lived by making blankets from hair. He preached to Ajātasattu as follows:

"There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brāhmaṇas, who have reached the highest point, who talk perfectly and who, having understood and realised, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of the four elements; when he dies, the earth in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the wind to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, with the bier as the fifth, take the dead body away till they reach the burning ground, where men utter eulogies, but there his bones are bleached and the offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts, it is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated and, after death, they are not".[24]

This doctrine also implies the idea of levelling, of the denial of social inequality, attributed to past deeds, good or bad, and associated with the concept of future life, in heaven or hell, or their counterparts, prosperity or poverty, here in this world.

Sañjaya Belatthiputta, the frustrated sceptic

The scepticism of Sañjaya Belatthiputta was also an echo of the same spirit of unrest and agitation. This teacher was the founder of a school of thought in Rājagṛha and Sāriputta was his follower before joining the order of the Buddha. The defection of Sāriputta and Moggallāna and 250 other disciples caused such a serious shock to Sañjaya that he fainted and died. According to Buddhagoṣa a famous disciple of Sañjaya was the wanderer Suppiya who started a school of his own. In the *Brahmajālasutta* Suppiya is described as a teacher who was opposed to the Buddhists and disparaged the Buddha and his doctrines and disciples. King Aśoka dedicated a cave-dwelling to his followers, the Suppiyas. B.M. Barua thinks that the Suppiyas were identical with the Aviruddhakas or Friends mentioned in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (III, 276).[25] Their standpoint is summed up by Śīlāṅka as follows:

"Some conceive the existence of an all-seeing soul, while others controvert it. Some speak of an all-pervading self (*sarvagatātmā*), others contend that the body being such an entity, it cannot be all-pervading.

24. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I pp. 73-74.
25. B.M. Barua, *Op. cit.*, p. 326.

Some estimate that soul is equal to a digit in size, while others say that it is equal to a grain of rice. Some posit a soul that has a material form, while others maintain that it is formless. Some point out that the heart is the seat of the soul, while others oppose them by saying that the forehead would be the right place... ....How can there be an agreement of views among these philosophers? Many injuries may result from the issues of such antagonistic blunders. For us ignorance is far better than these follies".[26]

In this way these teachers diverted the attention of men from fruitless enquiries and directed it towards the *summum bonum* which is the preservation of mental equanimity and the attainment of happiness.

Kakuda Kaccāyana, the humpbacked pluralist

Another famous teacher of those times was Kakuda Kaccāyana, a younger contemporary of Paippalāda, according to the *Praśna Upaniṣad*, and an elder contemporary of Buddha, according to Buddhist texts. He came of a Brāhmaṇa family and had a hump on his back which gave him the sobriquet of Kakuda or Kabandhin. According to Buddhaghoṣa he avoided cold water and used hot water whenever possible.

The doctrine of Kakuda Kaccāyana goes by name of pluralism (*anikkavāda*) or eternalism There are many resemblances between his views and those of the Sāṅkhya. He conceived of being as a plurality of unchangeable elements. The two elements, combining or separating the four elements, earth, water fire and air, are pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duhkha*), corresponding to the love and hatred of Empedocles. Kaccāyana also considered soul as an eternal unchanging life-element. According to him the elements combine into unity by their inherent tendency to eat one another and separate by a contrary tendency that perpetually disunites them. The bearing of this outlook on social morals is summarised by B.M. Barua as follows :

"If the elements of being be eternally existent and unchangeable by their very nature, if they mechanically unite or separate by pleasure or pain, inherent in each of them, if there be, in other words, no volitional activity of consciousness, then where is the ground for the conception of or distinction between good and bad, between knowledge and ignorance, and so forth ?"[27]

Thus this school of thought also hit at the foundations of the social morality of those times.

The heyday of heterodoxy

Besides the aforesaid teachers, there were others who questioned the validity of the prevalent system of social morality in a variety of ways.

26. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Ṭīkā* pp. 451-52.
26. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Ṭīkā* pp. 451-52.
27. B.M. Barua, *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

Some, like Śvetaketu, son of Uddālaka, Bābhravya of Pañcāla, Dattaka, Cārāyaṇa, Suvarṇanābha, Ghoṭakamukha, *etc.*, preached that happiness, the end of all beings, is nothing but a culmination of the pleasure arising from the satisfaction of various desires pertaining to the five senses (*pañca-kāma-guṇa-diṭṭha-dhamma-nibbānavāda*); others, whose opinions are discussed in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya, thought that the acquisition of wealth and material gain is the key to the attainment of happiness and that the science of acquiring wealth, economics or *vārttā*, and that of preserving the state of law and order, politics or *daṇḍanīti*, so necessary for it, are the key sciences, preceding and overriding even metaphysics and scholastics.

Most of the aforesaid thinkers and preachers are dubbed as upholders of non-action, *akriyāvādins*.[21] In fact the doctrine of the freedom of human will and action, *kriyāvāda*, in the context of the social condition of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., referred to the observance of a code of moral conduct, characterised by fixed notions of good and bad, reflecting the economic imperatives of the social relationships of different classes of people in that age. It was believed that the performance of the deeds, considered good from the standpoint of contemporary social ethics, and the avoidance of actions, deemed bad from the outlook of right and wrong of that period, resulted in the corresponding acquisition of merit and demerit, which was responsible for the happiness and misery of man both here and hereafter. Whatever we are enjoying or suffering now is the result of what we have done in the past, and what we are doing now will determine whether we are to be happy or otherwise in future. Most of the teachers of the so-called heretic or heterodox schools registered their protest against this theory of morals and actions in the various ways studied

21 In the *Thāṇāṅga* (Sthānāṅga) (V, 4) Mahāvīra alludes to eight classes of thinkers under the name of *akriyāvādins* (1) *Ekkavādin* (monist or monotheist); (2) *Aṇikkavādin* (pluralist), (3) *Mitavādin* (extentionist), (4) *Nimittavādin* (cosmologist), (5) *Sāyavādin* (sensualist), (6) *Samucchedavādin* (annihilationist), (7) *Nittavādin* (eternalist), and (8) *Nasantiparalokavādin* (he who did not believe in afterlife).

In the *Brahmajālasutta* (*Dīghanikāya*, I, 12-39)

Buddha enumerates the *Akriyāvādins* as follows :

(1) *Sassatavādin* (eternalist), (2) *Ekaccasassatavādin* (semi-eternalist), (3) *Antānantika* (extensionist), (4) *Adhiccasamuppannika* (believers in the fortuitous origin of things), (5) *Uddhamāghatanika* (eschatologist), (6) *Ucchedavādin* (annihilationist), and (7) *Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādin* (sensualist or positive hedonist).

Śīlāṅka in his *Ācārāṅga Ṭīkā* (p. 14) classifies the *Akriyāvādins* in the following manner (1) *Kālavādin* (believer in time as the main cause of change in the order of things), (2) *Īśvaravādin* (believer in God as the main cause of change in the order of things), (3) *Ātmavādin* (believer in soul as the determinant of actions and recipient of their fruits), (4) *Niyativādin* (believer in a predetermined order of nature as the cause of things), (5) *Svabhāvavādin* (believer in the origin and change of things by their own nature) and (6) *Yadṛcchāvādin* (believer in the fortuitous accidental and erratic course of nature).

We have discussed some of these views in a nutshell above.

above and thus came to be called the upholders of non-action (*akriyā-vāda*). But, behind their criticism of the theory of good and bad and their rejection of its role in determining the material well-being of man through a retributory process, was the spirit of the revulsion and revolt of those classes of people who were not satisfied with the conditioning of social relationships as functions of economic disparities and refused to accept the validity of the code of moral values sustaining the social order in terms of superhuman and metaphysical postulates. They challenged the structuring of society and the patterning of the individual on the basis of an *a priori* scale of moral values which tended to transcend the limits of the ratiocinative process of the human mind and sought to justify the prevalent social system by providing supernatural sanctions. In this way they acted as the mouthpieces of social revolt voicing forth its main urges and imperatives; they mirrored social unrest which questioned prevailing values and clamoured for a change in them; they expressed the ideology of the unprivileged classes seeking to level down social distinctions by undermining their moral justification

The significant thing about most of the aforesaid teachers is that they, unlike their more renowned contemporaries, Buddha and Mahāvīra, did not belong to aristocratic kingly families, but hailed from the dregs of society and voiced forth their distrust and disgust for the prevalent system of values in a variety of ways. The spirit and atmosphere of the age, in which these teachers lived and preached, is described by Radhakrishnan as follows :—

"It was an age full of strange anomalies and contrasts. With the intellectual fervour and moral seriousness were also found uited a lack of mental balance and restraint of passion ... ... The marvellous uncertainty and ambiguity of existence, the discordant attempts to systematise the world, the bewildering chaos of arbitrary by-ways, side-streets and resting-places of thought, invented by suffering humanity, trembling in fear and delighting in the new and the untried, the desert of unbelief, exhaustion and frigidity in the midst of energy, youth and enterprise, make the epic period an eventful era in the history of Indian thought[29]... The faith of centuries was dissolving like a dream. The hold of authority was loosened and traditional bonds weakened. In the tumult of thought, consequent on the disintegration of faith and declaration of the independence of man, ever so many metaphysical fancies and fertile speculations were put forward. An age, stricken with a growing sense of moral weakness, is eager to clutch at any spiritual stay".[30]

Genesis of Indian materialism

Indian materialism, though on old doctrine, was the typical product and expression of this age. The view of Kabandhin, son of Kātya, found

29. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I p. 272.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

in the *Praśna Upaniṣad*,[31] the doubt about life after death, expressed by Naciketas in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*,[32] the doctrine that consciousness arises from the elements of matter and vanishes along with them, referred to by Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,[33] the satisfaction of Virocana with the doctrine that the self is identical with the body, recorded in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,[34] the attacks on the belief in afterlife, sacrifices and *śrāddhas*, made by Jābāli in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and the explanation of life in terms of physical and physiological factors without any reference to the soul by Bhāradvāja in the *Mahābhārata*[35] are indications of the increasing popularity of materialist doctrines in the age under review. The very name *lokāyata*, meaning that, which is prevalent among the common people (*lokeṣu āyata*) or represents the view-point (*āyatanti, utsāhanti, vāyamanti,*) of the common man, applied to it, shows its popular character.[37] It not only remained the floating speculation of unsophisticated people, but attained a scientific and systematised form, having its own literature and treatises About 300 B.C. Kātyāyana refers to a *Lokāyataśāstra*, written by Bṛhaspati or Cārvāka, with its commentary composed by one Bhāguri. Though these works are now lost, quotations from them exist in a large number of works, including such late texts as the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* (III, 3.53) of Śankara, the *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* (I, 104) of Vidyānanda, Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* (vv. 1858, 1872), the *Yaśastilakacampū* (VIII, 37) of Somadeva *etc*. Bṛhaspati, Cārvāka and Purandara were regarded as the ācāryas of this school.

Summing up the role of materialism in the history of Indian philosophy Radhakrishnan says that this "theory had a good deal to do with the repudiation of the old religion of custom and magic. Liberal efforts at improving existing institutions, sanctioned by time and embodied in the habits of people, will remain ineffectual, if the indifference and superstition of centuries are not shaken up by an explosive force, like the Cārvāka creed. Materialism signifies the declaration of the spiritual independence of the individual and the rejection of the principle of authority. Nothing need be accepted by the individual which does not find its evidence in the movement of reason. It is a return of man's spirit to itself and a rejection of all that is merely external and foreign[38] .... It applied to the main questions of philosophy a judgement free from the fancies of theology and the dictates of authority."[39]

31. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 651; B.M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 281.
32. I. I, 20, Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 603
33. II. 4, 12, *Ibid*, p. 200.
34. VIII. 7, 3-4, *Ibid*., p. 502
35. II, 108.
36. XII, 186.
37. S.N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III pp. 564, 513; Debiprasad Chattopadhyay, *Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, pp. 1-2.
38. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 283.
39. *Ibid*., p. 283.

Sadhu Ram

THE MATHURĀ PILLAR INSCRIPTION OF CHANDRAGUPTA II, GUPTA YEAR 61

PROVENANCE	:	Caṇḍūl Maṇḍūl Bagīchī at Mathurā, U.P.
PUBLISHED IN	:	D. R. Bhandarkar, *Ep. Ind.*, XIII, pp. 8 ff.; D. C. Sircar, *Sel. Ins.*,
LANGUAGE	:	Sanskrit with a slight Prākrit influence.
BRAHMĪ	:	Brāhmī of 2nd cent. B. C.
METRE	:	*Āryā.*
OBJECT	:	Installation of *Śiva-liṅgas* in Teacher's Shrine.

INTRODUCTION

This inscription is inscribed on a pillar which was originally attached to a well in the Ch. ṇḍūl Maṇḍūl Bagīchī near the Raṅgeśvara Mahādeva temple at Mathurā. It is in Sanskrit prose except for a verse in Āryā metre at the end of which only half has been inscribed, probably for want of space.

The record refers to the reign of Candragupta II, son of Samudragupta, both of whom are given the title *Bhaṭṭārka-mahārājādhirāja* in exact imitation of the Kuṣāṇa title *Mahārāja-rājātirāja*. The script of the epigraph also resembles the Kuṣāṇa Brāhmī of the 2nd century B.C. Mathurā has yielded numerous Kuṣāṇa records, because it was one of the most important principalities of the Kuṣāṇas.

The incription records the intallation of two *Śiva-liṅgas*, called Upamiteśvara and Kapileśvara, in the Teacher's Shrine by the Pāśupata teacher Uditācārya.

TEXT

१. सिद्धम् [॥*] भट्टारक-महाराज-[राजाधि] राज-श्री-समुद्रगुप्त-स
२. [त्पु]त्रस्य भट्टारक-म [हा] राज-[राजाधि] राज-श्री-चन्द्रगुप्त-
३. स्य विज [य*]-राज्य-संवत्स [रे] [पं]चमे [५] कालानुवर्त्तमान-सं-
४. वत्सरे एकषष्ठे (०षष्टितमे) ६० १ [आषाढ़-मासे] [शु]क्ले शुक्ल-दिवसे पं-
५. चम्यां (म्याम्) [।*] अस्यां पूर्व्वा [यां] [भ]गव [त्कु]शिकाद्दशमेन भगव-
६. त्पराशराच्चतुर्थेन [भगवत्क] पि [ल] विमल-शि-
७. ष्य-शिष्येण भगव [दुपमित] विमल-शिष्येण
८. आर्य्योदि [ता] चार्य्ये[ण] [स्व]-पु [ण्या]प्यायन-निमित्त
९. गुरूणा च कीर्त्य [र्थंमुपमितेश्व]र-कपिलेश्वरौ

१०. गुर्व्वायतने गुरु-[प्रतिमा-युतौ[1]] प्रतिष्ठापितो (तौ) [।*] नै-
११. तत्ख्यात्यर्थमभिलि[ख्यते] माहेश्वराणां वि-
१२. ज्ञप्ति × क्रियते संबोधनं च यथा का[ले]नाचार्य-
१३. णां (णाम्) [।*] परिग्रहमिति (परिग्रह इति) मत्वा विशङ्क[ं] [पू]जा-पुर-
१४. स्कारं [ ] परिग्रह-पारिपाल्यं [कुर्या]दिति (कुर्युरिति) [।*]
१५. यश्च कीर्त्यभिद्रोहं कुर्याद्य[श्चा]भिलिखि[तमु]पर्यधो
१६. वा [स] पञ्चभिर्म्म[हा]पातकैरुपपातकैश्च संयुक्तस्स्यात् [।*]
१७. जयति च भगवा[न्द(द)ण्डः] रुद्रदण्डो[ऽ*]ग्र-[ना]यको नित्य[म्॥*]

TRANSLATION

ll. 1 – 5. (Salutation) to the Perfect One! In the 5th year of the victorious reign of *Bhaṭṭāraka-mahārājādhirāja*, the illustrious Candragupta (II), the worthy son of the *Bhaṭṭāraka-mahārājādhirāja*, the illutrious Samudragupta — on the 5th day af the bright half of the month, first Āṣāḍha of the sixty-first year, 61, of the current era.

ll. 5 – 10. On the aforesaid (date), (the *Liṅgas*) *Upamiteśvara* and *Kapileśvara* conjoined with the images of the preceptors (Upamitavimala and Kapilavimala) were established in the Teachers' Shrine by Ārya Uditācārya, 10th (in descent) from the venerable Kuśika, fourth from the venerable Parāśara, a disciple's disiple of the venerable Kapilavimala (and) a disciple of venerable Upmitavimala, for the commemoration of the preceptors and for the enhancement of his own religious merit.

ll. 10 – 14. It is not being written for (personal) glory; (but) it is a request and exhortation to the devotees of Maheśvara. Considering that this is the property (for installing the memorials) of the Ācāryas, they should, on proper occasion, perform worship and make offerings without hesitation, and protect the property. This is the request.

ll. 15 16. Whoever damages this monument or tampers with the writing, he would be invested with the five major as well as with five minor sins.

l. 17. Victorious for ever is the divine punishment, the Rudra's rod, the mighty chastiser.

NOTES

1. अस्यां पूर्व्वायां (line 5) — According to Dr. Sircar, the word *pūrvvā* was used with reference to the *tithi*, *kṣaṇa* or *ghaṭikā* in such expressions.[2] H. V. Trivedi told me that *pūrvā* in such cases means *praśasti*. But this meaning will not fit in other expressions like *etasyāṁ divasapūrvāyām*.

2. उपमितविमल (line 7) — Bhandarkar[3] has treated *vimala* as a separate word and rendered it by 'stainless', but the word is the last part of the names Kapilavimala and Upmitavimala, and is not a qualifying adjective

1. Restorations are suggested by D. R. Bhandarkar.
2. Vide *Sel. Ins.*, 1965, p. 137 fn. 3
3. *Ep. Ind.*, XIII, pp. aff.

3. गुर्वायतने (l. 10)—According to Bhandarkar, *gurvāyatana* reminds us of the *devakulas* mentioned in the *Pratimā-nāṭaka* of Bhāsa, which were really the "royal galleries of portrait statues". Bharata, on his way to Ayodhyā, came across one such *deva-kula*, and was told by the person in charge of it that it was not a place of worship, but was a statue-house. The last statue installed there was that of Daśaratha, from which Bharata concluded that his father was dead. The *deva-kulas* of Kuṣāṇa inscriptions were of different character and not meant for housing the royal statues. They were a cluster of devakulas, each commemorating a different Kuṣāṇa ruler, as those found at Māṭ near Mathurā. *Gurvāyatana*, on the other hand, was a shrine meant for installing the *liṅgas* set up in the name and to the memory of the departed *gurus* of a particular lineage.[4]

4. पंचभिर्महापातकै: (line 16)—The final great or major sins are (*i*) killing a Brāhmaṇa, (*ii*) drinking intoxicating liquors, (*iii*) theft, (*iv*) adultery with the wife of a teacher, and (*v*) associating with one guilty of these crimes.[5]

5. उपपातकै: (line 16)—Five secondary or minor sins are (*i*) killing a cow, (*ii*) forgetting the Veda, (*iii*) breaking the vow of chastity, (*iv*) offending a *guru*, and (*v*) selling the Soma plant.

CRITICISM OF SIRCAR'S INTERPRETATION

Sircar says that "Bhandarkar, who prefers full-stop after *kriyate* (line 11) and *ācāryyāṇām* (lines 11-12) and translates *yathākālenācāryāṇām* as "the *aeāryas* for the time being, seems to have misunderstood the meaning of the lines 10-14."[6] Sircar, however, puts a stop after *sambodhanamcha*. But he inserts the future verb *bhaviṣyati* between *parigraha* and *iti*, and gives the interpretation as follows: "......but it is a request and an address to the worshippers of Maheśvara. Knowing that this (*gurvāyatana*, would become) the property (of the Ācāryas) and offer worship. This is the request."[7]

Sircar further says, "It appears to me that Uditācārya built a temple-residence (*gurvāyatana*) for his teacher, Upamitavimala and teacher's teacher, Kapilavimala. Therein he established two *liṅgas* of Śiva. The lower part of the *liṅga*-shaft called Upamiteśvara was so shaped as to represent the figure of Upamita, while that figure of Kapila was made in the lower part of the other *liṅga* called Kapileśvara. Apparently the teachers were represented as bearing a liṅga on the head.[8] It also seems that the *Gurvāyatana* and the *liṅgas* were finished; but the

4. *Ibid.*
5. *Manusmṛti*, XI. 66.
6. *Sel. Ins.*, 1965, p. 278, fn. 7.
7. *IHQ*, 1942, p. 274
8. But, most probably, the sculptures represented the figures of the Ācāryas carved in front of the *liṅgas* as in the sculpture at Kārvān (ancient Kāyārohaṇa or Kāyāvatāra) in Dabhoi *taluka*, Baroda.

teachers Upamita and Kapila were not coming to stay there just then. Uditācārya, therefore, requested the local Śaivas to take charge of them. They were requested to do that without fear, that is to say, fear of molestation and being turned out even when the Ācāryas would come to stay there".[9]

It is obvious that in view of Bhandarkar's note that the *gurvāyatana* was a shrine for installing the memorials of the 'departed' *gurus*, the interpretation of Sircar does not fit in, because, according to it, the Ācāryas are thought to alive and occupy the shrine at some later date. Moreover, there is no reference in the record that the shrine was built by Uditācārya. Had it been so, it would have been clearly mentioned. The use of the word *Gurvāyatane* in the locative merely shows that it was already there and Uditācārya only installed the *liṅgas* in that shrine. The word cannot be taken to signify *Gurvāyatanaṁ nirmāya tata*.

Again Bhandarkar's comparison of the *Gurvāyatana* to the *Devakula* of the Kuṣāṇas found at Māṭ near Mathurā, or to the *Pratimā-gṛhas* in which statues of the dead kings were kept, appears to be more appropriate, particularly when the Kuṣāṇa traditions were alive at that time. In view of this, the insertion of the verb *bhaviṣyati*, as done by Sircar, becomes superfluous and meaningless. Moreover, nobody would dare 'molest' or 'oust', particularly the holy teachers of Uditācārya (if they had been alive, which the record hardly admits), the devout worshippers from that place when they would be performing worship.

In one point we agree with Sircar that Bhandarkar has mistranslated the expression *yathākalena* by 'for the time being', but it appears to be better and more logical to construe it with *pujāpuraskāraṁ... kuryyuḥ*, as we have done, rather than with the imaginary verb *bhaviṣyati* which is not there at all. By making slight stops after *yathākālena* and *matvā*, the passage yields good sense as given in our translation.[10]

DURATION OF THE REIGN OF CANDRAGUPTA II

The present inscription bears the date, the Gupta year 61 (A.D. 380-81), which is the earliest genuine date of the Gupta era. Bhandarkar reads the word *gupta* before the word *kālānuvarttamāna* (line 3), although the facsimile shows no trace of it. The restoration of the *saṁvatsara* to *pañcame* by Sircar[11] shows that the accession of Candragupta II took place in the Gupta year (61—4=)57 or A.D. 376-77. The latest date of his reign as known from the Sañci Railing Stone inscription is the year 93. Thus, the duration of his reign comes to at least (93—57=) 36 years. According to Bhandarkar, the lacuna in line 4 should be filled as *Āṣāḍha-māse* as done in the text above; for, in

9. *IHQ*. 1942, pp. 274-75; also see *Sel. Ins.*; 1965, p. 278, fn. 5.
10. *Vide* my note on this inscription in *JIH*, *XLII*, Part II, pp. 515-17.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

the year A.D. 380, there was an additional intercalary month Āṣāḍha. The word *prathame*, therefore, indicates that the installation of the sculptures took place in the first month of Āṣāḍha.

RELIGIOUS IMPORTANCE OF THE RECORD

In so far as the religious history of the Pāśupata sect of Śaivism is concerned, the record is very important, for it refers to four generations of the Māheśvara *Ācāryas* or Teachers, viz., Parāśara, Kapilavimala, Upamitavimala and Uditācārya. The name Upamita, though lost in the damage, has been restored with certainty. Uditāchārya is mentioned here as tenth in descent from Kuśika (line 5), but the names of only three *Ācāryas* preceding him are given. The five teachers who intervened between Kuśika and Parāśara are altogether omitted. This shows that Kuśika must have been a very eminent Śaiva teacher who, though he might not have founded a new sect or formulated some original doctrine, must have started his own separate line of teachers.

Now, on the strength of a passage, common to the *Vāyu* and *Liṅga* Purāṇas, D. Bhandarkar[12] has shown (i) That Lakulin was the last (?) incarnation of Maheśvara, (ii) that this incarnation took place at Kāyārohaṇa or Kāyāvatāra (*mod.* Kārvān), and (iii) that Kuśika, Garga, Mitra and Kauruṣya were Lakulī's four ascetic disciples. An inscription from the Somanātha temple (now preserved in *Quin ta* of *Don Joao de Castro* at Cintra in Portugal), belonging to the reign of Caulukya Śārṅgadeva[13], gives the same information about Lakulī's disciples in a slightly different order, *viz.*, Kuśika, Gārgya, Kauruṣa and Maiterya. It may be noticed that the name of Kuśika is mentioned first in both the records. From the Cintra *praśasti*, we also learn that these four disciples of Lakulin founded four different lines of Pāśupata teachers, and that Kīrttirāśi. Vālmikirāśi and Tripurāntaka were the three Ācāryas of the line of Gārgya (v. 19), the second pupil of Lakulin. In our present Mathurā inscription, we have the names of the teachers founded by Kuśika, the first disciple of Lakulī.

Now, as the Cintra *praśasti* came from the Somanātha temple in Surāṣṭra and the present inscription from Mathurā, it seems evident that the teachers of the Gārgya line established their headquarters in the Kāṭhiāwāḍ region, and those of Kuśika line settled in Mathurā. In the Purāṇas it is said that Lakulin introduced certain sanctimonious practices involving severe discipline of Pāsupata or Māheśvara Yoga, which were promulgated by his disciples. According to Vedānta, a *yogin* does not die like an ordinary mortal, but passes away by making his breath shoot out through the *Brahma-randhra* (*i.e.*, by bursting the skull), and is then absorbed in Brahman. Similarly, a Pāśupata *yogin* also is said to be absorbed in Maheśvara (Śiva) by the same process of passing away. At

12. *JBBRAS*, XXII, pp. 154 ff.
13. *Ep. Ind.* I, pp. 271 ff.

Kārvān, where Lakulin appeared as the last incarnation of Śiva and then relinquished his mortal frame through Pāśupata Yoga, there are two *lingas* with figures of Lakulin sculptured in front, representing him as absorbed in Śiva. In the same manner, Kapilavimala and Upamitavimala, having released their breath through the *Brahma-randhra*, were honoured with divine of title of *bhagavat* which indicated merger in Śiva. Hence, the sculptures Kapileśvara and Upamiteśvara were not the bare *lingas*, but had the figures of Kapilavimala and Upamitavimala carved in front of them. This alone can explain why all these departed ascetic disciples of Lakulin received the divine title of bhagavat.

Uditācārya, on the other hand, is merely styled as *ārya*, because he was alive and had not yet merged in Śiva. *Ārya*, according to Hema-Candra's *Abhidhānacintāmani*, is a synonym of *prabhu*, 'a master', or 'an owner'. As in the Cintra *praśasti*, Tripurāntaka, the builder of five temples, is called *ārya*, so is Uditācārya called ārya, the owner of the two sculptures raised to his *gurus* in the *Guru-āyatana*.

DATE OF LAKULIN AND HIS SECT

Now, in A.D. 380, Uditācārya belonged to the 10th generation after Kuśika or eleventh in descent from Lakulin. Allowing an average of 25 years for each generation, we get a total of 275 years which must have elapsed between Lakulin and Uditācārya. This gives A.D. (380–275=) 105 as the data of Lakulin, who may have flourished from 105 to 130 A.D.

Lakulīśa Pāśupata sect was one of the important branches of the Pāśupatas which, as distinguished from other branches, believed in the incarnation of Śiva. According to this sect, there were 18 or 28 incarnations of Śiva in different ages, whose names, in the absence of Lakulīśa Pāsupata texts, have to be gathered from inscriptions and literary works like those of Ācārya Haribhadra, Mādhava and Rājaśekhara Sūri. Cintra *praśasti* mentions only five incarnations, Haribhadra and Rājaśekhara enumerate 18, but Viśuddhamuni and the commentator of the works of Rāśikāra give a list of 28 which is entirely different from the former list

The name Lakulīśa or Nakulīśa occurs in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*.[14] In the *Linga Purāṇa*[15], it is stated that Maheśvara told Brahmadeva that he would appear in the incarnation of *Brahmacārin* named Lakulin at the time of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana during the 28th repetition of the *yugas*. Assuming the composition of *Vāyu Purāṇa* in the 4th century A.D., D.R. Bhandarkar places the incarnation of Śiva as Lakulīśa even earlier, i.e., in the first century. If we take the number of the *avatāras* to be 18, then all the subsequent *avatāras* would be complete by the end of the 6th century. But if the number is accepted to be 28, then the last

14. Chapter 23, verse 211, Ānandāśrama Series ed.
15. Chapter 24, verse 129, Calcutta ed.

incarnation took place 700 years after Lakulīśa, and a century at least must have been required for the propagation of the ideas of the sect.

Lakulīśa was a historical person who appeared as a great Śaiva teacher and came to be called Lakulin, because he carried a club in his hand. He conceived a new idea that Lord Śiva was Lakulīśa, *i.e.*, 'the Lord who bears the club', and began to preach this. Subsequently, his followers identified him with god Śiva and, in course of time, he came to be regarded as the incarnation of Śiva. Bhandarkar thinks, "that a person of the name of Lakulin or Lakulīśa founded a Śaiva system corresponding to the Pāñcarātra system which the *Vāyu* and *Liṅga* Purāṇas consider to be contemporaneous with it. The other general name, Pāśupata, arose by dropping the name of the individual Lakulin, and substituting that of the god Paśupati ; whose incarnation he was believed to be, as is done in the texts of the *Mahābhārata*."[16] In iconography, he is represented as a god with two arms holding a club in one of his hands. The base of the pillar, on which this inscription is engraved, contains a three-eyed human figure holding a club in his right hand and an unidentified object in the left shown *akimbo*.

Lakulīśa was a great Śaiva Teacher and his doctrine was very popular and wide-spread, for we find refrences to this sect in inscriptions in the different parts of India in the period between the 10th and 13th centuries.[17]

ABBREVIATIONS

Ep. Ind.	:	Epigraphia Indica.
IHQ	:	Indian Historical Quarterly.
JBBRAS	:	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
PIHC	:	Proceedings of Indian History Congress.

16. *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, p. 120.
17. *PIHC*, 1950, pp. 115 f.

ENGLISH

Bhim Singh

W. B. YEATS ON MODERN POETRY

The Later Yeats, we find, is frequently grouped with Eliot and other modern poets. And a study of his later poetry should, in fact, be made the basis to judge the rightness of Yeats' association with this group. But a study of the critical opinions of Yeats, especially his opinions on modern poetry, does also leave us better equipped in understanding his poetry. And Thomas Parkinson[1] has done a useful service to the readers of Yeats by making a complementary study of Yeats' poetry and his poetics in his first full-length study of this kind. What I propose to do in the present paper is not to seek relevance of his critical opinions to the body of his poetry, but to consider his claim to 'modernity' on the basis of his criticism of the 'modern' poets.

In his Introduction to the *Oxford Book of Modern Verse*, Yeats considers Eliot and Pound to be the chief representatives of the new group of modern poets. And it is Eliot and Pound who are considered by him at greater length than any other of the moderns. It is interesting to study his following remarks on Eliot :—

Eliot has produced his great effect upon his generation because *he has described men and women that get out of bed or into it from mere habit, in describing this life that has lost heart his own art seems grey, cold, dry.* He is an Alexander Pope, working without apparent imagination, producing his effects by a rejection of all rhythms and metaphors used by the more popular romantics rather than by the discovery of his own, this rejection giving his work an unexaggerated plainness that has the effect of novelty. *He has the rhythmical flatness of The Essay on Man*—despite Miss Sitwell's advocacy I see Pope as Blake and Keats saw him—later in The Waste Land, amid much that is moving in symbol and imagery there is much monotony of accent.[2] (italics mine)

I have quoted here at length because the quotation contains in it (more than one), point concerning the poetics of Yeats. Yeats attribures the' 'grey, cold, dry, nature of the Eliot's poetry to his cold and dry subject *i.e.*, the 'life that has lost heart.' Or in other words, Eliot's poetry lacks the qualities of heart *i.e.*, it is not passionate, and it is not so because its subject is not passionate. This reveals a significant point about Yeats' theory of poetry; that he believes, with the romantics, that poetry should be passionate instead of 'grey

1. W.B. Yeats, *The Later Poetry*, University of California Press, 1964.
2. W.B. Yeats, *Selected Criticism*, ed. by A. Norman Jeffares, Macmillan and Co. Ltd. London, 1964 (p. 223-4), which in further references I shall simply be mentioning as S.C.

and dry'. By implication, he also believes that there are certain subjects which are inherently poetic. This idea of the 'Poetic' becomes more clear if we read the following remark of his on the 'moderns' in one of his letters to Dorothy Wellesley:

"...Most of the moderns, Auden, Spender *etc.*, seem thin beside the more sensuous work of the romantics."[3]

It is the same Milton's formula of poetry being 'simple, sensuous and passionate', which the romantics of the 19th century so closely followed, that Yeats is applying to the modern poetry. This idea further gets clarified by his remarks on the Victorian poets. He says in his famous Broadcast on Modern Poetry :

" ....In the Victorian era the most fomous poetry was often a passage in a poem of some length, perhaps of great length, a poem full of thoughts that might have been expressed in prose .. .. Swinburne, Tennyson, Arnold, Browning, had admitted so much psychology, science, moral fervour." (S.C.p. 241)

'Psychology' and 'Science' are considered by Yeats as the subjects of prose and not of poetry. No one can miss here the echo of the romantic voice of the early nineteenth century He deprecates the 'rhythmical flatness' of Eliot's poetry and contrasts it with 'rhythmical animation' or 'emotional richness' of the poetry of 'the more popular romantics.' This clearly places him with the romantics for whom the poetry was not to be 'intellectual' but 'emotional'. Yeats not only contrasts Eliot with the romantics, but also places him with Pope and Dryden :—

"......I think of him as satirist rather than poet." (S C. p. 224).

This at once reminds us of Matthed Arnold, who says of Dryden and Pope in his essay *The Study of Poetry* :—

"Though they may write in verse, though they may in a certain sense be masters of the art of versification, Dryden and Pope are not classics of our poetry, they are classics of our prose."

Satire is considered by Yeats, as by Arnold, a subject fit for prose, and not for poetry, for the emotion behind satire is not 'exalting', and also because satire is more the concern of mind rather than heart. Poetry must be exalting and it must be 'conceived in soul' as true poetry is, so thought Wordsworth and Arnold, and so does Yeats.

But Yeats does not see Eliot or Pope wholly through the eyes of the romantics. He does appreciate some aspects of the satirical poetry of

3. *Letters on Poetry from W.B. Yeats to Dorothy Wellesley*. Oxford University Press, London, 1964 (p. 74), which in further references I shall simply be mentioning as L.

Eliot and his followers :—

"......We older writers were forced to admit its satiric intensity." (S.C.p. 46).

The romantics, along with Arnold, could never appreciate this quality of satirical poetry. 'Intensity', for Yeats is the essential and chief quality of great art. His own later poetry is an evidence to this fact. While discussing Miss Gyles' art in his essay *A Symbolic Artist*, he says:—

"I believe that the best of these drawings will live, and that if Miss Gyles were to draw nothing better, she would still have won a place among the few artists in black and white whose work is of the highest intensity". (S.C. p. 37)

Then there is another aspect of the 18th century poetry that he does not fail to admire. In his *A General Introduction for my Work*, he shows his affiliations with, and great admiration for, the romantics, and his dislike for 18th century poetry, but his personal prejudice does not prevent him from appreciating what is good in the poetry of Dryden ond Pope; and this certainly goes to his credit as critic.

"...........they had one quality I admired and admire; they were not separated individual men, they spoke or tried to speak out of a people to a people, behind them strstched the generations.. ....I wanted to cry as all men cried, to laugh as all men laughed." (S.C. p. 256).

In the 18th century he finds that the poet is still a man speaking to men, the poet is not an isolated man; he is still a man of the crowd. And it is precisily this quality that Yeats finds the modern poet lacking. The modern poet, he finds, is a man with his own world, and has nothing to share with his readers. He is an uncommon man who writes about uncommon experiences and in an uncommon manner. And this is one reason that Yeats disapproves modern poetry for. Talking of Auden and the group of poets associated with him, he remarks,

"The young English poets reject dream and personal emotion ; they have thought out opinions......*they employ an intricate psychology, action in character, not as in the ballads character in action*, and all consider that they have a right to the same close attention that men pay to the mathematician and the mataphysician." [S.C. p. 268 (italics mine)]

Modern poetry did become a specialized field in itself, as the fields of scientific knowledge are specialized in this age. Yeats feels that if literature assumes this character of a specialized field, it defeats it own purpose. Here, perhaps is implied his opinion about the function of literature, which, for him, seems to be to 'please' the common reader. And art to perform this function must necessarily be written in a manner commonly understood by people. It should not be difficult as the modern poetry is,

Yeats writes his views to Dorothy Wellesley on the 'difficult' art of the modern poets :

" ... ..This difficult work, which is being written everywhere now (...) has the substance of philosophy and is a delight to the poet with his professional pattern, but it is not your road or mine, and ours is the main road, the road of naturalness and swiftness and we have thirty centuries on our side. *We alone can think like a wise man, yet express our selves like the common people* These new men are goldsmiths working with a glass screwed into one eye, whereas we stride ahead of the crowd, its swordsmen, its jugglers, looking right and left. 'To right and left' which I mean that we need like Milton, Shakespear, Shelley, vast sentiments, generalization supported by tradition." (L.p.58) (italics mine).

Perhaps, Yeats, since he was an Irishman where the cummunity life was still a reality, might not have known the difficulty of the artist in sharing emotions and beliefs with the common reader which was a major problem for Eliot and Auden But to prove this is not as much important for my present purpose as to show his strong affiliations with the 'traditional' literature of the past (the use of the word 'tradition' is not in the sense Eliot would like to use it) Tradition for Yeats means to write the kind of poetry Homer, Shakespeare and Wordsworth wrote, which for Eliot has quite a different meaning altogether Eliot and Auden concerned themselves with the 'present', the temporal 'present, and rejected the common 'stuff' that had always been the concern of poetry. Yeats takes it to be a departure from the 'tradition' : —

" Here and there some young revolutionist would boast that his eyes were on the present or the future, or even denounce all poetry back to Dante, but we were content, *We wrote as men had always written.*"

(italics mine) (S.C.p. 245)

Eliot and Pound were great revolutionists, and they rejected not only the immediate past, but also a good deal of the 'traditional' past. The tremendous use of psychology in the exploration of character, the analysis of situation done like a surgeon, and the fragmentary form, are some of the qualities of modern poetry that were nevere there in the poetry of the past. Yeats' disliking for novelty 'and 'revolution' is repeatedly expressed by him -

" I must choose a traditional stanza even what I alter must seem traditional *Talk to me of originality and I will turn on you with rage*".

(italics mine) (S.C.p-266).

The demand of 'intensity' and 'passion' repeatedly made on poetry by Yeats implies that poetry must always concern itself with personal experience, for it is the personal experience alone which is intense and

passionate. And Yeats expresses this belief of his in his *A General Introduction for my work* :—

"A poet writes always of his personal life, in his finest work out of its tragedy, whatever it be, remorse, lost love, or mere lonliness,.. ..."

(S.C.p. 254)

And it is precisely this quality which is absent in modern poerty. And it is due to this reason that Eliot's poetry is' grey, cold, dry'. In modern poetry, Yeats finds, that it is not the personal experience that has been made the subject of poetry, but the impersonal material which is to be worked upon by the mind, as it were, on an operation table. The result is that the works of these poets do not contain in them the individual personalities, but an active and analytic mind :—

"Here stands not this or that man but man's naked mind," says Yeats about modern poetry in his Introduction to the Oxford Book of Modern verse. (S.C. p. 235).

He feels that modern poetry is the result of the scientific tendencey among the modern poets, the tendency to employ the mind in a sort of scientific exploration. Impersonal or scientific observation is never the concern of poetry, thinks Yeats. Poetry is the result of an 'exalted' mood for him, as for the group of the romantics in the early 19th century. In 'Discoveries,' praising Shakespeare and Tintoratto, he says,

"Their minds were never quiescent, never, as it were, in a mood for scientific observation, always in exaltation, never.. founded upon an elimination of the personal factor." (S.C. p. 153)

Again he asserts in his essay *First Principles*, that art is purely 'personal,' and never impersonal in the sense modern poetry is :–

Art "in its highest moments is not a deliberate creation, but the creation of intense feeling, of pure life..." (S.C. p. 140)

It is obvious how these statements speak against the practice of the modern poets. Pound and Eliot prefer conscious craftsmanship to revelation of one's personality. Auden considers poetry a 'game'. Yeats thinks it is strongly 'personal'; so much so that even a dramatist, who is generally not expected to talk of personal experience, is to make the material of his work an intense part of his nature. Discussing National Literature in *First Principles* Yeats says,

"If he really achieve the miracle, if he really make all that he has seen and known a portion of his own intense nature, if he puts it all into the fire of his energy, he need not fear being a stranger among his own people in the end." (S.C. p. 144–45).

It is, if we compare, the reverse of the theory of impersonality advanced by Eliot in his famous essay *Tradition and the Individual Talent*,

and the reverse of all that Pound and Auden have to say on this issue. For Yeats, even the out side experience is to be made intensly personal, where as for Eliot and Auden even the personal experience is to be made impersonal. It is Yeats' romanticism that results in the criticism of the contemporaries of his later years. He finds very little to appreciate in these poets. They are, for him, with Dryden and Pope, and not in the great tradition of Homer, Shakespeare, Milton and Wordsworth.

He does not like the revolution in poetry. We have seen how outrightly he condemns it He wholeheartedly sticks to the 'tradition'. Any innovation in art or manners seems to him going against what has been the pride of ages. In his, *Introduction to the Oxford book of Modern Verse*, he deprecates innovations in the poetry of Ezra Pound :

"Ezra Pound has made flux his theme; plot, characterization, logical discourse, seem to him abstractions unsuitable to a man of his generation". (S.C. p. 225).

We know well how the plot is absent in modern literature, irrespective of any particular genre; and how traditional characterization has been replaced by the exploration of the 'psyche' of man; and how time has been exploded, for the modern writers believe that the past and the present exist together in the mind of man Yeats' dislike of these innovations is not so much a matter of dogma as that of a well thought-out poetics. He believes that all great literature is 'popular', it is the property of the common people Therefore, it must contain the qualities of folk literature. We can well feel the echo of Wordsworth in this belief of Yeats; that a poet is 'a man speaking to men'.

Yeats again takes Pound to task for his break with the tradition, and for writing poetry which is not easily understood by people ;

Ezra Pound "is probably the source of that lack of form and consequent, obscurity which is the main defect of Auden, Day Lewis and their school". (S.C. p. 227)

Yeats' poetry is an evidence of his faithful adherence to traditional forms in poetry He, perhaps, could never concieve a poem without form. And obscurity he can never forgive, for it goes against the fundamental prciple of art; that it is to be simple :

"I feel that one's verse must be as direct and natural as spoken words." (L. p. 107)

His passion for Ireland, folk literature, national theatre and poetic drama clearly indicate his idea of the 'popular' literature. His being traditional in the ordinary sense of the word should be attributed to his being an Irishman, for Ireland was still, if not more, a century behind England.

There is no doubt that Yeats shares many things with the modern writers; for example, his concern with anthropological myth, the preoccupation with history, the natural syntax and diction, the reaction against the idea of progress etc., but most of these things have nothing to do with the poetics as such. On the other hand, this is an indication of Yeats having a receptive mind who remained alive to the changing times. So far as his poetics is concerned, he remains in the tradition of the great romantics, Blake, Wordsworth, Keats and Shelley. And it is not for nothing that he called himself one of the last romantics.

K.K. Shukla

"THE WASTE LAND": A STUDY IN POETIC TECHNIQUE

Eliot was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in November 1948. The citation takes special note of the "trail-blazing"[1] quality of his poetry. The eulogy is immensely significant, inasmuch as the phrase is an apt expressionistic description of Eliot's highly individualistic technique. Although the distinctive merits of his work were recognized after an arduous length of thirty years, the characteristic technical innvoation was made manifest from the very beginning. THE LOVE SONG OF J. ALFRED PRUFROCK, written in his undergraduate year at Harvard can be cited as an example. Nevertheless, he reached the fulness of his poetic expression in *The Waste Land* in 1922. The tone of flippancy, so obvious in most of his early poems, is now replaced by alienation and despair. The chastened world—sorrow of the poet at the ignoble sordidness and all-pervasive depravity lends a poignant note to his philosophical reflectiveness. Moreover, in conformity with the vastness of his design, the luminous symbols depicting the sterile universal desolation, have been chosen from the widest imaginable cultural spectrum. It is quite obvious that these symbols cannot be welded into a compact whole by any logic of concept. Consequently, to the uninitiated especially, *The Waste Land* quite often appears as a piece of pedantic mumbo jumbo.

I

Without any desire to raise the ghost of controversy, whose prolonged and bitter fumes have hung so far in the air; it may be suggested that Eliot's technique in the poem can be likened to the mechanism of a brilliant neon sign, whose characters are lit up one after the other in lineal sequence. There are obvious gaps in between the characters of the sign. But together they constitute a meaningful pattern when they are illuminated by a wiry network installed at their back. Eliot's richly nourished and wide-ranging faculty chooses a symbol and after charging it with the harmonizing energy of the framework, it moves on to the next one for a comparable treatment. The effect of his modus operandi is analogous to the confusion created in Belshazzar's banqueting-room when MENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHARSIN[2] appeared on the wall. The mysterious words were "Divinely formed, and only Daniel, under Divine direction could understand them."[3] The 'divine direction' in the case of Eliot is

1. Quoted by Louis Untermeyer, *Modern American Poetry* (New York, 1950), p. 397.
2. Daniel 5: 25
3. William Nicholson, *The Bible Student's Companion* (London), p. 594.

logic of imagination. Like invisible electric current of the hypothetical neon sign it animates and unifies his apparently unrelated poetic symbols.

II

The Waste Land constitutes an important landmark in the spiritual pilgrimage of the poet. Beginning as a Neo-Humanist, he adopted quite early in his life the aesthetics of Poe, Emerson and Henry James. His growing belief in pre-Christian ritualistic cultures is amply demonstrated by his choice of symbols in the poems. Because of their universal connotation, the theme of The Waste Land is not of a nation but of all nations; not of a man but of Man. The Fall that began in the Garden of Eden becomes a fait accompli in the desolation of The Waste Land. Because of the cosmic dimensions of the poem, it may be proposed that if Paradise Lost is an epic in empyrean breadth, the Waste Land is its inevitable sequel in psychic depth. If the first can be called the prologue of human history, only a few will hesitate to name the second as its epilogue. This conviction gets a firmer hold on the mind when we realize that The Waste Land delineates, in the main, "the present decay of Eastern Europe——the birth place of all the religions of the ancient worlds."[4]

Obviously Eliot had assumed a prodigious responsibility. But his shoulders were not frail. On the contrary, he was pre-eminently fit to accomplish his mission. His broad-based philosophical susceptibility needed only a technique whose amplitude of range could comprehend the desolate architecture of the world. The neat filigree work of Amy Lowell and her Imagist friends could not provide a befitting medium.[5] The harp of the bard of democracy. Whitman, was a little too ponderous. When the native traditions did not help him, he looked abroad and found his masters in the Jacobean metaphysical poets and the French symbolists. His temperamental affinity with these schools can be seen in his muscular intellectuality, lightning flashes of perception and dynamic flow of thoughts. It should, however, be stressed that in The Waste Land, the influence of Tristan Corbière, Jules Laforgue and even of Arthur Rimbaud is not so direct as it can be seen in his preceding two volumes. A witty playful flippancy and subtle irony in the conversational tone characterise almost all of his early poems. For these attributes Eliot is directly indebted to the poets like Laforgue, Corbière, Cros and Rollinat, who for their instinct of defiant rebellion were close allies of Rimbaud. They constituted the inner core of the radical group of the Symbolists. Their poems, especially of Laforgue are deeply pessimistic, full of self-mockery and sarcastic criticism of life. Eliot made an ample use of them in his poems upto 1920. He had, however, to renounce their bitter flavour in The Waste Land. Its use in the overall sombre pattern of the poem would

4. Elizabeth Drew, *T. S. Eliot : The Design of His Poetry* (London, 1954), pp. 111-112.

5. 'Hysteria', 'Aunt Helen' 'Cousin Nancy' and 'Le Directeur' seem to have been written in accordance with the Imagist formulae.

have brought in an incongruous element. Therefore, in consonance with the thematic requirements, he had to abjure his needle-sharp attitude of mockery and sneer. Their elimination has brought about an admirable uniformity of tone, and, in the present form, a far too grave spirit permeates the entire framework of The Waste Land. The perceptible change in the tone and outlook dissociates Eliot from the 'official' or the radical group of the French symbolists. He seems to have crossed the floor and pledged his allegience either to the École Romane—the late classicists of the symbolist movement, or, more probably to the Parnassians like Baudelaire, Verlaine and Mallarmé. In his notes on The Waste Land, Eliot had made three distinct allusions to the works of Baudelaire and Verlaine, while no reference whatsoever has been made to Laforgue and his coterie. The remakable simililarity between the poetic techique of Eliot, and Baudelaire and, Mallarmé strengthens this belief far more firmly. Long before, Baudelaire in his poem "Correspondances" had observed:

> Comme de longs échos qui de loin se confondent,
> Dans une ténébreuse et profonde unité,
> Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté,
> Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se repondent.

Similarly, Mallarmé felt that :

> The poet's idiom should be his own creation, and free from all fossilized patterns of expression. The most severe economy and compression would ensure the greatest wealth of content, and the more indirect the utterance, the stronger its mental stimulus. Explicit logic and syntax had to go, if the repeated shocks of broken construction are to rouse and reward attention. Things must be hinted, not said, and suggestion must be the standard method.[6]

Nevertheless, it would be unwise to presume that in search for a more befitting medium, Eliot lost the characteristic finesse of the Symbolist school. The key-board of his piano was cast in the moulds of the same foundry. Its workmanship stands guaranteed under the original patent. Only the maestro is using a different set of stops. Like the distinguished precursors of the Symbolist Movement, Eliot in The Waste Land has succeeded in freeing poetry from the tyranny of conventional form. He does not repudiate the objective method of presentation, but endeavours to give his images of externality a spiritual and symbolic value. He never gives a description for its own sake. Instead of literal directness of the Imagists, he enriches his descriptions with a rare suggestive indirectness.

> I think we are in rats' alley.
> Where the dead men lost their bones.[7] (p. 57, ll.115-16)

6. L. Cazamian, *A History of French Literature* (O.U.P., 1960), p. 388.
7. This and all the subsequent references to the text of the poem are to *T.S. Eliot : Collected Poems 1909-1962* (New York, 1963).

III

Nine years after the publication of The Waste Land, Eliot brought out a translation of *Anabasis*, a poem in French by St.-John Perse. In his preface to this edition, Eliot makes a few invaluable observations on the technique of his French compeer :

(a) ......any obscurity of the poem, on first readings, is due to the suppression of 'links in the chain', of explanatory and connecting matter, and not to incoherence, or to the love of cryptogram. The justification of such abbreviation of method is that the sequence of images coincides and concentrates into one intense impression of barbaric civilization. The reader has to allow the images to fall into his memory successively without questioning the reasonableness of each at the moment, so that, at the end, a total effect is produced.

(b) I was not convinced of Mr. Perse's imaginative order until I had read the poem five or six times. And if, as I suggest, such an arrangement of imagery requires just as much 'fundamental brainwork' as the arrangement of an argument, it is to be expected that the reader of a poem should take at least as much trouble as a barrister reading an important decision on a complicated case.

The two pronouncements provide the key to his esoteric code, the 'open sesame' of Eliot's techique. Almost a decade is gone by and the howls of fury that greeted the publication of The Waste Land in 1922 have also lapsed into silence. He allowed the dust to settle down and then through the art of a fellow craftsman, Eliot seems to be expounding his own technique He expostulates with the reader not to give up his hands in despair, because of the so-called obscurity of the 'links in the chain,......' He persuades us to believe that there is no incoherence in the poem and that it should not be taken as the chief exhibit of his 'love of cryptogram'. He also provides us with a 'justification' for using such a technique. In his anxiety to help the reader out of the wood, Eliot urges the imaginative reader to discipline his mind until the end is reached. Such co-operation, he seems to urge, is necessary for receiving the 'total effect.' No doubt the reader has to reconstruct the 'fundamental brainwork of the poem all by himself; and, in doing so, he may have to read the poem 'five or six times'. Eliot reminds us that he himself had to read *Anabasis* so many times before he was convinced of Perse's imaginative order.

Like a lady of the old pioneering days in America, the Waste Land displays a "tough reasonableness beneath the slight lyric grace"; and to appreciate the imaginative order of the poet, repeated readings, especially

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8. St.-J. Perse, *Anabasis* translated by T.S. Eliot (London, 1959), pp. 9-10.

of terse passages, are absolutely indispensable. This can be evidenced from a passage in "The Fire Sermon".

> At the violet hour, the evening hour that strives
> Homeward, and brings the sailor home from sea
> The typist home at teatime clears her breakfast, lights
> Her stove, and lays out food in tins
> Out of the window periolously spread
> Her drying combinations touched by the sun's last rays, . .[9].

It would be noticed that 'links in the chain' have been suppressed in these lines. The first two depict a situation whose continuity seems to have been snapped at the world 'sea' at the end of the second line. The last four lines fail to disclose their congruity with the preceding scene in the first two lines. There is a noticeable hiatus between these two transcripts, as if the intervening reel had been scrupulously scissored off. The first reading of the passage, in all likehood, may not succeed in locating the bridge of compatibility spanning over them. Repeated endeavours are likely to focus our attention on the violet hour of evening and dramatis personae of the two scenes. We note that the typist has come home and it is late in the afternoon. Further, it is the same hour when in the days gone by sailors used to come back from their thrilling adventures. Gradually we may realize that the word 'home' in the third line needs to be linked up with 'homeward' in the second line. These are the two pillars. The section of the bridge that rested on them seems to have been pulled down and the reader's mind, like a stupefied sheep looks before and after and pines for what is not. The timid sheep is scared by the yawning gulf before it. She cannot prosecute her homeward journey with the typist until such time as her own ingenuity can improvise a plank over the naked columns of HOMEWARD and HOME. Likewise, the repeated readings may not fail to reveal that two areas of human history – ancient and modern, have been closely juxtaposed in these lines. A closer look will bring to light that the contrast is operative on more than one level. In the first instance, there is a temporal contrast between antiquity and contemporaneity. Secondly, there is a professional contrast between valiant sailors coming home from the thrills and wonders at the sea and the morally apathetic girl typist washing and hanging her soiled combinations. But the most significant contrast is perhaps on the psychological level. The exhilirating adventures of sailors from the seas returning make life worth living for some ideal. The drab routine of typist's evening rounded off with a soulless sexual dalliance accentuates the purposelessness and the futility of our days. Thus the typist "illustrates Eliot's device of syntactic condensation......She exemplifies the metamorphic flow of things in the poem".[10] Eliot's poetic syntax

9 *Collected Poems* p. 61. ll 220-225.

10 George Williamson, *A Reader's Guide to T.S. Eliot* (London, 1955), p. 142.

constantly fuses together such disparate experiences. But the range of implicit contrasts and the galvanizing poetic brilliance that radiates from them may not flash on the impatient mind. In its quest for poetic material, Eliot' sensibility roams wide in the field and like a playful child it picks up every sparkling knic-knack that catches its eye. But it will show its rare finds only after closer cordial relations have been established between us. Thus aside from its multi-level ironic contrasts, the typist passage abounds in literary echoes, which like the long-reverberating echoes of Baudelaire mingle in the far horizon. These echoes lure us away to the Hesperus of Sappho and

> Home is the sailor, home from the sea
> And the hunter home from the hill.

of Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-1894)......, the lines from his "Requiem" which are now carved as an epitaph on his grave is Samoa. Yet another echo decoys the mind to the "Ode to a Nightingale" of John Keats (1795-1821). It throws into relief a subtler level of ironic contrast. The song of the 'immortal bird' reminds the romantic poet of enchanted castle of medieval age where a distressed damsel imprisoned in it is brooding over her sorry plight. At the warbling of the nightingale she rushes to the

> *Charmed magic casements*, opening on the foam
> *Of perilous seas*, in faery lands forlorn.

Eliot makes use of these lines of Keats, especially of the portions in italics. But the abrupt allusion to these lines in the typist passage

> Out of the window perilously spread
> Her drying combinations touched by the sun's last rays

brings out in a sharp outline the repulsiveness of the present times at the 'romantic' hour of evening—'touched by the sun's last rays. By an astute manoeuvre, Eliot is perhaps making a ghastly parody of one of the purple patches of romantic poetry. However it may be, he is a pastmaster in the art of ironic parallelism and is constantly blending the coarse with the elegant. The juxtaposition of the cherished literary fragments with unsavoury sordidness results in a startling brilliance. The shock of broken construction, as counselled by Mallarmé, rouses the mind ; and as it necessarily ferments an incomparable tang of its own, ironic parallelism is one of the recurring devices of T.S. Eliot in The Waste Land.

A little later the carbuncular young man and the girl typist are seen indulging in sexual merriment. After their carnal desires are gratified, the profligate philanderer bestows one final patronizing kiss on the girl. Sketching her in a few rapid strokes, the poet borrows a line from the song of Olivia in *The Vicar of Wakefield* by Goldsmith and jolts us into a

rude awakening by disclosing to us the meaninglessness of the loss of chastity today.

> Well now that's done : and I'm glad it's over
> *When lovely woman stoops to folly* and
> paces about her room again, alone,
> She smoothes her hair with autometic hand
> And puts a record on the gramophone.

The poem, thus, abounds with subtle intimations, and the agile brilliance of the poet's technique will be relished only after they have been properly chewed and digested. He avoids the profuse details of ballad poetry and leaves the joy of discovery to the responsive mind of his audience.

IV

The energising irony of the contrasts, however, is not the exclusive aim of all the literary fragments used in the poem. For example, in the concluding verse paragraph (ll. 424–34) no less than half a dozen snatches have been jazzed up. They have a syncopated rhythm about them. At first the bewildered reader looks at the jumbled medley with mounting despair. The impact on the mind is similar to the impression gained from the audition of pastiche compositions of Italian music. After the unflagging perseverance has established a pattern of meaning of the passage, a further scrutiny will reveal that its whole structure is bound together by the kinetics of parallel situations. The customary irony of the contrastive parallelism is for once held in abeyance. On the contrary the fragments which the Fisher King has shored against his memory serve the dual purpose of advancing the narrative and intensifying the emotive warmth of the situation. Under the contrastive scheme, as for example in the typist passage analysed above, only one literary fragment is used at a time. The relevant context of the fragment sheds a new light on it. A new dimension is added to its poetic substance and the 'figure in the carpet' takes on a signification wider than its previous import. The whole gains by the part and the part is illuminated by its placement in the vortex of the whole. In the montage pattern, a handful of jewel-like glowing phrases are heaped together which defy easy patterning. None of them is individually counterpoised against any other. Each component opens a new vista enriching the basic theme by its load of associations and the aroma of the parent atmosphere trailing close behind it. Therefore, in essence, the pastiche technique of the poet is an obvious extension of the device used in contrastive parallelism, though the enrichment of emotional state is accomplished here at the expense of clarity. The obscurity, in part, is attributable to the far-ramifying implications of the chain of allusions . and the whole passage at first sight at least, appears as abstruse as an abracadabra or a proposition in Nuclear Physics on the constituents of atom. The use of polyglot at this stage makes the confusion far more overwhelming. Stupefied by the fumes of rising obscurity the logic of

concept cannot set the 'lands in order'. The bridges of compatibility are 'falling down, falling down, falling down'. Even the logic of imagination, stunned by the successive blows rained on it, is laid low 'Like a patient etherised upon a table'. Whatever the apology and justification the scholars may put up in defence of Eliot's use of outlandish quotations, there is no gainsaying the fact that their lavish admixture fails to elicit our total poetic response to the last verse paragraph. Even half a dozen readings of such a passage as suggested by Eliot in the preface to *Anabasis* do not help the reader in reconstructing the poet's complete 'fundamental brain-work'.

Edmund Wilson is inclined to think that though this cargo of erudition would be enough to sink any writer, Eliot

> ...succeeds in *conveying his meanings*, in communicating his emotions, *in spite of all his learned or mysterious allusions, and whether we understand them or not.*[11]

While no one can question the validity of most of Wilson's observations on T.S. Eliot, the relevance of the portions in italics to the last verse paragraph of the poem evokes a few comments. The lines are reproduced below :

I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me
Shall I at least set my lands in order
London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down
Poi s' ascose nel foco che gli affina
Quando fiam uti chelidon—O swallow swallow
Le Prince d' Aquitaine á la tour abolie
These fragments I have shored against my ruins
Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata. Shantih Shantih Shantih.[12]

The rapid and seemingly unrelated images do not fail to elicit an emotional response. But it is achieved at the expense of logical progression. The verses are doubtless a classic example of polyglot-cum-montage technique, and of necessity, therefore, objective logic does not succeed in linking together what has indignantly been decried sometimes as erudite gibberish or "poetic rag-bag'. The reader is affected by the accelerated pace at which each oddment, like a smart cadet turning out for a march-past, neatly falls in its place. But the accumulating echoes and the play of cultural associations leave him gaping with astonishment. The shreds of memory recalled by the Fisher King to restore peace are like the troops of the U.N. Security Forces drawn from different lands. As each contingent is speaking its own language, despite their concerted action and

11. Edmund Wilson, *Axel's Castle* (New York, 1959), p. 111.
12. *Collected Poems* : p. 69, ll. 424-434

common endeavour, the resultant unintelligibility is somewhat similar to the confusion that prevailed when the infamous Tower of Babel was under construction. What Eliot succeeds in conveying to the reader is not 'his meanings' of the fragments used by him, but, at best, the emotional imbalance in the ruminations of the Fisher King. The precipitous break-down of the communication recalls to our mind Eliot's words in "East Coker":

> That was a way of putting it—not very satisfactory:
> A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion,
> Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle
> With words and meanings. The poetry does not matter[13]

Impressionistically, Eliot's poetry is a study of metallic glint in the intensity of emotions. The corpus of his poetry amply substantiates the assumption that he preferred the dry hard precision of a poet like Marvell to the mistiness of say William Morris. At times he has assembled together many images which are endued with high emotional tensility. The obscurity which envelops such passages cannot be easily illuminated even by the fluidity of conscious memory. In the concluding verses of The Waste Land, the obscurity is further deepened by the use of an inter-national idiom, which sounds like a new-fangled esperanto. It seems to be the specific Poundian pyrotechnics, because Eliot, except in epigraphs, has not used it in any poem before The Waste Land. Pound exerted an enormous influence on the struggling writers of his time and became a legend in his own life. Like many artists of his age, Eliot also looked to him for technical virtuosity. In its original form The Waste Land

> Was nearly twice as long.
> Ezra Pound reduced it to its present form[14]

The mentor's lancet probed wide and deep. He pared away all that was inessential, and to most of us today it is well-nigh impossible to determine his share in the residuum. Eliot has acknowledged this debt in the dedication,

> For Ezra Pound
> il miglior fabbro.

It is thus evident that The Waste Land is a joint product of two of the greatest minds of our time and it is difficult to apportion its obscurity which is legitimately attributable to them severally. About Pound, Professor Hughes observes:

> To say that it is a difficult technique for most readers is to put the matter mildly. It is so complex that only an adept can appreciate it. By comparison, the darkest Browning poem is crystal clear. For

13 *Collected Poems*, p. 184

14 Williamson: p. 119.

Browning after all, did stop occasionally to elucidate. Pound scorns doing so.[15]

Eliot did not scorn to do so. In fact, The Waste Land is his only annotated poem. The version emerging after the Caesarian Section performed by Pound necessitated extraneous aid to comprehension. Although the notes are not of much help to the reader in unwinding the skein of poet's thought, their appendage provides a psychological clue to Eliot's anxiety over the obstacles caused by the poem's present form.

V

The polyglot-cum-montage technique adverted to in the preceding section has not been used extensively in the poem. It is highly localized. On the other hand, the ubiquity of temporal blend pervades the entire framework of the poem. Contemporaneity and antiquity alternate with uniform regularity and the transitions from one to the other never fail in yielding a high degree of unanalysable aesthetic pleasure. An attentive mind cannot but be impressed by the uncanny agility of the poet's roving fancy; and while one is still entangled in the coil of wonderment at any of the numerous blends, the poem meanders onward in its winding course. The two elements of time impart a firm foundation to the superstructure and like the intertwining pair of serpents of caduceus are essential to the compactness of The Waste Land. Their conjunction enables the poet to transcend the barriers of time and space. In this boundlessness, sweet Thames of Spenser's Prothalamion is presently metamorphosed into the water of Leman, and seated on the burnished throne of Cleopatra, Lady of Situations can use the cosmetics of Pope's Belinda. Similarly Miranda's Ferdinand can hobnob with demobbed Albert's companions in one of the 'saw dust restaurents' of London; and London Bridge can be erected at the command of Eliot's technique in the close vicinity of the Ganga or anywhere in the kingdom of Hezekiah. But, however amazing the celerity with which the geography of our terra firma is dislocated or its anthropology is ransacked, it does not hamper in any way the even tenor of the poem. Despite the rapid changes in the kaleidoscope the unsullied drift of the poem is preserved right upto the end. The pensive note struck with 'April is the cruellest month' is sustained throughout the four hundred and thirty-four lines. It has been made possible by the novelists' technique of stream of consciousness as applied to the anima of human race. The poem moves back and forth in time and space as in the television technique of Arthur Miller. Such flights of fancy are not arbitrary. They are regulated by a circumambient mythical synthesis. The fertility myths, vegetation ceremonies and mystery cults of antiquity whose fascinating accounts are embodied in the monumental work of Frazer and Miss Weston's *From Ritual To Romance* have provided the basic framework of the poem. The significance of water in these rituals links them to the Tarot pack of cards, the archetypal resurrection story of

15. Glenn Hughes, *Imagism and The Imagists* (New York, 1960), p. 242.

the Fisher King, legend of the Holy Grail, Christianity, Shakespeare's *Tempest*, Baudelaire's Paris, modern London, Fire Sermon of Buddha and the three offspring of the Prajapati. The 'collective mind' of the human race and the 'gyres' of our history are but a tiny fragment in the flux and continuum of Time and though it sounds paradoxical, the blind Tiresias can 'see' through them all because he stands

> At the still point of the turning world neither flesh nor fleshless
> Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
> But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity
> Where past and future are gathered.[16]

In his note on Tiresias, Eliot has mentioned that although he is a mere spectator in The Waste Land, Tiresias is yet the most important personage. Elucidating the mythical synthesis which culminates in him, Eliot's note further states :

> Just as the one-eyed merchant, seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician Sailor, and the latter is not wholly distinct from Ferdinand Prince of Naples, so all the women are one woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias.[17]

Tiresias is thus the crowning example of mythical synthesis as observable in the characters of the poem. The other three areas where the subtle manipulation of this technique is equally competent are time, space and theme. Substantiating examples of various syntheses can be adduced from almost anywhere in the poem. However, perhaps the most splendid of them all can be found in Eliot's use of the Parable of Thunder[18] from the Sanskrit scriptures. In this instance also, the original fable has undergone a radical transformation, though, as usual, the source material has been refashioned in order to fulfil the requirements of the basic unity of theme. His note on line number 402 reads as under .—

> 'Datta, dayadhvam, damyata' (Give, Sympathise, (Control .
> The fable of the meaning of the Thunder is found in the
> Brihadaranyaka—Upanishad, 5, 1. A translation is found in
> Deussen's Sechzig Upanishads des Veda, p. 489.[19]

This reference is incorrect inasmuch as 'the fable' is given in Adhyaya 5, Brahmana II as against '5, 1' mentioned in the Notes. The three relevant mantras with their English translation are given below :—

> त्रयाः प्राजापत्याः प्रजापतौ पितरि ब्रह्मचर्यमूषुर्देवा मनुष्या असुरा
> उषित्वा ब्रह्मचर्यं देवा ऊचुर्ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति तेभ्यो
> हैतदक्षरमुवाच द इति व्यज्ञासिष्टा३ इति व्यज्ञासिष्मेति
> होचुर्दाम्यतेति न आत्थेत्योमिति होवाच व्यज्ञासिष्टेति ॥१॥

16. *Collected Poems* : 'Burnt Norton', p. 177.
17. *Collected Poems* : Notes on The Waste Land, p. 72.
18. *Collected Poems* . pp. 68-69, ll. 396-422.
19. *Collected Poems* : Notes on 'The Waste Land', p. 75.

अथ हैनं मनुष्या ऊचुर्ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति तेभ्यो
हैतदेवाक्षर मुवाच द इति व्यज्ञासिष्टा ३
इति व्यज्ञासिष्मेति होचुर्दत्तेति न आत्थेत्योमिति
होवाच व्यज्ञासिष्टेति ॥ २ ॥
अथ हैनमसुरा ऊचुर्ब्रवीत नो भवानिति तेभ्यो
हैतदेवाक्षर मुवाच द इति व्यज्ञासिष्टा ३ इति
व्यज्ञासिष्मेति होचुर्दयध्वमिति न आत्थेत्योमिति
होवाच व्यज्ञासिष्टेति तदेतदेवैषा दैवी
वागनुवदति स्तनयित्नुर्द द द इति दाम्यत दत्त
दयध्वमिति तदेत त्रयं शिक्षेद्दमं दानं दयामिति ॥३॥

TRANSLATION

After completing their term of studentship, angels, human beings and demons approached their progenitor, the Prajapati Brahma and supplicated Him to instruct them about their respective duties. The angles said : "Venerable sir, be pleased to instruct us". The Lord gave them the single syllable Da and asked them if they all had understood it. The angels replied, "We have understood it". "Restrain your desires and be humble"—DAMYATA, so you have instructed us. To this Brahma replied approvingly that they had all understood His instruction.

Thereafter the human beings supplicated Lord Brahma for instruction. To them also He gave the same syllable DA and asked them if they all had understood it. They replied, "we have understood it". "Offer gifts and be charitable"—DATTA, so you told us. To this Brahma replied approvingly that they had all understood His instruction.

Thereafter the demons supplicated Lord Brahma for instruction. He gave the same syllable Da to them and asked them if they all had understood it. They said : "We have understood it; 'have clemency and be mercifull—DAYADHAVAM, so you told us". To this Brahma replied approvingly that they had all understood His instruction. Thus the thunder repeats Brahma's instruction DA DA DA which means

Be Humble (Damyata)
Be Charitable (Datta)
Be Merciful (Dayadhvam)

Therefore let everyone practice these three cardinal virtues of Humility, Charity and Mercy. These virtues are to be practised by all living beings in order to attain Nirvana.

Eliot has been led to the concept of Nirvana and the method of its attainment as enunciated in the Upanishad by the peculiar spiritual needs

20. *Brihadāranyak-Upanishad*, V Adhyā, II Brāhmaṇa, Mantrās 1-3, pp. 266 629 (Union Press Allahabad, 1933).

of the protagonist in the Chapel Perilous. The evolution of the poem up to the Fable of Thunder makes it abundanty clear that Eliot's technique is capable of harmonizing the irreconcilable elements of Christianity and paganism. Once more the inexplicable brilliance of the technique is manifested to us by the swift change of focus—temporal as well as spatial, from the rocky terrain of Chapel Perilous to the holy banks of the Ganga. The transition is effected so smoothly as if the mind were transported by means of a dangling trolly run along the overhead steel cables.

What however is not a little disconcerting to a certain section of his audience is Eliot's amputation of the Upanishadic myth in The Waste Land. From a comparison of the Sanskrit text with the poet's version, it is evident that the fable has suffered an enormous change. Obviously, Eliot has used his poetic licence somewhat quite freely; and, as a result of his surgery, the rehash has lost quite a few distinctive features of the original. Thus he does not mention the threefold offspring of the Prajapati, nor does he name Brahma as the preacher of the doctrines of Control, Charity and Clemency to the Devas, the human beings and the Asuras respectively. The poet's version does not indicate that DA DA DA are the key-questions of the catechism or that it was the syllable which was later taken up by the god of thunder. It is also true that the poem does not record the minutiae of the dialogue exchanged between Lord Brahma and his disciples. But, inspite of these eliminations, which are more or less insignificant, it may be emphasized that the basic merits and overall poetic excellence of the original have been strenuously preserved in Eliot's rendition. The concluding part of the third Mantra epitomises the moral substance of the fable and by investing this core with a rare poetic excellence, he provides us with a fascinating illustration of thematic mythical synthesis. The Sanskrit fable has only a local habitation and a name: the poet's ingenuity has added to it a setting which is unique in its magnificence.

> Ganga was sunken, and the limp leaves
> Waited for rain, while the black clouds
> Gathered far distant, over Himavant
> The jungle crouched, humped in silence
> Then spoke the thunder[21]

The lines reproduced above illustrate Eliot's severe economy of expression. The first clause relating to the Ganga depicts the tenuous rill of the river. The limp leaves, thereafter, betoken the barrenness and moribund state of vegetation. Rich in its suggestiveness, the first line, besides presenting the picture of a drought-stricken and desolate landscape takes on yet another level of meaning from its context. The shrunken stream of the holy Ganga and withering flora of The Waste Land signify the loss of spiritual values and moral degeneration, yet the close proximity of the holy water holds out the promise of spiritual rebirth within the

21. *Collected Poems* : p. 68, ll. 396-400.

reach of man's endeavour. After delineating the land and waterscape of The Waste Land our eyes are directed towards the horizon where rain-laden clouds are piling up in the offing. The delinquent inhabitants of The Waste Land—Mrs. Equitone, Lady of the Situation, Mrs. Porter and her daughter, the typist, Sweeney and Mr. Eugenides, the carbuncular young man and the 'loitering heirs of City directors', are languishing because the spectre of spiritual-drought is stalking the land. Like Gerontion they need a warm rain of faith for their spiritual rejuvenation. The clouds of hope are gathering up in the high heaven but the hope of salvation is still 'far distant', because they have yet to be sanctified by the practice of charity, clemency and control. The tantalizing cumulus of clouds is tinged with blackness because of their despair and despondency. Himavant, besides providing the precise locus to the Sanskrit fable is charged with the rich overtones of Vedic music which comes out in fuller volume if the word is read with 'Ganga' and 'jungle'. Literally, Himavant means the abode of snow. Its lofty situation and rarefied atmosphere suggest serenity of 'The Peace which passeth our understanding'. It is the crowning reward as well as the exalted goal of a virtuous soul. The Fisher King, who is archetypal representative of the sick and suffering humanity, is striving for its attainment. He is 'the man with three staves' in the Tarot pack of cards of Madame Sosostris. These three staves are the three fold disciplines which Lord Brahma has exhorted his disciples to practise. At the end of the poem the Fisher King is seen sitting upon the shore/ Fishing .... ' Fish is the symbol of Christ and salvation which is equivalent to Nirvana. When the Fisher King succeeds in fishing, he will attain the serenity of Himavant. In the fourth line, an awe-inspiring elemental hush falls on the jungle. This word—Jungle, together with 'Ganga' and 'Himavant' helps us further in identifying the Indianness of the setting. The jungle like a primordial monster is overwhelmed be the oppressive lull which precedes the storm rumbling in the distance. By using its animal instinct it learns the nature of the impending thunder-storm and as it stoops and crouches for safety, its audacious hump rises before our mind's eye. For the image of the beast presented in the fourth line, Eliot has used a bare total of only two words in number—'crouched' and 'humped'. But the expressional compression of the image does not fail to impart austere precision to its delineation. Furthermore, it may be noted that 'Himavant' and 'the jungle' provide the necessary backdrop to the crouching leviathan which dominates the foreground of the picture. Besides performing the dual function—(a) of being animated into a beast, and (b) of providing a natural setting to it; symbolically, the jungle signifies the wild profusion of distracting impulses. The 'awful daring of a moment's surrender' begets 'fear in a handful of dust' and the 'blood-shaking' heart of the protagonist crouches in fear like an ungainly beast at the approaching ordeal. Similarly, the silence that befalls the jungle signifies the prayerful stillness of the soul thirsting for divine knowledge and self-realization. It is the moment of inexorable baptism by fire which

precedes the beatific vision; the moment of 'death in life' before the Fisher King can set his 'lands in order'.

Thus these five lines of the poem, like many others, belong to the class of the truly excellent. They have a unique vigour and freshness. Their union of simplicity and greatness, which is the hallmark of world's great poetry, provides an apt setting to the lofty ideals expounded by Lord Brahma. The fable consequently gains in poetic stature at the hands of Eliot and we marvel at the protean ease of the poet's technique as it reshapes the prosaic convocation address of the venerable Hindu Lord of Creation into a poetry of high intrinsic worth.

M. R. Tewari

THE THEME OF 'HYPERION'

The amorous encounter between the Lady and the Knight at arms in *La Belle Dame Sans Merci* faithfully reflects the nature of the inner strife which was tearing up Keats's being. The poet had probably realised the dangers inherent in his personal situation. His inveterate love for sensuous things of life, symbolised by the Knight at arms's lingering infatuation for *La Belle Dame* even after the horrible dream, points to the obsession, which Keats knew, might foil his aspiration for nobler deeds. But the poem does not give any idea to the reader of the majestic import of the issues involved, nor of their magnitude. It was in *Hyperion* that Keats dealt with this part of the story. *La Belle Dame* was of the nature of a pleasant dream which had the tendency to get converted into the intense horror of a nightmare. This contrary nature of his experience induced Keats to think a great deal more than the generality of poets do, and this pondering helped him to analyse the nature of this nightmare and its deeper implications. From about this time, therefore, Keats is seen to be more seriously cultivating his reflective faculties The dreams that he had dreamt however stayed with him if only to prove the extent of his constancy to old attachments. All this is thrown into bold relief in his poetry of the year 1819 which records the splendid effort he made to loosen the chains forged by habits of temperament. How enormous the problem was in the eyes of Keats becomes clear when we find it getting allegorised in the story of the fallen Titans. The Knight at arms had to gird up his lions for a tougher and mightier trial of strength and become Apollo to see the issue to its final conclusion.

Hyperion starts with the assumption that half, or more than half, of the battle was over. Only the resplendent Hyperion remained to be ousted from his abode of gorgeous splendour. But the new god who is to fulfil the task, as it turns out, is born consumptive. Gnawed by a consuming and nameless sickness, he rambles impotent even in his godly might. Hyperion is not displaced for the sick Apollo has neither the mind, nor perhaps the strength, to perform the task allotted to him. That however is not the whole story. There are many strands which go into the making of *Hyperion* and this necessitates a close scrutiny of its structure.

Hyperion begins much in the same way as the *Ode To A Nightingale.* But whereas Keats was to make desperate efforts in the latter poem to lose his *identity*, *Hyperion* dramatises a situation in which Saturn has lost it already and is in despair. Saturn is sitting overpowered, alone and completely annihilated by the grief at his personal loss :

> Deep in the shady sadness of a vale
> Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,

Far from the fiery noon, and eve's one star,
Sat gray-hair'd Saturn, quiet as stone,
Still as the silence round about his lair;

And "upon the sodden ground"—

His old right hand lay nerveless, listless, dead,
Unsceptred; and his realmless eyes were closed;
While his bowed head seem'd list'ning to the Earth,
His ancient mother, for some comfort yet.

Thus lost to heaven and earth, Saturn is disturbed by Thea from this state of complete oblivion. The roused god is in no better shape. The agony of despair takes possession of him and he exclaims :

...I am smother'd up,
And buried from all godlike exercise
Of influence benign on planets pale,
Of admonitions to the winds and seas,
Of peaceful sway above man's harvesting,
And all those acts which Deity supreme
Doth ease its heart of love in

We however discover that this loss of power had actually followed a much more serious loss—the loss of his identity :

I am gone
Away from my own bosom : I have left
My strong identity, my real self,
Somewhere between the throne, and where I sit
Here on this spot of earth. Search, Thea, search !

The lost identity must be searched. Subjective to a point, Saturn appears to be a step ahead in his knowledge than Keats. The loss of identity is not a very pleasant thing to be experienced by anyone, and it has not to be confused with what Keats calls 'negative capability' as Kenneth Muir does[1], for the simple reason that the loss of identity will take away the possibility of experience. Loss of identity will be, to all intents and purposes, a state of living death, whereas negative capability is just an attitude of mind or more truly a method of response. If anything, one has not to lose one's identity but to find it. Or perhaps, even as one loses it one ends up by finding it. The loss of identity by Saturn involves the loss of his capacity to create. Therefore the need to regain it.

Saturn must be King.
Yes, there must be a golden victory ;
There must be Gods thrown down, and trumpets blown
Of triumph calm,

1. *Essays in Criticism* Vol. II, January 1952, No. 1. See "The Meaning of *Hyperion*, by Kenneth Muir, p. 60.

because only thus

...there shall be
Beautiful things made new,

Until that happens, he must grumble complainingly :

..."But cannot I create ?
Cannot I form ? Cannot I fashion forth
Another world, another universe,
To overbear and crumble this to nought ?
Where is another chaos ? Where ?"—

So long as Saturn is wroth about his loss he may not expect to gain anything. There may be enormous advantages that may come out of the sense of this so called loss of identity provided it is accepted as one among other facts of experience and made the starting point for another discovery. Saturn searches for what he had lost and endeavours to reclaim it, whereas he should search for something new which would replace it and abundantly make up for the loss. That is why Oceanus pleads acceptance because that makes for stupendous gain in so far as it secures release from the former cramping limitations and leaves one free for further enterprise. In so far as Saturn sorrows for the loss of his identity, he is a slave of his self—the chief hurdle in achieving the state of negative capability. Saturn merely seeks to retrace his steps. He is therefore only seemingly ahead of the poet. He is actually a reactionary standing for regression, and Keats knows that that is not worth the trouble. The one thing which should be absolutely clear however is that the loss of identity involves the loss of the capacity to create, and Apollo, who has not yet discovered his identity, is therefore in no better position. To say therefore that Apollo "has no identity" and therefore "possesses to a supreme degree the negative capability that Keats has laid down as the primal essential of a poet"[2] is to misread the 'meaning' of *Hyperion*. The loss of identity by Saturn posed a problem for Keats, and that is probably what is obviated by the birth of a new God from out of the devastation of godly sorrow. And in the final analysis, it is not the *fall* of Hyperion that is the question : it is the ascension of Apollo which presents the real difficulty.

II

After the first book therefore, it is the third book of *Hyperion* which occupies the important place in the Keatsian scheme of things. Book II is of the nature of extraneous matter mixed up with what is genuinely a poem on Keats himself. The two could not possibly go together, or be reconciled to give *Hyperion* a logical and convincing ending. However, there is something in the beginning of the third book which takes the reader by surprise, comes with a slight jolt but misfires. The transition

2. *Ibid.*

promised in the opening lines of Book III is not effected. Keats asks the Muse to leave the Titans to their woes, and

> Meantime touch piously the Delphic harp,
> And not a wind of heaven but will breathe
> In aid soft warble from the Dorian flute;
> For lo ! 'tis for the Father of all verse.

He would wish the music to change from the heart-broken harmony which had sung of the fallen Titans. For now Apollo is the "golden theme". Therefore,

> Flush every thing that hath a vermeil hue,
> Let the rose glow intense and warm the air,
> And let the clouds of even and of morn
> Float in voluptuous fleeces o'er the hills;
> Let the red wine within the goblet boil,
> Cold as a bubbling well; let faint-lipp'd shells,
> On sand, or in great deeps, vermilion turn
> Through all their labyrinths; and let the maid
> Blush keenly, as with some warm kiss surpris'd.
> Chief isle of the embowered Cyclades,
> Rejoice, O Delos, with thine olives green,
> And poplars, and lawn-shading palms, and beech,
> In which the Zephyr breathes the loudest song,
> And hazels thick, dark-stemm'd beneath the shade :

But it will not do. The excitement is of the nature of a storm in the tea-cup. The shadow of the Titanic gloom falls on what would bloom forth in vermilion hue. What follows is not in keeping with the emotion behind the lines quoted above. There shall be more weeping and with far little of the stirring wrath that had put life of some sort in the verse of Book II. The last book of *Hyperion* is far more subdued in tone—which is in keeping with the feminine disposition of the new god who is to belie all hopes and fail to fulfil the task allotted to him, refuse even to undertake it.

Phoenix like the new god, Apollo, rises from out of the wreck of the old order. But whereas Saturn was poorly off because he had lost his identity, Apollo is suffering because he had not yet found his. Apollo, who is busy gaining enormous knowledge which was to make a *God* of him, is by no means happily occupied. He heard the "murmurous noise of waves", and as he listened

> .. he wept, and his bright tears
> Went trickling down the golden bow he held.

In this tearful state he beholds the arrival of Mnemosyne who is his link with the unknown (unconscious) and the past. So that once again

Apollo—Mnemosyne dialogue is in fact a kind of monologue. It brings out what happens in the awareness lurking in the depth of Keats's being. Even this frank exchange does not reveal the true cause of the agony of Apollo. He is too strongly possessed of his own personal existence to be able to distance himself and see things in perspective. Therefore, very rightly, the dialogue takes the form of questioning. Keats however does not give any satisfactory answer to these questions. Apollo says :

> "Goddess ! I have beheld those eyes before,
> And their eternal calm, and all that face,
> Or I have dreamed."—

Some compelling quality in the experience of the young poet makes him take the help of dream to plumb to those remote regions of his being which are wraped in darkness. We may, perhaps, with some effort make out the purpose which dreams serve in the design of Keats's poetry. It is, as it were, in and through these dreams that Keats achieves self-realisation and makes us glimpse the abyss of his tormented soul. The pattern of these dreams is determined by, and has for its basis, the maze of motives which confounds a sensitive suffering man when that man is a man of genius and a poet withal. With an *unconscious* deliberation, these obscure motives get woven into the very texture of his contemplative mind in the form of dreams and alter the very colouring of his imagination. In and through his dream imagery, Keats gains a new comprehension into the dark regions of his soul. A reader may seem warranted in connecting this tendency with the poet's overall effort to lift his problems on to a realm where obscure things of the spirit acquire the vividness of dreams and thus help in bringing about what Coleridge calls that state of "suspension of disbelief" which in large part constitutes "poetic faith." This *dreamy* quality of Keats's poetry evidenced in the great *Odes* and *The Fall Of Hyperion* emphasises the fact that weighty problems are pressing for solution. Apollo-Keats is not sure whether what he sees is a 'vision' or a 'waking dream'. That inevitably makes a reader labour to find out the meaning.

"Yes," replies Mnemosyne to Apollo's query :

> "Thou hast dream'd of me; and awaking up
> Didst find a lyre all golden by thy side,
> Whose strings touch'd by thy fingers, all the vast
> Unwearied ear of the whole universe
> Listen'd in pain and pleasure at the birth
> Of such new tuneful wonder...

No less than the reader, she herself is surprised at his lachrymose state and asks :

"...Is't not strange
That thou shouldst weep, so gifted ? Tell me, youth,
What sorrow thou canst feel; for I am sad
When thou dost shed a tear...

Apllo's reply is no answer to her question :

Why should I tell thee what thou so well seest?
Why should I strive to show what from thy lips
Would come no mystery.

Maybe, neither of them knows the reason of this agony. Knowing is not possible, for what happens in the depth of the being defies conceiving and articulation. Therefore Apollo would much rather describe his own predicament as far as it is possible to give it a verbal form :

.. For me, dark, dark,
And painful vile oblivion seals my eyes :
I strive to search wherefore I am so sad,
Until a melancholy numbs my limbs;
And then upon the grass I sit, and moan,
Like one who once had wings.

The process of acquiring experience is still channalised through the conscious limited self. That is why he feels 'curs'd and thwarted'. Apollo, like Keats in the odes, is caught in the meshes of his own suffering self. Actually the isle itself, bestrewn with the beauty of nature and capable of providing sweet sensuous pleasure, brings out the condition of Apollo's soul. He is a prisoner in the isolation of his own self, and the senses are its prison-gates. He asks :

Goddess begign, point forth some unknown thing :
Are there not other regions than this isle ?

If only he knew where his soul could dwell in peace ! Keats is in search of something greater, vaster and opener for his counterpart—Apollo. But Apollo-Keats does not know the way out :

...Point me out the way
To any one particular beauteous star,
And I will flit into it with my lyre,
And make its silvery splendour pant with bliss.

There are rumblings of the impatient spirit seeking to break out into freedom :

I have heard the cloudy thunder : Where is power ?
Whose hand, whose essence, what divinity

Makes this alarum in the elements,
While I here idle listen on the shores
In fearless yet in aching ignorance?

And he implores the goddess to tell him why does he rave thus. And though she remains mute, he could read

A wonderous lesson in thy silent face:
Knowledge enormous makes a God of me.

It is not clear as to what is the precise nature of this enormous knowledge which deifies him. The description of what amounts to it adequately sums up to its enormousness, and yet we know that Keats's experience falls far short of this impressive list. There is no doubt that most of this is of vicarious nature and lacks the validity of personal experience. Small wonder therefore that Keats should not know what to make of it. However, Apollo says:

Names, deeds, gray legends, dire events, rebellions,
Majesties, sovran voices, agonies,
Creations and destroyings, all at once
Pour into the wide hollows of my brain.
And deify me, as if some blithe wine
Or bright elixir peerless I had drunk,
And so become immortal.

One thing nevertheless is clear that Keats knows that the way to this enormous knowledge lies through an awful experience of a tortuous kind. Soon, Keats wrote:

...wild commotions shook him, and made flush
All the immortal fairness of his limbs;
Most like the struggle at the gate of death;
Or liker still to one who should take leave
Of pale immortal death, and with a pang
As hot as death's is chill, with fierce convulse
Die into life:

This gives a fair indication of the way out of the mood of 'obstinate questionings' which had beset young Apollo. He had not to *know* but *experience;* and therein lies the difference between the dreamer and the poet as will be explained by Moneta in *The Fall Of Hyperion.* And the contrary character of this *dying into life* should also be noted. It is not like "the struggle at the gate of death", but "liker still" to one

.. who should take leave
Of pale immortal death,

This peculiar mode of dying into life entails, in the words of St. John of the Cross, the soul's divesting "itself of the love of created beings",

which in its turn entails one's dying to one's self: "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life...shall save it." (Mark VIII-35) As already explained, the identity has to be lost and found in a process of simultaneity. It is by losing it that one finds it. Keats, in this Apollo episode, is indicating the ardours of self-realisation. Saturn was sore for having lost it when he should actually have celebrated the occasion, Apollo is miserable for not having found it. Both are tragic figures in their two respective ways. The way out of the difficulty lies in adding to the condition of Apollo that of Saturn's. To put it differently, both have personalities—but little awareness of their identities. Identity has to be discovered by losing personality. Saturn, who has lost his personality, wrongly thinks that he has lost his identity—weeps for it instead of seeking to discover the truth of his identity. Apollo who has personality wants to seek his identity without having to lose it. Both contend for impossibilities. Saturn is positively in the wrong, and Apollo has not yet grasped the point about the whole thing. Since Saturn considers the loss of his personality as something positive, he is not in a position to grasp the significance of Oceanus's plea: therefore his untenable position. Apollo should realise what Keats in his dialogue with Moneta in *The Fall Of Hyperion* ultimately does: that it is by casting aside the fever of the self, that is personality, that any advancement is possible. When Keats says that a poet has no identity, by 'identity' he means 'personality'. Kenneth Muir seems again to be on questionable ground, when on the basis of a few quotations from Keats' letters, he draws the conclusion that "Saturn and the other Gods of the old dispensation possess identities but Apollo has no identity." And that is because, he argues, Apollo "possesses to a supreme degree the negative capability."[1] Now, that is the only thing he does not possess—and he does not possess it because he does not fulfil the one paramount condition which entitles one to its possession. He has not discarded his personality. Personality and negative capability cannot coexist. It may even appear that negative capability is the ability on one's part to bypass personality. It is itself the process by which one discovers one's identity by casting off personality. The pangs of death that Apollo undergoes are symptomatic of this death of personality. The Apollo who could oust Hyperion is not yet born.

In this Keats lets out the other strong passion of his life. His idea of negative capability is associated in his mind with the idea of immortality in the world of art—with Shakespeare and his undying universal appeal. Beset with death on all sides, how is it possible to escape its clutches: that was Keats's chief concern as a poet. It was his art which would make him immortal but for that art will have to separate itself from all that is of a perishable kind. He must invest it with higher purport than merely tune it to the doleful music of his personal sorrows and pain,

1. Op. cit., pp. 58-60.

or pleasures of a delightful kind. Where the poet had formerly been a slave of his personality, he would now learn to escape into freedom by bringing about its death. He undergoes the convulsions of death of his personality to arrive at the consciousness of his identity—only thus he can enlarge the extent of his experience and realise all the potentialities of the experience of life. As Apollo passes through the tortures of death which lead to immortality, Mnemosyne, who might represent the totality of experience needed to make a poet what Keats wished to be himself, stands solemnly with upheld arms as the august witness to the awesome ceremony of initiation into the mysteries of life—as one who prophesied the *birth by dying* of a great poet and creator. It is relevant that she should have been

> The watcher of thy sleep and hours of life,
> From the young day when first thy infant hand
> Pluck'd witless the weak flowers, till thine arm
> Could bend that bow heroic to all times.

This shows that Mnemosyne who knows how Apollo had started with the witless plucking of the weak flowers (Keats's own early preference for sensuous pleasures ?) and now aspires to "bend that bow *heroic to all times*" (the poet's growing aspiration for more arduous and nobler tasks of life ?) represents the principle of deeper awareness which guides the development of Keats's genius. As yet however Apollo does not understand the cause of his suffering. But it is clear to the reader that what has been making him suffer was his great, and what was proving to be almost unbreakable, attachment to his former mode of experience seen in the context of his new aspirations. To get rid of it was no less than undergoing the experience of death—and that was hardly enjoyable. And yet the urgent pressure of the great need was forcing him on to further and newer course of action. But what thwarted his great endeavour was the uncertainty of the next step—which may prove to be a leap in the dark. How was he to proceed ? The poet had only a limited experience—and all that he could do was to use it for the purposes of his art. At best it could be concealed under an imposing garb, but Keats was too honest to do that, and whenever he tried unconsciously to do that, it tended to show out. There is however no doubt that Apollo in an improvement over Saturn in so far as he is willing to go all the way of the torturing experience, whereas Saturn was eager only to retrace his steps and recover what he had lost. So the two become complementary. Saturn's course is obviously ruled out, Apollo's is not yet laid. *Hyperion* had to be left unfinished for the poet could not see his way.

All that has been held so far should not blind the reader to the fact that Apollo's suffering traces its origin to the intense egotism which cuts him off from that enormous experience which could, under the circumstances, be known only vicariously. He suffers from egotism born of the morbid

self-absorption of a suffering invalid. Apollo-Keats holds a silent combat with the torturing agony. The saving feature, however, lies in the very fact of suffering. Egotism had ceased to be an experience of a pleasing kind. It was proving to be the sole barrier between him and immortality. Keats must enlarge the boundaries of his being. Before, however, he can measure his strength with momentous issues, Keats must ransack the dark passages of his being for salvage. At this point, therefore, the poem had to be interrupted for the sole reason that Keats does not know the next step forward. His experience is clearly not adequate to the form he wanted to give it. He must foster no illusions on that score. In a sense, therefore, although *Hyperion* is a "complete fragment"—yet Keats knew that it required completing. He will take it up again.

Before that could be done, Keats must give some time to the probing of his heart. Menaced by the shadows of the advancing night, the inexorable urgency awakens a groping perception—and the sick poet returns to the regions of memory which, in this state of utterly impregnable solitude and lurking fear, prove incomparably more important than anything actual. The irony of it is that the poet who had always wished to run away from himself is forced on himself and constrained to take account of his whole being. Excessively wearied by the dark thoughts of death and life which torment his very existence, and yet knowing that this way alone he can achieve manhood, Keats turns upon himself and engages in a silent combat with the consuming inward agony. He finds melancholy sweeter than common joy, and true to his intractable spirit makes of it a matter of pleasant sensation. This honest perversity, however, does not thwart Keats in his higher purposes. On the contrary, he is guided by the courage of high endeavour and makes a painful way through an unbearable load of hopes and regrets to work out the complexity of intricate relationship which bind and complicate the poet's lofty ideas of art to a sensuous enjoyment of life. It was somewhat in this mood that Keats settled down to write the great odes.

EDUCATION

S. P. Ahluwalia

SECONDARY EDUCATION IN MADHYA PRADESH, 1947-1966 : A STUDY OF THE EMERGENCE OF SOME DEMOCRATIC STRANDS

Education in general and secondary education in particular in Madhya Pradesh, throughout its long history, largely, reflected the trends and tendencies prevalent in India as a whole at a given period of history.

A historical retrospect shows that in the beginning the term secondary education had a narrow and restricted connotation. The High School Education Act[1] of 1922 defined high school education as "that stage of education which follows immediately the stage of education classified by the Provincial Government as middle stage and precedes immediately that stage of education controlled by the University of Nagpur."

Secondary Education Prior to 1947

A close examination of educational policies and programmes shows that nothing significant was done prior to 1947 either by the Government or by the educational organizations to improve the quality of secondary education to make it democracy-oriented.

The recommendations of two committees constituted at the provincial level in the pre-independence era, however, deserve some mention. Soon after the establishment of the High School Education Board in 1923, a committee under the chairmanship of C.E.W. Jones was constituted to reconstruct curriculum for high schools. A significiant recommendation of this committee was recognition of Hindi and Marathi, the languages of this province, as the media of instruction in high schools which gave this province a distinct lead. Perhaps, in a sense, this may be treated as a step towards democratization of secondary education in the future.

A few years after, the McFyden Committee made some important recommendations that prompted reorganisation of high school education in 1928. The pupils were, then, for the first time, given a limited freedom to select subjects of their choice within the framework of certain groups, thus, permitting but a restricted scope for differences in individual aptitudes. This was, decidedly, a democratic provision and can be treated, in a sense, precursor of the later diversification of courses of study. It, however, is surprising that prior to 1947 hardly any consideration was given

1. Board of High School Education, Madhya Pradesh, *Report on Reorganization of Secondary Education*, (Nagpur: Government Printing, 1948), p. iii.

to the function of high school in the life of a nation and in its social and economic reconstruction.

Prior to 1947, there was a general eductional backwardness in the State. In 1937-38, there were only 100 high schools, of which 87 were for boys and 13 for girls. In 1946-47, their number increased to 176, of which 139 were for boys and 37 for girls. Enrolment in these schools in 1937-38, was 10,476 which increased to 23,886 in 1946-47. There were, in 1937-38, 855 teachers engaged in high schools, of which 506 were trained. In 1946-47, the number of teachers serving in high schools rose to 1,634, of which 670 were trained. These figures do indicate that the educational facilities at the secondary school stage were increasing but seeing to the size and specific needs of the State, they were to a large extent inadequate. Furthermore, availability of even these inappropriate educational facilities was limited to a few selected towns and the Capital. Most of the schools were poorly equipped to meet the requirements of the emerging democracy.

The growth of education, prior to the attainment of Independence in August, 1947, was oddly enough, tardy. "Never in its long annals", an official report[2] points out, "were bold and comprehensive measures undertaken to make the educational system more effective and far-reaching in results. Never was an effort made to make education a mass-movement or to develop it in accordance with the needs of the State. Rural areas were meted out a step-motherly attitude and technical education was almost ignored. It rarely reached the hearths and homes of the backward communities and was a privilege of the few."

Independence and its Impact on Secondary Education

During 1947-1966, as a consequence of the advent of freedom, it has been increasingly recognised that provision of adequate educational facilities is an important function of a Welfare State. This, in turn, has resulted in great emphasis being laid on the improvement and extension of educational amenities sothat a new era ushers in, full of hope and promise. The people's government instituted in the post-independence period after the first General Election in 1952 embarked on well thought-out schemes with a view to reconstructing education at all stages to meet the requirements of the State. In the framing of the educational programmes and policies, the State Government drew great benefit and advantage from the reports submitted by the Commissions and Committees appointed by the Government of India. The reports of the two Committees on State level viz., (1) Committee on Reorganisation of Secondary Education of 1948 and (2) Committee on Financing of Education in Madhya Pradesh of 1952 proved specifically useful in planning reforms in the field of Secondary Education.

2. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Madhya Pradesh, *Progress of Education in Madhya Pradesh*, (Nagpur : Government Printing, 1955), p. 1.

"By the secondary stage of education", it was recognised "should be understood the education during the period of adolescence which is a period of psychological and physiological significance, viz., from about the age of 11 to 17 or 18"[3]. Moreover, it was pleaded that democracy requires training in self-government and in sharing responsibility and necessitates building up national character and national traditions. It was, hence, advocated that "the function of the school in the formative period will be too valuable to be ignored".[4]

Charter of Education – A significant Landmark

At the time of the adoption of the Second Five Year Plan, therefore, the State Government published a Charter of Education which can rightly be termed as a glorious land-mark in the history of democratizing secondary education in Madhya Pradesh. This Charter lays down, in brief, the educational goals and policies of the future which, perhaps, are clearly indicative of the immense impact of democracy. "It would be a truism to say," the Charter[5] unequivocally states, "that wheels of national progress revolve round the educational hub and the dream of a higher standard of living for every citizen can come true only through a well-conceived, balanced and progressive programme for education in future years." So it defined the educational goals of the State in terms of some definite physical targets which are enlisted here for the perusal of the readers :

1. An endeavour shall be made to provide every child with a satisfactory basic education.

This education should be such as to guarantee the child the opportunity to develop and maintain a healthy body and a balanced personality, to acquire skills needed as tools of learning, to get a good start in understanding appreciating the natural and social world, to participate happily and healthily in home and community life to work and play with others, and to enjoy and use music, art, literature and handicrafts.

2. Every endeavour shall be made to develop Secondary Education on right lines as enunciated by the Secondary Education Commission.

This education shall assure to the youth continued progress in his intellectual, physical, civic and cultural development begun in the basic school, and provide initial training in crafts of farming or other occupations and open doors to the college and other professions.

3. An endeavour shall be made to draw up an educational programme which bridges the gap between the home and the school and between the school and adult life.

3. Board of High School Education, M.P., *Op. cit.*, p. 3.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
5. Government of Madhya Pradesh, *Educational Charter for Madhya Pradesh* (Nagpur: Government Printing, 1955) p. 1.

This programme requires on the one hand co-operation with parents for the home education of childern too young for the school and for the joint educational guidance by home and school of all other children; and on the other hand, the co-operative development of cultural and vocational adult education suited to the needs and desires of the community.

4. School shall endeavour to provide in progressive stages various services, *viz.*, health service, educational and vocational guidance, library facilities, school lunches and pupil-transportation facilities.

Such specific services require the employment of specially qualified personnel and can be supplied more easily through enlarged units of school administration and the co-operation of several small schools.

5. Every care shall be taken to provide a suitably trained educational service of teachers, supervisors, and administrators who can deal effectively with the problems of education and teaching.

The accomplishment of these objectives is the responsibility of local leadership, the department of education, the teachers' associations and the national leaders in education.

6. It shall be the effort to provide satisfactory environments for children in educational institutions.

The environment should be attractive, clean, sanitary, conducive to good health, equipped with materials and apparatus essential to the best teaching, planned as a community centre with ample space for playgrounds, gardens and beautification.

7. Programmes shall be gradually formulated and developed to enable children to participate in community life and culture.

For effective service, the school must be planned and recognised as a centre of community activity; the closest possible inter-relationship should be maintained between the school and other community agencies, and the children and youth should be active participants in the community life.

8. An endeavour will be made to develop educational facilities in such a manner as to provide suitable educational opportunities for children with varying aptitudes.

An endeavour will be made to frame predictive tests with a view to sift student material and help each child to flower according to genius.

Even a casual look at the manifold goals stated in this Charter prove that it can, rightly, be considered a veritable blue-print of democratic secondary education in the State of Madhya Pradesh.

This official pronouncement was immediately followed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Education Department Resolution No. 4388-XVIII dated 10th August, 1955 which gave concrete shape to the decisions on future educational policy. Declaring that "secondary education is a significant step in the educational ladder and that intermediate leadership in the country can be produced only by a properly oriented meaningful secondary education", it reiterated that education at the secondary stage has to be creative in spirit, in tune with life as it has to be lived, and to be permeated by a spirit, of enquiry and know-how so that all education up to the age of 17 years is one continuous and harmonious stream. Further-on, in an attempt to realise what it professed, it announced certain important decisions about: conversion of traditional high schools into multipurpose schools and higher secondary schools; diversification of secondary school courses; formulation of aptitude tests; reconstitution of the Board of Secondary Education; constitution of a High Power Textbook Committee; introduction of dynamic methods of teaching; organisation of in-service training and seminars of teachers; provision of better training facilities and establishment of the State Bureau of Educational and Vocational Guidance.

Re-organization of the State and its Influence on Educational Development

But hardly had a concerted effort started for a substantial realization of the stipulated targets, on November 1, 1956, the new State of Madhya Pradesh was constituted under the States Reorganization Act of 1956.

As the constituent units of the new State historically had a past, ancient and varied, each unit brought with it peculiar educational problems. The new State, hence, faced two important educational tasks. It had : (1) to evolve a common integrated system of education in place of the five different systems which it had inherited as a legacy, and (ii) to bring about large-scale expansion and qualitative improvement of education in all sectors because inspite of the advance made between 1947 and 1956, the State was still, comparatively speaking, backward in education. Consequently, the programmes of educational development taken up by the erstwhile States were reviewed and a consolidated programme was chalked out keeping in view major interests of the new State.

The task of educational reconstruction in the new Madhya Pradesh was, perhaps, all the more difficult because of factors such as : the low economic development of the State; the comparatively large population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; the existence of large forest areas and small widely scattered habitations; and the under-development of of girls' education. The new State, however, continued developing secondary education without loss of efficiency and did useful work to eliminate existent gaps and inadequacies.

Evidently, it is difficult to make any useful comparison of the State figures for the period 1956-1966 with those of the period prior to 1947-1955 owing to territorial changes caused by the reorganisation of the State in 1956. Furthermore, the comparisons generally made can be vitiated by changes in the classification of schools. A perusal of the statistics showing progress of secondary education in Madhya Pradesh may, however, be interesting.

The post-independence period, there is no doubt, witnessed a considerable expansion in the field of secondary education. The phenomenal progress is reflected in the increase in the number of secondary schools, enrolment at these schools, number of teachers serving therein and expenditure incurred thereon.

(a) Secondary Schools

The progress is especially marked among high and higher secondary schools that increased from 125 in 1940-41 to 155 or by 24 per cent in 1945-46, to 258 or by 106.4 per cent in 1950-51, to 353 or by 182.4 per cent in 1955-56 and to 774 or by 519.2 per cent in 1960-61. After the State's reorganisation, the pace of conversion of high schools to higher secondary schools was accelerated and by the year ending 1960-61 all high schools were converted into higher secondary schools. In 1963-64, there were 1,128 higher secondary schools in the State. In the year 1964-65, 55 new higher secondary schools were opened by the Government by upgrading middle schools. Strangely enough, though the targets of the Third Five Year Plan have considerably been exceeded, yet the demand for higher secondary education is continuously increasing. It is interesting that there are still about 300 applications pending with the Government for opening of new higher secondary schools. There are expected to be 1,200 higher secondary schools in the State by the end of the year 1965-66.

The notable feature of this expansion is that an equally large increase has taken place in the secondary schools in the rural areas and those for girls. The secondary schools for girls have increased from 18 in 1940-41 to 27 or by 50 per cent in 1945-46, to 47 or by 161.1 per cent in 1950-51, to 65 or by 261.1 per cent in 1955-56 and to 130 or by 622.2 per cent in 1960-61. In the year, 1962-63, the number of higher secondary schools for girls increased to 174. By the end of the year 1965-66, this number is expected to rise to 200. The high and higher secondary schools in rural areas seem to have taken well-placed jumps as they increased from 27 in 1952-53 to 42 or by 55.6 per cent in 1954-55, 110 or by 307.4 per cent in 1956-57, to 195 or by 622.2 per cent in 1958-59, to 298 or by 1003.7 per cent in 1960-61. In the year 1962-63 there were 558 higher secondary schools in the rural areas. Every tehsil of the State has now

facilities for secondary education. It is notable that in the year 1955-56 there was no girls higher secondary school in the rural area. Two such institutions were opened in 1956-57 and this number has steadily increased to 5 in 1960-61 and 14 in 1962-63.

In pursuance of the policy of implementing the decisions already taken synchronising with the recommendations of the Secondary Education Commission, all high schools have been converted into higher secondary schools or multipurpose schools. All private high schools were given grants-in-aid on a 75% basis in order to convert themselves into higher secondary schools.

In 1956, at the time of the reorganisation of the new State, there were only 14 multipurpose schools which increased to 26 in 1960-61 and to 45 in 1964-65. The State Government has endeavoured to establish atleast one multipurpose school for girls in each division during the Third Five Year Plan.

For improving the general level of secondary education, the rules of grants-in-aid for the privately managed secondary schools have been revised and unified. In addition, the Government has taken over a number of non-Government secondary schools under its direct control on considerations of backwardness of the area, financial difficulties of the management and the consequent inefficiency in education. In 1950-51, of the total 258 secondary schools, 24·8 per cent were managed by Government, 12 per cent by local boards and 63·2 per cent by private bodies. Thereafter, the position has changed and a radical shift is visible. In 1960-61, of the total 774 secondary schools, 52·1 per cent were managed by the Government, 11·9 per cent by local boards and only 36 per cent by private bodies. In 1963-64, there were 1,128 higher secondary schools in the State. Out of these 722 higher secondary schools were managed by the Government and the rest were either run by local bodies or by private bodies.

(b) Enrolment

Simultaneous with this, the number of students attending high and higher secondary schools has registered a very considerable increase. In the decennium preceding 1947, the total enrolment, with difficulty, rose from 10,476 in 1937-38 to 23, 886 or by 126 per cent in 1946-47, but in the decennium following 1947, it rose from 24,526 in 1947-48, to 57,756 or by 135·5 per cent in 1956-57 and to 1,24,480 in 1960-61 showing an increase of 407·5 per cent. By the year 1963-64, the enrolment in classes IX, X and XI furthur increased to 1·95 lakhs. During the year 1965-66, the enrolment is expected to rise to 2·55 lakhs.

The enrolment of girls also shows a proportionate increase. It has increased from 692 in 1937-38 to 2,340 or by 186·3 per cent in 1956-57 and to 17, 855 or by 531 per cent in 1960-61. In the year 1963-64, in the

classes IX, X and XI, there were 29,121 girls. This number is expected to increase to 0·40 lakhs in 1965-66.

The number of pupils from rural areas in high and higher secondary schools has also registered a constant and consistent increase. It increased from 19,520 in 1952-53 to 47, 786 or by 144·8 per cent in 1955-56 and from 35, 509 in 1956-57 to 80,0498 or by 125·3 per cent in 1960-61. In the year 1962-63, it increased to 1,32,75. It is notable that the number of girls from rural areas in these secondary schools increased as well. From 1,220 in 1952-53 it increased to 2,685 in 1955-56 showing an increase of 70·9 per cent and from 1,234 in 1956-57 to 3,085 in 1960-61 showing an increase of 150 per cent. In the year 1962-63, the enrolment of girls in higher secondary schools in the rural areas increased to 6,483.

(c) Teachers

There has been an increase in the number of both trained and untrained teachers in high and higher secondary schools. The total number of teachers increased from 7,507 in 1956-57 to 13,730 or by 82·9 per cent in 1960-61. This number further increased to 19,308 in 1963-64. It is expected to rise to 20,500 in 1965-66. The number of trained teachers increased from 3,033 in 1956-57 to 6,529 or by 115·3 per cent in 1960-61. In the year 1963-64, there were 10,570 trained teachers working in higher secondary schools in the State. The number of women teachers increased from 1,539 in 1956-57 to 2, 759 or by 79·3 per cent 1960-61. In the year 1962-63, there were 3,577 women teachers serving in the higher secondary schools. This number increased to 3,783 in 1963-64 out of which 2,210 were trained. The percentage of trained teachers shows a consistent rise from 40·4 in 1956-57 to 47·5 in 1960-61 and to 55 in 1963-64. This is expected to increase to 65 by the end of 1965-66. The percentage of women teachers has almost remained shifting between 20·5 and 21·4 during these years. The teacher-pupil ratio during all these years has ranged between 20 and 21.

For ameliorating the quality and status of secondary school teachers many steps have been taken. The implementation of the recommendations of the pay commission has made possible an upward revision of the scales of pay of all teaching and non-teaching personnel in schools. The scales of pay were unified with effect from 1st April, 1958 and were further revised from 1st July, 1960. This has led to removal of the existing disparities in the pay-scales of the employees of the constituting units. The newly introduced common uniform pay scales, perhaps, compare favourably with those in other States. Table 1 presents a summary of the details of scales of pay of different categories of teachers.

TABLE I

REVISED SCALES OF PAY OF TEACHERS

Cadre	*Scale of pay*
Principal, Multipurpose Higher Secondary School	Rs. 360–700
Principal, Higher Secondary School	Rs. 275–700
Lecturers in Multipurpose Higher Secodary Schools/Higher Secondary Schools	Rs. 250–450
Teachers (Upper Division)	Rs. 150–290

The same scales of pay as are available to the teachers in Government institutions have been made admissible to teachers is non-government service.

Besides this, facilities for training of secondary teachers have also been improved. In-service programmes of teacher education have become increasingly popular. Each Division has now a training College for the graduates. There are 12 (11 Government and 1 privately managed) post-graduate basic training colleges in the State. Nine of them have an attached full-fledged department, centre or unit of extension services which acts as a liaison between the training college and some selected schools of the area. They aim at disseminating useful information, assisting in experimentation and revolutionizing or, perhaps, democratizing the school practices. The National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi established a Regional College of Education in Madhya Pradesh at Bhopal in 1963-64 which is to play a leadership role in the field of teacher-education.

(d) Expenditure on Secondary Education

The expenditure on secondary education has continuously increased since 1946-47. The total direct expenditure incurred on secondary education was Rs. 1,37,16,647 in 1956-57. In increased to Rs. 3,06,52,798 or by 167·2 per cent in 1960-61. In the year 1962-63, it rose to 4·95 crores. Thus the increase in the expenditure during 1956-57 to 1962-63 was 261·3 per cent. As the amount of total direct expenditure on education shows an increase, likewise the percentage of expenditure on secondary education to total direct expenditure on education shows a rising tendency (proportional increase) as it increased from 15·7 in 1956-57 to 18·8 in 1960-61 and to 21·6 in 1962-63.

The State Government, however, has recognised its responsibility of sharing increasingly the educational burden. In 1960-61, 70·1 per cent of the total direct expenditure on secondary education was met from Government funds, 17·1 per cent from fees, 2·5 per cent from local board funds and the remaining 10·3 per cent from other sources. Government funds are, thus, the major source of income out of which this

expenditure is met. The average annual cost per pupil in a high and higher secondary school has increased from Rs. 88·6 in 1956-57 to Rs. 110·2 in 1960-61 and to Rs. 132·6 in 1962-63.

In 1960-61, the State Government spent Rs. 16, 77·52 lakhs out of Rs. 80,26·76 lakhs or 20·1 per cent, almost one fifth of its total budget on Education. In earmarking funds for education Madhya Pradesh was, thus, seventh in the country. Of the total budget provision for education, secondary education gets a sizeable share. The Government budget estimates of 1960-61, which show an enormous increase in expenditure on education, reveal that about one-fourth of the total budget provisions were earmarked for secondary education.

(e) Scholarships, Stipends and Freeships

To enable the wards of weaker sections of the community and poor parents educational facilities at the secondary stage have been democratized through scholarships, stipends and free-studentships. Scholarships have been awarded in secondary schools on the basis of merit-cum-poverty. Free-ships have been provided on a more liberal scale. The various educational concessions, freeships and half-freeships, that are in force in secondary schools of Madhya Pradesh, are :

(a) Concession to the students between the age of 6 to 14 years ;

(b) Concession to the students of Scheduled Castes Tribes ;

(c) Concession to the children of Political Sufferers ;

(d) Concession to the children of landless labourers ,

(e) Concession to the children of agriculturists having less than 20 acres of land ;

(f) Concession to the children of displaced persons and destitute widows;

(g) Concession to the children of Government servants and Local Bodies employees,

(h) Concession to the children of teachers;

(i) Concession to the wards of police officials killed in dacoit-infested areas;

(j) Concession to the wards of defence personnel killed in border areas; and

(k) Concession to the wards of gold-smiths affected and rendered unemployed by Gold Control Rules.

Cash grants are also being paid at the rate of Rs. 20 per annum to some category of selected students in high and higher secondary schools for the purchase of books and meeting other school expenses.

Some Other Salient Features

The new Madhya Pradesh Secondary Education Act, 1959 which has come into force with effect from April 20, 1959 has perhaps, stimulated educational activity and has strengthened the system of secondary education. A new integrated body: Madhya Pradesh Board of Secondary Education, Bhopal, has been constituted by merging the existing boards of secondary education into one.

An earnest attempt has been made to democratize administration by providing ample opportunities to teachers and administrators to work together in the formulation and implementation of all new schemes and policies. Very often, there are periodic conferences and seminars at district, region, and State level which provide opportunities of co-operation, experimentation and exchange of ideas.

Being aware of the inherent defects in the system of secondary education, its unilinear character, its literary bias and its declining standards, the State Government has sought to remove most of these glaring defects by the introduction of diversified courses, training in crafts and inclusion of various types of educative and recreative activities in the curriculum. From the year 1956-57 admirable changes have been brought about by such reforms as : evaluation of pupil's progress through internal assessment by schools; grouping of subjects into diversified core subjects; and introduction of Craft, Social Studies and General Science as compulsory subjects. Establishment of bodies and institutions like State Evaluation Unit; Text-book Committee; Teachers' Re-orientation Department and the Saminar Section at the Prantiya Shikshan Mahavidyalya, Jabalpur ; College of Educational Psychology and Guidance at Jabalpur; English Language Teaching Institute at Bhopal and a Model Multipurpose Higher Secondary School in the State Capital have, to some extent, improved qualitatively the system of secondary education in the State of Madhya Pradesh.

Conclusion

Even a casual survey makes it clear that since 1947, some significant reforms have been initiated and introduced in the field of secondary education. As these reforms synchronized with the dawn of political freedom and consequent adoption of the democratic constitution, they, perhaps, largely reflect the impact of democracy on secondary education.

Every one agrees that things are changing. As to the trend of change, there are many interpretations. So complex is the situation that any body can pick from the whole, some instances of change congenial to him and proclaim that he has discovered the trend of the times. Furthermore, usually the opinion of the people on how things are changing, it is believed, is often ba on mere wild guesses as there is a recognizable

dearth of authentic and systematic empirical studies. This, has, possibly, led some people to level frequent un-healthy criticism against educational practices in secondary schools.

Criticism and condemnation apart, every sane man recognises the spectacular advance made in the domain of secondary education in the post-independence period. Certain educational policies and practices do reveal that the decision of constituting the country into a Sovereign Democratic Republic has served as the chief motivating influence. Simultaneous with phenomenal increase in the number of high and higher secondary schools and enrolment therein, educational amenities and allied facilities have also been democratized. Attempts have, possibly, been made to saturate the entire school paraphernalia with democratic strands and elements as it has been advocated that the educational institutions have an obligation to respond to the democratic demands of the country.

"The political revolution in India", said Maulana Azad, "took place in August, 1947, when power came into Indian hands. This led to reform and reorganisation in all fields of national life and perhaps most of all in the fields of educational and social reform. Since then there have been a series of changes and innovations which have been steady, continuous and persistent. They have in fact marked a complete reorientation of our educational aims even though practice from the very nature of the case is still lagging behind."[6]

However, there is no doubt gradually the secondary schools of Madhya Pradesh are perhaps being transformed into miniature democratic communities in response to the nation's call for democratization.

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6. Ministry of Education, *C.A.B.E. Silver Jubilee Souvenir 1960*, (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1960), p. 334.

HINDI

छविनाथ त्रिपाठी

काव्य-सिद्धान्तों के निर्माण की पूर्व-पीठिका

पावमानीर्यो अध्येत्यृषिभि: संभृतं रसम्।
तस्मै सरस्वती दुहे क्षीरं सर्पिर्मधूदकम्। ऋक् ९।६७।३२॥

जो व्यक्ति अत्यन्त पवित्र, ऋषियों द्वारा प्राप्त किये रस का भोग करता है, उसे सरस्वती, दूध, घी, और जल आदि, दोहन कर, देती है। ऋषियों ने अध्ययन, मनन और चिन्तन के द्वारा जिस रस का स्वयं अनुभव किया तथा विश्व-कल्याण के लिए जिसे वाक्-शक्ति के द्वारा अभिव्यक्त किया, उसकी परम्परा आज भी मनीषियों द्वारा सतत प्रवाहित हो रही है। वाणी की यह शक्ति अमोघ है। वाक्सूक्त में वह स्वयं अपने प्रभाव का निर्देश करते हुए कहती है—

मया सो अन्नमत्ति यो विपश्यति, य: प्राणिति य ईं शृणोत्युक्तम्।
अमन्तवो मां त उपक्षियन्ति, श्रुधि श्रुत श्रद्धिवं ते वदामि॥ ऋक् १०।१२५।४
अहं राष्ट्री संगमनी वसूनां चिकितुषी प्रथमा यज्ञियानाम्।
तां मा देवा व्यदधु: पुरुत्रा, भूरिस्थात्रां भूर्यावेशयन्तीम्॥ ऋक् १०।१२५।३
अहमेव स्वयमिदं वदामि जुष्टं देवेभिरुत मानुषेभि:।
यं कामये तं तमुग्रं कृणोमि तं ब्रह्माणं तं सुमेधाम्॥ ऋक् १०।१२५।५

अर्थात् "जो भी मानव प्राणी भली भाँति देखता और समझता है, जो भी श्वास लेता है, जो उस व्यापक उच्चरित शब्द को सुनता है, वह मुझसे उन विषयों को प्राप्त करता है, जो मुझे नहीं समझते अथवा मेरे प्रभाव को स्वीकार नहीं करते, वे भी मुझ पर निर्भर रहते हैं, सुनो, सुनो, मैं तुम्हें यह श्रद्धा-योग्य बात कहती हूँ। मैं वसुओं की शासिका और उनको गतिशील करने वाली तथा यज्ञनिष्ठों की प्रथम प्रेरणा हूँ। दिव्य-गुण-सम्पन्न व्यक्ति, सर्वव्यापिनी और प्राणियों को विविध कर्मों में लगाने वाली उस मुझको, संरक्षक के रूप में मानते हैं। मैं ही अपने आप इन देवों और मनुष्यों के लिए प्रीतिकारक शब्द बोलती हूँ। जिसको चाहती हूँ उसे क्षत्रिय, ब्राह्मण, ऋषि या मेधावी बना देती हूँ।"

वाणी की महत्ता, ऋषियों द्वारा अनुभूत या संचित रस, तथा उसकी वैयक्तिक और सामाजिक उपयोगिता का जो संकेत इन ऋचाओं में उपलब्ध होता है, वह उन काव्य-सिद्धान्तों का बीज है, जो आगे चलकर पल्लवित और पुष्पित हुआ। मन्त्रद्रष्टा ऋषि जब 'आ ते जिह्वा मधुमती सुमेधा' 'मधुमती वाचमुदेयम्'[1] 'येषां गव्या माहिना गी:'[2] जैसी उक्तियाँ कहता है, तब वह स्वभावत: वाणी के माधुर्य की ओर संकेत करता है। ऐसी वाणी से सम्पन्न कवि ही महान् इन्द्रिय-सामर्थ्य को धारण करते हैं।[4] उन्हीं में इतनी

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१. ऋक् १।५७।५॥
२. ऋक् १।६२।१॥
३. ऋक् १।७।५॥
४. तत्ते इन्द्रियं परमं पराचैरधारयन्त कवय: पुरेदम्। ऋक् १।१०३।१॥

सकता है कि वे बल देकर अपनी वाणी को सुनने के लिए श्रोता को बाध्य कर सकें।[5] यह काव्य की वाणी इन्द्र या वीरों के लिए प्रशस्य है।[6]

'शास इत्था महां असि अमित्रखादो अद्भुतः'[7] और 'कहउँ नामु बड़ राम ते'[8] एक ही प्रकार के हृदय के उद्गार हैं। विष्णु के चरणों में ही माधुर्य का स्रोत[9] ढूँढने वाले ऋषि और 'राम चरन पंकज मन जासू। लुबुध मधुप इव तजइ न पासू'[10] के कवि की मौलिक भावना में कोई अन्तर नहीं है। 'शास इत्था महां, अस्य मित्र खादो अद्भुतः। न यस्य हन्यते सखा न जीयते कदाचन'[11] में जिस अरिनाशक, अद्भुत एवं महान् शास्ता का निर्देश है, जिसका सखा न मारा जाता है न पराजित होता है, उससे कृष्ण-चरित्र की असुरनाशिनी प्रवृत्तियों और मित्र-रक्षिणी-भावना का स्मरण हो जाना स्वाभाविक ही है।

तीन गुणों या कोशों से आवृत नौ द्वार वाले पुण्डरीक में विद्यमान, यक्ष ही देह का स्वामी है। उसकी शक्ति महान् है, वह ब्रह्म रूप है। इच्छा, क्रिया और ज्ञान का मूल स्रोत वह यक्ष ही है।[12] इस दृष्टिकोण पर ध्यान जाते ही ऐसा लगता है, जैसे कालिदास का विरही यक्ष, यह आत्म-पुरुष ही है और यक्ष-विरह उनका अपना विरह। प्रत्येक काव्य के आरम्भ में धार्मिक कवि जिस सरस्वती की वन्दना करते हैं, वह हमारे पंच ज्ञानेन्द्रियों, पंच कर्मेन्द्रियों और पंच प्राणों की नियंत्रिका शक्ति है। अनुभूति-ग्रहण के समय उसका प्रवाह अन्तर्मुखी होता है और अभिव्यक्ति के समय बहिर्मुखी।[13] मन के साथ जब पांचों ज्ञानेन्द्रियां अपने बाह्य-व्यापार से विरत हो जाती हैं, बुद्धि भी चेष्टा रहित हो जाती है, उसे ही तो परम गति कहते हैं।[14] वेदान्त दर्शन की समाधि, काव्य की रसात्मक-स्थिति और ब्रह्मानन्द की उपलब्धि के लिए जिस शक्ति की याचना की जाती है, जिसकी सहायता अपेक्षित है, वह शारदा या सरस्वती ही है। हृदय समुद्र है, मति सीप; किन्तु 'स्वाति-शारदा' की कृपा के बिना कवित्त-मुक्ता का सृजन कहां संभव है।[15]

रचना चाहे किसी भी प्रकार की क्यों न हो, अपने रचयिता की जीवन-दृष्टि की प्रतीक होती है। कवि का जीवन-दर्शन, उसके विचार, भाव, लक्ष्य, प्रयोजन आदि स्वाभाविक रूप से उसकी कृतियों में झलक उठते हैं। कहीं वे स्पष्ट होते हैं, कहीं अस्पष्ट; कहीं व्यक्त कहीं व्यंजित। कभी वे विचार व्यक्तिगत होते हैं, कभी सामाजिक; कभी वे लौकिक होते हैं, कभी शास्त्रीय, पर वे होते कवि के हैं। यदि वैसे ही विचार, वैसे ही

५. आश्रुत्कर्ण श्रुधी हवं नू चिद्दधिष्व मे गिरः ॥ ऋक् १।१०।९॥
६. अस्मा इत्थाभ्यं वच उक्थमिन्द्राय शंस्यम् ॥ ऋक् ५।३६।५।
७. ऋक् ७।११।१।
८. रामचरित मानस, बाल काण्ड। २१॥
९. ऋक् १।१५४।५
१०. रामचरित मानस, बा० का० । १७॥
११. ऋक् १०।१५२।१।
१२. वैदिक दर्शन, पृ० ८, ३४, १०७; अथर्व १०।८।४३, बृहदारण्यक ५।४।१, छान्दोग्य उप० ८।१ पुण्डरीक व्याख्या।
१३. यजुः ३४।३
१४. कठोपनिषद् ६।१०
१५. हृदय-सिन्धु मति सीप समाना। स्वाति-सारदा कहहिं सुजाना। राम० च० मा० बा० ११॥

सिद्धान्त, वैसे ही दृष्टिकोण पहले भी व्यक्त हो चुके हैं, तब भी कवि की स्वीकृति और उसकी धारणा का परिचय मिल ही जाता है। इन्हीं व्यक्त भावों और विचारों में कवि की काव्य-दृष्टि का भी परिचय मिल जाता है। ये भाव और विचार विभिन्न अवसरों पर व्यक्त होते हैं, विविध वर्णन-प्रसंगों पर झलक उठते हैं, पर वे कवि-स्वीकृत या अस्वीकृत होकर, विधि या निषेध रूप में व्यक्त होते रहते हैं। ये वे मानस-तरंगें हैं, जो अपनी मूलधारा से बिछुड़ कर भी अपनी क्षेत्रीय भूमि को सरस एवं निर्मल बनाती हैं। इन बिखरी भाव या विचार-वीचियों को एक लड़ी मे पिरो कर उस मानस के आकार-प्रकार और व्यक्तित्व की एक झांकी प्रस्तुत की जा सकती है। कवियों के काव्य-सिद्धान्त सम्बन्धी ये संकेत न केवल महत्त्वपूर्ण होते हैं अपितु उनको जोड़ कर सैद्धान्तिक रेखा-चित्र भी तैयार किया जा सकता है।

उपनिषद् काव्य-ग्रन्थ नहीं हैं, पर वे जिस आध्यात्म-विद्या का प्रतिपादन करते हैं, उसका क्षेत्र और उसकी सीमायें बहुत विस्तृत हैं। सम्पूर्ण कर्मकाण्ड या वैदिक यज्ञों को उन्होंने लौकिक से अलौकिक धरातल पर उतार दिया है, ठीक वैसे ही, जैसे लौकिक शृंगार को भक्त कवियों ने अलौकिक रूप दे दिया है। आध्यात्मीकरण की इस प्रक्रिया में कम से कम दो-छान्दोग्य एवं बृहदारण्यक-उपनिषदों ने वाग्यज्ञ का विस्तृत विवेचन किया है। बृहदारण्यक-उपनिषद् ने तो जिस विराट् अश्व की प्रतिमा, आरम्भ में ही प्रस्तुत की है और उसकी बलि का विधान किया है, वह वस्तुत: मन, उसकी कल्पना-शक्ति, उसका क्षेत्र और वाणी में उसकी अभिव्यक्ति से भिन्न, कुछ और प्रतीत ही नहीं होती।[16] इन दोनों उपनिषदों में संकेतित इस वाग्यज्ञ की कुछ विरल रेखाओं को एक साथ प्रस्तुत करने का उद्देश्य केवल यह स्पष्ट करना है कि रचना चाहे किसी भी प्रकार की क्यों न हो, ऐसे संकेतों की उपलब्धि हो ही जाती है, जो रचयिता की उस मान्यता को झलका दे, जो उसकी रचना प्रक्रिया के समय उसके अन्तर्मन में विद्यमान रहती है।

पुरुष का रस वाणी है, वाणी का रस ऋक्, ऋक् का रस साम है और साम का रस उद्गीथ है।[17] प्राण ही साम है,[18] साम ही उद्गीथ है, प्राण ही उद्गाता है[19] और वही तेजोमय वाक् है।[20] चित्त संकल्पों का आश्रय है,[21] संकल्प मन को प्रेरित करते हैं[22] और मन ही वाणी का प्रेरक है।[23] मन ही आत्मा का विश्वचक्षु है।[24] इस वाणी या उद्गीथ की उपासना अंगिरा ने की, उन्होंने अंगों के रस को पहचाना अत: वे आंगिरस माने जाते हैं।[25] इसी उद्गीथ की उपासना बृहस्पति ने की, वाक् ही बृहती है, उसके वह पति हैं।[26] मृत्यु से

१६. बृहदारण्यक—१।१।१—६ और ६।१।११।
१७. छान्दोग्य १।१, रसानां रसः वेदादिरसाः। छान्दोग्य १।५ (बानी को सिंगार वेद रस ही बखानिए। (गंग कवि)।
१८. बृहदारण्यक १।३।२२।
१९. १।३।२३।
२०. छान्दोग्य ६।६।
२१. ७।५।
२२. छान्दोग्य ७।८
२३. छा० ७।३।।
२४. छा० ८।१२।
२५. छा० १।२ और बृहदा० १।३।८
२६. छा० १।२ और बृहदा० १।३।२०—२१, बृहती एक विशेष छन्द है।

छन्दसीय देवता अभी विद्या में प्रविष्ट हो गये, छन्दों के द्वारा वे आवृत या आच्छादित हुए, यही छन्दों का छन्दस्त्व है।[17] साम गान के रूप में विद्वान् साम ही गाते हैं, साम ही गाते हैं।[18] ये सामगान या अभीष्ट गान प्राणों की गहराई से उठने वाले उच्छ्वास हैं, इसी से 'गीः' 'वाचा' और 'गिरः' कहे जाते हैं।[19] वाणी ही देवलोक, मन ही अन्तरिक्ष लोक और प्राण ही पृथ्वीलोक है। वाक् देवता, मन पितर और प्राण ही मनुष्य हैं।[20] स्पष्ट है कि प्राण, मन और वाणी का समन्वय ही तीनों लोकों का-देव, पितर और मानवों का संगम है।

जिस हृदय-पुण्डरीक और उसमें पुरुष-यज्ञ का उल्लेख अनेक उपनिषदों में किया गया है[21] उस हृदय की तीन मुख्य विशेषताएं हैं—'हृ हरति' (काव्य की भाषा में अनुभूतियों का संचय); 'द ददति' (उसका दान या अभिव्यक्ति) तथा 'य' 'गति' संप्रेषणीयता या निरंतर हरति-ददति का क्रम)।[22] मन ही इस यज्ञ-पुरुष का आत्मा है और वाणी ही जाया या यज्ञ-प्रिया।[23] मानव-सृष्टि के मूल में इस प्रजापति का मिथुनीभाव ही मुख्य है।[24] वह पुरुष तेजोमय और अमृतमय है।[25] इस महान् भूत का निःश्वसन ही इतिहास और पुराण है।[26] पृथिवी, द्यौः, अन्तरिक्ष और समुद्र आदि इसकी कलायें हैं।[27] वह स्वयं षोडश-कला-सम्पन्न है।[28] वही कवि, मनीषी, परिभू और स्वयम्भूः है।[29] इस मधुकृत् का ही पुष्प इतिहास-पुराण है।[30] ऋग्वेद भी उसका ही पुष्प है।[31] इस प्रिय आत्म-पुरुष की ही उपासना करनी चाहिए।[32] जो पद से इस आत्मा को प्राप्त करते हैं, वे कीर्ति और श्लोक प्राप्त करते हैं।[33] प्राणों के इस संगीत का स्वरूप विविध ऋतुओं में बदलता रहता है—"ऋतुषु पञ्चविधं सामोपासीत, वसन्तो हिंकारो[34], ग्रीष्मः प्रस्तावो, वर्षा उद्गीथः[35], शरत् प्रतिहारो, हेमन्तो निधनम्"[36] (छा० २। ५)।

१७. देवा वै मृत्योर्बिभ्यतस्त्रयीं विद्यां प्राविशंस्ते छन्दोभिरच्छादयन् यदेभिरच्छादयंस्तच्छन्दसां छन्दस्त्वम्। छा० १।४।
१८. छा० १।७
१९. प्राणेन हि ... वाक् गीः वा गी ... गिरः इत्याचक्षते। छा० १।३।
२०. बृहदा० १।५।४ और १।५।८।
२१. कठ २।१।१२, केन० ३।३।२।
२२. बृहदा० ५।३।१।
२३. मन एवास्यात्मा वाक् जाया प्राणः प्रजा चक्षुर्मानुषं ...। बृहदा० १।४।१७।
२४. बृहदा० १।४।३।
२५. बृहदा० २।५।१।
२६. अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद् इतिहासः पुराणं ...। बृहदा० २।४।१०।
२७. छा० ४।६।
२८. छा० ६।७।
२९. ईशावास्य ८।
३०. छा० ३।४।
३१. छा० ३।१।
३२. बृहदा० १।४।८।
३३. बृहदा० १।४।७।
३४. 'हिंकारो' ... ... है द्रष्टव्य छान्दोग्य २।११।
३५. लोष्ठारसहित, ... विस्तृत करते,
कोन पुरुष ... ... ,
मिले मिले ... । विश्व कवि रवीन्द्रनाथ।
३६. विधवद् ... ।

वह वाग्यज्ञ स्वान्तः सुखाय भी होता है; स्वराट् की स्थिति, आत्मरति, आत्मक्रीड़ा, आत्म मिथुन एवं आत्मानन्द से ही उपलब्ध होती है।[४७] आत्मा की कामना जब लोकोन्मुख होती है तो वैराज की स्थिति आती है, उस समय सारा संसार ही उसे प्रिय हो जाता है।[४८]

यह आत्मपुरुष, यज्ञ या कवि, स्मृतिजन्य और सर्जनात्मक कल्पना से सम्पन्न होने के कारण स्वयं प्रकाशमान् है।[४९] वह अदृष्ट का भी द्रष्टा, अश्रुत का भी श्रोता, अमंत का भी मन्ता और अविज्ञात का भी विज्ञाता है।[५०] उसके पास रथ नहीं है, रथ-योग्य पंथ भी नहीं है, पर वह रथ और पंथ, दोनों की ही सृष्टि कर लेता है। वह निरानन्द को सानन्द, अमुद को मुद, और अप्रमुद को प्रमुद में परिवर्तित कर सकता है। वह मरु-प्रान्तर में सरस पुष्करिणी का सृजन करने में सक्षम है। यही उसका कर्तृत्व है, इसीलिए उसे कर्ता कहा जाता है।[५१]

कवि का आयतन हृदय है, लोक मन है और वह स्वयं ज्योतिर्मय है।[५२] इस हृदय-आयतन का जिसे ज्ञान है, वह जन-हृदय को भी पहचानता है। वह स्व-हृदय का लोक-हृदय से सामंजस्य स्थापित करने में भी समर्थ है। उसका हृदय लोक-हृदय, और लोक का हृदय ही उसका अपना हृदय बन जाता है।[५३] तभी तो कवि की हृदय रूपी वीणा की झंकार, विश्व की हृदय-वीणा के स्वर मुखरित करती है। भाव के साधारणीकरण का बीज इसी में निहित है।

वाग्यज्ञ या वाणी की साधना में निरत कवि, जब अपने ही हृदय-आयतन की अनुभूतियों में मन-प्राण से विभोर हो उठता है तब वह उत्क्रान्तदर्शी होता है। उस समय उसे इस बाह्य-लोक का कुछ भी दिखाई नहीं देता, कुछ भी सुनाई नहीं पड़ता, न कुछ जानता है, यह स्थिति ही भूमा है। जो यह भूमा है, वही सुख (आनन्द) है।[५४] पुरुष-मन और जाया-वाक् का यह परस्परालिंगन, प्रिय-स्त्री के आलिंगन सदृश ही आनन्ददायक है।[५५] अनुभूति और अभिव्यक्ति के आलिंगन का यह क्षण, एक प्रकार का ही बन्धन है। वह श्रेय और प्रेय के द्विविध रूपों में पुरुष को बाँधता है, साधु केवल श्रेय का ही वरण करता है, प्रेय का नहीं।[५६] 'सर्वाणि भूतानि श्रैष्ठ्याय कल्पन्ते' (बृहदा० ५।१३।३) द्वारा उपनिषद्-कार ने सारे प्राणियों के लिए श्रेष्ठता को ही एक मात्र लक्ष्य निर्धारित किया है। उच्च

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४७. छा० ७ । २५ ।

४८. बृहदा० २ । ४ । ५ ।

४९. श्वेताश्वतर-न तत्र सूर्यो भाति ६ । १४ 'जहां न जाय रवि तहां जाय कवि'।

५०. बृहदा० ३ । ७ । २३ ।

५१. न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्ति । अथ रथान् रथ योगान् पथः सृजते, न तत्रानन्दाः मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्ति । अथानन्दान् मुदः प्रमुदः सृजते, न तत्र वेशान्ताः पुष्करिण्य स्रवन्त्यो भवन्ति । अथ वेशान्तान् पुष्करिणीः स्रवन्तीः सृजते, स हि कर्ता । बृहदा० ४ । ३ । १० ।

५२. बृहदा० ३ । ६ । १४ ।

५३. बृहदा० ६ । ? । ५ ।

५४. यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा । छा० ७ । २४ । यो वै भूमा तत्सुखम् । छा० ७ । २३ ।

५५. बृहदा० ४ । ३ । २१ ।

५६. कठ० १ । २ । १ ।

कोटि के काव्य के लिए इससे उत्तम लक्ष्य और कोई भी नहीं है। काव्य में जिस सत्य की अभिव्यक्ति होनी चाहिए, कभी-कभी कवि, जान बूझ कर उस पर कंचन का आवरण डाल देता है; उसकी सत्य-धर्म की दृष्टि निमीलित हो जाती है, तब उसे पूषन् से यह प्रार्थना करनी पड़ती है कि उसे अपावृत कर (कंचन-मोह से मुक्त कर) सत्य-दृष्टि प्रदान करे।"[17]

उपनिषदों के उक्त उद्धरणों में पाये हुए—वाक्, मन, प्राण, कवि, कर्ता, रस, संकल्प, छन्द, हृदय, मिथुनीभाव, कला, इतिहास, पुराण, कीर्ति, श्लोक, ऋतु-गीत, कल्पना-शक्ति, कवि-सामर्थ्य, लोक हृदय से कवि-हृदय का सामंजस्य (साधारणीकरण), भूमा, भूमा-सुख, श्रेय-प्रेय एवं काव्य की सत्य-दृष्टि आदि—शब्द एवं उनकी सांकेतिक व्याख्यायें ठीक वे ही हैं जिनका उपयोग काव्य-सिद्धान्तों के प्रतिपादन एवं स्पष्टीकरण में किया जाता है। कवि, काव्य, काव्य-हेतु, काव्य-सिद्धान्त और काव्य-लक्ष्यों के निर्धारण में उपनिषदों की इन व्याख्याओं का प्रचुर प्रश्रय लिया गया है। उदाहरण के लिए राजशेखर के काव्य-पुरुष के वर्णन को प्रस्तुत किया जा सकता है।[18]

वाणी की विशेषताओं का संकेत वैदिक ऋचाओं, ब्राह्मणों, उपनिषदों तथा विविध सूत्र-ग्रन्थों में मिल जाता है। वाणी को आकार देने वाले शब्दों के शुद्ध रूप और उपयुक्त अर्थों में उनके प्रयोग की ओर सर्वप्रथम ध्यान, निघण्टुओं, निरुक्तों और प्रातिशाख्यों के द्वारा दिया गया। वेदांगों की जो ६ विधायें विकसित हुईं, उनमें व्याकरणों ने शब्द, शब्द-शक्ति एवं अर्थ से उसके सम्बन्धों का विवेचन सबसे अधिक किया। ऐन्द्र, चान्द्र और सारस्वत आदि अनेक शब्द-शास्त्रों की परम्परायें प्रकाश में आईं। सर्वाधिक वैज्ञानिक और संक्षिप्त रूप पाणिनि के अष्टाध्यायी सूत्रों का रहा। देशज शब्दों के प्रयोगों को व्याकरण-सम्मत बनाने का प्रयत्न कात्यायन ने अपने वार्तिकों द्वारा किया, किन्तु पतंजलि ने उन्हे स्वीकार नहीं किया और पाणिनि के व्याकरण-सिद्ध रूपों पर ही अधिक बल दिया। पतंजलि का महाभाष्य वैदिक और लौकिक संस्कृत की परंपराओं को जोड़ने वाली अन्तिम कड़ी है।

पतंजलि के समय तक पालि और प्राकृत जन-सामान्य के क्षेत्र की सीमा का अतिक्रमण कर साहित्य में भी प्रयुक्त होने लगी थीं। बुद्ध के तीनों पिटक एवं जातक कथाओं का पर्याप्त प्रचार हो चुका था। लौकिक संस्कृत में भी रामायण और महाभारत का सृजन हो चुका था। पाणिनि के भी 'जाम्बवती जय' काव्य का उल्लेख मिलता है।[19] पाणिनि ने स्वयं नट-सूत्रों के कर्ता शिलालिन् और कृशाश्व का उल्लेख किया है,[20] किन्तु संस्कृत एवं प्राकृत में जिस प्रकार के काव्य-ग्रन्थों का विकास हुआ, उसका कोई सैद्धान्तिक रूप उस समय तक निर्धारित नहीं हुआ था। रामायण और महाभारत भी इतिहास-पुराण ही कहे जाते थे। शब्द-प्रयोग के विषयों (क्षेत्रों) की चर्चा करते हुए महाभाष्यकार पतंजलि

१७. हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम्।
तत् त्वं पूषन् अपावृणु सत्य-धर्माय दृष्टये। बृहदा० ५।१५।१।
तुलनीय-'माधव हम परिनाम निरासा' विद्यापति पदावली (बेनीपुरी) २५४।

१८. काव्य मीमांसा-तृतीय अध्याय।

१९. काव्य मीमांसा—अथ: शक्तिमते...।

२०. अष्टाध्यायी—४।३।११० तथा ४।३।१११।

ने जहाँ वेद, उपनिषद्, वाकोवाक्य, इतिहास और पुराण का उल्लेख[61] किया है वहाँ 'काव्य' का संकेत भी नहीं है। काव्य शब्द या उसकी सिद्धि की कोई चर्चा नहीं है। 'कविता' (कवितायें)[62] का उल्लेख अवश्य है और उसका 'कवि के भाव' के अर्थ में प्रयोग किया गया है। संभव है उस समय तक मुक्तक काव्य 'कविता' तथा प्रबन्ध काव्य 'इतिहास-पुराण' के अन्तर्गत परिगणित होते होंगे। 'संग्रह'[63] का उल्लेख भाष्यकार ने किया है, जिसका अर्थ टीकाकारों ने व्याडि कृत लक्षश्लोक संख्यक ग्रन्थ किया है।

उपनिषदों की भांति ही महाभाष्य भी कोई काव्य-शास्त्रीय ग्रन्थ नहीं है, परन्तु उसमें भी कुछ ऐसे निश्चित संकेत उपलब्ध होते हैं, जिनका प्रभाव काव्य-विवेचन की सरणि पर बहुत अधिक पड़ा है, ऐसे कुछ महत्त्वपूर्ण संकेतों का ही उल्लेख यहां किया जायेगा।

जो व्यवहार के समय शब्दों के प्रयोग में कुशल है वह अनन्त जय प्राप्त करता है, किन्तु वाग्योगवित् अपशब्दों से दूषित भी हो सकता है।[64] प्रकृति-प्रत्यय के विभाग से अर्थ-विशेष का बोध कराने वाली वाणी को जो जानता है वही वाग्योगवित् है।[65] जिस प्रकार उपनिषद्कार ने देवों को छन्द में प्रतिष्ठित किया, उसी प्रकार पतंजलि ने महान् देव, 'शब्द' को मरणधर्मा मनुष्यों में।[66] शब्द नित्य है, शब्द का 'स्वं' उसका अर्थ ही है।[67] दुष्ट शब्दों के प्रयोग से अर्थ-सिद्धि संभव नहीं है।[68] 'सिद्धे शब्दार्थ सम्बन्धे'[69] की व्याख्या का इतना समादर हुआ और शिष्ट जन-मानस पर इसका इतना गहरा प्रभाव पड़ा कि 'शब्द' का तात्पर्य 'व्याकरण-सिद्ध-शब्द' ही स्वीकार कर लिया गया और उपयुक्त अर्थ के साथ उसका नित्य या संपृक्त सम्बन्ध स्वयंसिद्ध समझा जाने लगा।[70] इस मान्यता का ही यह परिणाम हुआ कि प्रारम्भ के काव्य-शास्त्रियों ने 'शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्'[71] 'शब्दार्थौ सहितं काव्यम्'[72] कह कर ही यह मान लिया था कि काव्य की परिभाषा पूर्ण हो गई। शब्द और अर्थ तथा इन दोनों के पारस्परिक सम्बन्धों का संस्कार उन्हें परंपरा से प्राप्त तथा मान्य था। अर्थ निश्चित करने की प्रक्रिया में महाभाष्यकार ने शब्द-शक्तियों का भी संकेत किया है।[73] उन्होंने यह भी कहा है कि शब्द और अर्थ का सम्बन्ध बहुत कुछ लोक पर निर्भर करता है।[74] शब्द-प्रयोग में प्रयत्न करने वाले अप्रवीण तथा अकृतप्रयत्न भी प्रवीण हो सकते हैं[75]। यह अभ्यास की अपेक्षा प्रतिभा की ओर संकेत है।

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६१. महाभाष्य, पस्पशाह्निक २।१।१ का भाष्य।
६२. महाभाष्य ५।४।१० का भाष्य।
६३. महा० १।१।१ का भाष्य।
६४. महाभाष्य १।१।१ पस्प० पृ० ११ (निर्णय सागर प्रेस-प्रति)।
६५. वही, पृ० ११।
६६. वही, पृ० ४१।
६७. महा० १।१।६ पृ० ५४६।
६८. महा० १।१।१ पृ० ३०।
६९. वही, पृ० ५६।
७०. वही, पृ० ६२ 'वागर्थाविव संपृक्तौ'। रघुवंश १।१।
७१. ७२. भामह और रुद्रट की काव्य परिभाषायें।
७३. समर्थः पद विधिः २।१।१ का भाष्य।
७४. लोकतः १।१।१ का भाष्य, पृ० ६४।
७५. वही, पृ० ७१।

भाष्यकार ने विविध प्रसंगों पर ऐसे शब्दों का भी प्रयोग किया है, जो काव्य-विवेचन या उसके सिद्धान्त-निर्धारण में व्यवहृत हुए हैं ; जैसे—उपगीत, प्रगीत, ग्राम्य, प्रगल्भगीत, अप्रगल्भगीत, योग, मंगल, शक्ति, कला, अनुभव्य और कल्पना आदि।"[७९] यद्यपि ये शब्द काव्यालोचन में जिन अर्थों में प्रयुक्त हुए हैं, उन्हीं अर्थों में यहाँ नहीं हैं, पर व्युत्पत्ति की दृष्टि से वे उनके बहुत समीप हैं। 'दुष्टः शब्दः' या 'अपशब्द' से शब्द-दोषों पर विचार करने की प्रेरणा मिली होगी। च्युत-संस्कृति दोष तो स्पष्टतः व्याकरण-विरुद्ध प्रयोग ही है।

काव्य-सिद्धान्तों को स्पष्ट रूप में प्रस्तुत करने वाला उपलब्ध एवं प्रथम ग्रन्थ भरत मुनि का नाट्य-शास्त्र ही है। नाट्य शास्त्र के पूर्व ही बाल्मीकि का रामायण निर्मित हो चुका था और आदि काव्य के रूप में उसका महत्त्व भी प्रतिष्ठित हो चुका था। उसमें भी उत्तम काव्य-नायक के गुण, आदर्श वीर-चरित, चरित दोष, पाठफल, कारुणिक, शोक, श्लोक, पदरचना, गेय, शब्द की श्लोक प्रवृत्ति, सरस्वती (वाणी), अविदित की अवगतता, भावितात्मा, अनुष्टुभ् छन्द, पाठ्य, माधुर्य, शोभा, प्रमुदित-हृदय, अश्रु, आश्चर्य, गीतों का गान, छन्दोविद्, करुणा, संवेदना, वाणी की सार्थकता, काव्य-सृजन की प्रेरणा, रस, संदेश और अलंकृति आदि—शब्दों के प्रयोग से काव्य-तत्त्वों का संकेत किया गया है। वैदिक साहित्य एवं आदि काव्य रामायण में व्यक्त काव्य-सिद्धान्त सम्बन्धी संकेतों ने ही उस पूर्व पीठिका का निर्माण किया है, जिस पर नाट्य-शास्त्र के रस-सिद्धान्त सहित अन्य काव्य-सिद्धान्तों का भव्य-भवन आगे चल कर खड़ा हुआ। भरत मुनि ने आर्ष दृष्टिकोण को अपने विवेचन में प्रचुर महत्ता प्रदान की है।

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७९. द्रष्टव्य क्रमशः पृ० ८२, ८९, १०५, ९६, ९६, २७५, ६२, १२६ तथा ६।३। ३४, ३।१।१०७ और २।९।१० का भाष्य।

शिवप्रसाद गोयल

गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह के ब्रजभाषा-काव्य में प्रकृति-चित्रण का स्वरूप

गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह सच्चे गुरु एवम् मार्गदर्शक थे। वे सिखों के दसवें धर्मगुरु ही नहीं थे वरन् महापराक्रमी, रणवीर, नीति-निपुण, गहन विचारक, अद्भुत् संगठनकर्त्ता, राजनीति के परम विज्ञ एवं चतुर खिलाड़ी, दिव्यदृष्टि-सम्पन्न एवं काव्य-शास्त्र-मर्मज्ञ थे। सिखों में शास्त्रज्ञान का अभाव उन्हें बहुत अखरा और उन्होंने बहुत से सिखों को व्याकरण, साहित्य, दर्शन आदि के अध्ययन के लिए काशी भेजा था।[1] वे पर्याप्त सुन्दर काव्य-रचना करते थे।[2] अनेक कवि उनके आश्रय में रहा करते थे।[3] गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह ने हिन्दी में कई अच्छे साहित्यिक ग्रन्थों की रचना की है।[4] गुरु जी के दशमग्रन्थ में इन सब काव्यग्रंथों का संग्रह हुआ है। इन ग्रन्थों में से अधिकांश शुद्ध साहित्यिक ब्रजभाषा में लिखे गये हैं।

यद्यपि अनेक विद्वानों ने गुरु जी को 'दशमग्रन्थ' का रचयिता मानने में संदेह प्रकट किया है,[5] किन्तु डा० धर्मपाल अष्ट ने बहिर्साक्ष्य और अन्त: साक्ष्य के आधार पर यह सिद्ध किया है कि दशमग्रन्थ की समस्त रचनाएं गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह ने ही रची हैं।[6]

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१. हिन्दी साहित्य का इतिहास, रामचन्द्र शुक्ल, पृ० १९३-९४।

२. "……From it, it appears that Gobind Singh was very expert in making poetry." —History of the Sikhs, Henry Court, p. 46.

३. "The Guru kept fifty-two bards permanently in his employ and others occasionally visited him. They wrote on all the nine subjects (love, mirth, pity, anger, heroism, terror, hate, wonder and contentment), which in the opinion of the orientals are suitable themes of poetry; but the composition of eulogies on the Guru occupied most of their attention."

—The Sikh Religion, M.A. Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 161.

भाई कान्हसिंह ने अपने 'महान कोश', भाग ४, पृष्ठ २५१० पर इन ५२ कवियों के नाम दिये हैं।

४. हिन्दी साहित्य का इतिहास, रामचन्द्र शुक्ल, पृष्ठ १९४।

५. (a) The Sikh Religion, M.A. Macauliffe, Vol. V, pp. 161 and 260.
   (b) A History of Sikhs, J.D. Cunningham, p. 356.
   (c) Transformation of Sikhism, Dr. G.C. Narang, p. 342.
   (d) Evolution of the Khalsa, Indu Bhushan Banerji, Vol. II, p. 189.

६. The sevenfold external evidence and sixfold internal one together with that of a matchless style with a vigorous uniformity of its own, when fully weighed and considered, leads one to the conclusion that the whole of the Dasam Granth, with all its parts, without exception, is the work of one poet alone and that that poet is no other than Guru Gobind Singh.

—The Poetry of the Dasam Granth, Dr. Dharam Pal Ashta, p. 31.

दशम गुरु के दशमग्रन्थ का काव्य उत्तम कोटि का काव्य है जिसमें ब्रह्म, जीव और जगत् के सभी विषयों और क्षेत्रों को ग्रहण किया गया है। प्रकृति का इन सभी से अविच्छिन्न सम्बन्ध है। प्रकृति जड़ भी है और चेतन भी। सृष्टि के प्रारम्भ से ही प्रकृति का मानवजीवन से अपरिहार्य सम्बन्ध रहा है और कवियों को वह विशेष रूप से मोहती आई है। यही कारण है कि कविता के जन्म से लेकर अब तक प्रायः सभी काव्यों में प्रकृति किसी न किसी रूप में चित्रित होती रही है। वास्तविकता तो यह है कि कविता का जन्म ही प्रकृति के माध्यम से हुआ जब सर्वप्रथम आदि कवि के मुख से, काम-विमोहित क्रौंचमिथुन में से एक को व्याधे के द्वारा वध किया जाता देखकर, यह वाणी फूट पड़ी थी :—

'मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।
यत्क्रौंचमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥'

अस्तु, गुरु गोविन्दसिंह के 'दशमग्रन्थ' के विभिन्न काव्यों के अनेक पहलुओं में से यदि हम केवल उनके प्रकृति-वर्णन का निरीक्षण करें तो यह पायेंगे कि वे अपने युग के अन्य कवियों से पीछे नहीं रहे। गुरु जी एकमात्र कवि ही नहीं थे कि वे अपना सम्पूर्ण समय काव्यसाधना में लगाते और न उन्हें कविता को जीविका का साधन बनाना था। संगठन, संघर्ष और युद्धों की विषम परिस्थितियों में अपने काव्यप्रेम के कारण स्वान्तःसुखाय उन्होंने काव्य रचना की, उनमें पत्र और प्रमाद के से प्रकृति के पूर्ण संश्लिष्ट चित्र ढूंढना अनुचित होगा। आनन्दपुर, पांवटा आदि प्राकृतिक रम्य स्थलों पर रहते हुए यद्यपि वे कभी-कभी समय मिलने पर प्रकृति का सूक्ष्म निरीक्षण किया करते थे और उससे आनन्दित होते थे, किन्तु प्रकृति का स्वतन्त्र आलम्बन रूप में वर्णन वे न कर पाये। रीतिकाल में, जिसमें गुरु गोविन्दसिंह का काव्य रचा गया, वैसे भी स्वतंत्र प्रकृति-वर्णनों का अभाव-सा है। प्राचीन कवि-परम्परा से प्रकृति के जो सांचे हम चुके थे, स्वतन्त्र प्रकृति-निरीक्षण के अभाव में, इस युग के कवियों ने सिद्धान्त और व्यवहार दोनों में उन्हीं का अनुकरण किया।[७] कवियों की दृष्टि प्रकृति से हट कर मानव-जीवन और उक्ति-चातुर्य पर केन्द्रित हो रही थी। प्रकृति-चित्रण परम्परा-पालन का एक मात्र अंग रह गया था। दशमग्रन्थ के काव्य में भी प्रकृति-चित्रण की दिशा में इसी परम्परा-पालन के दर्शन होते हैं। इसमें मुख्य रूप से अलंकार-रूप में, जीवन की पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में, उद्दीपन रूप में, मानवीकरण के रूप में और रहस्यवाद के रूप में प्रकृति-वर्णन हुआ है। दशमग्रन्थ का यह प्रकृतिवर्णन सर्वतोभावेण पर्याप्त प्रभावशाली एवं मनोमुग्धकारी बन पड़ा है।

अलंकार-रूप में प्रकृति

प्रकृति वह अवगुण्ठनवती सुन्दरी है जिसका सौन्दर्य आवरण-ग्रस्त नहीं रह पाता, उसकी सुषमा फूट-फूट कर चारों ओर छिटकती है। अपनी अभिव्यक्ति को स्पष्ट, सुबोध, प्रभूत एवं समलंकृत करने के लिए तथा उसमें अर्थ-चमत्कार एवं शब्द-गौरव लाने के लिए दशमग्रन्थ के कवि ने प्रकृति का आश्रय लिया है। मानवीय सौंदर्य, मुखशोभा, रमणियों

७. हिन्दी काव्य में प्रकृति-चित्रण, डॉ॰ किरण कुमारी गुप्ता, १०९ ।

तथा जीवन की अन्य गतिविधियों को मूर्तिमान करने के लिये कवि ने मीन,[8] कंज,[8] खंजन,[8] भ्रमर,[8] तोता,[8] कबूतर,[8] कोयल,[8] मोर,[8] बिम्बाफल,[8] अनार,[8] चन्द्रमा,[9] नीरद,[10] गगन,[10] तड़ित,[10] बक-पंक्ति[10] आदि प्राकृतिक पदार्थों को उपमान रूप में ग्रहण किया है।

युद्ध में रह-रहकर तलवारों के टकराने से उठने वाली चिनगारी पर भाद्रपद मास की रात्रि में चमकने वाले जुगनुओं की उत्प्रेक्षा कितनी सार्थक और चित्र को स्पष्ट तथा सजीव बनाने वाली है :—

> सार सो सार की धार बजी झनकार उठी तिहु ते चिनगारी।
> मानहु भादव मास की रैन लसै पटबीजन की चमकारी।[11]

अंग-सौंदर्य और गंध के स्पष्टीकरण के लिए संदेह से पुष्ट पुष्पों की उत्प्रेक्षाएं देखिए, कितनी भली लगती हैं :—

> किधौं फूलमाला लसै चन्द्रमा-सी। किधौं पदमनी मैं बनी मालती-सी।
> किधौं पुहप अनिआ फुली राइबेलं। तजैं अंग ते बास चंपा फुलेलं॥[12]

दूध, छाछ और चन्द्रमा के साथ-साथ कवि ने उज्ज्वलता के लिए गंगा की जलधारा, चांदनी, हंसिनी, चंपा और मालती के पुष्पों तथा चांदी, पारा, शोरा और हीरा जैसे खनिज पदार्थों तक से उपमाएं दी हैं।[13] स्वच्छता और उज्ज्वलता के लिए प्रकृति में से इतने अधिक सार्थक उपमानों को एकत्र कर भव्यरूप में संजो पाना सुगम नहीं है।

जीवन की पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में प्रकृति

रीतिकालीन कृष्णकाव्य में रासलीला और राधाकृष्ण की शृंगारभावना की पृष्ठ-भूमि के रूप में प्रकृति का चित्रण किया गया है। दशमगुरु के 'कृष्णावतार' काव्य में कृष्ण

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८. मीन मुरझाने कंज खंजन खिसाने अलि फिरत दिवाने बन डोलैं जित तित ही।
कीर अउ कपोत बिंब कोकला कलापी बन रूठे-रूठे फिरै मन चैनहूं न कित ही।
दारम दरक गइओ पेख दसननि पांत रूप ही की क्रांति जग फैल रही सित ही।
ऐसी गुनसागर उजागर सुनागर है लीनो मन मेरो हरि नैन कोर चित ही।
—चंडीचरित्र (प्रथम), छंद ८६।

९. लखो रूपवंती महाराज दासी। मनो चीर कै चाव चंद्रा निकासी।
—ज्ञान प्रबोध, छन्द १८८।

१०. भूमि को भार उतारन को जगदीस बिचार कै जुद्ध ठटा॥
गरजै मदमत्त करी बदरा बंगपंत लसै मनु दंत गटा॥
चहरे तनत्रान फिरै नर बीर लिए बरछी कर बिज्जुछटा॥
दल दैतन को अरि देवन पै उमड्यो मानो घोर मलय्य घटा।
—चंडी चरित्र (प्रथम), छंद ९२।

११. चंडीचरित्र (प्रथम), छंद ११८।

१२. ज्ञान प्रबोध, छंद १८९।

१३. छोर कैसी छीरावध छाछ कैसी छत्रानेर छपाकर कैसी छब कालिन्दी के कूल के।
हंसनी सी सबा रूम हीरा सी हुसैनाबाद गंगा कैसी धार चली सातों सिंध रूल के॥
पारा सी पलाऊगढ़ रूपा कैसी रामपुर सोरा सी सुरंगाबाद नीके रही झूल के।
चंपा सी चंदेरी कोट चांदनी सी चांदागढ़ कीरति तिहारी रही मालती सी फूल के॥
—अकाल उस्तुत, छंद २६४

की रासलीला के वर्णन में प्रकृति पृष्ठभूमि का काम करती है। मेकालिफ़ के अनुसार गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह कृष्ण की क्रीड़ाओं, गोपियों के साथ उनकी रासलीला तथा राधा के प्रति उनके विशेष समर्पणभाव का अत्यन्त आनन्दपूर्वक वर्णन किया करते थे। गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह उत्तर में यमुना-तट पर निवास करते थे और अपना पराक्रम दिखा रहे थे। उधर, दक्षिण में, उसी यमुना के तट पर किये गये कृष्ण के पराक्रमों ने उन्हें हिन्दुओं में देवत्व प्रदान किया। इसीलिए अपने साहित्यिक परिश्रम के बीच-बीच में वे यमुना को बालू की शय्या पर अठखेलियाँ करते हुए बड़े चाव से ध्यानपूर्वक देखा करते थे और उसकी नीली लहरों तथा उज्ज्वल फ़ेन की सराहना किया करते थे।"[१४] इसी कारण उनके काव्य में वनों, पर्वतों, नदियों, वृक्षों, पुष्पों तथा पशु-पक्षियों का वैविध्यपूर्ण विस्तृत वर्णन स्वयमेव आ गया है। इन वर्णनों में गुरुजी ने रीतिकालीन नाम-परिगणन शैली को ही अधिकतर अपनाया है अथवा प्रकृति के माध्यम से परोक्ष व्यंग किये हैं। प्राकृतिक पदार्थों की पृष्ठभूमि को लेकर मानव के अज्ञान, कृपणता और ईश्वर में अविश्वास-भावना आदि पर दशमग्रन्थकार के सुन्दर व्यंगों का एक उदाहरण लीजिए :—

> मानिबोई करत मोर दादुर करत मोर सदा घनघोर घन करिबोई करत है।
> एक पाइ ठाढे सदा बन मे रहत बिच्छ फूंक-फूंक पांव भूमि स्रावग धरत है॥
> पाहन अनेक जुग एक ठौर बासु करैं काग अउर चील देस-देस बिचरत है।
> गिआन के बिहीन महादान मैं न हूजै लीन भावना यकीन दीन कैसे कै तरत है॥"[१५]

'कृष्णावतार' में वनश्री-वर्णन, संयोग और रासलीला के लिए कितनी सुन्दर पृष्ठ-भूमि प्रस्तुत करता है —

> बेन बिराजत है जिह जा गुन चंपक की सुप्रभा अति पाई।
> मौलसिरी गुललाल गुलाब धरा तिन फूलन को छबि छाई।
> चंपक मौलसिरी बट ताल लवंगलता कचनार सुहाई।
> बार करौ झरना गिर ते कबि स्याम कहै अति ही सुखदाई॥"[१६]

इसी प्रकार 'रामावतार' काव्य में वनवास के अवसर पर सीता के राम के साथ चलने के आग्रह पर राम द्वारा वन की गहनता और भयंकरता का वर्णन, उसे भयभीत कर

१४. The Guru delighted to describe the sports of Krishan, the circular dances performed by him and the milk-maids, and his special devotion to Radhika, his queen. It was further to the south, on the margin of the same river, that Krishan disported himself and performed those great feats which have secured him deification among the Hindus .....At intervals in his literary labour he used to watch the river rolling over its shingly bed, and admire its sparkling foam and blue wavelets.

—The Sikh Religion, M.A. Macauliffe, Vol. V, p. 22.

१५. अकाल उस्तुत, छंद ८१।

१६. कृष्णावतार, छंद ५८१।

अयोध्या में ही रहने के लिए प्रेरित करने की पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया गया है :—

ऊंचे द्रुम साल जहां लांबे बट ताल तहां ऐसी ठौर तप कउ पधारै ऐसो कौन है ।
जाकी छबि देखे दुति खांडव की फीकी लागै आभा ताकी नंदन बिलोक भजे मौन है ।।
तारन की कहा नैकु नभ न निहार्यो जाई सूरज की जोत तहां चंद्र की न जौन है ।
देव न निहार्यो कोऊ दैत न बिहार्यो तहां पंछी की न गंम जहां चींटी को न गौन है ।।[17]

× × ×

गूंजत सिंह डकारत कोल भयानक भील लखे भ्रम ऐहै ।
सूंकत सांप बकारत बाघ भकारत भूत महाबुख पैहै ।।[18]

पाख्यान चरित्र में कवि ने वृन्दावन का इसी प्रकार विस्तृत वर्णन किया है जिसके अन्तर्गत वृक्षों, पुष्पों, पक्षियों, झरनों आदि का सूची-परिगणन शैली में उल्लेख हुआ है । एक ही स्थल पर प्रकृति का इतना विस्तृत वर्णन गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह के पूर्ववर्ती सिख गुरुओं में से किसी ने नहीं किया है ।

प्रकृति का उद्दीपनकारी रूप

शृंगार-वर्णन में प्रकृति संयोग में सुख और मिलनोत्सुकता को तथा वियोग में दुःख को उद्दीप्त करती है । 'कृष्णावतार' काव्य में संयोग के अवसर पर प्रकृति का मनोहारी रूप गोपिकाओं को कृष्ण के साथ गोकुल चल कर क्रीड़ा करने के लिए उद्दीप्त करता है और वे कृष्ण से गोकुल चलने का आग्रह करती हैं :—

बासि भलो द्रुम छांह भली जमना ढिग है मग है तट जाके ।
कोटि झरैं झरना तिहि ते जग मैं सम तुल्य नहीं कछु ताके ।।
बोलत है पिक कोकिल मोर किधौं बन मैं चहुं ओरन बाके ।
बेग चलो तुम गोकुल को तज पुन्न हजार भये तुम गाके ।।[19]

इसी प्रकार सावन की सुंदर चांदनी रात गोपिकाओं को रस-केलि करने के लिए उद्दीप्त कर देती है :—

चांदनी सुन्दर रात बिखै कबि स्याम कहै सु बिखै रितु सावन ।
ग्वारनियां तजि कै पुर को मिलि केलि करैं रस नीकनि ठावन ।।[20]

और यही दशा कृष्ण की भी है । वे कामोद्दीप्त हो कर राधा को ग्रस लेते हैं ।[21]

१७. रामावतार, छंद १०० ।
१८. वही, छंद २४८ ।
१९. कृष्णावतार, छंद १५० ।
२०. कृष्णावतार, छंद ५५२ ।
२१. जहां चंद की चांदनी छाजत है जहं पात चंबेली की सेज बही है ।
सेत जहां गुल राजत है जिह के जमना ढिग आइ बही है ।।
ताहि समै हरि राधे ग्रसी उपमा तिहि की कबि स्याम कही है ।
सेत त्रिया तन स्याम हरी मनो सोम कला हरि राह गही है ।। —वही, छंद ५२१

संयोग में प्रकृति का रूप आह्लादकारी प्रतीत होता है, किन्तु वियोग में नायक-नायिका की मनोदशा के मेल में न होने के कारण वह दुःखदायक होने लगता है और प्रकृति उपालम्भ की पात्र बन जाती है। 'कृष्णावतार' काव्य के 'बारह-माह' (बारह-मासा) वर्णन में प्रसन्नवदना प्रकृति वियोगिनी गोपिकाओं को संयोगकालीन सुख की स्मृति करा कर उनके वर्तमान दुःख को और अधिक बढ़ाने का काम करती है। वर्षा ऋतु में बादलों की गड़गड़ाहट तथा चातक मोर और दादुरों की जो आनन्द ध्वनि संयोग-काल में गोपियों के मन में कृष्ण-प्रेम को वर्द्धित कर उन्हें प्रेम-क्रीड़ा के लिए प्रवृत्त करती थी, वियोग में वही दुःखदायक बन जाती है :—

> घोर घटा घन घाए जहा मधि बूंदन मेघ भली छबि पाई।
> बोलत चातक दादुर अउ घन मोरन पै घनघोर लगाई॥
> ताहि समै हम कान्हर के सग खेलत थीं अति प्रेम बढ़ाई।
> सौन समय सुखदायक थी रितु औसर याहि भई दुखदाई॥[12]

दशमग्रन्थ के कृष्णावतार काव्य के 'बारह-माह' वर्णन में ऐसे अनेक चित्र भरे पड़े हैं।

प्रकृति का मानवीकरण

प्रकृति को मानव-रूप प्रदान करने की प्रवृत्ति अत्यन्त प्राचीन है। पतंजलि ने एक स्थान पर लिखा है —'पत्थरो सुनो'।[13] भवभूति एक स्थान पर लिखते हैं—"पहाड़ भी रो देता है और वज्र का हृदय भी फट जाता है।"[14] दशमग्रन्थ में प्रकृति का शुद्ध मानवीकरण तो नहीं मिलता किन्तु मानव के सुख-दुःख में उससे प्रभावित होते हुए तथा सहानुभूति संवेदना आदि प्रकट करते हुए उसे अवश्य चित्रित किया गया है। 'रामावतार' काव्य में वियोग-संतप्त राम की वियोगाग्नि से तपते हुए वन का शीतल समीर स्वयं जलने लगता है और सरोवर में आकर शरण लेने के लिए विवश होता है :—

> तन राघव भेंट समीर जरी। तज धीर सरोवर मांझ दुरी॥[15]

'कृष्णावतार' में गोपियां कृष्ण-वियोग में तुलसी के राम की भांति[16] वृक्षों और वनों आदि से कृष्ण का पता पूछती फिरती हैं :—

> पै जिहि के हम कारन को पग कंटक को सिर धूप सहो रे।
> सो हमको तुम देहु बताइ परौ तुम पाइन जावन हो रे॥[17]
> × × ×
> पाइ परौ कहियो बन भ्रात कहो हरि जी किहि ओर पधारे॥[18]

१२. वही, छंद ८७१।
१३. —पतंजलि महाभाष्य
१४. अपि ग्रावा रोदित्यपि दलति वज्रस्य हृदयं। —उत्तररामचरित, भवभूति
१५. रामावतार, छंद ३६१।
१६. हे खग, हे मृग, हे मधुकर श्रेनी। तुम्ह देखी सीता मृगनैनी॥ —रामचरितमानस, तुलसीदास।
१७. कृष्णावतार, छंद ४८०।
१८. वही, छंद ४८६।

यहाँ प्रकृति का संवेदनकारी रूप ग्रहण किया गया है, किन्तु मुरली-वादन से प्रभावित होकर वृक्षों का रस-धार बहाना पर्वतों का पिघल कर झरने के रूप में बहने लगना[९] और यमुना का स्तब्ध हो जाना[१०] आदि वर्णन मानवीकरण के अच्छे निदर्शन हैं।

रहस्यवाद के रूप में प्रकृतिचित्रण

दशमग्रंथ में कवि ने सम्पूर्ण जड़ और चेतन प्रकृति को प्रायः ब्रह्ममय देखा है। भूमि, आकाश, पाताल, रसातल, यक्ष, भुजंग आदि सभी प्राकृतिक पदार्थ उसी एक प्रभु की खोज करते और उसका ध्यान धारण करते हैं :—

> जच्छ भुजंग सु दानव देव अभेव तुम्हैं सब ही कर ध्यावैं।
> भूमि, अकास, पताल, रसातल, जच्छ भुजंग सबै सिर नावैं॥
> पाइ सकै नहिं पार प्रभाउ को नेतिहि नेतिहि भेद बतावैं।
> खोज थके सब ही खुजिया सुर हार परे हरि हाथ न आवैं॥[११]

चन्द्रमा और सूर्य आदि ज्योतिपिंड उस ईश्वर की ज्योति से ही ज्योतित हैं तथा पावक और पवन का जन्मदाता भी वही है :—

> दुति चंद दिनेसहि दीप दई। जिह पावक पौन प्रचंड मई॥[१२]

इस सृष्टि का अणु-परमाणु सब ब्रह्मरूप है, उसीसे उसकी उत्पत्ति हुई है और अन्त में वह उसी में समा जायगा अर्थात् समस्त प्राकृतिक पदार्थों में मूलभूत तत्त्व ब्रह्म ही है :—

> जैसे एक आग ते कनूका कोट आग उठे निआरे-निआरे हुई कै फेरि आग में मिलाहिंगे।
> जैसे एक धूर ते अनेक धूर पूरत है धूर के कनूका फेर धूर ही समाहिंगे॥
> जैसे एक नद ते तरंग कोटि उपजत हैं पानि कै तरंग सबै पानि ही कहाहिंगे।
> तैसे बिस्वरूप ते अभूत भूत प्रगट हुई ताहि ते उपज सबै ताहि मैं समाहिंगे॥[१३]

ब्रह्म न केवल प्रकृति के समस्त सौंदर्य में व्याप्त है, उसकी उत्पत्ति का मूल कारण है, वरन् वह सब को गति एवं शक्ति भी प्रदान करता है।[१४]

इस प्रकार प्रकृति के प्रति दशमग्रंथकार गुरु गोबिन्दसिंह का दृष्टिकोण अति व्यापक है। उन्होंने प्रकृति को अपने समस्त सौंदर्य से युक्त रूप में निहारा है और अपने युग के कवियों के अनुरूप अपने काव्य में उसका रूप सजाया-संवारा है। उनका कोई काव्य

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९. रूखन ते रस चूवन लाग झरै झरना गिर तें सुखदाई॥
—वही, छंद ६५०

१०. ठाढ़ रही जमुना सुनि के धुन राग मले सुनिबे को चही है॥
—वही, छंद ६५१

११. अकाल उस्तुत, छंद २४६।

१२. वही, छंद २५२।

१३. वही, छंद ८७।

१४. वही, छंद २५६।

ऐसा नहीं है जिसमें प्रकृति के किसी न किसी रूप में दर्शन न होते हों। प्रकृति के सम्पर्क में रहकर, जब-जब उन्हें अवकाश मिलता था, वे प्रकृति का सूक्ष्म निरीक्षण किया करते थे। यद्यपि उनके काव्य के प्रकृतिवर्णनों में अधिकतर परम्परा-पालन के ही दर्शन होते हैं, किन्तु कहीं-कहीं उनमें मौलिकता और निजी निरीक्षण की छाप भी मिलती है। खेद है, नागरी लिपि में सुलभ न होने के कारण हिन्दी के अधिकांश काव्य-रसिक और विद्वान् दशमगुरु गोविन्दसिंह के काव्य का आनन्द नहीं ले पाते। शोध-संस्थानों और विश्वविद्यालयों को इस दिशा में प्रयत्न करना चाहिए जिससे अधिकाधिक काव्य-मर्मज्ञ दशम-ग्रंथ में निहित काव्य-रत्नों को अधिकाधिक प्रकाश में ला सकें और सारे देशवासी उससे लाभान्वित हो सकें।

रणजीत सिंह

सन्त वाणियों में "अध्यास"

सन्तों की वाणियों में जीव-ब्रह्म की एकता का प्रतिपादन शास्त्रीय दृष्टि से न होकर व्यावहारिक दृष्टि से है, क्योंकि सन्तों की दृष्टि सिद्धान्तपरक न होकर व्यवहार मूलक ही अधिक है। परन्तु सन्तों की वाणियों का तात्त्विक प्रयोजन भी विद्वानों ने निकाल ही लिया। इसके परिणाम स्वरूप हिन्दी साहित्य में सन्त वाणियों का अध्ययन तात्त्विक पक्ष और सामाजिक पक्ष इन दो आधारों पर होने लगा। तात्त्विक पक्ष को लेकर विद्वानों ने उन्हें रहस्यवादी, अद्वैतवादी, अभेदवादी, आदि कोटियों में विभक्त करना आरम्भ कर दिया। सामाजिक पक्ष वालों ने उन्हें समाज सुधारक, लोक नायक की उपाधियाँ बाँटनी आरम्भ कर दीं।

सन्तों की वाणियों में उपलब्ध जाति निषेध को तात्त्विकों ने कोई महत्त्व नहीं दिया, जबकि सामाजिक पक्ष वालों ने उसे व्यावहारिक जगत में प्रभूत मान्यता प्रदान करते हुए केन्द्र ही मान लिया। मेरी विचार धारा में सन्तों का जाति निषेध सामाजिक की अपेक्षा तात्त्विक एवं सैद्धान्तिक अधिक है। क्योंकि सन्तों की विचार धारा में आत्मा में किसी भी प्रकार की जाति नहीं होती, किन्तु मूर्खता एवं अज्ञान के कारण आत्मा में जातित्व का अध्यास हो जाता है।

अध्यास

आत्मा और परमात्मा तत्वत: एक होते हुए भी अध्यास के कारण भिन्न-भिन्न सत्ता सम्पन्न दृष्टिगोचर होते हैं। अध्यास के ही दूसरे नाम भ्रम, अज्ञान, अविद्या और माया हैं। अध्यास अनादि, अनन्त एवं नैसर्गिक है। मिथ्या ज्ञान रूप, कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व का प्रवर्तक और सबके लिए प्रत्यक्ष है। जगत के समस्त प्रमाण और प्रमेय व्यवहार की मूल भित्ति यही अध्यास है। इस विषय में पशु और मनुष्य में किसी भी प्रकार का अन्तर नहीं। सन्तों की वाणियों से निष्कर्ष निकलता है कि यह अध्यास कहीं तो संयोग से और कहीं रूप से होता है। संयोग अध्यास का उदाहरण हमें सुन्दर दास की वाणियों में इस प्रकार मिलता है :—

देह के संयोग पाइ जीव ऐस नाम भयो,
घट के संयोग घटाकास ही कहायो है।
इस्वर सकल बिराट में बिराजमान,
मठ के संयोग मठाकास नाम पायो है।
महाकास मांहि सब घट पट फिर देखियत,
बाहिर भीतर एक गगन समायो है।
तैसे ही सुन्दर ब्रह्म जीव ईस्वर,
अनेक जीव विविध उपाधि भेद अन्धन में आयो है[1]।

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१. सुन्दर दास, 'सुन्दर विलास', पृ० १५१।

यारी साहिब की वाणियों में रूप अध्यास का उदाहरण भी स्पष्ट रूप से इस प्रकार मिलता है :—

देखु विचारी हिये अपने नर देह धरो तो कहा बिगरो है।
यह मिट्टी के खेल-खिलौना बनो एक भाजन नाम अनन्त धरो है।
नेक प्रतीत हिये नहिं आवत भर्म भूलो नर अवरो करो है।
भूषन माहिं गवाई के देखु, यारी कंचन अनेकों जैन धरो है।[१]

पशु इत्यादि भी संयोग अध्यास के कारण यदा-कदा अखाद्य पदार्थों को खाते देखे गए हैं। रूप अध्यास के कारण तो हम निरन्तर पशुओं को डराने के लिए खेतों में मनुष्याकृति बना कर उन्हें वस्त्रादि पहिनाते हैं।

अध्यास की सामग्री

यद्यपि सन्तों की वाणियों में कहीं भी अध्यास की सामग्री का विवरण नहीं मिलता, तथापि उनकी वाणियों के अध्ययन के उपरान्त इस विषय पर यत् किंचित् प्रकाश अवश्य पड़ता है। इसके आधार पर अध्यास की सामग्री अर्थात् कारणों को निम्न प्रकार समझा जा सकता है :—

सजातीय वस्तु के ज्ञान जन्य संस्कार[२] अध्यास के कारण हैं। इसमें वस्तु के सत्य अथवा मिथ्या होने की कोई अनिवार्यता नहीं। प्रमाण, प्रमेय और प्रमाता दोष को बहुत से विद्वान अध्यास का कारण मानते हैं। परन्तु यह सिद्धान्त भी सत्य नहीं है, क्योंकि हम इसका विरोध सन्त वाणियों में बार-बार देखते हैं। सादृश्य दोष के बिना भी आत्मा में जाति का अध्यास होना देखा गया है; जबकि आत्मा में जाति का सादृश्य नहीं। जैसे आत्मा में सादृश्य के बिना भी जाति का अध्यास हो जाता है, वैसे ही सादृश्य के बिना भी अहंकार आदि रूप का अध्यास भी हो जाता है। प्रमेय दोष अध्यास का कारण है, यह भी देखने में नहीं आता। इस तथ्य को निश्चल दास ने इस प्रकार स्पष्ट किया है :—

दोष को न हेतुता अध्यास विषे देखियत,
पट विषे हेतु जैसे तुरी-तन्तु वेम है।[३]

प्रमाता दोष एवं प्रमाण दोष भी कोई कारण नहीं है। क्योंकि प्रमाता राग-रहित शुद्ध चक्षु सन्यासी को भी रजत में प्रीति न होने पर भी सीपी में चाँदी दिखाई दे जाती है। फिर यह अध्यास क्यों और कैसे होता है? इसका एक मात्र उत्तर है कि अध्यास सदैव पूर्वानुभव जनित संस्कारों से ही हुआ करता है, तथा उस संस्कार के समान ही अध्यास होता है। सभी अध्यासों का उपादान कारण जो अविद्या है, वह तो सर्वत्र समान ही होती है। परन्तु निमित्त कारण जो पूर्वानुभव जन्य संस्कार होते हैं, वे विलक्षण होते हैं। जिस पदार्थ का अहमाकार ज्ञान जन्य संस्कार के सहित अविद्या का परिणाम हो, उस पदार्थ का अहमाकार रूप अध्यास होता है, तथा जिसका इदमाकार अनुभव ज्ञान जन्य संस्कार के सहित अविद्या का परिणाम हो, उस पदार्थ का इदमाकार का रूप अध्यास होता है।

१. यारी साहब (रत्नावली), पृ० १६।
२. सजातीय ज्ञान संस्कार ते अध्यास होत, सत्य ज्ञान जन्य संस्कार को न नेम है।
निश्चल दास, "विचार सागर", द्वितीयतरंग।
३. निश्चल दास, "विचार सागर", पृ० ५१।

इस प्रकार सन्तों के विचार से सांसारिकों में "स्व" और पर की अनुभूति उदित होती है। "स्व"—अनुभूति के आधार पर मनुष्य और पशुओं में स्वार्थ परायणता और "पर" के आधार पर अपने से भिन्न सत्ता का आभास होता है। इसी लिये सांसारिकों में "स्व" के प्रति मोह एवं "पर" के प्रति घृणा जागृत होती है। "स्व" की सीमा शरीर और मन दोनों को आवृत करती है। अर्थात् शरीर सम्बन्ध से, गोत्र सम्बन्ध से, अन्वय सम्बन्ध से और जाति सम्बन्ध से जो स्वकीय है, तथा मन अर्थात् विचारों की तुल्यता के कारण जो हमारे निकट हैं, उनका एक वर्ग एक समाज बन जाता है। यह वर्ग या समाज "पर" के प्रति घृणा, द्वेष, एवं अनास्था का प्रतीक होता है। इस लिए भी सन्तों ने अपनी वाणियों में अध्यास को बुरा माना है। और वर्ण व्यवस्था की अवहेलना की है। इस अवहेलना का यह अभिप्राय कदापि नहीं कि सन्त विश्रृंखल समाज के पक्षपाती थे अपितु वे तो पूर्ण समाज के प्रचारक थे। अतः उन्होंने एक पूर्ण समाज, एक पूर्ण भगवान की स्थापना हेतु अपने विचारों को फैलाया। सन्तों की वाणियों का प्रमुख सार बृहदारण्यको-पनिषद् के अर्थों में निम्न प्रकार है :—

पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ।

इस पूर्णता के लिए आवश्यक था कि सन्त अध्यास की ओर लोगों का ध्यान आकृष्ट करते ।

HISTORY

D. Awasthi

ROLE OF AZIZAN IN THE REVOLT OF 1857-58

If there be fuel prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire. The fuel of discontentment, misery and chaos was ready in India by the 30th day of May 1857, and the unsuspected source whence the spark came was the infamous cartridge, the fat on which enkindled and inflamed revolt. The new firing missile brought by the new rulers for their own protection threw the oppressors themselves under intense fire capable of reducing them to ashes.

The fourth day of June of that fateful year found Kanpur surrounded by rebels. A beginning was made by the 2nd Cavalry. The night was still young when a pistol was fired thrice in Company barracks and a bunglow was set on fire. It is said that Tika Singh,[1] who was on picket duty with his troops gave these signals which were promptly followed by others. The mutineers rushed to burn buildings, and to take possession of the regimental treasury. Among them was Azizan, a beautiful and charming dancing girl, who set an example of daring, organizational skill and protection.

Historians have given different versions about Azizan's early life and parentage. According to Shankar Bomanji, Azizan was born in Lucknow in 1832. Her father's name was Husain Khan and mother's Hamida Begum. Her mother died soon after her birth.[2] V.D. Gokhale is of the opinion that the news of the outbreak of the Revolt of 1857 in Meerut on May 10, made Azizan anti-British. The massacre of her kith and kin in Etawah during the course of the Revolt further made her indignant.[3] This view of Gokhale indicates that Azizan belonged to Etawah. Hardikar says that Azizan used to put up in Umrao Begum's house at Kanpur. This view is perhaps based on the following statement of Ram Din while giving particulars about Azizan :-

"Question : Where is (*sic*,-are) the prostitute Asseesun (Azizan) and her servants ?

"Answer : I do not know.

"Question : Where did she reside ?

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1. Mutiny Narrative, N W.P. Agra, Cawnpore District; Depositions taken at Cawnpore, Deposition N. 23, pp. 59-60. Vide also Hardikar, S.B. *Attharah-Sao-Sattavan*, p. 120.
2. Shankar Bomanji's 'Azizan' cited in the 'TRIPATHGA', Lucknow, Vol. II, Year 12, November 1966, p. 38.
3. V.D. Gokhale's 'Sahryadris' cited in the 'TRIPATHGA', Lucknow, Vol. II, Year 12, November 1966, p. 37.

"**Answer** : In the house of Oomrao Begum in the Setringee (Shatranji or Satrangi) Mahal.

"**Question** : Who is Oomrao Begum ?

"**Answer** : She is a prostitute, and is now at Farruckabad; the girl Assesun (Azizan) rented her house."[4]

But according to Colonel William's enquiry Azizan was in the keeping of Seth Kalloo Mal.[5]

On the basis of these accounts it appears probable that Azizan was born in Lucknow, had migrated to Kanpur and had her relatives at Etawah. At Kanpur she was a tenant of Oomrao Begum and was in the keeping of Kalloo Mal.

On June 7, when a Proclamation was issued by the Indian revolutionaries of Kanpur exhorting all true Hindus and Muslims to unite and rally round Nana Saheb, Azizan obeyed it promptly and collected a squad of brave and fearless women. Sir George Trevelyan has thus given a picture of Azizan :

"Azeezan, the Demoiselle Theroigne of the revolt, appeared on horse-back, amid a group of her admirers dressed in the uniform of her favoured regiment, armed with pistols, and decorated with medals".[6]

Almost the same picture of Azizan has been presented by Janki Prasad, a merchant of Kanpur. He says :

"The day the flag was raised, she was on horse-back in male attire decorated with medals, armed with a brace of pistols, and joined the crusade. I saw her as thousands of others did also."[7]

Thus donning male attire Azizan entered the battlefield alongwih her band of brave women in similar attire. The main responsibility of this band of women warriors was to inform the people about the nation's war, to tend wounded sepoys and to look after their comforts. To quote A.S. Misra,

"They distributed milk, fruits, and sweetmeats amongst the sepoys. When needed, they also helped in reaching supplies and ammunition to the fighters at the entrenchement, regardless of the fire from the enemy."[8]

Azizan, apart from extending such help, was greatly attached to some of the top leaders of the Revolt like Tatya Tope, Azimullah Khan,

4. Mutiny Narrative, N.W.P. Agra, Cawnpore District; Depositions taken at Cawnpore, Deposition No. 16, pp. 40-41.
5. *Ibid.*, Deposition No. 28, pp. 68-69
6. Trevelyan, G.B., 'Cawnpore', p. 99.
7. Evidence of Jankee Prasad, Deposition No. 22 at page 53; vide also Deposition No. 25, p. 66.
8. Misra, A.S., 'Nana Saheb', p. 560.

Shamsooddeen Khan, Kazi Wasiuddin Khan, Tikka Singh, Jwala Prasad and Hulas Singh, who used to chalk out their programmes of action against British.[9] Some historians believe that Azimullah was one of her lovers. But Dr. Vir Bharti Singh is of the view that Azizan loved Azimullah Khan and Azimullah did not. He loved some girl at Delhi[10]. Hardikar also, not expressedly but tacitly, hints at close intimacy between Azizan and Azimullah Khan. But V. D. Gokhale does not at all agree with Hardikar. He says that Shamsooddeen Khan was the real lover of Azizan and not Azimullah Khan.[11] Previously Shamsooddeen was a Subedar in the English Army, but later on he joined Nana Saheb. This change of sides and loyalty by Shamsooddeen was due to Azizan's influence. The news of his death in the battle of Fatehpur on 12th July, 1857, made Azizan furious and she took up arms against the British.[12]

How keenly was she interested in the Revolt and how thoroughly had she organized men and women can be seen from the statement of Kanhaiya Prasad, the deposed Mahajan of Kanpur. He says :

"I was at Cawnpore when the mutiny broke out at that station, and state what I know of it."

"When the news of the Meerut mutiny was received there was much excitement amongst the troops at Cawnpore and reports were rife that they would follow the example of the troops at Meerut. I was on bad terms with the sowars of the 2nd Cavalry, as a year previous to the Mutiny, four of the troopers had been imprisoned on a complaint made by me. I therefore feared their vengeance. I knew that many of the troopers frequented the house of a prostitude named Asseesun (Azizan), and bought over her servant Emambux (Imam Bakhsh). She informed me that the sowars of the 2nd Cavalry were plotting with the Nana, and that a mutiny had taken place between the parties."[13]

These words of Kanhaiya Prasad also reveal her intimacy with the men of the 2nd Cavalry.

9. For details see 'Diary of Events during the Uprising at Kanpur by Nanak Chand; *vide* also Mutiny Narrative, N.W.P. Agra, Cawnpore District; Depositions taken at Cawnpore; Deposition No. 16, pp. 40-41; *vide* also Foreign Political Proceedings, 30th Dec. 1859, (Deposition 23); *vide* also Gupta, P.C., Nana Sahib and the Rising at Cawnpore, p. 85.

10. Cited in Amar Bahadur Singh Amresh's article on "Azizan' in the 'Tripathga; Lucknow, Vol II, year 12, Nov. 1966, p. 38.

अजीजन के मनस्ताप का कारण चाहे अनेक लोगों की समझ में न आया हो, लेकिन उसके निकटवर्ती लोगों को यह मालूम था। क्रांति के विचार से मोहित हुए उसके प्रेमी शमसुद्दीन को तो यह निश्चित ही मालूम था।

—गोखले, वी०डी०, *op. cit.* p. 38.

12. Amar Bahadur 'Amresh', *Op. cit.* pp. 38-39.

13. Mutiny Narrative, N.W.P. Agra, Cawnpore District; Depositions taken at Cawnpore, Deposition No. 16, pp. 40-41.

On the recapture of Kanpur, Azizan was arrested and brought before General Havelock.[14] He was so much enamoured of her 'surpassing beauty' that he could not believe that such a good looking woman could have the manly qualities which she possessed. He was even prepared to pardon and spare her life if she showed repentance. But the brave Azizan declined saying that "I want the destruction of the British." With the result that she too was ordered to be shot dead like other revolutionaries.[15] As the bullets of the firing squad pierced her body, she remembered her master and cried *Nana Saheb Ki Jai*. This account of Azizan's last moments has been extracted from Hardikar's book.[16] But there is some doubt in the correctness of the fact that Azizan was shot dead as she was one of the witnesses in the enquiry conducted by Colonel Williams after the restoration of British authority.[17] While under arrest she gave the following answers to the enquires made of her :

"What do you know about the religious flag at Cownpore ?"

"Answer—I heard that it was raised by Azeemullah Khan, who took Moulvie Salamutullah with him. The Moulvie in vain attempted to resist. He also took all the residents of the city, and said 'If you don't come I will blow you from the mouth of canon'; he must have also taken Kazi Wasiuddeen. The sowars collected all the people, and took them to a house near the canal and they took me also. They were about 1,000 persons, men and women collected there. The Nana and Azeemullah ordered the people to attack the entrenchment. Moulvie Salamutullah and the people said, 'you first attack them, then we will'. They then sent the people away and I also returned home. I remember seeing the Nunney Nawab, Azim Ali Khan, *Darogah;* Agha Meer Shah Ali; Recar Ali;[18] Moulvie Salamut Oollah, Baker Ali; Kazi Wasi-uddeen; and Ahmad Ali Khan, *Vakeel*, Moulvie Ubdul Rahman; Hoolas Singh, *Kotwal*, and Raheem Khan, Native Doctor; and all the Government officials were present, and a good many from the city whose names I don't know."[19]

Another important point which cannot be said to be free from doubt in Sri Hardikar's book about Azizan is when he associates her with the Bibighar murders. He says that she was responsible for instigating the

14. Azizan, according to Amar Bahadur Singh, was arrested at Etawah. The 'Tripathga', Lucknow, Vol. II, Year 12, November 1966, p. 39; *vide* also for details see Williams' Committee Report.
15. Azizan was shot dead under the Williams Committee sometime before 20th September.
Ibid., *Loc. cit.*
16. Hardikar, S.B., *Op. cit.*, pp 124-139
17. Colonel Williams' 'Memorandum on the investigations regarding out break at Kanpur in June 1857', pp. 18-21.
18. Appears misspelt for some other name; it may be Riaz Ali.
19. Mutiny Narrative, Cawnpore District; Depositions taken at Cawnpore, Deposition No. 28, p. 69.

murders at Bibighar.[20] In fact she was Hussaini Khanum, popularly known as the Begum[21] and not Azizan as has been made clear in the enquiry of Colonel Williams. Apart from Colonel Williams' enquiry the statement of Mohammad Ali[22] made before Forbes-Mitchell also proves that it was not Azizan but Begum who was associated with Bibighar massacre. Pandit Sundar Lal has also condemned the views of Hardikar in this affair.[23] It is equally interesting to note here that Colonel Williams has also referred about a dancing girl named Adla belonging to Kanpur. His description of this courtesan is also very much similar to Azizan's. But this does not mean that Adla was Azizan, because the former was residing at Bithoor under Nana Saheb since Maharaja Baji Rao's time (1850), and the latter according to Colonel William's enquiry was in the keeping of Seth Kalloo Mal of Kanpur. Thus it becomes clear that both Azizan and Adla were two different dancing girls who took keen interest in the 1857 Revolt. Following is the description of Adla by Colonel Williams :

"Adla, by birth and profession a courtesan, born at Mugrassa, resided with the Nana from 1850, and from receiving Rs. 200 p.m. and becoming a favourite, was, it is said, endowed with the jewels belonging to the widows of late Peshwa, valued at Rs. 50,000. On the Nana's flight from Bithoor, she was sent in a boat some distance up the river; but returning to Cawnpore in August 1857, was secreted in a house in the Butcher-Khana, went from thence to Misreepore, zillah Humeerpore, and is now said to be at Mugrassa, near Kanpur, under the care of a man named Mundhoo; having promised, she states to await one year at Kanpur the return of the Nana to that station. The sister of Mundhoo, named Kareena, resides with Oojagur Dobey of Dahabey, zillah Cownpore, and the jewels are said to be secreted in his house".[24]

The differences among historians can in no way affect the heroic image of Azizan who, though a dancing girl by birih, was second to none in the love of her country for which she made the supreme sacrifice.

20. Hardikar, S.B., *Op. cit.*, p. 139.
21. She was one of the four slave girls of Baji Rao and continued in the family even after his death. She was looking after the ladies confined in Bibighar and served food to them. Colonel Williams is of the opinion that she had carried the order for the massacre of the prisoners to the sepoy-guard placed over them and who, on their refusing to execute it, is said to have returned to fetch five men to finish the prisoners.

    For details see : Col. Williams, *Op. cit.*, pp. 18-21; *vide* also Shepherd's 'Personal Narrative of the Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore', pp , 157-59; *vide* also Forrest, State Papers, II, xlvii-xlix.
22. Mohommad Ali Khan belonged to Rohilkhand. He had served as Jamadar of the Company's Engineers after passing his examination in civil engineering from the Government Engineering College at Roorkee. He had also accompanied Rana Jang Bahadur of Nepal as his P.A. to London. He was all the time assisting Azimullah Khan after his return from London. He was a widely travelled man.

    For details see: Forbes.Mitchell, 'Reminiscences', Chapt. X.
23. cited in the 'Tripathga', Lucknow, *Op. cit*, p. 39.
24. Colonel Williams, *Op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

R.C. Jauhri

AMERICAN RESPONSE TO QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT 1942

American interest in India's freedom entered a significant phase during the Second World War. The Americans realised the strategic importance of India as a reservoir of man power and supplier of war material. India was vital for Allied war effort. The duel between Indian nationalism and British imperialism hampered the war effort. The only way to get the people of India fight was to get them fight for India. The political aspirations of Indian people and their fulfilment became a military necessity. The American Government began to exercise diplomatic pressure on the British Government for an early grant of freedom to India.

The opening of an American mission at Delhi in 1941 signified American recognition of India's potential for independence.[1] With the signing of the Atlantic Charter, America was openly committed to independence for the colonies. Indians henceforth looked to America for help in their freedom struggle. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill was alarmed and asserted that Atlantic Charter applied to the states of Europe under Nazi yoke, and that was a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self governing institutions in the regions owing allegiance to the British Crown.[2] This unilateral interpretation of the Charter excluding India and Burma from the purview, shattered the anti colonial stand of America. The American Government disagreed with Churchill's interpretation, yet on grounds of expediency, did not openly repudiate the British stand.[3]

Pearl Harbor brought America directly into the war. India at once became a part of American security and national defence. The American Government shed its reluctance to discuss India's freedom with the British. President Franklin D. Roosevelt raised the issue with Churchill during the latter's visit to Washington in December 1941. Churchill's reaction was very sharp and nothing tangible came out.[4] The rapid victories of Japan brought the war to the very gates of India. To boost up Indian war effort, American Government with the concurrence of the British, organised a technical mission under the Chairmanship of Colonel

1. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* : 1941, III (Washington, 1959), pp. 170-176. Hereafter cited as *FR*
2. *House of Commons' Debate*, Vol, 374, c. 68-69, Hereafter cited as *H.C. Deb.*
3. *FR* : 1941, III, pp. 186-187 ; *The Memoirs of Cordell* Hull, (New York, 1948), p. 1484.
4. Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, (Boston, 1950), p. 209.

Louis Johnson.[5] The success of the technical mission was not likely unless the political situation in India improved and the British made substantial constitutional concessions. President Roosevelt directed American Ambassador in London John G. Winant to explore the feasibility of a new relationship between Britain and India. Later on, the President directly wrote to Churchill urging the desirability of setting up a temporary national government in India, headed by a small representative group covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies.[6]

Churchill did not approve Roosevelt's approach to the Indian problem, yet to assuage American opinion he announced the appointment of Cripps Mission on March 11, 1942.[7] During Sir Stafford Cripps visit to India, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative in India Colonel Louis Johnson also arrived. He tried to resolve the deadlock between Cripps and Indian leaders. President Roosevelt also made a last minute effort to save the Cripps Mission from failure. Churchill, however wriggled out.[8]

The failure of Cripps Mission increased Indian hostility towards Britain. Indian nationalists felt that if the British were unwilling to transfer power in their hour of peril, there was no hope of their doing so after the war. The British added fuel to fire by their propaganda that Gandhiji was pro Japanese. They blamed the Congress party for the failure of Cripps and dubbed it as a non-representative body. The Earl of Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington delivered a lengthy speech on 'The Position of India' at Town Hall, New York on 7th April, 1942, explaining British policy. He emphasised the acute divisions and disunity in India, making it difficult for the British to end the constitutional deadlock.[9] This British propaganda was meant for consumption in America. The Americans did not approve the British contentions. Eminent Americans protested. Louis Fischer wrote : Great Britain is fighting the battle of India in America by a whispering campaign against Gandhi. This whispering campaign is certainly not helping to solve the problem of India. And it is in India that the battle of India must be fought.[10] Mrs. Pearl Buck branded as false propaganda, British efforts to paint the Indian leaders as appeasers of Japan. Gandhi was cheered as a "great liberty loving democrat of democrats."[11] He was regarded "incapable of consciously or deliberately devising, imagining or approving treachery in any form."[12]

5. *FR* : 1942, I (Washington, 1960), p. 613.
6. *Ibid*., pp. 615-16.
7. *Command Paper* 6350, p. 3. Hereafter cited as *CMD* ; Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 215.
8. *FR* : 1942, I, pp. 633-35.
9. Hamilton Fish (ed), *The American Speeches of Earl of Halifax* (New York, 1947), pp. 147-62.
10. New York *Times*, August 6, 1942, 3 : 5.
11. *Ibid*., August 7, 1942, 5 : 3.
12. *Ibid*., August 17, 1942, 14 : 6-7.

Gandhiji was convinced of British dishonesty. In his appeal to the British he argued back and forth "for orderly and timely British withdrawal from India".[13] Gandhiji's Quit India demand created misgivings among the Congress leaders Jawahar Lal Nehru and C. Raja Gopalachari. Gandhiji's logic won over Nehru. Rajaji could not be convinced and resigned from the Congress. Consious of American influence on the British, Gandhiji, before launching the Quit India movement wrote to President Roosevelt explaining his demand and as a guarantee to the Allied war effort offered to have under treaty Allied troops in India and use her as a base against the Japanese.[14] The President's response was not encouraging. His reply could reach Delhi after Gandhiji has been put in jail.[15] Merrell, Officer in charge of American Mission at Delhi also informed the State Department that Gandhi was planning the Quit India Movement and if the movement was launched, India would be lost to United Nations. Stressing the disunity among the Congress leaders, he suggested that if a declaration was made by the British with a guarantee from President Roosevelt, the crisis could be averted.[16] The American Government was concerned at the new crisis. The Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on June 3, 1942 expressed concern on the explosive conditions developing in India. Halifax informed Hull that the British Secretary of State for India, Leopold S. Amery had asked him to convey to the President that the British Government would be forced to take drastic measures against Gandhi if the movement was launched.[17] Generalssimo Chiang Kai-shek, eager to rally Indian nationalists to the defence of India, as an essential complement to the defence of China also cabled to Roosevelt on July 25, 1942 to take quick action to avert the crisis.[18] The President transmitted Chiang's message to Churchill and sought his thoughts and suggestions on the Indian crisis.[19] The Prime Minister resented Sino—American intervention in Indian affairs and informed the President that the Government of India have no doubt of their ability to carry on government with efficiency and secure India's maximum contribution to the war, whatever the Indian Congress might say or do, provided of course that their authority was not undermined.[20] The President convinced of Churchill's reasoning, took no action and informed Chiang that intervention at this stage would undermine the only existing government in India and create the very crisis which we wish to avoid.[21]

13. M.K. Gandhi, *My Appeal to the British* (New York, 1942), p. 12.
14. *FR*: 1942, I, p. 677
15. *Ibid.*, p. 703
The letter could not be delivered until two years later when Gandhiji was released
16. *FR*, 1942, I, p. 633 and 691.
17. Hull, *Memoirs*, II, p. 1487.
18. *FR*: 1942, I, pp. 696-98
19. *Ibid.*, p. 700.
20. Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 507-08.
21. *FR*: 1942, I, pp. 705-6.

Since British war effort was essential to United Nations defence and Quit India Movement was likely to affect British resources, the American attitude turned non interventionist. Giving priority to defence over independence, the American Government became critical of Quit India threat of Gandhi. Hull believed that by preaching Quit India demand Gandhi was playing into the hands of Japanese.[22] In his radio address on July 23, 1942 he warned the Indian nationalists that post war freedom could only be assured to peoples who showed themselves worthy of it.[23] The stiffening of American official attitude had the support of American public opinion. Public appeals were made to Congress party to defer the movement. Herbert Agar, editor of the Louisiville Courier Journal, Dean Christian Gaus of Princeton University, Bishop Henry W. Hobson former chairman of Fight for Freedom Committee, Walter Millis, Writer, Professor Henry P. Van Dusen of Union Theological Seminary, Alexender Sachs, economist, and others in a joint appeal to the Congress Party said, the proposed programme of Civil Disobedience would alienate American opinion and harm the cause of India. At this grave hour India cannot expect mankind to show more interest in her independence than she herself shows in the victory for the common cause.[24]

The All India Congress Committee in its resolution of August 8, 1942 endorsed Quit India Movement. The same day British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell delivered to Hull a message from Clement Attlee, stating that the British Government was arresting Gandhi and other leaders to prevent the spread of the movement[25]. Next day Gandhi and other leaders were arrested. The arrests led to wide spread disturbances mob violence and hooliganism. The Quit India Movement had begun.

President Roosevelt, and his administration were annoyed at the outbreak of the movement. Chiang Kai-shek's another plea to the President as the inspired author of the Atlantic Charter to take measures in support of Indian independence evoked the retort "irrespective of the merits of the case, any action (meaning Quit India Movement) which slows up the war effort in India results not in theoretical assistance, but in actual assistance to the armed forces of Japan" and "we have not the moral right to force ourselves upon the British and the Congress Party."[26] The leading paper, The New York *Times* in its successive editorials condemned the Congress party and supported the British. "Britain cannot tolerate anarchy in India while her own life is at stake, nor can we in this country urge her to do so", and "Americans as a nation at war with Japan refuse to countenance the non-co-operation movement.[27] Other papers

22. Hull, *Memoirs*, II, p. 1486.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 1485-86.
24. New York *Times*, August 6, 1942, 3 : 6.
25. Hull, *Memoirs*, II, p. 1488.
26. *FR*: 1942, I, pp. 716-17.
27. New York *Times*, August 3, 1942, 14 : 1, September 5, 1942, 12 : 2.

took the same line and argued. "At this stage lifting India out of British frying pan means dropping it in much hotter Japanese fire."[28]

The stiffening of American official and public attitude, and the presence of American troops in India led Indians to believe that Americans were supporting the British imperialism. American position among the Asiatic people would be adversely affected by such a belief. To counteract the belief American government directed the American troops in India not to participate in Indian internal political problems or even appear of doing so.[29] Thus America tried to disassociate herself from the repressive measures of the British.

The early collapse of the Quit India Movement, its failure to affect the war effort and the success of British repression swung the American public opinion in favour of India. Within a few days the tide turned. Numerous letters, interview reports, editorials and articles supporting Indian independence flooded the American press. There were warnings that the whole affair should not be allowed to degenerate into mere suppression of revolt.[30] India in revolt held down by British troops was regarded an open invitation to Japan.[31] Pearl Buck observed "The arrest of Congress leaders and the shooting down of Indian people reveal a spirit contrary to the principles of democracy".[32] Frederick L. Schuman, the eminent political scientist and Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, in his lectures at Williamstown and letters to the editor of *The New York Times* criticised the British policy of terrorisation in India and invoked American help for India's freedom. "All Americans" he argued "have a solemn duty to themselves to demand that this road to ruin be abandoned at once. An India ruled by force and torn by rebellion is an India mortagaged to common enemy. A sullen and beaten India will doom China to subjugation, force Russia behind the Urals, regardless of second front and deliver all Europe, Asia and Africa to the Axis. The Tory mind, which once courted catastrophe by meeting Nazi violence with non-violence is now courting an incalculably greater catastrophe by meeting Indian non-violence with violence. These silent and wanting multitudes (Indians) will conclude wrongly no doubt, but nonetheless irrevocably, that Western white men offer them only fair words and foul deeds. The time is to act now. This is America's opportunity. The most hopeful suggestion is that President should publicly propose to the British, Indian, Chinese and Soviet Governments a plan for the establishment of United Nations tribunal for settling the Indian crisis."[33] Norman Thomas, the socialist leader along with sixteen other Americans compared the Indian

28. *The Nation*, New York, August 8, 1942, p. 102.
29. *FR* 1942, I, p. 721.
30. New York *Times*, August 16, 1942, 1 : 3
31. *The Nation*, August 15, 1942, p. 123.
32. New York *Times*, August 11, 1942, 6 : 6.
33. *The Nation*, August 29, 1942, p. 180 : New York *Times*, August 16, 1942, 12 : 5.

movement with Sinn Fein uprisings in post Easter week in Ireland in 1916 and urged Hull for an assurance that Lend-lease equipment would not be used against Indians. He pleaded for the establishment of a satisfactory provisional national government in India.[34] Louis Fischer criticised the American official indifference towards India and urged a strong scolding of Britain and support for India's release from the colonial domination.[35] Senator Reynold carried the fight to the Congress chambers by his 'Help India' speech in the Senate on August 20, 1942.[36] American public opinion was stirred.

Churchill's provocative speech on September 10, 1942 in the House of Commons, wherein he branded the Congress party as powerless body and reiterated the Cripps proposals to be the settled policy of the British Government,[37] provoked a storm in America. *The New York Times* veered round in India's favour and reminded Churchill, "if they mean to recognise the freedom and equality of Indian people, they must not use against a rebellious minority any measure that they would not use against a similar minority in England.[38] Criticising Churchill's approach the editorial retorted, "We know too much about human nature to believe that a plan produced by a fallible cabinet and interpreted by a fallible emissary can be final and perfect. The whole history of the evolution of the British Empire into British Commonwealth is a ringing and noble answer to such a superstition."[39] Other periodicals characterised Churchill's speech a declaration of war on Indian National Congress. It was regarded as the speech of an unreconstructed, unrepentant imperialist.[40] There was a general demand for positive gesture on the part of the Imperial Government. The climax of American support was reached on September 29, 1942. In a meeting held at New York Town Hall more than two thousand Americans applauded again and again Mrs. Pearl Buck, Frederick L. Schuman and other speakers characterising the British policy in India as fantastic, barbaric, stupid and Tory imperialism. The shouts: India must be free, rang through the hall. The meeting organised by India League of America passed a resolution asking President Roosevelt to intervene to break the Indian deadlock. It pleaded for the support of all Americans for the fulfilment of India's political aspirations which were consistent with the declared war aims of the United Nations.[41] A memorandum signed by one hundred fifty Americans was presented to the Senate requesting the President to intervene and secure full participation

34. New York *Times*, August 17, 1942, 3 : 1.
35. *The Nation*, September 5, 1941, p. 185.
36. *Congressional Record*, (Washington, 1942), 77th Session, Congress 88 : 6887-6895.
37. *H.C. Deb.* v. 383, c. 302-305.
38. New York *Times*, August 13, 1942, 18 : 2.
39. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1942, 22 : 2.
40. *The Nation*, September 19, 1942, p. 224.
41. New York *Times*, September 30, 1942, 8 : 2.

of the Indian people in the war and assure their political freedom.[42] The public enthusiasm in favour of India rose to such heights that even the editors of the popular magazine *Life* addressed an open letter to the people of Britain arguing for independence to India.[43]

It was impossible for the American Government to remain indifferent and non-interventionist, owing to the vociferous public opinion in favour of India. Hull therefore again took up the matter with Halifax on September 17, 1942. Expressing concern over the situation in India, he asked if there was any prospect of a resumption of conversations between the United Kingdom and the Indian leaders. Halifax sidetracked the issue till Indian resistance ceased. The British intransigence annoyed Hull and he bluntly remarked, "During this deadlock there was in prospect in the United States a general movement of agitation in favour of independence for India which might create complication later on."[44]

The Anglo-American differences gave rise to various rumours and created misgivings about American capacity to influence the British policy regarding India. Since the departure of Johnson, the post of the Personal Representative of the President in India had remained vacant and it was widely believed that the British did not want the post filled.

The State Department decided to act and explore further the feasibility of some settlement between Britain and India. It could not afford to remain non-committal in view of the public feelings in America. It was decided to appoint William Phillips as Personal-Representative of the President. He was authorised to explore with an open mind the Indian situation with appropriate British officials.[45] Thus by the end of the year 1942, the American Government reverted to its earlier policy of pressing the British for granting freedom to India.

42. *Congressional Record*, 77th Session, Congress 88 : A3583.
43. *Life*, New York, October 12, 1942, 34 : 3.
44. Hull, *Memoirs*, II, p. 1490. ; *FR*: 1942, I, p. 733.
45. William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston, 1952), p. 343.

LINGUISTICS

J. D. Singh

THE BASES OF SANSKRIT PHONOLOGY

The phenomenon of speech did not fail to attract the inquisitive attention of the Vedic seers. How unique and wondrous it appeared to them. It could not but be God's own creation and gift to mankind. They showered full eulogies on it. But soon the enchanted and amazed thinker of that hoary past found himself struggling to dive deep into the mystery of this phenomenon. Facts of speech were observed, scrutinized and explanations were sought thereof. This culminated, in course of time, into the development of various schools of linguistic studies and treatises on phonetics, grammar, etymology, semantics, *etc.*, were composed. We shall here attempt to comprehend their approach and attitude to speech study and examine the framework they evolved to account for the linguistic facts, more specially in regard to phonological problems.

Metaphysical basis of speech

There are passages in Sanskrit literature, both earlier and later, that ascribe divine origin to speech. Speech came to be recognized as the only effective means of probing reality and was identified with reality itself. The whole creation emerged from speech. It was enjoined on the seeker after truth to worship and meditate on speech for its realization. *Praṇava* or *Om* came to be regarded as the primordial sound from which evolved the whole universe. This metaphysical assumption formed the bed-rock of further speculations regarding the nature of speech and it continued to be so even when more objective view was taken of linguistic facts. Patañjali, who comes after long trail of generations of scientific investigators shared it fully. To him the data of language, *i.e.*, speech-sounds, words, sentences, *etc.*, were "so many sparks of the all-illuminating Brahman." Philosophers, linguists, logicians, theologians, musicologists, mystics—none of them questioned the authenticity of this belief.

Once divine origin and eternality of speech is recognised there are certain inescapable implications. Speech in its unmanifested form rests in Brahman. It passes through several stages before it is externalized in the form of vocal noise in human. The Hindu grammarian philosopher recognises three or, according to some being four stages of its manifestation. These are: (i) *parā* "the highest" resting in Brahman and identical with Him, (ii) *paśyantī* "the supervising one", completely free from any distinctions like a seed desiring to sprout, (iii) *madhyamā*, "the middle one", the stage immediately preceding the articulate speech, an internalized (mental) form, and lastly (iv) *vaikharī* "the resounding one", the articulate speech of human beings manifested by vocal organs and apprehended by auditory ones.

Later tāntrika and grammatical literature explained at greater length how the primordial sound *praṇava* or *nāda* finds expression in human speech. It shows itself first in the *mūlādhāra*, pelvic plexus, in the form of *parā vāk*, the subtlest form of speech. From there it is carried by the internal air to *nābhi*, the navel plexus, where it assumes the form of *paśyantī*. The yogis alone are capable of realizing these two. In the region of the heart it appears as *madhyamā*. And in the throat and mouth it is manifested as *vaikharī*. At each successive stage it becomes more tangible. *Vaikharī* is its grossest form.

We may also refer here to the doctrine called *sphoṭa*. It attempts to explain how articulated speech, though perishable, is capable of revealing the various speech units, namely *varṇa* (speech sounds), *śabda* (words) and *vākya* (sentences). The competency of the speaker of a language that binds together the disjointed disparate elements of gross speech into linguisitic units capable of entering into larger constructions may be, thus, called *sphoṭa*. And we have as many sphoṭas as the linguistic units we recognize, namely, the sphoṭas of speech sound, word, sentence, *etc*.

What justification is there to posit these numerous stages of manifestation of speech may be a pertinent enquiry. Apparently, the gross speech as vocal noise is a real physical event. Nobody will deny its existence. This tangible external form of speech is the "parole" of de Saussure. In contrast to this we can surely recognize an "internal" form which is part of the psychological make up of an individual but of more general nature being shared by other members of a speech community. It may be equated with "langue." We can also think of more comprehensive and universal form of speech—an intellectualized and abstracted form. This is the *paśyantī*. Whether such a form of speech encompasses the whole universe and is identical with reality is perhaps a matter of belief and faith.

Psychological basis of speech

All the descriptions available in Sanskrit grammatical treatises pertain to the state of speech called *vaikharī*. Pāṇini, for instance, lists a number of speech sounds which are primarily described in terms of various movements of the so-called organs of speech. But it must be conceded that the physiological process is not all too mechanical. The motivating force behind is the will to seek expression. Ātman, the self, is recognised as the prime mover of this activity. With the help of *buddhi*, intellect, it formulates what is desired to be expressed through speech, and prompts the *manas*, mind, with a desire to speak. In the ultimate analysis it is *manas*, that is imbued with the desire to concretise through physiological events what *ātman* formulates with the help of *buddhi*.

Whether we accord recognition to these three elements, namely *ātmā*, *buddhi* and *manas* is a matter of convinction and choice, but it must be

admitted that there is some psychological motivation that underlies the physiological act of speech. The Hindu grammarian has given it due recognition.

Physiological basis of speech

The production of speech sound is described as follows. The mind impelled with a desire to speak ignites *kāyāgni* (the bodily fire) which in turn sets *māruta* (air) in motion. Thus starts the upward journey of air. As it reaches the *uras* (throax) it produces *mandra svara* (low pitch), at *kaṇṭha* (throat), *madhyama svara* (mid pitch) and at the *mūrdhan* (head), *tāra svara* (high pitch). Being repulsed at *mūrdhan* it is diverted to *a vaktra* (buccal cavity) where it generates diverse types of sounds. The authorities on music substantially corroborate this process except adding that the *māruta* is originally located in *brahma-granthi* and successively passes through the regions of naval, throat and head producing *dhvani*, sound.

As this description does not agree with the one given in modern text books on phonetics, a few comments are called for here. *Kāyāgani* (the bodily fire) is a technical term in medical science. Its nature, location and functions, *etc.*, are described in detail in such treatises as Caraka Sanihitā, Vāgbhaṭṭa, Suśruta, *etc.* It refers in brief to "chemical processes involved in gastro-intestinal digestion". It also exercises a general systemic influence which regulates and governs tissue metabolism all over the body. In this sense *kāyāgni* may be said to be an instrument of *manas* to urge *māruta*.

According to the medical texts *vāta* (air), another synonym of *māruta* governs respiration and motor activities of the body. However, in the production of speech, *māruta* stands for the current of air expelled from lungs through the reflex action of the diaphragm. It flows out along the the windpipe through the nasal or oral cavity. The production of any speech sound below the sub-glottal region is not possible. The various pitches are also produced only in the larynx where vocal cords are located.

With this background in view, we shall now examine the bases of description and classification of sanskrit speech sounds as attempted by Hindu grammarians. Mostly the data will be drawn from Pāṇini.

Production of speech sounds

Pāṇini has provided, in the begining of his treatises, *i.e.*, *Śikṣā* and *Aṣṭādhyāyī* an inventory of speech sounds classified into structural groups. A few more are added to this list in the course of his grammatical description. All these are produced on the egressive current of air by movements of the so-called organs of speech.

Phonetic classification

Pāṇini and other grammarians also have enunciated the following phonetic criteria to classify these speech sounds.

1. Sthāna—point of articulation
2. Prayatna—intra-buccal process
3. Anupradāna—extra buccal process
4. Kāla—duration
5. Svara—pitch

These criteria in fact relate to articulatory features. Each speech sound is a bundle of concomitant articulatory features. Except voiceless aspirate [ḥ] there is no other speech sound that is characterised by a single feature alone. We shall examine here the validity and adequacy of these criteria to account for all the speech sounds in sanskrit.

1. Sthāna—articulation

As the speech sounds are produced on the egressive current of air by movements of certain organs of speech, it will be legitimate to investigate what organs are involved and how they behave in this particular activity. At the start, these can be set off into two groups *viz.*, (i) that are more or less stationary and serve as point of articulation, and (ii) that are flexible and capable of making a movement towards the points of articulation modifying the behaviour of the current of the air. These are called *karaṇa*, (articulators). Usually these two lie in close proximity so that a contact is feasible. In case of sounds or sound features produced at thorax, glottis and nasal cavity such a distinction has apparently no validity.

Eight such points of articulations are recognised. These are *uras* (thorax), *kaṇṭha* (glottis), *jihvāmūla* (root of the tongue, *i.e.*, velum), *mūrdhan* (cacumen), *tālu* (soft palate), *danta* (teeth), *oṣṭha* (lips) and *nāsikā* (nose). Besides, it is stated that some of the sounds are produced by combining two positions. These are : *dantoṣṭha* (dento-labial), *kaṇṭhoṣṭha* (velo-labial) and *kaṇṭha-tālu* (velo-palatal). Sounds are thus usually known after the point of articulation except when two separate sounds are produced at one and the same point of articulation by two different articulators.

The above list of speech organs is comprehensive enough to account for the production of all the sounds of sanskrit. However, inclusion of thorax here appears somewhat incongruous. But taking into consideration the nature of voiceless asprirate [ḥ] which is produced from here one feels inclined to believe that there is ample justification to treat it as a pulmonic sound. It is nothing but a puff of air that originates in the lungs and passes unobstructed through the glottis and buccal cavity. It is a speech sound that does not make any position.

Sounds described as *kaṇṭh-tālavya* (velo-palatal) and *kaṇṭhoṣṭhya* (velo-labial) are in fact diphthongs, *i.e.*, phonetically sequence of two sounds produced at two different points of articulation. Thus at phonetic level there is no justification to treat them as single units.

The *dantvoṣṭhya* [dento-labial] sound has the lower lip (*oṣṭha*) as articulator and teeth (*danta*) as point of articulation. It differs from other dental sounds in having a different articulator.

Again *jihvāmūla* is an articulator and not a point of articulation. Velum is the point of articulation here.

Nāsikā (nose) strictly speaking is no point of articulation. No speech sound is produced there. It gives rise to a sound feature only, namely, nasal twang.

To sum up; the points of articulation are : thorax, glottis, velum, cacumen, palate, teeth and lip; and *the articulators are* : root of the tongue, underside of the tip of the tongue, front of the tongue, apex, and the lower lip. And in case of thorax and glottis, the distinction of point of articulation and articulator is not applicable.

Following *types of sounds* are thus produced at these points by various articulators.

	Type of sound	*Point of articulation*	*Articulator*
1.	pulmonic	thorax	
2.	glottal	glottis	
3.	velar	velum	back of the tongue
4.	retroflex	cacumen	underside of the tip of the tongue.
5.	palatal	palate	front of the tongue
6.	dental	teeth	apex of the tongue
7.	dento-labial	teeth	lower lip
8.	labial	upper lip	lower lip

Further distinctions in the group of speech sounds produced at the same point of articulation are effected by the following articulatory features, some of which are recognised by Pāṇini as classificatory criteria.

2. *Prayatna* : *Intra buccal process*

The way the articulator approaches the point of articulation and modifies the current of air and gives a shape to the speech tract makes a difference in the quality of the sound. Theoretically speaking there can be innumerable ways of doing so and thus countless qualities can be generated at one point. However, each language makes use of only a few of them. Pāṇini has listed four such manners of articulation.

(i) spṛṣṭa—closure

(ii) īṣat-spṛṣṭa—slight closure

(iii) īṣadv—ivṛta-slightly open

(iv) vivṛta—open.

3. *Anupradāna*

The sound features produced by vibratory movements of the vocal cords, i.e., voice (nāda), nasal cavity, i.e. nasality (anunāsikatā) and vigorous puff of air closely accompanying the release of consonants (and more particularly the stops), i.e.. aspiration (*śvāsa*) are termed *anupradāna*. Two of the features, namely. voice and nasality produced by vocal cords and nose respectively are always concomitant with other feature, while aspiration may precede or follow consonants. Two degrees each of these, features i.e., strong and weak are recognised by sanskrit grammarians. Patanjali, however, supplies further details and lists eight *anupradāna* indicating four oppositions, namely *vivāra*: *saṃvāra* (openness: constriction of glottis), *śvāsa*: *nāda* (breathness: voice), *ghoṣata*: *aghosata* (sonance: non-sonance) and *alpaprāntā* : *mahāprānatā* (weak aspiration: strong aspiration). *vivāra*, *śvāsa* and *aghoṣatā* on the one hand and *saṃvāra*, *nāda* and *ghoṣatā* on the other always occur together. Latter group corresponds to Pāṇini's *nāda* (voice), which is of two grades and the former one stands for absence of voice. *Alpa-prāna* and *mahā-prana* correspond to *iṣac-chvāsa* (unaspirated) and *śvasin* (aspirated).

4. *Kāla*: *Duration*

How long a particular position assumed by the speech organs is maintained is also an important feature of speech sounds. However, Sanskrit grammarians associate it with only vowels, Three such degrees are recognised, viz. *hrasva* (short,) *dīrgha* (long) and *pluta* (extra long). But we can speak of short and long consonants also.

5. *Svara* : *Pitch*

The vocal cords are responsible for production of another feature called *svara* (pitch). It depends upon the frequency of the vibration per second. However, pitch levels seem to have been determind on the basis of auditory impressions. Three pitch levels are described here, viz. *udātta* (high), *anudātta* (low) and *svarita* (high falling). Some authorities, however, recognize a larger variety.

6. *Tense and lax*

Some authorities have recognized three varieties of [y] and [v] types of speech sounds. These are *guru* (heavy, fortis), *laghu* (light, lenis) and *laghutara* (extra-lenis). Pāṇini and other authorities have attributed the features of *guru* and *laghu* to vowels also. Tenseness and laxness of the organs is responsible for these features. It may be observed that tense vowels tend to be longer in duration.

To sum up :

(a) The total number of articulatory features is

1. *Sthāna : Position*

(i) pulmonic position
(ii) glottal position
(iii) velar position
(iv) cacuminal position
(v) palatal position
(vi) dental position
(vii) labial position

(Note : Various positions are to be understood in conjunction with the articulators listed above. Positions and articulators constitute integrated units).

2. *Prayatna : Intra buccal process*

(i) Closure
(ii) Slight closure
(iii) Slightly open
(iv) Open

3. *Anupradāna* : *extra buccal process*

(i) voice : strong, weak
(ii) aspiration : strong, weak
(iii) nasality : strong, weak

4. *Kāla* : *duration*

(i) Short
(ii) long
(iii) extra long

5. *Svara* : *pitch*

(i) High
(ii) low
(iii) High falling

6. *Tense vs.* : *lax*

(i) guru : fortis
(ii) laghu : lenis
(iii) laghutara : extra lenis.

These features occur in various combinations and characterise fferent speech sounds. There are five series made by closure of the air ıssage at velar, cacuminal, palatal, dental and labial points. These are lled *spṛṣṭa*, stops. These are further distinguished as characterised by

voice (weak : strong) : voicelessness; strong aspiration: weak aspiration. Nasality according to some combines with voice only while other authorities maintain that it combines with aspiration also. In one case we have only one variety of nasal while in other four. (As allophonic variants the nasals are called *yama*). Speech sounds with slight closure are articulated at cacuminal, palatal and dental points. These are marked with voice and nasality. These are called *antahstha*, semi-vowels. These occur as pure oral or nasalised. It may be noted that at dental position two varieties are made one with apex as articulator and the other with lower lip. With slightly open passage sounds are articulated at glottal, velar, cacuminal, palatal, dental and labial positions. Glottal one is marked with weak voice. These are called *ūṣma* (fricatives). Velar and labial ones are known as *jihvāmūlīya* and *upadhmānīya* respectively. From all positions except velar, sounds are produced with open passage. Barring the pulmonic one all others carry distinctions of voice, duration, pitch and nasality. Thus a large variety is available at each point. For instance we can have 18 varieties of palatal open speech sounds. These are known *svara* : vowels. The pulmonic one is considered an aspirate.

Phonological Units

The vast variety of speech sounds are discribed above is reduced to a smaller number of phonological units. Bases of phonogical groupings are :

1 Distribution

Speech sounds that are commutable in identical environments are treated as separate entities. While phonetically similar sounds occuring in complementation are subsumed under one unit. For instance close and half close sounds produced from velar and labial positions are treated as close ones. Similarly palatal and dento-labial half close fortis, lenis and extra-lenis are grouped under one unit. Glottal half-open and pulmonic open ones are grouped together. Degrees of voice, showing no contrast, are not recognised at phonological level.

2. Phonetic symmetry

Consideration of phonetic symmetry has set aside even complementary distribution. Velar and palatal nasals have been given recognition simply to maintain a phonetic pattern in the series of stops. Palatal and dental open sounds although occuring in complementation with cacuminal and dento-apical half close, are kept separate units for the sake of symmetry.

3. Syllabicity

Sequences of two speech sounds forming one syllable are treated as one unit. These have been described as being produced from two points

of articulation. Glides—nasal and vocalic, etc., are subsumed under one of the neighbouring sounds, e.g., [pədⁿmə] "lotus"/pədmə/.

4. Grammatical Convenience

Similar sounds occuring in complementary distribution are treated differently to facilitate operation of certain grammatical rules. For instance, [i] and [i.] are in complementation. [i.] occurs before consonant clusters while [i] occurs elsewhere. [i.] and [i] both contrast with [i:]. But for the purposes of application of 3.3.103 (Pāṇini) [i.] has been grouped with [i:].

5. Semantic distinctness

Extra length in vowels, for instance, is recognised as a separate unit just to account for certain semantic components. Extra length here is phonemic but always a morpheme. Linguistic context where it is employed denotes a question or a call from a distance.

From the above we notice that to take grammatical and semantic features into consideration in phonemicization is not in consonance with the accepted practice in modern linguistics. Linguistic levels thus cannot be distinguished sharply. In fact language has to be treated as one integrated whole where sub-systems tell upon one another.

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1. Prabhatchandra Chakravarti : *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, University of Calcutta (1933).
2. *Yājñavalkya Śikṣā.*
3. *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā.*
4. Pāṇini : *Aṣṭādhyāyī.*
5. Patañjali : *Mahābhāṣya.*
6. Bhartṛhari : *Vākyapadīya.*
7. W.S. Allen : *Phonetics in Ancient India*, Oxford University Press, (1953).
8. C. Dwarkanath : *Introduction to Kāyachikitsā*, Popular Book Depot, Bombay-7, (1959).
9. K.C. Pandey : *Abhinavagupta* : An Historical and Philosophical Study, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series-Varanasi (India).
10. John Woodroffe : *The Garland of Letters—Studies in the Mantra Shastra*, Ganesh and Co., (Madras) Ltd.

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

A. K. Sinha

TELIC THEORY OF OPEN SOCIAL SYSTEM

Society is a system of telic persons who organize themselves to realize a set of natural or artificial goals. There is relatedness amongst the members of a social system. The relatedness amongst the members of a social system orginates from the psychobiological principles which are germane to human personality. Thereafter the natural psychobiological relatedness between persons gets reconstructed into new forms of devised relations for the realization of certain artificial ends. The successive stages of reconstruction and transformation of original relations between persons is oriented towards more and more comprehensive systems of social order. When the shake up in the mode of original pattern of relations between persons persists for an indefinite period, and thereby fails to approximate and realize the artificial ends, there are signs of social disorganization. However, it is found that when the disorganization of certain social system reaches an optimum level it has the tendency of being engulfed by a more organized social system.

Internal order is the basic principle of a social system. It is the extension and the development of the fundamental nature of living systems and personality systems A living system has internal organization. It maintains internal organization by counteracting the general tendency in the physical world of going over from order to disorder.[1] Every process in physical world is characterized by increase in entropy ; and since living organisms are included in the physical world they are also subjected to positive entropy or gradual process of decay which ultimately leads to maximum entropy or death. Living systems are able to ward off decay and death under normal conditions by extracting 'negative entropy' in the form of nutrition from the evironment. The negative entropy is the sign of order, whereas positive entropy is the sign of disorder. A living system is able to maintain its internal order and stability by extracting orderliness from the environment. The highly evolved living systems have the capacity for transforming disorganized sensations into organized experience. If the mainfoldness of *stimuli* of the physical world were directly translated into conscious experience it would present a sort of subjective chaos. However, the nervous system of a highly evolved living system has the capacity for operating on sensory information which though chaotic in their nature become shaped into orderly physiologic events with their

1. Schrodinger, E., *What is life ?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, p. 69.

orderly subjective counterparts.[3] Hence, even though the universe of stimuli is chaotic, conscious experience is orderly.

Human personality is the most highly evolved living system on the planet earth. The cerebral cortex in human peronality plays a very important part in organizing experience. There is recording of conscious experience in the cortical neuronal pattern of each individual. The recorded counterpart of consciousness in the human brain in the form of neuronal patternings is complete in its minute details. These recorded neuronal patterns prove to be extremely useful to a person for recollection of past experiences and creative thought. There are ample neuropsychological evidences which indicate that the experience of a person is teleological or purposive.[3] The human brain has biologically inherited the capacity for programming for learning, thinking, and creating; it has also the capacity for changing its programme in course of its interaction with the changing environment.[4] The experience and creative activity of human personality involves some form of planning and orientation. The human brain has the capacity for dealing with vague ideas and transforming them into orderly experience.[5] Here lies the unique creative ingenuity of the human brain. In brief, normal human experience is orderly and purposive.

The internal order which is germane to a living system and a system of personal experience is also found in a social system and its associated institutions though in a different scale. Society as a system consists of a set of social units with relationships among them. The relationships between the various units of a social system may be expressed in ordinary language or by logical or mathematical symbols. A social system, then, has a structure with various sub-systems which are held together by some kind of relationship. The nature of purpose of a social system is influenced by the nature of relationship between its various sub-systems. There seems to be a continuity between the purpose in a living system, personality system and social system. However, the nature of purpose in a social system has not been precisely defined so far.

There are many social scientists who recoil from giving teleological interpretation of societal processes. Under the influence of Darwinian theory of organic evolution some social scientists gave organismic interpretation of societal processes. Some social scientists, on the other hand, interpret societal processes from the mechanistic point of view under the influence of the basic concepts and methodology of physics. The views

2 Chase, R.A., 'An Information-Flow Model of the Organization of Motor Activity : Transduction, Transmission and Central Control of Sensory Information', *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, Vol. 140, No. 4, 1965, p. 240.

3. Grossman, S.P., *A Textbook of Physiological Psychology*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1967, p. 821.

4. Simon, H.A., *The New Science of Management Decision*, New York, Harper and Row, 1960, p. 23.

5. Wiener, N., *God and Golem*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1964, p. 76.

of these two categories of social scientists will be briefly discussed before giving an exposition of my telic theory of social system.

Theory of society as an organismic system

The contributions of Lamarck and Darwin to biological science were of the greatest significance in the nineteenth century. Their theory was so revolutionary that the very structure of human knowledge had to be modified in the light of Lamarckian and Darwinian influence. Some of the early pioneers of social theory like Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer employed the concepts of organic evolution to their doctrines of society. They advocated a form of unilinear social evolution analogous to the Lamarckian and Darwinian doctrine of organic evolution.[6]

Paul Lilienfeld maintained that human society was a living being similar to a living organism. A. G. Schäffle employed the organismic analogy for the description of societal processes. Alfred Fouillée also gave an organismic interpretation of societal processes. However, he maintained that society resembles an organism even though it is not exactly a living organism.

According to Herbert Spencer, society is an organism of which individuals are inter-dependent parts. Society is subject to the laws of organic evolution. It develops from the relatively homogeneous state to the relatively heterogeneous state. The members of a society resemble the cells of an organism. The social organism continues to live even though individuals are born and die just as a living organism continues to exist through continuous replacement of the dead cells by the living ones. It undergoes continuous growth. Evolution tends towards self-preservation and equilibrium of society.[7]

Ostwald Spengler also gave an organismic interpretation to socio-cultural system. In his view, each culture is an organism.[8] Each society has its natural process of development and subsequent decay like living organisms. It is possible to build up a morphology of social organism.

C.H. Cooley gave an organismic interpretation to societal processes. In his view, individuals and society are like the distributive and the collective aspects of the same organic phenomenon. The self and the society are like the Siamese twins who have indentical ego. Hence, it is an illusion to regard them as two separate entities.[9] Individuals are the inseparable members of the same organism which has a psychic unity.

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6. Stocking, G.W., 'Lamarckism in Social Thought', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 1962, p. 241.
7. Spencer, H., *The Data of Ethics*, London, Williams and Norgate, 1907, p. 4.
8. Spengler, O., *The Decline of the West*, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1928, Vol. I, p. 95.
9. Cooley, C.H., *Social Organization*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1955, p. 5.

Criticism of organismic interpretation of society

Contemporary social scientists refrain from giving organismic interpretation to societal processes. Morris Ginsberg observes that society may be regarded as an organism in a metaphorical sense. In his view, a society is neither an organism nor a personality, but a rational unity of a complex nature.[10]

Ernest Barker aptly observed that the term 'social organism' was a metaphor and that it could not be carried too far. In his view, the metaphor of 'social organism' may turn out to be a false guide when carried too far.[11] Herbert Spencer committed the error of carrying the analogy of organismic metaphor for explaining societal processes too far. Vilfredo Pareto remarked that society was a system rather than an organism. Herbert Spencer, Spengler, Cooley and others used the organismic metaphors for explaining the nature of society on account of their biological bias. They adopted the model of biological functionalism for describing the societal processes. Metaphors are usually employed as techniques for popular explanation, and not strictly speaking as a strategy of scientific explanation. It is not possible to transcribe the laws from the field of biological science to the field of social science. The organic and social phenomena are not structurally identical in their natures. Consequently, the theoretical model of biological phenomena cannot be regarded as identical with the theoretical model of social phenomena. Social system is a distinct category of existence despitè the fact that there is intimate relation between organic evolution and social evolution. Societal processes can be satisfactorily explained from the standpoint of the social laws which have their relative autonomy.

Theory of society as a structural-functional system

Revolutionary changes have taken place in the domain of physics in the twentieth century. These changes in the physical theory have produced a great impact on psychological as well as social sciences. A large number of contemporary psychological and social scientists accepted the theory and the methodology of physics as the most perfect model for all sciences. The various shades of behaviourism in the domain of psychology, and functionalism in the domain of sociology were developed under the impact of some of the basic concepts and methodology of physics. The structure of human personality has been conceived on the model of a machine or a physical system; and hence, the various functions of this machine may be quantitatively measured and stated in operational terms.

A large majority of contemporary social scientists maintain that society is an organized structure with various types of constituent social

10. Ginsberg, M. *Psychology of Society*, London, Methuen & Co., 1944, p. 120.
11. Barker, E., *Principles of Social and Political Theory*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952, p. 132.

groups, institutions, and organizations. B.E. Bergal maintains that if a whole is composed of two or more distinguishable parts, it may be called a 'structure'. A structured system is composed of distinguishable units or components. A social structure is composed of various types of social units. Not only society as a whole has a structure, but also social units are structured.[12] The term 'social function' refers to the various dynamic processes within a society. There is close relation between the structure of a society and its functions. There is inter-dependence between the structure and the functions of a society. The structure of a society determines its various functions; and the functions of various social units and social groups determine the nature of the entire social structure. Some of the contemporary social scientists use the concept of 'group dynamics'. The science of group dynamics studies the nature of social groups, the laws of their developments, their interrelations with various institutions and individuals.[13]

Emil Durkheim gave a systematic formulation of the functionalist approach to the study of society. In his view, the causal and the functional methods of analysis are the two complementary methods for the study of society. The term 'function' is preferable to the term 'purpose' for the scientific explanation of societal processes because a society does not necessarily produce useful results.[14] A social event is just a form of natural event. It does not necessarily fulfil a given end. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and B. Malinowski also tried to explain social phenomena from the functionalist point of view.

D.F. Aberle *et al* maintain that certain functional pre-requisites are necessary for the maintenance and persistence of a social system. In their view, each social structure has a 'self-sufficient system of action'.[15] The most important pre-requisite for the formation of a society is the 'structure of action'. The super-structure of a society is based on the foundational notion of the 'structure of action'. The structural change in society may be brought about through change in the 'structure of social action'. The termination of the 'structure of action' leads to the termination of a society. In brief, then, a society can function if the self-sufficient system of action operates satisfactorily.

P.A. Sorokin has developed the doctrine of sociocultural super-system in order to explain the nature of human associations and the

12. Bergel, E.E., *Social Stratification*, New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1962, p. 3.
13. Cartwright. O., and Zander, A., 'ORIGINS OF GROUP DYNAMICS', in *Group Dynamics*, ed. by D. Cartwright and A. Zander, London Tavistock Publications, 1960, p. 9.
14. Durkheim. E., *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1938, p. 97.
15. Aberle, D.F., *et al*, 'The Functional Prerequisites of a Society', *Ethics*, Vol. LX, No. 2, 1950, p. 101.

various types of social processes. He has used the expression 'superorganic' to describe the nature of society under the influence of Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless, he frequently makes use of mechanistic analogies for describing social structure. For instance, if a blot or a spring is taken out of a miscellaneous heap of unassembled car, it does not produce any significant change in the heap, but if the former is removed from an assembled car, it may impede the function of the car. There is unity and system in a society just as there are interconnections between the various parts of an automobile.[16] Even though Sorokin is quite critical of the morbid mania of some of the contemporary social scientists for their bias for objectivism and quantification of social phenomena, his own view is not free from technological bias which is sometimes carried to the extreme length.

G.A. Lundberg applied the method of natural science to social science. In his view, sociology should be legitimately called 'social physics'. The generalizations of social phenomena can be stated precisely in mathematical terms. Human activity can be described as a system of energy manifestation within the field force of society. Society is analogous to a physical system in which there are attractions and repulsions amongst its constituent members. Social behaviour of individual can be regarded as function of energy.[17] Societal groups are analogous to the electron-proton configurations of a physical system. The basic concepts of physical science, such as motion, energy, force, and so on are applicable to all types of human behaviour in the social context.

Talcott Parsons explains the nature of society from the structural-functional point of view in a slightly different way. In his view, actions of individuals constitute the bases of a social system. A social system consists of a plurality of individuals who are bound together through interaction reactions. The interactions of individuals in a society can be studied in as systematic way as any other phenomena on Nature.[18] The nature of social system can be known through the analysis of social actions of individuals in a social situation. The voluntaristic behaviour of individuals is oriented towards the normative aspect of social life. The nature of a social system is founded on the means-end scheme of social action. Social order is sustained through interlocking of interests of different types of individuals. J. F. Scott remarks that Parsons has recently drifted from his earlier voluntaristic position which he held upto 1935.[19] Parsons maintains that the entire pattern of actions may be subjected to scientific analysis except in the case of value-choice. He admits

16. Sorokin, P.A., *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, London, Peter Owen, 1957, p. 6.
17. Lundberg, G.A., *Foundations of Sociology*, New York, Macmillan & Co., 1939, 1956, p. 103
18. Parsons, T., *Social System*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951, p. 3.
19. Scott, J.F., 'The Changing Foundations of Parsonian Action Scheme', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, 1963, p. 716.

that his conception of value-choice involves a disturbing vagueness.[20] He has, therefore, adopted the position in 1959 that his theoretical scheme of social action is comparable with that of physical mechanics.[21] In his view, actions of individuals may be predicted with as great exactness and accuracy as the motions of planets through the application of the laws of mechanics.

R. K. Merton, a student of Talcott Parsons, has elaborated the social action theory of Max Weber and that of Parsons. In his view, social function refers to an observable event which can be studied from the standpoint of an observer. Merton's standpoint of Functionalism is, however, slightly different from Parsons' doctrine of Functionalism. Parsons has given almost identical definitions to the terms 'mechanism' and 'function'. Merton maintains that his theory of Functionalism includes the concepts of 'manifest content' and 'latent content'. In his view, manifest functions are conscious, while, on the other hand, latent functions are unintended and unconscious. All types of social functions can be objectively studied. It is found through functional analysis that socially conformist behaviour as well as socially deviant behaviour is generated by the social structure. Social structure is not static, but it is dynamic.[22] The nature of social structure may be known precisely through functional analysis.

In brief, this is the brief exposition of structural—functional point of view of the contemporary social scientists. Most of the contemporary social scientists have a very strong tendency for making extensive use of mechanistic concepts for explaining societal processes. Society is conceived on the model of a mechanistic system. The mechanistic terminology abounds in the various types of field theories, interaction theories, sociometric theories, and empiristic-statistical theories in the domain of social sciences. J.G. Miller makes use of the concepts of 'matter', 'energy' and 'information' for the explanation of different types of systems, viz., molecular systems, cellular systems and social systems. In his view, the concept of 'energy' in physics gets transformed into the concept of 'action' in biological and behavioural science. Any change of state of matter-energy or its movement over space may be called 'action'.[23] There is a continuity between the concept of 'energy' in physical science and the concept of 'action' in social science.

20. Parsons, T., 'The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theorys', *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 45, 1935, p. 306.

21. Parsons, T., 'An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the Theory of Action', *Psychology : A Study of Science*, ed. S. Koch, Vol. III, New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1959, p. 615.

22. Merton, R.K., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949, 1961, p. 121.

23. Miller, J.G., 'Living Systems : Basic Concepts', *Behavioural Science*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1965, p. 193.

Recently D. Katz and R.L. Khan have developed a theory of open social system by making extensive use of the concepts of physics and information theory. In their view, an open social system may be explained from the standpoint of the 'energic input-output system'. The theory of open-social system is based upon the assumption of entropy. The open social system does not run down and disintegrate because it imports energy from the world which environs it. In other words, positive entropy sustains the stability of a social system. The important characteristics of an open social system consist in importation of energy from the social and physical environments, through put or transformation of energy through production of societal process, and the output in the form of exportation of social products into the environment. The products which are exported into the environment in the form of technological devices provide a new source of energy to a social system. In this way energy exchange in a social system with its environment has a cyclic character. The open social system sustains itself by absorbing negative entropy from the environment.[24] It maintains its steady state and dynamic homeostasis through continuous exchange of energy from the environment. In sum, a social system and its various functions can be explained on the model of a machine.

Criticism of the structural-functional theory of society

The early pioneers of social science were under the spell of the revolutionary doctrine of organic evolution, and constructed theories of society on the model of a living organism. The contemporary social socientists got over that spell and realized that organismic model of society was merely a metaphorical expression. However, the contemporary social scientists are at present under the more powerful spell of physical and technological sciences. A large number of social scientists have accepted the models of Quantum Mechanics and Information Theory as the working models for the construction of social theory. It is quite evident from the few representative samples of contemporary social theories which have been briefly given in the preceeding pages. It is not possible to give detailed criticisms of the structural-functional point of view of social theory in this short paper.

There is, however, a basic error in the understanding of the contemporary scientists of the various phenomena of Nature. It is an undeniable fact that a living system is composed of atomic systems, colloidal systems and the like, but it has unique characteristics of its own which has not so far been detected in physical systems. Likewise personality system and social systems have their unique sets of characteristics which have not so far been detected in conglomeration of atoms, colonies of bacteria, and flocks of sheep. Since human personality as well as human society

24. Katz, D. and Kahn, R.L., *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1966, p. 21.

is composed of physical particles and energy systems, its actions can be explained from the standpoints of physical and technological sciences. This explanation, however, misses a great deal since it fails to take into account certain aspects of personality as well as society which cannot be measured by quantitative criteria. The concept of purpose is the foundational principle of human personality as well as society. The creative orientation of human personality as well as society has certain features of spontaneity, uniquess and originality which cannot be operationally defined. Mèchanistic explanation of human behaviour and societal processes fails miserably when the spontaneity and creative uniqueness and novelty of persons and social systems are taken into consideration. The mechanistic explanation of societal processes is naive even though it looks technically grand and imposing.

The inadequacy of mechanistic approach for the explanation of all types of phenomena have been recognized by some contemporary scientists. David Bohm recognizes the qualitative infinity of Nature. In his view, the drawback of the mechanistic approach consists in "the limited and the narrow conception of reduction it adopts." Albert Perez and Ladsilav Tondl adopt the position that in the realm of science it is necessary to "repel any machanistic approach, no matter whether deterministic or indeterministic."[25] Norbet Wiener ridiculed those social scientists who accept the models of physics as the most perfect models for the explanation of societal processes. He wrote, "The mathematics that the social scientists employ and the mathematical physics that they use as their model are the mathematics and the mathematical physics of 1850."[26] Leon Brillouin remarks that the concept of 'value' is beyond the range of Information Theory, and that it is still beyond human reach to "discuss that process of thinking or any other problem about the use of information by living creatures."[27] Precise language of logic and mathematics prove to be inadequate for the description of social phenomena. Ludwing von Mises criticises that standpoint of those social scientists who consider physics to be "the paragon of science and blithly assume that the knowledge is to be fashioned on its model."[28] In his view, many social scientists are working under the false belief that by imitating the methodology of natural sciences, they will be able to quantitatively describe social phenomena. The science of society must take into consideration the situations which influence societal process both quantitatively and qualitively.[29] In

25. Perez, A. and Tondl, L., 'The Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures', *Information and Prediction in Science*, ed. by S. Dockx and P. Bernays, New York, Academic Press, 1965, p. 34.

26. Wiener, N.. *God & Goblem, Inc.*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1964, p. 92.

27. Brillouin, L., *Science and Information Theory*, New York, Academic Press, 1956, 1962 p. 10.

28. Mises, L. Von, *The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science*, New Jersey, D. Van Nostrand, 1962, p. v.

29. Mises, L. Von, *Epistemological Prolems of Economics*, Princeton, D. Von Nostrand, 1960, p. 10.

brief, the concepts and methodology of physical and technical sciences are not completely suitable for the explanation of social phenomena.

Telic structure of open social system

It is the central theme of the author's telic theory that the teleological principle is the foundational principle of reality.[30] The telic principle is well-defined in human personality. It is the principle of individuation.[31] If integrates and regulates the behaviour pattern of a person. It gives orientation to a person in various possible directions.[32] It is responsible for decision-making, free choice of an alternative out of a multitude, and planning. It is the source of creative advance and cultural flux.[33] Creativity and appreciation of values owe their origin to the telic principle. Incessant creation of values is the main purpose of human existence. The values that human personalities create my range from the most trivial to the most significant values.[34] The law of creativeness is the governing law of personality. It establishes internal harmony within a personality. The law of appreciativeness establishes interpersonal harmony. All normal human relations are based on the law of appreciativeness. All forms of social groups are based on the principle of appreciation.

Society is a systematic organization of telic persons. Social purpose is the manifestation of the purposive inter-personal relations.[35] The nature of relationships between persons in a society -depends upon the nature of conflux of teleologies of different persons. There are two-way passages between creative and appreciative persons in a well-organized society. There is continuous completion of circuits betwen creativity and appreciation of values by creative-appreciative persons.[36] The principles of creativity and appreciation are the cohesive principles of a social system. The telic principle is the matrix of the principles of creativity and appreciation of values.

A social system is sustained by the telic principle. A telic person is basically creative-appreciative of values. It is on account of the creative

30. Sinha, A.K., *A World View Through a Reunion of Philosophy and Science*, Calcutta, The Library of Philosophy, 1959, p. 12 *et passim*.
31. Sinha, A.K., 'Principle of Individuation', *Indian Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. I, 1956, p. 36.
32. Sinha, A.K., 'Teleological Nature of Personality', *Research Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences*, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 104.
33. Sinha, A.K., 'Towards a Synthesis of the Different Levels of Human Knowledge', *Calcutta Review*, 1964, p. 270.
34. Sinha, A.K., 'Philosophy of Social Progress', *University of Rajasthan Studies*, Vol. VII, 1961-62, p. 93.
35. Sinha, A.K., *Principles of Sociology*, Agra, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1963, p. 91.
36. Sinha, A.K., *Social Philosophy*, Calcutta, The Library of Philosophy, 1962, p. 60.

appreciativeness of values that a person is not entirely divorced from society. Individual-in-society is the expression of the principles of creativity and appreciation. Individual-in-society is the basic individuo-social reality as the expression of the principles of creativity and appreciation [37]

Aspects of society are in the interspatial regions of individuals. The strength and solidarity of a society is enhanced by the predominance of interspatial social aspects subsisting between creative-appreciative persons. For instance, aspects of society are within the intervening spaces between a mother and her child, a lover and his beloved, a teacher and his disciple, and so on. The interspatial social aspects subsisting between individuals may be called 'social bonds.'

Social bonds intertwin the members of a society. The principle of creativity establishes the link between creative person and society via the field of creativity. On the other hand, the principle of appreciation establishes link between individual as an aspect of society and creative person as a unique creator of values via the field of appreciation. In this sense the loci of both an individual and the society are in the same region of space. That is, the loci of both individual and the society are in the same creative-appreciative person. The loci of society subsisting in creative-appreciative persons may be called 'located society.'

Apart from the located society there is the 'projected society which subsists in the intervening space between individuals. 'Projected society' is the expression of 'located society.' The loci of projected society are in those regions where the fields of creativity and apprecition of creative-appreciation persons intersect and interfuse.

Social purpose emerges through the fusion of the aspects of projected society. Creative advance and cultural progress of a society are the expressions of social purpose. The nuclei of projected society sustain social cohesion in a social structure. There is the abundance of projected social nuclei in an open social system. An open social system is a well-integrated social structure. It evades disintegration through incessant absorption of various shades of values from the surrounding cultures as well as world culture into its own structure. Assimilation of values from the surrounding cultures as well as world culture contributes to the vitality and sustenance of an open social system. Pure and applied socince and philosophy are allowed to develop unhampered in an open social system. The signs of telic well-definedness of an open social system are consistent philosophical theories, advanced theories of science, rapid technological productions, refined aesthetic creations, enlightened ethical codes and the like. The signs of social progress are not only observed in the creative expressions of the members of an open social system, but also

37. Sinha, A.K., *Prolegomena to the Philosophical Foundations of Society*, Calcutta, Sinha Publishing House (P) Ltd., 1965, p. 36.

in the social structure as a whole. Human history progresses in its creative adventure through rapid widening of area of creativity in the various spheres of human life.[38]

The telic principle, then, is the fundamental notion of telic theory of society.[39] It gives orientation to the behaviour of a person and societal processes of a social system. The directional nature of human behaviour and societal processes can be adequately explained with reference to the telic principle. Social teleology is functionally dependent upon the intersection of the fields of appreciation of telic persons. Social organization is ushered into existence whenever there is confluence of social teleologies.

In a case of faked appreciation there is the absence of lasting intersections of the fields of appreciation between two or more persons. In such a social situation two or more persons are hooked to one another for opportunistic reasons.[40] Lasting social teleology is not formed due to the absence of lasting intersections of the fields of appreciation of telic persons. In such cases these are usually frequent fluctuations in the fields of appreciations which shift form person to person for opportunistic reasons.

In an organized society there is the possibility of social progress because the fields of creativity and appreciation of its constituent members intersect, and accelerate the spiralling processes of creativity and appreciation. Social organization is, therefore, the manifestation of the intersection of the fields of creativity and appreciation of telic persons. Social teleology is the necessary prerequisite for the formation of cultural nuclei. However, there is no relation of identity between cultural nucleus and social teleology. Social teleology may be there in a social organization without the presence of well-defined and relatively stable cultural nuclei.

The existence of cultural nuclei in a social structure necessarily implies the existence of 'located society' in telic persons and 'projected society' or the intersections of the fields of creativity and appreciation. Cultural nucleus may be defined in terms of 'located society.' There is cultural nucleus in a social structure, if and only if, there is the compatibility between 'innate teleology' and 'acquired teleology' in a telic person, and there are intersections of the fields of appreciation produced by two or more telic persons. Cultural progress

38. Sinha, A.K., 'Idealistic Interpretation of History', *Voice of Ahimsa*, Vol. VIII, No. 12 and 13, 1958, p. 306.

39. Sinha, A.K., *Social Structure of India : Prolegomena to the Theoretical Foundations of Social Change in India*, Calcutta, Sinha Publishing House (P) Ltd., p. 17. (forthcoming)

40. Sinha, A.K., *Principles of Sociology*, p. 13

involves creative advance through appreciation. Culture is the function of creativity and appreciation.[41]

A culturally stable and progressive society is a telic organization of persons which strains towards an open system. It has a structural aspect. It has also a teleological aspect. The structural aspect of a society is organized through the regulation of its teleological principle. The organization of a society together with the constellation of its social groups and institutions is the function of its teleological principle. The structure of a society may be explained mainly with reference to its spatial co-ordinates; the teleological principle, on the other hand, may be explained mainly with reference to its temporal co-ordinate. The stability of a society may be explained primarily with reference to its spatial co-ordinates, and its dynamism may be explained primarily with reference to its temporal co-ordinate.[42]

Social change and social progress of a society may be explained primarily by taking into account a given duration of time as the frame of reference for such an explanation. Sometimes no cognizable and appreciable change takes place in a social organization within a given duration of time. Sometimes, on the other hand, appreciable change or progress takes place in a society within a given duration of time. The acceleration of the organizational change of a society is due to the operation of its teleological principle. The nature and the acceleration of social change is the function of the nature and degree of well-definedness of its social purpose. There is cultural progress in a society when its social groups and institutions give frequent expressions to novel and original values through the media of creative-appreciative persons. In brief, cultural progress of a society is the function of the well-definedness of its social purpose. This is the telic interpretation of an open social system.

Summary and conclusion

Telic theory of open social system does not outright reject the mechanistic interpretation of social structure, but considers it to be inadequate. The concepts and methodology of mechanistic theory must be subsumed under telic theory of open social system. The concept of system involves the notion of integration and purpose. J. L. Kennedy maintains that the concept of system involves "interaction and communication between components or parts".[43] Ellis and Ludwig classify systems

41. Sinha, A.K., 'Telic Theory of Culture', *Quarterly Journal of Indian Studies in Social Sciences*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1967, p. 63.

42. Sinha, A.K., *Social Structure of India*, p, 26.

43. Kennedy, J.L., 'Psychology and System Development', *Psychological Principles in Systems Development*, Ed. R.M. Gagne, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962, p. 15.

into three types, viz., natural, devised and hybrid systems.[44] Human personality as an evolute of natural systems constructs devised systems or technological devices. Human civilization as a hybrid system of persons and machines has been ushered into existence through the incessant creative activities of scientists and philosophers. The most complex devised systems which technical scientists have been able to create are the computers. Computers are purposive machines which have the capacity for 'thinking', learning, remembering, analysing, and problem-solving. "It exhibits insight both in the sense of vicarious trial and error leading to 'sudden' problem solution, and in the sense of employing heuristic to keep the total amount of trial and error within reasonable bounds."[45] Human personality is infinitely more complex with well-defined purpose than even the most complex computer. Human society is the most complex structure of telic systems. Individual telic systems are the subsystems of social system. Social system is on a higher plane than devised systems in the architecture of complexity.

Human personality as a telic system has the freedom of decision making and creative adventure. "Almost every activity of man, social groups or entire societies is connected with specific purpose or a number of purposes."[46] Decision is freely made by a person in order to achieve a goal or a set of goals. Devised systems created by telic persons contribute to the enhancement of energy in a society. A social system sustains itself through absorption of 'negative entropy' in the form of products of civilization and accumulated experience of mankind. The openness of social system is sustained by free creative and appreciation activities of telic persons. Open social system is a superstructure of well-defined telic systems.

44. Ellis, D.O., and Ludwig, F.J., *Systems of Philosophy*, Englewdod Cliffs, Printice Hall, 1962, p. 4.
45. Newell, A., Shaw, J.C. and Simon, H.A., 'Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving', Presented before the *Seminar at Yale University*, 1956, p. 30.
46. Sadowski W., *The Theory of Decision—Making*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1965, p. 1.

C.L. Jain

UNDERSTANDING, DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION

In the history of mankind, men, who cared to understand the phenomena of nature (including man as a part there-of) were all inspired by their curiosity to know. The means adopted for the attainment of knowledge were quite often diverse depending upon the attitudes of striving men but the basic ends pursued were essentially the same. The diversity of means led the searchers of truth to the creation of different disciplines, all purportedly arriving at the same end, namely, knowledge about man and the universe.[1] One of them has been manifested in religious creed and mystical outlook, another resulted in metaphysics and yet another one emerged as empirical (or natural) science. But this diversity of means, in their initial stages, was not clearly marked and their overlapping perpetuated many confusions. In the beginning, perhaps, the entire process of knowledge was unitary and what is called religion, metaphysics and science today were entangled with each other under the appellation 'natural philosophy.' As the realisation to discriminate dawned on men, they split up the entire field of knowledge in order to formulate precise and exact notions of the means (or methods) for the purpose. The 'History of Ideas' may be well restated and established as the successive attempts of mankind to formulate precise and distinct methods for understanding the phenomena of nature; as the intellectual insight of human race that has passed from a stage of relatively more imprecision and ambiguity to a stage of more clarity, precision and exactness towards understanding its environments.

As compared to religion and metaphysics, empirical science is comparatively of late development; but the position it has acquired among the epistemological disciplines is of great significance because of its fantastic achievements in the intellectual and practical spheres. On the other side, the philosophical problems, which science has given rise to, have been crucially important, since their acclaimed solutions have proved vital for the future development of science and its proper understanding.[2] One of the still keenly debated problems about science has been its proper aim. Lured by the simplicity of the doctrine, the positivist philosophers of the nineteenth century maintained that the aim of science is merely to describe the phenomena of nature; the upholders of this view are very few today. On the contrary, there is a very influential school of thought, which

1. Singer, Charles, *A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900*, Oxford, (1965), p. 5.
2. Popper, K.R., 'The Nature of Philosophical Problems and their roots in Science' *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III (1952), p. 132.

maintains that the aim of science is to explain the phenomena of nature so as to enable the scientists to predict the course of future events.

The controversy appears to have arisen from a misunderstanding of the actual aim before the men of science. The aim of the scientists working in various fields, is to understand the phenomena of nature and communicate such understanding to others in precise terms. For this purpose, the scientists have to resort to what may be called 'descriptive' approach and also to 'explanatory-predictive' approach depending upon the stage to which a particular branch of science has risen. The succeeding pages claim to have established the above thesis; but only after precise meanings of 'understanding', 'description' and 'explanation' have been elucidated in the context of the theory of science.

(1)

'Understanding' (hereafter 'U-ing' for abbreviatition) is an exceedingly vague and ambiguous term in English language. If a curious person throws a cursory glance at any standard English dictionary, he would be immediately confronted with this character of 'U-ing' or 'U'. One might be bewildered at the variety of usages of this term. As for instance, 'U-ing' is used to express intelligence, an ability to grasp things in a general or specific manner or the capacity to make judgements 'U-ing' is also intended to designate the faculty of comprehending and reasoning (for whatever these terms, in turn, might stand for) and is conceived as representing one of the basic traits of human personality. Again, 'U-ing' is purported to stand for meaning, significance or knowledge, as, for instance, when one says 'Professor X is a man of deep understanding'; still, at other times, 'U-ing' designaties a belief or assumption, as when one bids good bye to a friend saying, 'we depart now on the understanding that we shall meet at the railway station'. 'U-ing' also stands for a mode of inference, as when suddenly one comprehends a connection, an inter-relation among facts, events etc., which could not be comprehended till the understander discovered it. These are some of the diverse shades of meanings of 'U-ing', brought out to expose its extremely imprecise and inexact character.

For the present consideration, it would seem convenient to classify the variety of meanings of 'U-ing' into four distinct but not mutually exclusive categories :–

(1) 'U-ing' as designating faculty

When a sort of power or capacity is attributed to human personality or self (soul) for comprehending facts and situations, 'U-ing' designates a kind of cognitive faculty. Kant's conception of 'U-ing' as a faculty of the phenomenal self is a good case in point. When modern psychologists, like Binet, posit intelligence as the ability to understand directions, to maintain mental set or correct one's errors, they are using 'U-ing' to signify a kind of capacity or power of human organism. Locke and Hume,

among the empiricist philosophers, also entertained views similar to this. Sometimes, however, 'U-ing' is treated as being synonymous with intuition, which represents a kind of power of human personality to have a direct, complete and immediate grasp of a situation or set of events, without, of course, being in a position to reason out at the time one acquires a direct apprehension.

(2) 'U-ing' as designating activity

Another designatum of 'U-ing' is the act of comprehending the meaning, signification of facts or a situation etc.; as, for example, when one says, 'I am beginning to understand the entire situation.' 'He ought to have understood my position in the matter'.

(3) 'U-ing' as designating product

When 'U-ing' appears in a linguistic expression to express cognition, meaning import of an object or event, or knowledge, it represents an achieved end resulting from the activity aspect of 'U-ing'. 'U-ing of the diverse trends of Indian culture is a difficult job' is a statement in which 'U-ing' designates knowledge. Examples can be multiplied on this meaning of 'U-ing'.

(4) 'U-ing' as designating objective or incentive

The use of 'U-ing' to denote intellectual grasp, or comprehension. as the aim of another activity of man, indicates that it acts as the objective or incentive for that It is, perhaps, in this sense that the term 'U-ing' is used, while maintaining that the aim of philosophy is to understand the world.[3] Lack of understanding, misunderstanding (false beliefs), or partial understanding compells the individual to aim at comparatively complete understanding. When one understands, he acquires knowledge of facts by their becoming intelligible to him. The desire to get answers to 'how?' and 'why?' questions indicates one's desire for understanding.

These distinctions among the classes of denotata designated by 'U-ing' are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. It seems difficult to draw a distinct line between what is denoted by 'U-ing' in (2) and in (4), since all intellectual activity, undertaken to acquire knowledge or classification or seek connection among facts appears to be goal-directed. In a sense, U-ing could hardly be distinguished from controlled thinking, which, if successful, leads to U-ing in sense (3) judgements or knowledge. Controlled thinking is goal-directed activity; being the intellectual activity of the subject, it strives towards the solution of an immediate problem. To arrive at a judgement or U-ing in the sense (2), the individual consciousness is activized by U-ing in sense (4) and is led to U-ing in sense (3). U-ing as the aim of scientists is taken here in sense (4), which acts as the sustaining force for all scientific activity. It is 'U-ing' in this sense

3. Caws, Peter, *The Philosophy of Science* 1965 p. 11.

that will have to be related to 'description' and 'explanation' in the context of the theory of science.

Another important feature about the phenomenon of U-ing, which seems to have been duly recognised by philosophical psychologists is the *levels* of U-ing. U-ing occurs at various levels of thought and it is this aspect which is relevant here. At the primitive level, U-ing occurs in the individual by way of 'demonstrative definitions'. Here it is the establishment of the connection between the symbol and the symbolised, to the exclusion of other compresent objects etc., that brings forth U-ing.[4] The second stage of U-ing occurs when one understands a symbol or a sequence of symbols as referring to some symbolised object (s), properties of objects or relations among properties, objects or classes of objects. The symbolised may not be being perceived by the individual at the time the symbol or the sequence of symbols are uttered. In such a situation the symbolised is being *described* to him. At this stage the symbol, or the sequence of symbols, does not point to the symbolised but stands for it and also include those cases in which future possibility of the symbolised being perceived is there. It is maintained that, at this level of U-ing, it is not merely the possibility of becoming aware of the presence of the symbolised or sense data etc., but it is also the expectation or looking-for attitude of the mind, which is also involved. Thus, here it is not merely our response to the words (sequence of symbols), but it is also expectation, which contributes to the U-ing of the situation. 'In expectation, there is a kind of felt incompleteness or disequilibrium, a gap in the mind requiring the symbolised to fill it, a reaching out towards the symbolised.'[5]

It can not, perhaps, be said with certainty that the element of expectation is a necessary pre-requisite for U-ing at this level, along with the awareness of the percept, which is symbolised; but it seems reasonable to believe that, before U-ing at this level is reached, it is imperative for the mind to be aware of the situation that demands to be understood minus the possible or actual occurrence of the symolised which, if and when occurs leads to U-ing of the situation. As, for instance, when one desires to understand the situation signified by the statement—'the train is coming'—he is well aware of the situation minus the gap (in this case created by the non-perceivability of the moving train) which refers to the expectation of the arrival of the train. Such a gap, if and when filled up, results in U-ing. This may be called as the 'descriptive level of U-ing'.

At the next higher level of U-ing, one makes a distinction between believing and U-ing, which he hardly does at the earlier levels. Both believing and U-ing are expressed in response to expectation. But at this more advanced level, we learn to differentiate the two; we do understand what is brought to our notice without adopting the attitude of belief or

4. Whiteley, C.H., *On Understanding*, *MIND*, Vol. LVIII (1949), p. 345.
5. *Ibid.* pp. 347-48.

disbelief. This is what happens when we understand fiction. Believing or disbelieving is not important at this level. But, one can hardly be said to understand at higher levels. unless he takes recourse to inference and link together propositions into coherent complexes.[6] At this higher level of U-ing, perhaps one already knows the "what ?", of the situation, and believes it to be so, but he does not know the "how ?" and/or "Why ?" of the situation etc. It is the desire to know the "how?" and/or "why?" of situation etc. that appears to constitute the essence of our crave for U-ing, here. This, as we shall see, may be called 'the explanatory level of U-ing'.

(2)

The evidence as to whether a man has understood (or misunderstood) a certain situation can only be available in the form of utterences or expressed judgements. To express a judgement is to undertake some kind of linguistic (symbolic) activity for communicating judgements; otherwise expression becomes meaningless. Communication of judgements may be both verbal and non-verbal. It is a question still debated among psychologists as to whether linguistic activity is part of thinking activity; no clear cut answer is forthcoming as yet. What is important to note is that linguistic activity of expressing a judgement is a phenomenon that comes later than the process of U-ing; the former is both, psychologically as well as logically, dependent upon the latter.

Expression of judgements constitutes the verbal activity of describing. This activity and the product of the phenomenon of describing is designated by 'description', in its widest and informal sense. Descriptions are essential because without them we cannot express or communicate our judgements. To communicate means to deploy language. A language is deficient of descriptive power, unless it expresses our ideas (judgements) to some other intelligent being who can understand them.[7]

In the context of scientific activity, the phenomenon of describing acquires a special significance. Broadly speaking, the 'what ?' questions in science are mostly answered in the forms of descriptions and the majority of the "how ?" and "why ?" questions have to be answered by way of being provided with explanations. What exactly is the concept designated by 'descriptions' in the context of scientific enquiry is the question that concerns us.

The analysis of 'descriptive' statements can be made from various points of view : grammatical, logical and semantic. A brief consideration with reference to their significance for the language of science, is attempted.

6. *Ibid.* pp. 349-50.

7. Butler Samuel, 'Thought and Language', *Importance of Language* (ed.) Max Black, (1962), p. 17.

A cursory reflection on the complexity of the structure of language will reveal that it consists of a large kinds of signs or combinations of signs, ranging from simple words through complex linguistic structures. The most convenient units of language, which are capable of expressing judgements, are sentences, which R. Harre likes to call as the 'the dead bodies of language'. A sentence as understood here, is that single word or combination of words, which is taken complete by itself, and in which the intelligible purpose of the speaker is clearly expressed. The dead bodies of language (*i.e.* sentences) come to life, when semantic relations between sentences and the facts are established – they acquire the status of statements (symbolic representations of the descripta or nominata). Simple statements are the simplest descriptions of the world. Out of these simple statements, complex linguistic structure could be built by truth-functional structurisation but this method may not prove adequate for the analysis of ordinary natural languages. Simple statements, however, differ due to the different arrangements of words in their syntactic structure and also due to different words. The possibility of combining words in different syntactical ways constitute both the richness and the complexity of language. This complexity makes the task of analysing descriptive statements difficult.

The grammatical analysis of sentences of English (taking as a paradigm case) is based on the traditional view borrowed from Aristotelian logic, that a sentence is a combination of words that allows itself to be analysed into subject and predicate. This may be possible in grammar but it is doubtful whether the analysis of descriptive statements in terms of subjects and predicates will be adequate for logical and scientific purposes. One of the major criticisms levied against the traditional analysis of statements is that it confused grammatical analysis with logical analysis. As already mentioned earlier, grammatically, statements are analysable into subject-predicate components only, but, logically this is not the correct and the only form of analysing descriptive statements. Logical analysis of statements in terms of subjects and predicates will blur the real significance of many other types of statements.

By far the most difficult task in the contemporary methodology of empirical science is the analysis of descriptive language from the semantic point of view. The Fregian analysis of descriptions is accepted by a few methodologists.[8] Frege's analysis depends upon the recognition that a descriptive statement does two jobs; it individuates and refers to a certain subject, and it ascribes to this subject certain properties. The first task of the analyst, assert the Fregians, is to isolate the expression or expressions which carry the primary reference. Frege calls this as the argument of the sentence and the remaining part function. Thus, in the sentence "Zakir Hussain is the third President of India", "Zakir Hussain" is the argument and "   is the third President of India" is the function. But the analysis of descriptive statements in terms of argument function

8. Harre, R, *Introduction to the Logic of Sciences*, pp. 6-8.

may apply to simple or atomic descriptions but it is doubtful if such an analysis can be successfully carried on with respect to complex descriptive statements involving complex linguistic structures. Again, this kind of analysis does not specify as to where the line of demarcation can be drawn between descriptive and non-descriptive statements. Apparently one difficult situation, that one may visualize, in so far as the theory of science is concerned, is the status of generalizations or statements expressing law-like propositions. Clearly, on Fregian analysis, not all generalizations could be admitted as descriptions. Again, it is not possible to exclude the class of general statements from among the class of descriptive statements, because otherwise we would restrict descriptions to extremely narrow limits.

A generalization is a statement which asserts (or denies) some properties about all members of a class of objects or some relation amongst the members of classes of objects. 'All' might indicate a reference to objects in the spatio-temporal frame-work past, present and future and to all places. But, are we justified in saying that generalizations are descriptions in the sense that they refer to omni-temporal objects even if it is admitted that the total number of objects coming within the purview of 'all' is not infinite ? Sometimes the answer offered is that generalizations are the economical ways of stating many singular descriptions. But this answer, even if accepted, would not confer the status of descriptions on generalizations, as there will always be a gap between the *total* range of reference of a generalization, if it can have any, and the sum of the references of the singular descriptive statements put together. Accordingly, we may conclude that the above analysis cannot enable us to decide the fate of generalisations as to whether they may be treated as descriptions or not.

An analysis of descriptive language analogous to the one suggested by Carnap for observation language might be useful here.[9] The logical structure of the descriptive language L_d may be taken as consisting of primitive constants. Let the descriptive vocabulary V_d be the class of descriptive constants of L_d. L_d contains only individual variables, with descriptive or observable events taken as individuals. The rules of formation, which specify the admitted form of sentences and rules of logical derivation are given. L_d is assumed to be completely interpreted inasmuch as it is communicable and is actually used and understood by a certain community. The terms of V_d are predicates designating ostensive or observable properties of things or events or observable relations between them.

Certain restrictions are imposed on L_d such that the scope and meaningfulness of descriptive statments becomes explicit. The following requirements are adopted from Carnap:

9. Carnap, R, 'The Methodological Character of Theoretical Constructs', *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. I (1956) H. Feigle and M. Scriven (ed).

1. Requirement of observability for the primitive terms

All primitive terms in L_d must refer to observable properties of things or events and relations among them. This would also ensure that all terms of L_d are non-vaquous.

2. Requirement of various degrees of strictness for non-primitive descriptive terms

3. Requirements of nominalism :

The values of variables must be concrete entities.

4. Requirements of finitism :

(a) The rules of L_d do not state or imply that the basic domain is infinite. L_d has one finite model.

(b) L_d has only finite models.

(c) There is a finite number of n such that that no model contains more than n individuals.

5. Requirement of constructivism

Every value of the variable of L_d is designated by an expression in L_d.

6. Requirement of Extensionality

The L_d contains only truth functional connectives; no terms for logical or casual modalities.[18]

On the basis of the above analysis, it may be said that empirical generalizations, which contain only primitive descriptive terms or terms explicitly defined in terms of the primitives, would be considered as descriptive statements. Thus, on the basis of above criteria, the statement, "all crows are black" is a descriptive generalization but the statement "Electrons behave both as waves as well as particles" is not a descriptive statement. All statements whether singular or general, which contain terms referring to non-observable properties of objects or relations among them, will have to be treated as non-descriptive, which means that those will have to be treated as theories or theoretical statements. The above view might appear rather stringent and arbitrary, but it will have to be so on any view of descriptive statements. Any demarcation between descriptive statements and non-descriptive statements will have to be arbitrary, depending upon the structure of the language adopted and semantic criteria accepted in this regard.

To sum up, on the above analysis of descriptive language, it follows that only those statements which admit of only observable predicates are descriptive and others are not. Descriptions are observation statements,

18. *Ibid.*

which may be singular or general depending upon whether they refer to an individual object or to a class of objects.

(3)

'Explanation' is another extremely ambiguous term. For some, it may mean reducing the unfamiliar to familiar terms; or, in other words, making the things, events or situations self-evident. To quite another few, it means adducing of 'causes' for happenings, that occur but remain unintelligible. To yet another group of individuals seeking an explanation of a happening is to find out the purpose of it, and so on. The first of the above views is so naive that it hardly needs consideration and can be safely ignored. An explanation by way of reducing the unfamiliar to familiar terms will be highly arbitrary and subjective. Very often the apparent familiarity hides underneath it a staggering degree of unfamiliarity. As for instance, to commonsense it might appear that the familiarity of box like space and stream like time is unquestionable but recent interpretations of space and time in terms of spatio-temporal four dimensional continuum have shattered all illusions of familiarity about them. The other two views, which seem to represent common-sense notions of two basic types of explanation e.g., 'causal explanations' and 'teleological explanation' are rather vague. It is not feasible within the short span of this paper to discuss all aspects of explanation but an analysis of 'explanation' in relation to 'understanding' and 'description' is appropriate here, and is being considered accordingly.

What is it one is asking for, when one is seeking an explanation with regard to an occurrence or a certain configuration of objects, entities etc.? When one is asking for an explanation, it seems reasonable to believe that he is asking for an answer to a 'How ?' or 'Why ?' question. In other words, he is confronted with a situation, which he does not *understand* and has the desire that it should be made intelligible to him. Majority of the explanation-seeking questions are 'why ?' questions.* These explanation-seeking-questions emanate from the awareness of a state of mis-U-ing or lack of U-ing about a situation, happening *etc.* or the unintelligibility of facts. The potential explanation-seeker is usually confronted with an unintelligible situation and feels a kind of gap in the situation which he desires to fill up. He is not in a position to grasp its proper connectedness, which alone would satisfy his curiosity to understand, as otherwise his motive to understand and hence to seek explanation remains unintelligible. The mere fact that the individual has succeeded in raising a question seeking explanation, which might later on turn out to be irrelevant, is a sufficient proof of the fact that he is aware of the difficulty or unintelligibility of

*I agree with M. Scriven that there can be many forms of questions seeking explanation other than 'why ?' form. But I am inclined to think that all explanation seeking questions could be put forth in 'why ?' form. (M. Scriven's paper 'Explanation, Predition and Laws' in *Minnesota Studies* in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III, (1962), pp. 173-74.

the situation. Again, he cannot understand the putative explanation, unless he has the capacity to understand the communications intended for him by way of explanations. This implies that the potential explanation seeker must be well aware of the situation and the context in which the explanation is being sought and provided.

When an individual or, particularly a man with a scientific background, raises an explanation-seeking question, he is avowedly having the entire *context* in view and the answer in the form of an explanation is sought to fill in the gap in U-ing the situation that the individual may be confronted with, or is looking forward to some connections which will render facts, in his epistemic range, intelligible. It is in this sense, U-ing is related to explanation, prior to the explanation being *actually* provided. After it his been provided, a kind of dual relation would come into existence between explanation and understanding. Explanation, if appropriate, will lead to U-ing (of the situation etc.); and whether the explanation is appropriate has also to be decided by U-ing alone. The above may be presented as under :

I	II	III
Situation	"*Why?*"	*Answer*
confrontation with difficulties or lack of grasp*	Explanation-seeking -question	Explanation
		⇅
		Understanding (appropriateness of explanation and acquisition of the proper grasp is more or less simultaneous)

It would be realized that any explanatory activity is dependent, before and after its occurrence, on U-ing. An important result that emerges out of this discussion is that explanation is essentially a contextual activity. What may be part of an explanation in one context may be just an ordinary statement of fact in another.

But, what is it that constitutes an explanation? Various views may be put forth of which not all are non-trivial. It would be interesting to discuss this issue with reference to the controversy that has arisen between C.G. Hempel and M. Scriven due to their opposing views on explanation. Let us consider the position upheld by both of them, briefly.

Hempel regards explanation as an 'argument to the effect that the phenomenon to be explained (explanandum phenomenon) was to be

*Confrontation is a kind of understanding in which the mind is aware of the difficulty of the situation but does not quite know at that moment as to how to get over the difficulty ; hence the need for explanation arises.

expected in virtue of explanatory facts. These fall into two groups : (i) particular facts and (ii) uniformities expressible by means of general laws'.[11] The first group includes facts which are expressed by means of singular descriptive statements. The second group constitutes general laws. If we imagine the various explicit or tacit explanatory assumptions to be fully stated, the explanation may be conceived as a deductive argument of the form :

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} C_1, C_2, \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots C_k \\ L_1, L_2, \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots L_r \end{array}\right\} \text{Explanatory statements}$$

....

$$E \qquad\qquad \text{explanandum/sentence}$$

Here C_1, C_2.......... C_k are statements describing the particular facts invoked, L_1, L_2,............L_r, are the general laws on which the explanation rests......... .... The conclusion E of the argument is a sentence describing the explanation'.[12] Hempel calls it a Deductive-Nomological model of explanation because it effects a deductive sub-sumption of explanandum under principles that have the character of laws*. Micheal Scriven, on the other hand, holds the view that explanation is nothing more than a 'mere description' and does not have an argument like structure. "Explaining", he says, "sometimes consists simply in giving the right description . ...The right description is the one which fills in a particular gap in the understanding of the person or people to whom explanation is directed............What would be in one context a mere description can in another be a full explanation'.[13]

In the last section it has been brought out that a descriptive statement is either a singular or a general statememt, which contains apart from the vocabulary of logic only observation terms. It has also been contended that any statement, which contains non-observation (theoretical) terms is not a description, would be a theoretical statement whose cognitive significance can be determined only *indirectly* through relevant *descriptive statements*. To assert, therefore, that all explanation is 'mere' description is too sweeping a generalization and the one which restricts the scope of explanation. However, the issue involved would be considered in the context of scientific enquiry in the next section.

(4)

It is a commonplace to believe, and rightly so, that there are only two sources of acquiring genuine and communicable knowledge. They

11. Hempel, C.G., *Aspects of Scientific explanation*, 1965, p. 336.
12. *Ibid*.

*Hempel puts forth another model of explanation known as the Statistical-Probabilistic model, which makes use of statistical laws and the relation between the explanandum and the explanan statements is not deductive but probabilistic.

13. Scriven, M., *Explanation, Predictions and Laws* in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* Vol. III M. Feigle and G. Maxwell (ed.)pp. 175-176.

are perception and inference. Perception is the *direct* source of knowledge in as much as the knower, in this situation, is in direct contact with the stimuli through his sense organs. His knowledge is based on acquaintance with the environments. Inference, the other source of knowledge, is based on the validity of the logical procedure and is essentially related to perceptual premises. It is, thus, an *indirect* source of knowledge being dependent upon the validity of the logical procedure and the testability of the premises. These two sources constitute the bed rock of scientific knowledge.

Some metaphysical philosophers are, however, of the view that intuition is also a source of knowledge. Without going into detailed discussion on the subject, which is unnecessary, it may be mentioned that pure intuition as a method of gaining knowledge is utterly useless, in so far as science is concerned. Intuitive knowledge is incommunicable in its entireity, even if one admits that such a process of knowing is possible. And admitting, that it is partially communicable, the authenticity of such communication is always in doubt, as authenticity of intuitive knowledge, on logical grounds, remains undemonstrab'e. Intuitive knowledge being subjective and arbitrary is as such unscientific and devoid of all methodological propriety.

Nevertheless, intuition, in the from of creative imagination has a limited and a kind of bound role to play in as much as it enables the theoretician in a field of science to co-ordinate the data obtained by observation (selective perception) and experimentation (controlled observation) into a coherent theory through direct comprehension. But the methods of science are not confined merely to the co-ordinatization of the data but also to enable the experimentalist to predict future occurrences on the basis of such co-ordinatization, so that the verification/falsification of predictions may determine the practicability or otherwise of the theory. Intuition, therefore, has only a limited, but a very vital, role to perform in the search for authentic and communicable knowledge.

It is the objective (inter-subjective) and hence communicable character of scientific knowledge that constitutes its main characteristic. It is its amenability to verification and testability that has made scientific knowledge universally acceptable. The aim of scientific activity can now be clearly stated as the U-ing of the phenomena of nature and the communication of such U-ing to others. But it has been shown in the earlier sections as to how U-ing and its communicability is vitally related to description and explanation. Without description and explanation, U-sing is incommunicable and hence would constitute no knowledge. It is in this sense that we can have a clear perspective of U-ing as the aim of science and its communication in terms of descriptions and explanations.

A brief consideration of the development of the methodology of science would facilitate elucidation of the above ideas. The history of science reveals that the pursuit of science has been sustained due to two important but complimentary motives, namely, practical necessity and intellectual curiosity. It is the second motive which is important, in the long run, for the continuance of scientific enquiry. Man, the rational being felt a gap between what he could perceive and that, which he thought lay hidden beneath. It is this desire to fill the gap which constitutes the essence of U-ing as the continued theme of scientific activity.

In the pre-scientific era, myths and superstitions were rampant and what passed for knowledge was mainly a set of beliefs, only some of which were somehow supported. A kind of rudimentary form of observation and measurement was, perhaps, all that pre-scientific men possessed as the techniques of acquiring knowledge. Later on, as scientific outlook developed, curious men installed the first stage of scientific enquiry by grouping objects into classes on the basis of observational similarity of objects. Such a grouping of objects into 'natural kinds' came to be known as classification. Classification promoted the process of arriving at empirical generalizations. At this 'natural history stage' of empirical science, U-ing of natural phenomena is communicated through descriptions in the form of observation statements and empirical generalizations.

A belief that nature is rational and is amenable to logico-mathematical metrization has been creeping into science since the Middle Ages. The successes, which the men of science have achieved due to metrization constructs in various spheres of science, have strengthened their belief in the rationality of nature, even though a few cracks have appeared in it, particularly in the micro-field. Descriptions, at the natural history stage are expressed by means of empirical laws and generalizations ; the constructs (concepts) formed here are those which represent observable properties or entities. Similarly, mathematically metrized constructs (concepts) that occur in empirical laws, such as Boyle's Law, the relationship is asserted between observational quantities. It is description, in the form of declarative statements, to which a scientist resorts to communicate the knowledge of natural phenomena.

At the next stage of scientific inquiry, description alone is not sufficient to enable the scientist to communicate his U-ing of nature. At this stage of 'theory-construction', the theoretician has to resort to what are known as theoretical constructs. Theoretical constructs are those constructs which do not represent any observable property or entities but which has to be linked with those constructs which represent some observable properties or entities. Those statements in which such theoretical constructs occur are known as "theoretical statements". Such theoretical statements or theories acquire *partial* meaning only when linked through the 'rules of correspondence' with

observation statements.[14] The testability of theoretical statements is therefore, only indirect. The theoretical statements or complex of theoretical statements as such do not possess any semantic significance unless they are correlated with observation.

At the primitive level of U-ing, no scientific activity is possible. This is due to the fact that all that is knowable at this level is through 'demonstrative definitions', *i.e.*, by establishment of relation between the symbol and the symbolised. The communication of knowledge is only through 'demonstrative' symbols like 'it', 'this' *etc.*, and hence lacks systemicity and connectedness among facts, which is so very vital for any science to take shape. The consciousness is aware only of the existence of the unconnected facts, here and now, and the communication of such awareness lies in the recognition of the relations established between the symbol and the symbolised. All knowledge is by direct acquaintance and, perhaps, no significant descriptive element is involved. For science to come into being, the stage of description must be reached.

When U-ing has risen to the secondary level, scientific knowledge is possible and begins to emerge as soon as classification manifests itself as the outcome of man's intellectual activity. The groupings not only of *known* members of the symbolised (*i.e.*, objects, properties of objects, relations *etc.*) on grounds of similarity is reached but the mind also expects that the future occurrences of the members of the symbolised should also display the similarity observed in known cases. The empirical constructs (concepts) of science are formed at this early stage of the secondary level of U-ing. In the methodology of science, this principle of classification or of concept formation is made use of in the form of inductive inference. The next step here is to arrive at empirical inductive generalisations, which result by the establishment of a relation between two or more concepts. It has been shown already that such empirical generalizations are asserted through descriptive statements. It may, therefore, be concluded that, at the classificatory stage of U-ing, science is more or less descriptive inasmuch as the scientist's activity is directed towards communicating his U-ing through descriptions.

Science, at the higher levels of U-ing, transcends (but includes) the level of description. Here the scientist makes use of empirically established generalizations for other than descriptive purposes; he explains particular occurrences of events on the basis of such empirical generalizations. These lower level generalizations, in turn, could be explained by subsumption under higher laws and theories as has been amply demonstrated by Hempel.[15] At the descriptive level, however, generalizations of empirical science are believed to be representing the character of physical reality. Here

14. Carnap, R. *The Methodological Characters of Theoretical Constructs—Op. Cit.*
15. Hempel, C. G., *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, pp. 345.

the knowledge of what is known corresponds to what is believed to constitute nature. At the explanatory level of U-ing, the mode of U-ing is dissociated from the attitude of believing. If U-ing can ascend higher without adopting the attitude of believing, one can reach the higher level of science accordingly. Science, at the explanatory level is not belief-oriented but is intelligibility-oriented.

As already mentioned, at the explanatory level certain theoretical constructs are introduced which acquire semantic meaning partially with 'the rules of correspondence' with observation statements. The question of belief, in so far as hypothetical entities designated by theoretical constructs are concerned, does not arise. This is because the theoretical constructs do not describe anything nor could be used in a descriptive statement. Theoretical constructs are posited only for the formulation of comprehensive scientific theories, so as to coordinate wider range of phenomena and also to explain certain 'How ?' and 'Why ?' questions pertaining to those phenomena. The knowledge at the 'theory-construction level' is purely inferential being based on the observational statements (perceptual premises) and the 'rules of correspondence' (conditions which validate the inferential procedure).

Knowlege at the advanced stages of science is only inferential and hence involves argument like structure, whereas at the descriptive level, it is the declarative statements that convey scientific knoweldge. Description, therefore, does not have an argument like structure, whereas explanation essentially involves structure of that type. To assert, therefore, that explanation is 'mere description' is to confuse the two levels of scientific enterprise. These are two distinct modes of communicating scientific knowledge depending upon the stage of U-ing, that man, the searcher of truth, has reached in his endeavour to uncover truth.[16]

16. Morgenbesser, S., *The Explanatory-predictive Approach to Science, Philosophy of Science—Delware Seminar* (Vol. I), (ed.) B. Baumrin 1963, pp. 55.

Lalit Kumar Mishra

FACT, PROPOSITION AND TRUTH

Fact is the condition of the assertability, it is a condition of objective communication. But we must not take this statement to mean that objective communication is wholly and solely dependent upon facts, for we may speak a statement which is although communicable and yet it does not refer to fact of any kind. Therefore, it would be better to say that in the empirical language by which is meant a language whose business is to inform us about the external world, every statement that is capable of being communicated is dependent upon its capacity to refer to fact of some sort. Factual questions are different from the questions of opinion. A certain opinion of a certain man has nothing to do with the objective state of affair in the external world, unless and until, that opinion be in the form of some factual statement, as for example when I say, 'in my opinion, the sky is clear to-day', it is quite clear that the addition of the phrase 'in my opinion' is quite irrelevant to the statement 'the sky is clear to-day' which is obviously a factual statement. But on the other hand, when I say, 'In my opinion, a particular thing is good', here I am not referring to anything in the external world but I am expressing my own attitude towards certain thing. Again, since empirical questions are nothing short of factual questions, we are compelled to distinguish between questions of fact and questions of mathematics, questions of formal logic, questions of language, questions of philosophy and questions of art-criticism. Because these questions are not about the empirical world they do not inform us about the external world in any way In fact, even all empirical questions are not factual. There are also theoretical questions, which are empricical and factual statements are opposed to theoretical statements. Any statement which is used in theory is a theoretical statement. The atomic theory, the molecular theory of gases and the wave and quantum theories of radiation may serve as examples of general theories of the theoretical sciences. Such theories as these do not refer to facts, nor do they assert any facts. To interpret them as if they asserted facts is not correct. In fact, theoretical statements contain mention of or make reference to theoritical concepts. Examples of thoretical concepts are 'atom', 'energy', 'quantum', 'entropy' and 'field'.

Facts are not things, because thing is always particular, so that it can be named, but a factual statement is not a name of some particular theory and why a thing or particular thing cannot be regarded as a fact is because of the reason that a mere particular thing cannot make any proposition, true or false. When I say 'Socrates is dead' I state the fact that Socrates is dead. But if I only say 'Socrates', I do not state anything and if I understand this word, I understand it as stating some fact of such

kind as 'Socrates was a great philosopher' and so on. This fact is a sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence not by a simple name like 'Socrates'. And when a simple word, such as 'wolf' comes to express a fact it is due to un-expressed context.

Now, it was Wittgenstein who first of all pointed out that propositions are not names for facts, for there can be two propositions corresponding each fact, one true and one false or one positive and one false. This illustrates how the relation of proposition to fact is different from the relation of name to the thing named. There are two ways in which a proposition can be related to a fact; it may be true to the fact or it may be false to the fact. But there is only one relation of name to the named. It just names a particular thing and if it does not name anything, then it is not a name. But even if a proposition is false, it does not cease to be a proposition. But if a name does not name anything, well, it is just a voice. Further, Wittgenstein contends that facts are complex and the complexity of facts is mirrored in the proposition. There is always a fundamental identity of structure, between a fact and the symbol for it, which is the proposition.

C.A. Baylis contends that fact is either the relation between particular or is relation of examplification between a particular thing and the characters which characterize it. He says "Facts are entities in relation. At the lowest level, they are relations among particulars such as one patch or one building being large than another, or they are relations of exemplification between particulars and the characters which characterize them, as for example a given patch being red. These are facts about particulars. They are concrete occurrences, events or states of affairs. At a higher level, there are facts about characters, as for example, the fact that the relation of implication is transitive."[1]

Baylis thinks then that there are particulars and there are facts. Thus 'rose' is a particular and 'Rose is red' is a fact. But B. Mayo contends that we cannot specify as to what should be called the particular, meaning thereby that what we mean by particular is not some thing ontological but merely the way of speaking. Thus, in the example given above, the term 'Rose' is a particular, but, "if the proposition were 'the red-rose is fragrant', the corresponding fact indeed would be one about the particular, this red-rose. This seems to imply that the kind of thing referred to as a particular varies according to what you are going to say about it."[2]

Russell says that there are different types of facts. The simplest imaginable fact is that which consists in the possession of a quality with some particular thing as for example, 'This is white'. Then, there are facts in which one thing is related to the other, as for example 'This is to

1. Mind 1946 "Facts, Propositions, Examplification and Truth." by C.A. Baylis.
2. Mind 1950 "Mr. Rayle on 'facts' by B. Mayo".

the left of that'. Such facts are called 'atomic facts' by Russell, and the propositions expressing them are called atomic propositions. All atomic propositions combined with such words as 'or', 'if', 'and' and so forth are called molecular propositions. In atomic proposition, there is only one corresponding fact. But in molecular proposition of the form 'p or q', there would be two facts, which would be relevant to discovering the truth and falsehood of this proposition. We can use the phrase 'atomic fact', but then, we cannot use the phrase 'molecular fact' for the simple reason that in the objective world there is no such thing as disjunctive fact corresponding to 'p or q'.

Up to now, we have talked of fact as positive and singular but we may ask as to whether a fact is only positive and singular and it cannot be negative and general. Russell has contended that the fact is both negative and general. He says that unless and until we admit the adequacy of the view that negative facts are ultimate, we cannot account for the false positive proposition, as for example when we say 'Socrates is alive', this sentence is false because of a fact in the real world, because a sentence cannot be false except because of a fact, so that we would find it extremely difficult to say what exactly happens when we make a positive assertion that is false, unless, we are going to admit negative facts. Mr. Demos on the other hand, contends that there is no negative fact at all for negative proposition is not in any way dependent upon a cognitive subject for its definition. When I say 'Socrates is not alive', I am merely expressing disbelief in the proposition that 'Socrates is alive'. Thus there is the fundamental difference between knowing the positive proposition and knowing the negative proposition. Negative proposition cannot be taken at its face-value; in order to understand its actual origin we would have to interpret it. Mr. Demos, further contends that 'not' should not be regarded as the qualification of the predicate. If we say 'This is not red', we may regard 'not-red' as predicate, but it cannot be so, for so many propositions are not expressions of predicates and strictly speaking 'not' applies to the whole of proposition, not-p, where p stands for any proposition. If this is so, then every negative proposition would mean that there is a proposition which is in compatible with some other proposition, which is true. Thus, when we say 'Socrates is not alive', we mean to say that there are two propositions 'Socrates is alive' and 'Socrates is dead' and that the former is incompatible with the latter. It is in this sense that Mr. Demos asserted that we should not take negative proposition at its face-value; but we must interpret it in order to know its real meaning. But Mr. Russell points out that if we make incompatibility the fundamental idea in interpreting the negative fact, then why not should we regard the negative fact itself as fundamental. But we donot think that Russell is justified in indentifying the incompatibility with negative fact, for the simple reason that when we say that a certain proposition p is incompatible with certain other proposition q, we are not talking of anything, but

on the other hand we are talking of the relation between concepts in question. Thus, when we say 'Socrates is alive' and 'Socrates is dead' and further point out that the proposition 'Socrates is alive' is incompatible with the proposition 'Socrates is dead', we are in fact talking of the in compatobility of the use of the word 'alive' with the use of the word 'dead' in the same context and this incompatibilty has nothing to do with any fact whatsoever. This shows that we cannot use such phrase as 'incompatible fact', nor can we think that Mr. Demos in his analysis of negative fact has consciously or unconsciously thought of the 'incompatible fact; but Mr. Russell wrongly believed that Mr. Demos was replacing the phrase 'negative fact' by 'incompatible fact' and for this reason, Russell's criticism of the view of Mr. Demos is not quite correct. But the type of incompatibility, which is present in these two propositions 'Socrates is alive' and 'Socrates is dead' cannot explain every type of negative fact and the reason of it is quite obvious : the inaompatibility in the present case is a logical incompatiblity, which is ultimately dependent upon the law of contradiction. But how are we going to explain the negative fact such as the 'colour of this cloth is not red' which is the necessary condition for the falsehood of the positive proposition. 'The colour of this cloth is red'. Now, according to Mr. Demos, there must be at least one true proposition about the same cloth and let it be 'the colour of this cloth is blue', and the moment we know the latter proposition, we need not resort to the negative fact such as the colour of this cloth is not red in order to understand the falsity of the proposition 'The colour of this cloth is red'. Now in this example, the incompatibility is not that of logic, for logically speaking the proposition 'The colour of this cloth is blue' is not incompatible with the proposition' the colour of this cloth is red', because 'blue' and 'red' are not contradictory terms at all. So, in this case, our use of the term, 'incompatibility' has a different sense and that is this that when there are two propositions about the samething, one of which is false and the other true, then, we cannot use both the propositions at the same time, in any single significant discourse.

In fact, if we clearly analyse the negative proposition, it speaks either speaker's ignorance of something or it asserts something positive. Thus, when I say 'this flower is not rose', I merely indicate my ignorance of the name of the flower in question, otherwise, if I had known the name of the flower and if I were not in the habit of talking lavishly, I would have just spoken 'This flower is this' or 'the name of this flower is this.' Again, when I say 'the dog is not barking now'. I am merely pointing out the fact that 'the dog is silent now'. Thus, every negative proposition has some corresponding positive fact and as such, if we take into consideration only these positive facts, then, even we can dispense with the negative propositions.

Now, we have to consider the contention of Russell that there are general facts. He considers the plausibility of the view that there are

general facts on the basis of general statement, or inductive generalizations. He says that a generalization cannot be true, unless and until, there is the corresponding fact, and since a generalized statement, in order to be true must refer to the general fact, therefore, there must be general facts. But general statements such as 'All men are mortal' are not descriptive statements in the sense in which the statement 'S is a man' is a discriptive statement. The general statements are in fact, the normative statements which regulate our thinking with reference to certain classes. The business of general statements or the laws of science are not to describe the external world but to regulate our thought to point out certain procedures by which we can think of certain things. They are thus not descriptive but prescriptive in nature and thus the question of truth and falsity does not arise in the case of such statements. Therefore, there is no need of admitting general facts.

Upto this, we have not said anything about the term 'proposition' concerning whose definite meaning, there is much controversy. Russell defines proposition as the content of belief, but we do not think, that belief has anything to do with the definition of proposition, because we are concerned with a definite indicative statement, whether that statement is either believed or disbelieved by anybody is quite a different matter. Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of the term 'proposition', we need not consider such psychological terms as 'belief', 'opinion' or any other similar term. According to Moore, it is the meaning of the sentence, which is a proposition. But Moore has not clearly pointed out as to what is the meaning of the meaning itself and further how a proposition is nothing short of the meaning of the sentence and we can use our own meaning of the term 'meaning' then, obviously the proposition is not the same as the meaning of the sentence, for proposition is said to be true or false, but we cannot say that the meaning of the sentence is either true or false. As against all these views A.J. Ayer points out "We may define proposition as a class of sentences which have the same intensional significance for any one, who understands them. Thus the sentence, 'I am ill', 'ich bin krank', 'Je suis malade', are all elements of the propositions 'I am ill.'"[3]

Proposition is thus what is asserted or expressed in a statement; it is not an entity of any type as Carnap and others have thought. Carnap says "We apply the term 'proposition' to any entities of a certain logical type namely those that may be expressed by (declarative) sentences in a language."[4] He thinks that proposition is something of the sort of objective being, which may or may not be exemplified in nature for he says, "Like the term 'property', it is used neither for a linguistic expression, nor for a subjective, mental occurrence, but rather for something objective that may or may not be exemplified in nature."[5]

3. Language, Truth and Logic, p. 88.
4. Meaning and Necessity, p. 27.
5. Meaning and Necessity, p. 27.

This view of Carnap has serious defect in so far as it may mean that mean that a proposition, which is an entity of logical type, has some sort of ontological status (although, he never intends to say so). In order to avoid this commitment to any ontology, it would be better to confine the definition of the proposition to the linguistic statement which asserts something. Now that which is expressed by the proposition may or may not be exemplified in nature and in the former case, the proposition is said to be true, while in the latter case, the proposition is said to be false. Thus the term 'true' is applied to all those declarative sentences or propositions which refer to some fact. This is the view of 'truth' which Tarski has elaborated in his essay, 'Semantic Conception of Truth'.[6] Tarski in this essay has pointed out that when we say that a certain statement (say) x is true, we mean to say that there is some corresponding fact (say) p in the external world. This can be shown in the following way :

X is true if, and only if, p. In fact this conception of truth is nothing short of the correspondence theory of truth in new light, and we do not think that there is any other way of analysing the concept of truth. And yet there are thinkers such as A.J. Ayer, Strawson and F.P. Ramsey, who have understood the problem of truth quite differently. Ayer says "Thus to say that a proposition is true is just to assert it, and to say that it is false is just to assert its contradictory. And this indicates that the terms 'true' and false' connote nothing, function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial. And in that case, there can be no sense in asking us to analyse the concept of 'truth'.[7] "Now the statement that 'to say that a proposition is true is just to assert it' is extremely inaccurate and primafacie objectionable, for if this statement is valid, then any statement which we assert is true, which as we know, is not the case, because we do not assert only true statement but we may assert false statement as well. Again, merely asserting a certain statement cannot make that statement true, for in order to prove that a statement is true would have to show that statement refers to something in the external world. P.F. Strawson[8] has argued that the words 'true' and 'false' are in fact performatory, rather than descriptive and hence the sentences in which they appear express activities rather than state facts. He says that our purpose in using such expressions as "it is true that......", "That is true .....", and so on, is to endorse, underline, confirm or concede, what has been or might be said by another. But this view of Strawson is extremely misleading. When, we say that a particular statement is true, we do not mean that we agree with the man who has uttered the statement, but on the other hand, we mean that the statement in question correspondes with the reality. W.H. Walsh says, "To say that p is true, is not merely to assert p, but further to say that p ought to be

6. An essay published in *"Semantics and the Philosophy of language"*. Ed. by L. Linsky.

7. Language, truth and Logic, pp. 88-9

8. "Truth" in Analysis, 1949.

asserted; it is to imply that there are grounds for asserting p or that there is evidence for it, which is generally valid."[9]

Again, there are thinkers such as Neurath, Carnap and Popper, who think that the truth of the statement is dependent upon its agreement with other statements. But this conception of truth equates truth with validity. Whether a certain statement is in agreement with other statements is not the question of truth but the question of validity. When we consider the truth of the statement, we are not considering the agreement of the statement with other statements, but on the other hand, we are considering the agreement of the statement with the reality.

9. Mind 1952.

R.D. Mishra

ON PROPOSITIONS

This paper aims at showing the indispensability of the concept of proposition, and thereby involves an examination of a long-drawn logical controversy over the question : Are there propositions ? The most common tendency these days is in favour of rejecting the notion. In brief, two sorts of reasons are given for its rejection. First, the notion is alleged to be superfluous. It is held that anything that can be said by talking about propositions can be said better by talking about something else, say, sounds, words, sentences or statements. Ryle, for example, thinks that the notion is superfluous just because sentences do suffice and, at the same time, avoid any mistification;[1] Ayer says that propositions are a class of 'would-be-invented facts'[2] and Schlick holds that the notion of proposition has to be given up in favour of "a series of sounds or other symbols... together with the logical rules belonging to them."[3] Secondly, the notion is said to be obscure because it is difficult to give a satisfactory account of what a proposition is, or to state in what the identity or non-identity of a pair of propositions consists. Geach, for example, holds that it is doubtful whether there is such a concept as the concept of propositional-identity and even if there is, it is confusing and obscure.[4]

Let us examine these objections. The chief motive for talking about propositions, in addition to their verbal embodiments, is that there is a difference between the identity of sentences and the identity of 'the thing that is said.' The identity of sentences lies in the identity of words and word-orders. But the simple identity-tests applied to sentences can neither rule out the possibility of ambiguity of reference or meaning, nor can ensure that there is one and the only one way of saying the same thing about the same object, person or state-of-affairs. It is therefore possible that (i) two sentences may say the same thing and (ii) on different occasions, one sentence may say two things, or refer to two things or both. This may come about in a variety of ways, for example, when the two sentences contain personal pronouns or demonstratives, such as 'this', 'that' 'here', 'now' etc.; or when there happen to be several ways of saying the same thing about a person or an object, such as 'A is bigger than B' and 'B is smaller than A'. It may come about again simply because someone says something first in one language and then in a different one.

There seems therefore to be no point in saying that there are no such things as propositions unless this means that there is no such thing as the

1. *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 30 (1929-30), pp. 91-126.
2. Ayer, A.J. : *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, p. 96.
3. *Analysis*, 2 (1934-35), p. 67.
4. *The Aristotelian Society*, (Suppl.), 32 (1958), p. 160.

thing that is said, over and above the sentence saying it. It might be argued that ambiguity of reference, or obscurity, is not an essential feature of sentences and can always, in principle at least, be eliminated, for instance, by pointing out or talking more. But it is the possibility of obscurity or ambiguity, and not the mere fact of its existence, which creates the need for the concept of proposition. Similarily, it is not the mere fact that atleast two languages do exist, but the mere possibility that two might have existed, even if it were supposed that only one did exist, that provides another reason for talking about propositions.

Amongst those who prefer to talk of sentences rather than propositions, there is also an internal controversy regarding the exact nature of the sentence capable of becoming a genuine substitute. Some of them, following the older tradition, hold that only declarative sentences, or statements as Ayer and other logical positivists prefer to call them, are suited for this purpose [5] But there are others who think that it is pointless thus to limit the range of genuine substitutes and even commands, wishes, questions and requests are competent to fulfil the same requirements. It is possible, they think, for a command, request or order to be repeated at greater lenght, and the sort of thing which can be asserted is not different from the sort of thing which can be requested, commanded, regretted, promised, inquired about or longed for.[6] Any way, whatever form of an expression is conceived to be a genuine substitute, it falls short of replacing a proposition, for the sole reason that while verbal embodiments, at the most, can be meaningful or meaningless, it is only a proposition that can be true or false and to be meaningful is not the same as to be true.

The second reason for objecting to the notion of proposition is that no simple satisfactory criterion of its identity can be found. Most of the possible criteria that have been suggested are found unsatisfactory for one reason or the other. But this objection loses all its plausibility if the proposition is defined in terms of truth-values, as is repeatedly suggested by almost all formalists Such a criterion fully satisfies the formal requirements of propositional-identity. The main criteria may roughly be divided into three types : (a) those which concern utterances—sentences and words in them; (b) those which concern sentences and their meanings; and (c) those which treat truth-values as essential conditions of identity.

Regarding the first criterion, some thinkers maintain that a proposition is an utterance, i.e., some one historic event which occurs at some one time and consists of some one uttering certain noises; and there are others who hold that a proposition is a sentence. Now since the utterance, being spoken rather than written, cannot be repeated as any

5. See, for example, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 37 (1940), p. 233 ; *Mind*, 46 (1937), p. 347.

6. See, for example, *The Philosophical Review*, 70 (1961), p. 503; *Philosophy*, 39 (1964), p. 40.

repetition would constitute a new utterance, and since the word 'utterance' suggests moans, groans, sighs etc., as well as words, it is not at all like the notion of the proposition as 'that which is said'—a repeatable and meaningful concept. Regarding the equation of sentences to propositions, some of the objections have already been given. In addition, it may be remarked that while sentences can be grammatically analysed and phrased, punctuated and bold-faced, when spoken they can emerge quickly or slowly, loudly or softly, and can be broken or interrupted by sobs and laughter, none of these things are true of propositions. Moreover, word-word equivalence is clearly not a necessary condition of the synonymy of sentences, nor of the identity of propositions. It is not even a sufficient condition unless a great deal else is assumed. It follows therefore that the conditions of the identity of utterrances, sentences, or words are different from the conditions of the identity of propositions.

The second criterion is well-expressed by Moore in maintaining that a proposition is that which is apprehended when a sentence is heard or understood.[7] That which is apprehended is the meaning of the sentence. But the concept of meaning is no less difficult than that of propositions. Let us consider in detail, however, the further sub-divisions of this criterion : (i) It is said that since the meanings of sentences are facts which the sentences state or refer to, two sentences would express the same proposition if and only if they refer to the same object, person or state-of-affairs. But if some one asks, for instance, to all his neighbours 'Do you like gardening ?', he has asked each one of them the same question—about gardening as well as the 'you' concerned, yet the reference changes each time the question is asked. Thus even if the very same statement is made, it is not a necessary condition of identity for all types of propositions.

(ii) Another definition of the meaning of a sentence is that it is the method of its verification. On this view of meaning, notably held by logical positivists,[8] two sentences express the same proposition if and only if the method of verifying the one is identical with the method of verifying the other. But, being concerned with evidence, it cannot be of any use in dealing with necessary propositions. Moreover, if the verification test is regarded not as a necessary condition but as a test, it is still not very useful for the simple reason that it is improper to assume that the notion of 'same verification' is simpler than that of the 'same proposition'.

(iii) Quine suggests that two sentences are synonymous when the situation in which they are utterred and the responses which they evoke have a certain degree of similarity.[9] His test is here presumably to be understood as requiring a knowledge of the internal state of the speaker as

7. Moore, G.E. : *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 57-58.
8. Ayer, A.J. : *Language, Truth and Logic*, pp. 15-16. etc.
9. Quine, W.V.O. :*From A Logical Point of View*, pp. 108-9 etc.

part of the first situation, but this, as he himself admits at one stage, is a difficulty. A more serious difficulty is that there is no indication in the world as to what constitutes relevant similarity of situation or reaction.

(iv) A fourth veriety of meaning-identity view, held by Strawson and others,[10] is that meaning is use. It is argued that if a proposition is the meaning of a sentence, then two sentences express the same propositon if and only if the rules for the use of the one sentence are exactly the same in form and content as the rules for the use of the other. But if use determines meaning then 'So-and-so is happenning now' should always mean the same, whereas the fact is that it means something different every time it is utterred, just because the time-referent 'now' keeps on changing. Again, uses of sentences containing proper names are not the same as of those containing personal pronouns and demonstratives. But 'Mr. X did it' and 'That man did it' may express the same proposition. Moreover, the use of 'I' is different from that of 'he' and 'you', and the report of another person's intention to a third person is a different sort of thing from an expression of one's own intentions. But from the point of view of the third person—the hearer—the information might be the same. Hence, sentences with the same kind of use can make different statements on different occasions, and sentences with different kinds of use can sometimes make the same statement.

(v) Lastly, there is the entailment-view, according to which two sentences mean the same proposition if they entail one another.[11] Against this view of mutual entailment as a test of synonymy, one objection is that entailment is undoubtedly a more difficult notion than the notion of propositional-identity, and the natural tendency is to explain the first in terms of the second, not vice-versa. Moreover, there do seem to be pairs of sentences which, on some occasions atleast, count as saying the same-thing yet the things they say do not entail one another. Thus one can say the same thing to different people, yet if what is said is about the listener there is no mutual entailment. This means that even entailment is not a good test of identity. It may nevertheless be a sufficient condition of identity.

Identifying propositions in terms of entailment is closely connected with the question : Can a proposition change its truth-value ?. The right answer and the only satisfactory criterion seems to be to assume that the identity of propositions does depend on the identity of their truth-values. This is, in fact, implied by most of the suggested criteria discussed above. So far as the necessary propositions are concerned, there is no controversy and it is commonly admitted that they can not change their truth-values. The trouble is regarding the contingent propositions; for there are thinkers, notably pragmatists and some pseudo-formalists, who maintain that many

10. Strawson, P F. :*Introduction To Logical Theory*, pp. 188-89, also *Mind*, 59 (1950), p. 326.

11. *Analysis*, 2 (1934-35), p. 71.

things affect the truth-value of propositions and that these truth-value changes involve changes in propositional-identity. To me, all such efforts seem to be misconceived, and this may become obvious if we go into the reasons for saying that one proposition may have different truth-values.

One reason for believing that propositions can change their truth-value is the existence of propositions like 'It is no longer true that the so-and-so is the such-and-such'. But these propositions, in fact, stand in need of explicit formulation, and when so formulated they do imply just the opposite. For example, the expression 'It is no longer true that Mr. X is the leader' can be translated into 'At time *t*, Mr. X was the leader but at time *r*, Mr. X was not the leader'. But then it does not seem to change its truth-value. It is, in fact, a defect of ordinary language that gives a chance for such obscurities.

Another reason for believing that propositions can change their truth-value is the unwillingness of saying that the identity of propositions remains unknown until one has decided whether or not the proposition is true or false. For if it is absolutely impossible for a proposition to change its truth-value, it looks as if its being true or false is one of its essential features. So the question 'What proposition is this?' would always contain the question 'Is this proposition true or false?' which manifestly leads to absurdity, since one has to know what a proposition is before one can ask whether it is true or not. Against this reason, it seems pointless to insist that knowing that two sentences express the same proposition involves knowing that the truth-value of one proposition is, in fact, truth and that of the other proposition is also, in fact, truth; unless this is necessarily involved in knowing that the truth-values of the propositions in question are the same. It is certainly possible to know that the truth-value of a particular proposition is the same as the truth-value of another proposition, without knowing what, in fact, this truth-value is; since what the truth-value of a proposition is depends upon what the proposition is about, what it says about it, of what time it is true and so on, and can not vary independently of these things. If one knows therefore what things, events, places, speakers, times and so forth are referred to be relevant by two propositions and knows that they are all identical, then one also knows that the truth-value of the propositions, whatever it is, is in fact the same for each proposition. Thus the identity of reference, time, place and whatever else might be relevant is a sufficient condition of identity of truth-value.

Of course, if one knows that the references made by two propositions to time, place etc., are not identical then one knows not that their truth-values are different, but that they might be different. Consequently, it is possible to know that the truth-values of two propositions are the same without knowing what the truth-value, in fact, is ; but it is not possible to know that the two propositions have different truth-values,

without knowing what the truth-value of each is. Hence, the view that a difference in truth-value is a sufficient condition of non-identity of propositions does not involve the assertion that to identify a proposition one must know its truth-value, and thus it is not an absurd view.

It follows then that although there seem to be two distinct ways of thinking about propositions, of which one appears to allow changing truth-values and the other does not, it is logically untenable to maintain both that truth and falsehood essentially characterise a proposition and, at the same time, that it may change its truth-value. In its primary sense, the proposition is anything that may be said to be true or false, and truth and falsehood both being formal characteristics can nohow be subject to change nor can admit of degrees. It is only in this sense of the term that entailment, implication and a number of other such notions are relevant to propositions. A great number of sentences which state accomplished facts, for instance, most of those in history books, represent such propositions. Even sentences whose subject-terms refer to time express propositions thought of in this way, for times do not change with time. 'Something said *about* so-and-so' can always be changed into 'Something *that* is said'. It would not be possible, however, to submit any timeless proposition to the reverse process. This seems further to be a reason for saying that the primary notion of propositions is the one in which a proposition's truth-value does not change.

The essential property of every proposition is, therefore, its claim to truth, even when it happens to be false. In fact, we could not reject, *i.e.*, disclaim a proposition if it were not proposed as a claim. The denial of a proposition would itself be a proposition. It is nohow possible therefore to maintain that there are no propositions, without at the same time actually presenting a proposition, and thereby refuting the contention that there are no propositions.

Raj Kumari Gupta

NEED OF HUMANISTIC TURN IN PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is exactly what philosophers do. Broadly speaking, thinking is the only common feature of their doings. This thinking cannot mean mere idle and playful manipulation of images and ideas in one's mind, for results of philosophic thought are serious and effective in our life. Philosophy is effective thinking which differs from reverie inasmuch as the latter is a passive indulgence in imagery psychically stimulated by failure or impossibility of a real action, but effective thinking takes its rise from an actual problem or situation which vitally concerns man and his conditions and also aims at its solution. Effective thinking is no less than an activity through which man ideally reacts to his environment in order to bear upon it. The following characteristics seem to be essential for effective thinking :—(1) It must have a real and vital content, *i.e.* it must be born out of a genuine problem or situation. (2) It must be dynamic i.e, it must seek to solve the problem at hand. (3) It must be consistent both with itself and outside reality and (4) it must be capable of resulting in a real change in the environment.[1] So philosophy is effective thinking.

But is Philosophy only effective thinking and nothing more ? Everyman indulges in thinking and he is, nevertheless, effective in his thought in so far as he may have a problem concerning his family or profession and he seeks to solve it too. Thinking of family and business matters cannot be equated with philosophic thinking although the former may be more serious and more immediately effective sometimes or for some people than the latter. Philosophic thinking will have to be distinguished from ordinary thinking. Firstly, philosophic thinking is more general and more broad-based than ordinary thinking in so far as the former takes into account general problems and situations and the ordinary thinking confined to particular and personal situations. Philosophy, being general thinking, is usually confused with abstract thinking. In general-thinking, we may not abstract ourselves from the real problems and concrete situations in the context of which alone it is effective. Secondly, philosophy is thinking in terms of attitudes, outlooks and principles which underly ordinary thinking ; it is not merely thinking from a special point of view but thinking about the point of view itself. Thirdly philosophic thinking is more systematic and methodical than ordinary thinking. It is due to the methodicity and systematic nature of philosophic thought that it is called a discipline. Lastly, philosophic thought in view of its generality

1. "Philosophers have been interpreting the world, but the point is to change it"
—Karl Marx.

and fundamentality, is found useful and directive for thinking at the ordinary level. Philosophy brings forth results and principles from its depth of accumulated wisdom and dynamism of fresh thinking, which guide and enlighten the minds of ordinary people. This eternal wisdom is Philosophia Perennis. Let us conclude it by saying that Philosophy is an effective and methodical thinking about all things in general including Man and the Universe. Hence philosophy is always of the nature of a Weltanschauung or a world-view.

(2)

The definition of philosophy seems to be as vague and nebulous as it is casual and provisional. The difficulty of defining a study like philosophy is bound to be great, for reasons of its vastness of scope and generality of its approach. Inspite of the strict conditions of logical definition which make the task all the more difficult, some preliminary understanding of the subject in the form of definition is possible, and that much has been attempted above. So far the terms used therein are concerned, there may not be a general and easy agreement upon them among the students of philosophy. In the first instance, the word "thinking" may be objectionable for some philosophers who do not like so much of mere intellectual thinking in philosophy. This objection may be expected from two quarters :—

Firstly, philosophers of scientism and logical positivists do not find that philosophy, by its own nature, is bound to be abstract, and, therefore, they, in spirit of reformation, attribute to philosophy the function of criticism and logical syntax while all sciences invest in themselves the sole responsibility of discovering the truth or reality. These thinkers make philosophy subservient to science.

Prima facie this objection springs from a definite attitude and a well-established philosophical point of view which cannot be easily refuted or discarded. But this much can be definitely asserted that this attitude about the function of philosophy is not born out of a genuine interest and true love for philosophy and it is the approach of those who have been exclusively interested in scientific methodology and scientific activity. These scientific philosophers have transferred their interest from science to philosophy without the necessary re-orientation proper to the philosophical problem and temper. This misplaced interest has forced them to see philosophy empty of its genuine problems and devoid of its real contents. They give a mere supervisory function to philosophy and make it subservient to the original task of discovering the truth in sciences. The man who is truly and genuinely interested in philosophy, can well understand that the problem of philosophy is of its own kind and it necessitates a unique philosophic method and approach which is fundamentlly different from that of sciences. Hence the objection that philosophy, as it is,

indulges in mere intellectual abstraction in thinking and in order to be more effective in its function, it must devote itself to clarification and logical analysis of terms, is not justified. It is simply to first empty philosophy of its real problems and contents and then to say that since philosophy has no actual problem of its own, it must assume some other function which is derogatory to philosophy. Thinking in general terms about general problems and situations is not abstract intellection, but an effective activity and thinking in the purview of a world-view, which cannot be achieved by merely piecing together truths obtained by various sciences, has been always the sacred prerogative of philosophy.

The objection from the second quarter is based upon the attitude and outlook of religious philosophers. They contend that a philosopher is all absorbed in thinking and reasoning, but does not see the reality face to face. According to them, philosophy is not mere interpretation or abstract movement of concepts in the mind, but it should do the more real task of transformation of life and actual creation, and experience or vision of the reality must not only be a necessary condition but the very destination of all philosophical knowledge, thinking and good life must all be ways to the ultimate basking in the blaze of reality in the forms of mystic or spiritual experience[1]. What these philosophers contend for is a more religious and practical view of philosophy, which belongs to the true Indian Tradition that does not distinguish between religion and pure philosophy.[2]

There seems to be an element of truth in what religious philosophers say, but it does not lie in saying that philosophy is simply vision or darshana and that philosophic activity is not different from the function of religion, but in giving a practical tinge to philosophy and allowing it to play an effective role in the life of mankind. The view of these philosophers of religion is erroneous. Whereas the view of these scientific philosophers made an error in giving over-importance to science, the religious philosophers, in overrating religious philosophy. No doubt religion and philosophy should colour and determine each other they possess the common background of reality and unity of life,[3] still they are to be kept apart as distinct disciplines. The Indian Tradition of Philosophy which does not distinguish between Religion and Philosophy, has been criticized by western thinkers on that very account and their charge that

1. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society* p. 70, "Philosophizing is not an end in itself but culminates in personal vision and transformation. Philosophy is not a cerebral activity, but a way of life"—*The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, ed. by Bernard Phillips.
2. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, p. 26.
3. Indra Sen in an article "The New Lead to Philosophy" in *Philosophy Quarterly* 1954 (July) writes "Philosophy has given mental clarity and conviction to the religious aspiration and Practice, Religion and Yoga have given vigour and life to Philosophers."

there is no pure philosophy in India is justified to some extent. "Do we do pure philosophy in India ?" is a question which will have to be faced.[4] Mixed Philosophy is no pure philosophy and pure philosophy is not pure Philosophization. So what is pure Philosophy ? The answer is that Philosophy has its own genuine problems and methods of approach which can be justified on their own account without reference to any other discipline. Hence the religious interest in philosophy resulting in a confusion between Religion and Philosophy is intolerable. Mysticism is the ultimate essence of all true Religion,[5] and Mysticism is different from pure philosophy on the ground that Mysticism believes in experiencing while philosophy means thinking.

The view of Religious thinkers is open to two objections. Firstly, "Religion" itself is a word having vague and disputable connotation. Some smell dogmatism and fanaticism at its bottom and others impute ritualism and institutionalism to it, still others define it to be a way of life based on moral and spiritual values.[6] Philosophy in attempting at any basic affiliation with Religion will certainly imbibe more of confusion than clarity. Secondly, to define Philosophy as Darshana or vision is to indentify it with some belief grounded on experience, (religious or mystic) which is beyond self-conscious thought or aspires to be general and universal discipline open to all rational thinking and capable of its own justification in self conscious thinking. Mystic experience cannot justfy itself and has to depend upon Reason for its defence and intelligibility. Hence self-conscious thought must hold the reins in Philosophy. But this self-conscious thinking will be empty of its content unless it feeds upon some experience without which it can never contact realitv and remains a mere cerebral activity. So all kinds of experience-sensory, moral, aesthetic, spiritual, religious and mystic, enter into philosophy in so far as they are capable of rational interpretation or fit into the frame-work of world-view. Hence philosophy is the rational interpretation of all kinds of experience rather than experience itself or a belief based exclusively on one experience alone. There is no denying the fact that a philosopher will be at home in his philosophy if he has the experience of all kinds and also feels the throb of the eternal in his being, but he will have to come down to rational language to interpret or communicate it to others in order to be called a philosopher. To interpret all experience in rational terms and enlighten Mankind with what he finds to be true, is the sacred task of a true philosopher.[7] Hence both the objections against philosophy indentified with effective thinking do not

4. G.R. Malkani faces the same question in his article "Two Different Traditions in Pure Philosophy" in *Philosophy Quarterly* 1955 (January) and concludes by saying that Indian Philosophy has a different philosophic method.

5. Stace, *Religion and the Modern Mind*.

6. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*.

7. This ideal of a true philosopher is well exemplified in the personality of Samkara who combined in himself the seer, the dialectician and the saviour of mankind.

stand much ground, for effective thinking assimilates the truth of both the objections.

(3)

Another question, not necessarily an objection, can be raised about the above definition of Philosophy *viz.* what is the relationship of Man and Philosophy. Is Philosophising necessarily a human activity ? Can we say that Man is the focus of philosophical activity ? The problem to which these questions point out is of utmost importance for modern Philosophy. Every scholar and student of philosophy has to face it, it is not only a problem for thought but also of the whole culture and progress of mankind. Let us formulate clearly as to what the relationship of Man and Philosophy really implies. There may be two-fold implications :

(a) Does Man form the subject-matter of Philosophy on his own account, and in what way ?

(b) Does man in any way form part of the ultimate motivation of philosophical investigation, or is it done for its own sake totally untainted by any human motive ?

These questions have seemed to divide the philosophic Tradition into two main camps which advocate different views on the issue[8] :

The first group of thinkers are the philosophers of scientism who uphold the scientific method and scientific spirit of enquiry in Philosophy. The Scientific method is unique in maintaining an absolute indifference to man with all his motive, desires and aspirations.[9] They recommend that Philosophy should also abandon all reference to Man and his ideals in order to be objective and progressive like science and maintain the scientific spirit of investigation. According to this view, Man can enter into the field of Philosophic enquiry only in two ways. Firstly, man is one of the objects in the world to be studied. He demands a special consideration only because of his unique position as "the crown of creation" and "the finest evolute of Nature". Otherwise he is no more important that other phenomena of Nature. Secondly, man also

8. I am constrained to quote from Betrand Russell who observes, "Two groups of motives are on the one hand, those derived from Religion and Ethics and on the other hand those derived from Science. Plato, Spinoza and Hegel may be taken as typical of the Philosophers whose interests are mainly religious and ethical while Leibniz, Locke and Hume may be taken as representatives of scientific wing. In Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley and Kant both groups of motives are strongly present "Scientific method in Philosophy" in *Mysticism and Logic*,

9. Bertrand Russell writes "The greatest merit of science is the irrelevance of human passions and the whole subject apparatus where scientific truth is as concerned...The scientific outlook is refusal to regard our tastes and interests affording a key to the understanding of the world", 'Science in liberal education' in the *New Statesman* May 1913.

demands special attention from the Philosopher because he is the instrument in all the knowing processes.[10] Man is the measure and the knower of the universe and it is through his apparatus that the whole structure of knowledge is built up. All knowledge has got to pass through the moulds of human nature and categories of human understanding. Man as the knower stands unique and paramount in all philosophical enquiry.

Inspite of these points, the scientific wing never subscribes itself to the belief that Man is the centre of the Philosophical gaze. According to scientific philosophers, Man is only one of the objects of study and whenever we allow legislative functions to human motives and ideals, the philosophy no more remains objective and scientific, it becomes subjective anthropocentric and therefore unprogressive.[11]

The view that man is not the subject-matter of philosophy on his own account and there is no scope of human motives and ideals in knowledge, seems to imply vagueness of what it asserts; it confuses between subject matter and motive of philosophical enquiry. The subject matter of any subject is the group of facts or objects to be studied by it, and it is different from the motive of study which may mean the impulse which activates the enquiry or the purpose for which it is done or both. To say that man is not the subject-matter of philosophy is not the same as to say that philosophical enquiry is not motivated by any human motives, for the two propositions do imply each other logically.

Let us suppose that the position of scientific Philosophers implies both the assertions without any confusion between the two *i.e.*, they assert them and justify them separately. It will, therefore, be possible for us to deal with them separately. The first of the statements that man on his account is not the subject-matter of philosophy betrays an attitude of segregation of human studies, social sciences and moral philosophy from the domain of philosophy proper. It can never be doubted that Man on his own account is the subject-matter of sciences like Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology *etc.*, and these sciences contribute their portion of truth to Philosophy, which is concerned with the whole truth including Man and his ideals. If it is asserted that Philosophy has got nothing to do with those human studies, it amounts to narrowing down the scope of Philosophy from the whole truth to a portion of it obtained from a special point of view. But scientific philosophers do not want to subscribe to this assertion and they argue that "Man is the subject-matter of

10. To quote Bertrand Russell again, "Man on his own account is not the subject matter on Philosophy...Man demands consideration solely as the instrument by mean of which we acquire knowledge of the universe. We are not in a mood proper to Philosophize so long we are interested in a world as it affects human beings; the philosophic spirit demands and interest in the world for its own sake."

11. Cf. Bertrand Russell : *Scientific Method is Mysticism and Logic.*

Philosophy and he is one of the objects of study, but he does not occupy the focus of Philosophy"[12] Even this assertion is erroneous, for Man is not only one of the objects of study, but also he is the only subject of all knowledge. Man is the knower and runs through the circuit of reality. It is this unique position of Man in existence which determines the ultimate nature of knowledge.[13] Scientific philosophers boast of their impartiality and irrelevance to human ideals and values in the scientific sprit of enquiry but anybody with a little knowledge of psychology can bolster up their flagrant assertion in the light of a well-established fact that knowing process is always determined by human physiology (senses, nervous system, brain etc.), human psychology (attention, interests, memory etc.) and human history (past culture, social background etc.). Hence, howsoever objectivity may be claimed in scientific knowledge, it is bound to be conditioned by the fact of human elements. Philosophy cannot afford to neglect these human elements, for the whole of value philosophy centres round this problem.

The second of the two propositions of scientific philosophers about the motivation of philosophy implies an ambiguity of the term motive. There are two senses of the term motive. Firstly motive is that which impels us to action and secondly, motive is that which induces us to action. In the first sense, motive is an impulse or an emotion, or an instinctive urge towards action, and in inducement sense, motive becomes the purpose for which the action is done. The assertion that philosophical enquiry is not motivated by any human motive implies either that there is no emotional urge towards it or that there is no purpose for which it is done or neither of the two. But in every way, these implications cannot be justified. Firstly, every type of knowledge, however, distinterested it may be, must spring forth from some human urge or desire; curiosity will always remain as the irreducible common factor of all motivation of knowledge; knowledge itself is an end in itself. Besides it, there is no denying the fact that the knowledge (scientific or philoophic) is pressed into service of mankind and is the greatest and most powerful factor in the human progress.

This much refutation of the stand of scientific philosophers will not hold much water, because their altitude towards Man stems from a fundamental outlook and well-established principle which can be reversed only by replacing it with another more cogent point of view in philosophy. But it may be asserted briefly about this *Scientific spirit in Philosophy that irrelevance of scientific* enquiry to human interests and welfare has, as a

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12. Butrand Russell, *Scientific Method.*
13. The dignity of Man either in the East or West cannot be doubted," writes Dr. P.T. Raju, "the fact that in an important sense he is the measure of the things, cannot be rejected ; the thought that thinks is human thought." *The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 519.

matter of fact, brought about a crisis in culture and civilization in the modern times and if a similar attitude is maintained in philosophy too, it will fail to fulfil its time-honoured task of becoming a guide and friend of Mankind. Today philosophy is vehemently condemned as ineffective in life and its ineffectivenses is partly due to its abstractness and irrelevance to Man and his problems and affairs. Philosophy in order to be effective must not maintain an attitude of aloofness and indifference to the contemporary events and human affairs.[14] It must abandon its ivory tower and airy moorings and come down in touch with the brown earth and its earthly beings where it has an ample scope to guide and enlighten the course of history and human progress.[15]

(4)

The second of the views about the relationship of philosophy and Man owes its origin to the writings of those who are favourably inclined towards Ethics and Religion. In this connexion the names of Urban, Whitehead, Radhakrishnan and the whole of Indian tradition[16] can be mentioned. These thinkers assert that the motive behind all philosophic enquiry is to fulfil man's deepest demands and highest aspirations. Philosophic knowledge is not to be pursued for its own sake but for the spiritual and moral development and progress of man. Philosophy, according to them, centres round religious spiritual and moral values. Philosophy is not man's quest after a type of reality which may horrify and threaten Man himself and stifle all his hopes and aspirations by demolishing the whole of the value-structure of reality. Values, according to this view, must guide the philosophical enquiry and condition its nature. S.K. Maitra of India recommends a change from a Philosophy of Pure existence towards that of value which is the only stand-point in philosophy. Whether the aim of philosophy is religious development of Man or values, it is always humanistic, according to this view. This view of religious philosophers and value-thinkers is correct in maintaining that philosophy should be concrete and effective in the affairs of men and for that, it has to base itself on value—philosophy. But the view of such

14. C E M. Joad observes, "Philosophy no doubt must be different from life and it should not be indifferent. Yet divorced from the contemporary events, philosophers make a merit of their aloofness and preoccupied with a barren controversy over epistemology devote themselves to the elaboration of a logical technique." *A Counter-Attack from the East*, p. 16

15. Radhakrishnan writes, "It is true that what makes history is not pure thought but thought which applies itself to practical problems...philosophy becomes history, culture and civilization. What we are is the result of That we think. Philosophers are the creators of the future." *Religion and Society*, pp. 69-70.

16. The names of G.R. Malkand and S.K. Maitra are notable Cf/Malkani's articles in *Philosophy Quarterly* (Jan. 1955) Maitra's article in *Contemporary Philosophy in India*, p. 389.

thinkers cannot be justified in a whole...some way, for the view lacks in the following respects :—

Firstly, Religion, to put in again, is a vague term, it often enters into philosophy with a bad odour of dogmatism and blind faith which strikes reason as dumb. The philosophical stand-point is based upon wide-awake rational conciousness about all our attitudes towards life and the world. Religious tenets stand on a different pedestal than that of Philosophy. Religion, on account of its long history, cannot claim any good amount of confidence of human beings in its capacity to promote the necessary welfare of Mankind. If Religion may be allowed to take a start in philosophy on so little a credit for human progress, it will not fulfil the charished hopes of the religious philosophers.

Secondly, it is doubted that religion can ever defind the true cause of Man and his values in Philosophy so long as religion is based upon a supernatural explanation of things, for an otherworldly or supernatural account of values and things will not generate a proper atmosphere of genuine morality and true faith of Man in himself. Man can become truly moral on his own account and never by any external agency beyond his own capacity and nature. Religion has already lost its favour with the modern mind and has become ineffective in the modern time.[17] Hence Philosophy shall lose much of its effectiveness and vigour rather than gaining them by following the lead of Religion. But will matters be different if Religion is not taken in its historical or supernatural senses but taken in its true sense in which philosophers of the Indian tradition take it i.e., religion as a way of life based on spiritual and morel values. True religion may be expected to fare better in philosophy. Still a high degree of caution and vigilance is to be exercised on the acceptance of religious and spiritual basis for philosophy. Whatever is regarded as "Spiritual" may not be opposed to or transcend our self conscious belief in what is real ; philosophy with all its critical faith and hopes of intelligibility, seems to be destroyed in the ultimate silence of the spirit. Philosophy should learn to steer clear of both the avalanche of spiritual transcendentalism and the calamity of supernaturalism in which we are sure find Man dead and gone. But if the spiritual is only an un-explored element of human nature-it cannot be discarded or transcended. It may serve as a positive basis of spiritual values. It may still be hoped that the value point of view in Philosophy will work and guide the future course of philosophy in a better way than Religion. But unless values are based on critical conviction and positive selfvalidity, value-philosophy is going to be stigmatized as highly subjective and imaginative. Subjective value standards will not be effective in a philosophic discipline which believes in objectivity and universality. Hence it will be the task of philosophers to search for

17. Radhakrishnan : *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 61 and also *Religion and Society*, p. 47.

objective and universal standards of values and to endeavour to validate values on some more concrete and real basis. Human nature itself is an enduring and objective ground of human values. If values can ever be shown as objective principles validated on human nature, Man becomes self-sufficient in morality and he no more needs God or the supernatural for his help.

In conclusion of this discussion about the true relationship of philosophy and Man and the ultimate motivation of philosophic enquiry, it may be stated that neither the view of philosophy for philosophy's sake nor that of philosophy for religious and spiritual values is correct. But it will be true to say that philosophy is for Man's sake.

The spirit of knowledge for knowledge's sake is good so far as it goes, but ultimately knowledge itself is a value and it is also a human value. Religion points out to certain values on which it is ultimately based and they are human values. Hence philosophy must come round to value or humanism more properly speaking. Humanistic motivation of philosophical enquiry and the value-basis of knowledge and reality are the stand-points by which philosophy will have to be re-orientated. A philosophy of Man, and for Man and his world are going to be the truth with the Philosophers. In other words, philosophy will have to enter into the moulds of humanism in order to be an effective force with the modern man.

The result of the whole discussion in this paper may be given in the following propositions which can serve as the basis of a new Humanism :—

1. Philosophy is a systematic and universal discipline of effective thinking about Man and the Universe.
2. Philosophy will have to derive much from all kinds of experiences so far as they are amenable to a rational interpretation.
3. The emphasis in philosophy should shift from existence to Man and his values which constitute the ultimate motivation of philosophic enquiry.
4. Values are to be based upon universal and objective standard and positive self-validity. Human nature itself is a positive and objective ground of values rather than suppernaturalism and transcendentalism.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

D. Kaushik

BRITISH INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH SINKIANG (LATTER HALF OF 19th AND EARLY 20th CENTURY)

Imperialism or India's Security

With the entry of Britain into the imperialist phase of its history in the latter half of the 19th century, the importance of India increased considerably in the British colonial system. India, with her vast area, enormous material resources and population, became at once 'the base and bastion' of the British Power in the whole of Asia and East Africa. The British imperialists used India as a springboard for further colonial conquests. They waged aggressive wars in the Sudan, Egypt, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Burma and China, using Indian soldiers, and imposed the expenses of these wars on India. The people of India were made to pay for the maintenance of the India Office at London, the colonial establishments at Aden and other ports in the Red Sea, the consulates in China and the embassy in Persia.

Jawaharlal Nehru's opinion about the falsification of modern period of Indian history by British writers should spur Indian scholars on to re-examine this period more critically than is often done. Nehru wrote :

British accounts of India's history, more especially of what is called the British period, are bitterly resented....Truth hides somewhere at the bottom of the deepest well and falsehood, naked and unashamed, reigns almost supreme.[1]

In the imperialistic activities of the British for expansion into countries adjoining India, Sinkiang, Afghanistan, Upper Burma and Tibet, held a prominent place. Though as markets for their industrial goods and sources of raw materials these territories occupied but an insignificant place in the foreign trade of the British, their role increased from the viewpoint of strategy in the epoch of the struggle of the imperialist powers for final division of the world, since they were situated on the approaches to China and Central Asia.

The external policy of the British colonial power in India was always aggressive. Its basic direction was determined in the first place by the international position of Britain. In the second half of the 19th century the main place in the colonical policy of Britian was occupied by the 'Eastern Question', i.e., the struggle for inheriting the decaying,

1. J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, London, 1956, p. 287.

Turkish Empire. Russia was the chief enemy in the Near and Middle East. This fact determined the development of British expansion on the frontiers of India, mainly in the northern and northwestern directions against Kashgar, Afghanistan and the southern regions of Turkmenia. The British colonialists regarded these territories as springboard for struggle against Russia in Central Asia.

The degree of aggressiveness of the frontier policy of the British varied with the fluctuations of the situation inside India. There arose two schools of policy. The 'forward policy' on the frontiers of India, which harped on the vulnerability of north-western frontiers in the system of defence, called for strengthening the defences of India in territories beyond her natural fronters. The advocates of this policy argued that the conquest of Central Asia by Russia was a great threat to British India. The other school denied such a danger and defended a 'close border' policy rejecting the idea of an active advance beyond the frontiers of India. It aimed at the consolidation of the internal position in this colony. Due to the historical circumstances of the period, the 'close border' policy predominated from 1857 upto 1875. The serious internal complications following the popular uprising of 1857 made an active advance difficult. This temporary abandonment of 'forward policy' however, did not mean an outright rejection of penetration into the bordering territories. By a skilful use of diplomacy the British continued to widen their sphere of influence; they were preparing for conditions suitable for renewal of active aggeression. The British policy in Kashgar and Afghanistan upto 1875, provides a clear evidence of it.

In Kashgar, during the above period, the British were using commerce as a cover for their expansionist activities. With rare frankness G. J Alder admits :

> The British policy in Eastern Turkistan was always, from the 'sixties of the nineteenth century onwards, a blend of commercial means and political ends,.. Trade was only a weapon. All the Viceroys of the period were well aware that trade is 'the great lever of political influence'. Lawrence and Ripon anxious to confine India's political responsibilities within the Indian border, did nothing to encourage the Kashgar trade. All the others, because they wished to extend British influence, did encourage it.[2]

This observation of the British writer is no doubt true. But his explanation that the wish of the British to extend their influence to Kashgar was due to 'its special importance for Indian security' is far from truth. The bogey of a Russian menace to India was raised by the British to serve as a smokescreen for their prospective aggression across

2. G.J. Alder, *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-95*, London, 1963, p. 98.

the northern and north-western frontiers of India. Alder contradicts himself at another place in the same work by saying :

> Kaufmann's plan of annexation of Sinkiang by Russia was vetoed in 1880 on ground that its returns would not justify the time and expense it would involve...there were sound political as well as military reasons why Russia would not wish to forsake an excellent natural frontier and become responsible for even more trouble-some Asiatic Muslim subjects . a british military report authoritatively discounted the possibility of a Russian attack on Kashgar.[3]

This clearly shows that the British concern for security of India against a Russian invasion from Kashgar and the danger of coterminity of a powerful European state like Russia with a semi-inaccessible native Kingdom of dubious loyalty like Kashmir' was a sham excuse. It is unfortunate that these traditional motives of British historiography are still credulously accepted by some eminent Indian writers on the subject. Bisheshwar Prasad writes :

> Yet it must be emphasized that in this period intimate relationship between the integrity and independence of the border states and India's own security, rather the identity of the two, was fully unfolded. Aden, the Persian Gulf, Kalat, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma, all these were bulwarks of her safety and in their protection from alien encroachments lay the security of India also...The foundations of India's foreign policy were then laid and a system of alliances and interests developed which provided for her security.[4]

Similarly, D.P. Singhal also argues :

> Indian interest formed an important part of British Imperial considerations, and the problem of strengthening Indian frontiers against the influence of European powers became in the later nineteenth century a dominant factor in Imperial period.[5]

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.
4. Bisheshwar Prasad, *The Foundations of India's Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, 1955, p. 263. Very recently, another Indian author has also attributed the British interest 'in the northern region' to the 'fear of Russian advance into Central Asia and Persia'. But it goes to his credit that he admits the British policy to have been 'formulated' for a long-term domination of Central Asia'. He, however, somewhat naively believes that the Russian danger 'galvanised' the British 'to frantic activity'. (P.N.K, Bamzai, *Kashmir from Lake Success to Tashkent*, Delhi, 1966, pp. 28, 33, 40, 46). According to R.C. Majumdar 'the principal objective' of the foreign policy of India under the British 'from the beginning to end was the security of the natural frontier of India, on the north-west and the north-east'. (*British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance*, The History and Culture of the Indian People, Part I, 1963, pp. 1039-44).
5. D.P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan*, 1876-1907, Melbourne, 1963, p. xi.

Such a view ignores the basically imperialistic aims of the British rule in India which K.M. Pannikar has correctly assessed :

> Undoubtedly it was the India-based strength of Britain as a great Asiatic power, that enabled it to force open the doors of China, establish European predominance in the Yangtze valley, reduce the power of the Great Manchus, and help to convert the rest of Asia into a European dependency.[6]

British expansion in Asia followed directly from the logic of British imperialism and not from a professed concern for India's security. The ruling classes of Britain desired a maximum colonial expansion in the period of transition from pre-monopoly capitalism to imperialism. 'Russian menace' to the security of India as already stated was invented by them to justify their own aggression in Central Asia. It is really regrettable that the Indian authors upholding the British policy towards the states bordering upon India in the north and north-west as motivated by interests of Indian security have not taken any pains to examine the extent to which this 'Russian menace' was real from the viewpoint of military and political position of Russia and her economic and transport possibilities.[7]

Early Intrigues

British attempts to bring Kashgar in the orbit of their political influence may be traced back to the early years of the 19th century. William Moorcroft, the Superintendent of the East India Company's Stud, visited Leh in 1821. He concluded an agreement for passage of Chinese and Uzbek Turk merchants through Ladakh. He also sought permission from the Chinese authorities to enter Kashgar which was refused. Moorcroft raised the bogey of Russian invasion through Kashgar at a time when Russia had not even annexed the Kazakh steppe. He believed in the rumours spread about some Agha Mehdi, an agent of Russian government, journeying to visit the ruler of Ladakh and Ranjit Singh. He also carried on intrigues in Ladakh against Ranjit Singh.[8]

After Moorcroft, a number of other European 'explorers' like the Gerard brothers, Henderson, Falconer and Vigne were busy in Ladakh, Kashmir and Baltistan.[9] It was with British assent that Gulab Singh, a

6. K.M. Pannikar, *Asia and the Western Dominance*, London, 1954, p. 95.

7. K.P.S. Menon' *The "Russian bogey" and British aggression in India and beyond*, Calcutta, 1957, is perhaps the first attempt in India at a critical study of the British policies in Central Asia.

8. See G.J. Alder, *Op cit*., p. 18.

9. For an account of these explorations see S.A. Hedin *Southern Tibet : VII—History of Exploration in the Kara-Koram Mountains* (Stockholm 1922). Ishwari Prasad calls these "explorers" "the pioneers of imperialism". (*History of Modern India*, 1951, p. 167).

feudatory of Ranjit Singh conquered Ladakh in 1834. After the defeat of the Sikhs, the British made Gulab Singh the Maharaja of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh in 1846. He was required to alter his frontiers only with British permission and submit all disputes with neighbours to the British for arbitration. In 1849 with the disappearance of the remnant of Sikh state, British Indian territory became coterminous with that of Gulab Singh and through him with Sinkiang itself.

The British interest in Sinkiang now began to increase. In June 1861 a printed questionnaire seeking information on the state of trade with Sinkiang was sent to the Punjab officials by the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab. On the basis of this questionnaire the Secretary to the Punjab Government, R.H. Davies submitted a comprehensive report. Davies came to the conclusion that Indian trade had a fair chance of competing with Russian trade in the markets of Central Asia.[10]

To the enthusiastic Punjab officials the physical difficulties of the caravan routes between India and Sinkiang were not so great a factor in restricting the trade as the raids by Hunza tribesmen, political instability and the indifference of Chinese authorities. They also put part of the blame upon the restrictive commercial policy of the Kashmir officials. Sir Robert Montgomery, the Lt. Governor of Punjab also took keen interest in the development of trans-Himalayan trade. In 1864 the Maharaja of Kashmir was persuaded to accept the reduction of import and transit duties.

Wooing Yaqub Beg

The political situation in Sinkiang completely changed with the advent of Yaqub Beg, a military adventurer from Kokand, to power in 1866. Yaqub Beg reciprocated the enthusiasm of Punjab officials for forging commercial relations by sending a mission to Kashmir in the first year of his rule[11]. He promised to prevent the Kirghiz and Hunza bandits from plundering the tea caravans and provide for the security of Leh trade routes. The expulsion of the Chinese from Sinkiang offered to Indian tea a golden opportunity. The new tea plantations of Kangra on the Kulu route were particularly well-placed to profit from this opportunity.

Dr. Cayley, the British Commissioner at Leh, made serious efforts to improve the routes to Kashgar and encourage the merchants from Yarkand to trade with India. To him goes the credit for discovering the Chang-Chen-mo route which Shaw and Hayward followed later on. Dr. Cayley proposed that an envoy be dispatched to Kashgar to conclude an alliance with Yaqub Beg. The Lt. Governor of Punjab supported his proposal.[12] From the information reaching him at Leh through traders,

10. *F.D.S.P., August, 1874, Nos. 205-7* (Indian Archives).
11. *Letters from India and Madras*, Vol. I, p. 845.
12. F.D.S.P., *Op. cit.*

Dr. Cayley gathered an impression that the Amir desired to be friendly with the British. This was further confirmed by the report of R.B. Shaw who visited Yarkand in 1868 in his private capacity. Friendly relations with Yaqub Beg's Kingdom were officially initiated when the Lt. Governor of Punjab received his envoy Mahomed Nazar in the early summer of 1868. Shaw mentioned to this envoy his desire to visit Kashgar. The envoy welcomed the idea. In December 1868, Shaw proceeded to Kashgar where he was received with marked cordiality. Lt. Hayward, who followed him, was also allowed to enter the country. Shaw spoke to the Amir of the 'friendship of England towards the Sultan of Turkey, the Chief of the Mussulman religion'.[13] He wrote a 'Memorandum' on routes to Yarkand. In this he suggested negotiations with Kashmir to open a free trade route to regions of Central Asia. He favoured the Chang-Chenmo route over the rival Karakoram route from the point of view of its being easily negotiable with fewer passes and rivers to cross, and also of easy availability of grass, fuel, and provisions, etc. To Ladakh he preferred the Kangra, Kulu and Lahoul route as against the Kashmir route.[14] A controversy over rival trade route continued through the next decade when we find in 1874 Capt. E. Molloy, British Joint Commissioner at Leh, showing his preference for the Kashmir route over the Kulu route, because the former was 35 miles shorter and practicable for at least 9 months in the year, while the Kulu route was closed for 6 months. Molloy recommended carriage by camels as against the horse as the Russians were using the same to cut the cost of transport. He also complained that British goods were not made to suit the taste of the Turkis, while the Russians were 'gaudy patterns and fast colours, adapted to hard wear and tear'.[15] Molloy favoured the Kugiyar route to Kashgar, while Forsyth, the Commissioner of Jullundur division, that of Chang-Chenmo. Shaw gave a rosy picture of trade between India and Sinkiang. To promote it the Yarkand Trading Company was founded.

This wave of enthusiasm for trade with Sinkiang was the result of a series of 'explorations' which began in 1855. During six years the surveyors of the Great Trignometrical Survey of India had extended their work into Ladakh and Kashmir. New maps of this area were completed in 1868. Too much has been made of the cautious policy of non-interference in Kashgar pursued by Lawrence. In this connection it is noteworthy that British knowledge of lands north of the Karakoram was still extremely scanty. The only European known to have crossed the Karakoram was Alexander Gardner who entered Ladakh from across this mountain. The

13. *Pol. A, July, 1870, Nos. 73-76* (Indian Archives). D.C. Boulger, *The Life of Yakoob Beg*. London, 1878, pp. 214-15.

14. *Memorandum by Shaw, Foreign Department Sec., July 1876, No. 30* (Indian Archives).

15. *Foreign Deptt., Pol. A, May 1874, Nos. 37-39, E. Molloy to the Secretary Punjab Govt.* (Indian Archives).

three Schlagintweit brothers explored this region on behalf of the Company between 1854-58. The murder of Adolph Schlagintweit at Yarkand put an effective damper on the European enthusiasm for penetration into this region. But the work was not entirely given up and was entrusted to native agents. The use of native agents was nothing new. Moorcroft had sent his servant Mir Izzutollah to Kashgar in 1812.[16] 1852, In Ahmad Shah Nakshabandi and in 1858 Mahomed Amin had been sent there. Captain Montgomerie, while engaged on Kashmir survey, had used trained natives to obtain information about this region. Alder writes :

From 1863, a series of remarkable men, using false or abbreviated names, in disguise, and employing such ingenious devices as hollow prayer wheels and decimated rosaries to help with the counting of paces, penetrated all over the northern frontier.[17]

The mass of information which they brought back was edited and then laid before the government. Lawrence's opposition to 'exploration' of these dangerous areas by the British had a political motive behind it. 'If they lose their lives we cannot avenge their deaths, and so lose credit'. He therefore laid down that no British official in future was to cross the frontier without prior permission from the Foreign Department. Before this prohibition came into force, W.H. Johnson had, however, reconnoitred an area of 21 thousand square miles beyond the frontier. While a ban on government officials visiting Sinkiang became operative, nothing prevented private individuals like Shaw and Hayward from going to Kashgar. Thus we notice that the period of Lawrence's rule was one of active preparations for later intrusions.

Lord Mayo, the successor of Lord Lawrence, was the first to renew the British penetration into Kashgar. Before him even Lawrence was veering round to the same policy. In the autumn of 1868 Lawrence had approved the proposal of Punjab authorities to appoint a native agent at Kashgar.[18]

Forsyth had been making efforts to draw attention to the strategic importance of the relations with Kashgar. His note of 7th October 1868 to the Governor-General was a detailed study of this so-called 'strategic' aspect. He wrote :

But I would endeavour to show that, whilst we are so eagerly watching the front, it is just as well to see whether our rear is so perfectly secure from all approach as we suppose.

16. *Calcutta Quarterly Oriental Magazine and Register*, III and IV (1825).

17. G.J. Alder, *Op. cit.*, p. 31. For an account of native 'explorers' see K. Mason, *Abode of Snow*, London 1955.

13. *Parliamentary Papers XLVII*, 334, pp. 49 and 55, 1868-69.

He quoted from Vambery a Turkish proverb that 'one nail can save a horse-shoe, the horse-shoe a horse, one horse a man, one man a government', and concluded that 'the much-wanted nail is easily to be found beyond the range of the Kuen-Luen mountains'.[19]

Forsyth, Shaw and Hayward raised a scare of Russian invasion from the side of Kashgar. Forsyth had soon after to change his view from personal experience when he found it difficult to maintain even a few hundred horsemen over high desert plains. But Shaw and Hayward continued to indulge in 'scare-mongering'.

Lord Mayo regarded Kashgar as a part of legitimate British sphere of influence. He wanted to achieve his object through the creation of a 'buffer' state under the political hegemony of Britian. The development of commerce was used by him as an instrument for his political ends. Mayo took a stiff attitude towards Kashmir. Capt. Grey a special envoy was sent there to negotiate an agreement with the Maharaja. Forsyth later concluded a treaty in 1870 along the lines laid down by Grey. The treaty had a provision for survey of all routes after which one of them was to be nominated as 'a free highway in perpetuity' for all travellers and traders. There were to be two Joint Commissioners, one from each side, to supervise that route and settle disputes. The Maharaja agreed to levy no transit duties on goods passing through Kashmir. Dr. Cayley was appointed the first British Joint Commissioner at Leh.

As a result of Shaw's first unofficial visit to Kashgar, Yaqub Beg dispatched his envoy Mirza Shadi to India in the winter of 1869-70. Forsyth and party went to Kashgar with this envoy.[20] Mayo included no soldiers in the party and disavowed any political object. But Forsyth was instructed to collect information about political and economic conditions in the neighbouring country. He was also urged to advise the Amir to refrain from aggressions on his northern borders. The British knew well that this would lead to the destruction of Kashgar at the hands of Russians, and with it of their hope of subjecting it to their rule one day. Forsyth's first mission was a failure and he returned without seeing the Ataliq, as Yaqub Beg was called. Two hundred animals with his party perished on the way.[21]

The forsyth mission of 1870 caused an alarm among the Russians who occupied Muz-Art pass, apprehending the conquest of Ili valley by Yaqub Beg. Russia annexed the Ili valley in 1871 to prevent it from being reduced to a vassal state of the British.

19. *Foreign Deptt. November 1868, Pol. A, Nos. 1-3* (Indian Archives).

20. *Foreign Deptt., Sec., July, 1876, No. 30* (Indian Archives).

21. *Foreign Deptt., Sec., July 1876, No. 30.*

Exploiting Pan-Islamism

In the winter of 1871-72, another Kashgar envoy, Ihrar Khan Tiura came to India with letters not only for the Viceroy but also for the Queen. In 1872 Kaulbars, a Russian diplomat, visited Kashgar and arranged a highly favourable commercial treaty. In 1873 Syed Yaqub Khan visited India on his way to Constantinople. In the meantime, Lord Mayo had been assassinated and his place was taken by Lord Northbrook who arranged for a British mission to accompany Syed Yaqub Khan on his return from Turkey. At Constantinople the Kashgar envoy placed the new Kingdom of Kashgaria under the suzerainty of the Porte. The British made a clever use of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism against their Russian rivals. They encouraged Amir Yaqub Beg to forge intimate links with the Sultan of Turkey. Later on, during the period of Lord Lytton, when a clash between Britian and Russia appeared to be imminent in the Near East, the British diplomacy showed its readiness to explit this 'Muslim League' against Russia in Central Asia. But in 1875 when the Kashgar envoy in his interview with Forsyth and the Foreign Secretary broached the question of an alliance with Afghanistan, he was cautioned against such a course on the ground that it was likely to cause offence to Russia[22]. In doing so, British were in fact apprehensive of the dangerous implications of an international front of Islam, for their own empire included a very large number of Muslim subjects.

Trade—A Cover for Political Domination

A mission was sent to Kashgar under Forsyth in 1873 with instructions to negotiate a commercial treaty analogous to the Russian treaty of 1872. Although as usual the overt object of the second Forsyth mission was commerce, in reality, however, its aim was wider. It was to drag Yaqub Beg's Kingdom into the orbit of British policy and to convert it into a base for British aggression against China and Russia. The British knew about the chaotic conditions of Kokand and they were eager to exploit the Kokand origin of Yaqub Beg to extend their sway to that region using him as a puppet. The composition of the mission had no relevance to its declared object of promoting commercial relations. It consisted of intelligence officials and spies of the topographical department. The mission had among its members Capt. Biddulph, Capt. Chapman, Capt. Trotter and Lt. Col. Gorden from the army, Dr. Stoliczka, a scientist and Dr. Bellew a medical doctor, besides many native officials and attendants, in all 300 souls and 400 animals. It looked like a small army. The members of the British mission were honourably received by the Amir of Kashgar and hospitably entertained for more than three months. On 2nd February 1874 a treaty as favourable as of 1872 with Russia was concluded with the Amir. It gave extra-territorial rights to British subjects and recognised the British right to appoint a permanent

22. *Foreign Deptt., Sec., May 1875 No. 119* (Indian Archives).

representative to reside at the Amir's court. Much valuable information regarding the conditions, resources, history, geography and trade of Sinkiang and neighbouring countries was collected by this mission. The Tien-Shan plateau was visited by Lt. Col. Gordon; Capt. Trotter and Dr. Stoliczka surveyed the route to the Takle Rebat Pass and the Chadur-Kul Lake in Russian territory. Kaufmann wrote to the Russian war minister Miliutin about the real aims of the Forsyth mission. There is evidence to suggest that the Russian annexation of Khokand in 1876 was caused by their fear of British intrigues from Kashgar. The Russian annexation of Kokand placed Kashgar militarily at the mercy of Russia.

The information brought back by Forsyth's party cast doubts on the commercial significance of Sinkiang. The mission pointed out the danger of a Russian advance across the Pamirs and through easier passes into Hunza, Yasin and Chitral. Gordon's Report on the Pamirs presented Kashgar in a new strategic light as 'a rich supply base on the flank of a more westerly advance.'

Forsyth was instructed 'to ascertain the political boundaries of the Kingdom of Kashgar' with India which he found 'no easy matter' because the Amir himself was not aware of their limits. Forsyth in his report judged them as follows :

Commencing from the South-East corner there is no question that the Kuen Luen range is and always has been in Yarkand territory ; and as the jade quarries in the lower Karakash valley have been worked by the Chinese for the last 150 years, we may assume that the valley forms a boundary . . So far as I could ascertain from the Yarkandis themselves, no claim is asserted to any tract of country south of the Karakash river ; and on the Yarkand river, they do not come higher up the Kufeelong; but for convenience sake, I would put the boundary at Ak Tagh; and in laying out supplies, I practically made that point the limit. The line then would run from the Eastern corner of the Kuen Luen Long. 81 down to Karakash river Long. 78.5 (approx.) Lat. 35.59; thence down the Yarkand river to Kunjut. Kunjut is beyond Yarkand territory.[23]

In 1876 Lord Northbrook was replaced by Lord Lytton as the Viceroy. Northbrook's reign was 'a high-watermark of British influence in Kashgar as evidenced by the 1874 Treaty'. But Lytton was not content with it. In September 1876 he sketched the outlines of his new active policy in Kashgar. When Syed Yaqub Khan arrived in India for the second time, Lytton was negotiating with Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Kashmir at Madhopore an agreement by which the latter was to extend his territory into Yasin and agree to the appoinment of a British agent at Gilgit. Lytton went ahead with his plans to extend the British control to the three passes considered to be 'easy' by members of Forsyth mission, in spite of the fact

23. *Confidential Report, Yarkand Mission, Aug. 1875, Sec. No. 68* (Indian Archives).

that Capt. Biddulph had changed his earlier opinion that these passes of easy approach. When Lytton received the information that one o allegedly easy passes was closed by a glacier, he confessed 'disappointm 'A strange reaction', remarks Alder:

...if the extension of Kashmir and therefore of British influ upto the passes which he was proposing had been defensive only.[24]

Early in 1877 Lytton was proposing privately that Russia shou asked 'not to interfere, or compete with us in Baluchistan and Kashgı well as Afghanistan'.

The decision in favour of sending a British representative was formally sanctioned until April 1877. The choice naturally fell on who was preparing to leave for India in July. The reluctance to sanction to such a decision was, in some measure, a result of Shaw's fa to obtain a ratification of the 1874 Treaty. Yaqub Beg tried to action on Article 6 of the Treaty of 1874 regarding permanent represe tion until sanction of the Sultan of Turkey had been obtained. He not willing to offend Russia and feared a similar demand from that When Shaw was instructed to return back in June 1875, he carried him a communication bearing the Amir's seal. The documment w Shaw took for the instrument of ratification turned out to be a complimentary letter to the Viceroy.

Mediation for Saving the Stooge

The British were rather confident of the continuation of Yaqub rule in Kashgar. They believed that the Chinese were not in a positic reconquer Sinkiang. It was not until 1876 that British Minister at Pe became convinced that the Chinese were really serious about brir Sinkiang once again to their fold. Lord Augustus Loftus, the Bı Ambassador at St. Petersburg, favoured a joint Anglo-Russian effor mediation. But Thomas Wade at Peking opposed the idea. He too initiative single-handed. The British, despite their loans to the Mauc were still interested in preserving the power of Yaqub Beg who was mely friendly to them. Hence they tried to mediate between him anc Mauchus. In 1876, Forsyth visited Peking and played some pa mediating between Kashgar and China. Thomas Wade as already takin the matter with the Chinese. Through his efforts a meeting was arra between Li-Hung Chang and Forsyth and Mayers. Li-Hung Chang ted on unconditional surrender by Yaqub Beg and his acceptan Chinese vassalage. On being asked how an envoy sent from Kas would be received at Peking, Li-Hung Chang replied that the eı management of Kashgar affairs had been delegated to General Tso-T t'ang just as all Indian affairs were delegated to the Viceroy, and Y

24. G.J. Alder, *Op, cit.*, p. 61.

Beg should approach General Tso.[25] However, hopes of a successful reconciliation between Yaqub Beg and the Chinese again rose high as the British Charge d' Affaires at Peking reported about the difference of opinion in debates in the Grand Council with reference to military operations against Kashgaria.[26] Throughout 1877 the British Charge d' Affaires at Peking continued to write about the Chinese reverses against Kashgar. The Memorandum of Sir Brooke Robertson's conversation with the Viceroy of Canton indicated that the demand of vassalage from Yaqub Beg made by Li Hung Chang in his talks with Forsyth had now been modified. The new proposal was that Kashgar's relation with China should be the same as of Nepal and Burma.[27] On hearing of this the Viceroy Lord Lytton wrote to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, on 16th July, 1877.

If the views expressed to Sir. B. Robertson by the Canton Governor in regard to Kashgaria are in any way a reflection of those held by the Chinese Government, we are of the opinion that they are very favourable to British interests in the East, and we trust that the presence of the Yarkand envoy in England may afford an opportunity to Her Majesty's Government for encouraging the alliance with Yarkand apparently contemplated by the Chinese Government.[28]

Lord Salisbury had an interview with Syed Yaqub Khan who was then in London. The scene of activity now shifted from Peking to London and efforts were made by Lord Derby, Salisbury and Thomas Wade to secure the good offices of the Chinese Ambassador at London. They succeeded in this task and a meeting was arranged between the Chinese Ambassador and the Amir's Special Envoy in July, 1877 at Sir Thomas Wade's residence. But the same day arrived the news of the death of Yaqub Beg, Amir of Kashgar, and nothing came out of these efforts for peace between Kashgar and China.[29] The Chinese occupied Kashgar in December, 1877.

The confusion prevailing in Kashgar after the death of Yaqub Beg compelled the Indian Government to postpone Shaw's trip. In the meantime the new ruler Beg Kuli Beg expressed a wish for a British representative. Ney Elias, the British Joint-Commissioner at Leh suggested that a British representative be sent to Kashgar to enable the new ruler to win an 'honourable peace' with the Chinese with moral support.

Lord Lytton urged acceptance of this suggestion. He permitted Elias to leave for Kashgar, pending London's approval to send a permanent

25. *Foreign Deptt Sec*, *Jany. 1877 No. 120* (Indian Archives).
26. *Foreign Deptt Sec.*, *Oct. 1877 No. 193* (Indian Archives).
27. *Ibid.*, No. 195, 197.
28. *Ibid.*, No. 197.
29. *Ibid.*, Nos. 219-225.

represesentative. Elias started for Kashgar, but he could never reach there as Beg Kuli Beg had fled from the Kingdom.

Return of the Chinese : Russian A scendancy

After the return of the Chinese, the balance of power for some time still remained in Britain's favour. There had arisen the issue of restoration of the Ili valley which the Russians had occupied in 1871 on the understanding that it would be restored after the return of normalcy in this area. The treaty signed at Livadia after 8 months' hard bargaining was repudiated by the Chinese Foreign Office, and the Sino-Russian relation, already strained, assumed critical proportions. A war which appeared to be imminent was, however, averted and the crisis ended by the Treaty of St. Petersburg in February 1881.

The period of 1878-81 during which Sino-Russian relations had remained strained was exploited by the British to increase their influence in Sinkiang. Their trade with Sinkiang steadily revived during 1879-80 and by 1881 it had almost reached the previous best of 1876.[30] The Chinese prohibition on Indian tea remained largely ineffective. In 1881 Andrew Dalgeish, a British trader, made handsome profit. The Sino-Russian trade was, on the contrary adversely affected by the tension that existed in the relations between the two powers. Elias, who was sent back to Yarkand in 1880, met the Governor of Yarkand and inssted on 'a system whereby intelligence of Russian activity could be exchanged' between the British and the Chinese.[31] The Chinese foreign office at Peking refused the British request for consulate in Kashgar and a convention to regulate the trade. It, however, allowed British agents to travel in Sinkiang. Taking advantage of these travel facilities, Delgeish started on his extensive journey over Sinkiang. He, however, met many obstructions from the side of local Chinese officials. By the Treaty of St. Petersburg Indian trade, which had flourished for some time until 1881, received a major set-back-Russia secured many commercial advantages by this treaty which the British did not enjoy, and thus emerged from this period of confusion with a favourable position. The Chinese could not forget that British in India had treated one of their provinces as a sovereign kingdom and entered into full-fledged diplomatic relations with it.

Before long Indian trade with Sinkiang began to feel the adverse effects of favourable concessions enjoyed by the Russians in their trade with that region. From 1883 Russian goods even began to penetrate into Chitral and Leh.[32] With the increase in trade, Russian political influence also went up. According to Alder, Lord Ripon allowed Russia to increase its influence over Kashgar unchallenged. Wade in Peking

30. G.J. Alder, *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

31. *ibid.*

32. *ibid.*, p. 80.

raised the question of a permanent British representative at Kashgar and the Chinese at long last agreed. But Ripon decided not to send any. It is difficult to agree with Alder's characterisation of Ripon's trans-frontier policy as 'one of complete disengagement, backed by military safeguards at home and diplomatic insurance at St. Petersburg.'[33] Ripon's aversion to 'entanglement' in Kashgar was not due to any conscientious scruples against an aggressive policy. In fact, the British imperialists were then preparing for a new phase of aggression in Central Asia in a different direction. Their agents in Herat and Persian Khorasan were actively carrying on subversion in Turkmenia.[34] The McGregor plan of 'defence' of India, prepared in 1884, had for its object despatch of emissaries to create disturbances in the Khanates of Central Asia and among the Turkmens It is interesting to note that this plan called for 'immediate reconciliation with China.[35] To absolve Ripon of any aggressive frontier policy is to slur against facts. The settlement effected by him in Afghanistan was a 'conservative settlement' inasmuch as it was in 'close apppoximation' to the Gandamak treaty.[36] It was also in Ripon's period that the Afghan Government under pressure from the British annexed Roshan and Shugnan in 1883 in violation of the 1873 agreement between Britain and Russia over the northern borders of Afghanistan.

Lord Dufferin (1884-88) set before himself the object of achieving a trade convention and consulate in Sinkiang. He decided to send a mission to Kashgar. The Chinsse foreign office refused to send their representative to negotiate with Elias on the ground that the British Indian trade was too small to justify a special trade convention. Elias received an unfriendly treatment at the hands of the Chinese and he blamed for his failure O' Conor, the British Charge d' Affaires at Peking. A draft of trade convention was sent to O' Conor from India. No progress was, however, made towards its acceptance by the Chinese authorities in Peking and the relations with China were bedevilled by several other complications such as Tibet Trade, the Burma dispute and Sikkim negotiations, etc. O' Conor demanded consular rights for the British in Sinkiang towns on the basis of most-favoured nation clause of the Treaty of Tientsin. But the Chinese, who had already had a bitter experience of having a Russian consul at Kashgar (Petrovsky, the Russian Consul there had acquired greater political influence than the Chinese were willing to grant) were reluctant to have another British like him. The British demand for a

33 *Ibid*, p. 80.

34. For a detailed account of the aggressive British activities in South Turkmenia, see N.A. Khalfin's '*Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii K Rossii (60-90 ye gody-XIX v.)*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 329-370.

35. Mc Gregor, *Oborona India*, Ch. 1, Vyp 43, p. 207, Khalfin, *Op. cit*. p. 367.

36. D.K. Ghose, *England and Afghanistan : A Phase in their relations*, Calcutta, 1960, Bisheshwar Pd.'s opinion is similar to Alder's, Lord Ripon, he holds, 'followed the pattern of Lord Lawrence's policy'. See B. Prasad, *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

consular representative changed into a demand for political agency owing to the British Indian trade having dwindled to insignificant volume. The British Indian Government continued to goad Walsham at Peking to press the matter with the Chinese foreign office, but nothing came out of it in the face of Chinese intransigence.

In 1891, the British Indian Government decided to retain Macartney in Sinkiang indefinitely, even without any official recognition of his position by the Chinese. He served them well both as their 'contact' man with the Chinese and also as an intelligence agent watching the Russians. The British occupation of Hunza in 1891 embittered the Chinese who claimed some shady suzerain rights over it on the basis of tribute often paid by its rulers.

British Appeasement of China

In the period 1893-95, London was keen to retain the Chinese friendship in order to carry out its aggressive designs on the Pamir. Under the usual pretext of Russian 'menace' to India, the British had been pursuing a policy of active intrusion into this region. In such circumstances they now grew reluctant to press for the Kashgar consulate. In their wider imperialist interests which were really global, the British practised some appeasement of China in 1893. This was done by them to consolidate their position on the sea coast of China and in some areas of the mainland which they had reduced to a state of semi-colonial dependence by their unequal treaties with the Manchu rulers of China. In January 1893, the Government of India reported to the Home Government that the Chinese authorities had erected boundary marks on the Karakorum pass. It was a subject of correspondence by the Foreign office. Conor at Peking disfavoured any objection being taken to the Chinese attitude in this matter. The Home Government agreed with his view. Lord Kimberley, the Foreign Secretary, suggested that :

The Chinese Government at Peking should be informed of the purport of the reports which have been received by Her Majesty's Government and that it should be intimated to them that the Indian authorities acting on behalf of the Kashmir state would gladly co-operate with the Chinese authorities in Kashgaria in determining the frontier on the road from Leh to Kashgar. Her Majesty's Government would, however, demur to any attempt being made by the Kashgarian officials to fix the boundary of the Ladakh state on this road without their previous concurrence being obtained.[37]

Conor discovered 'soreness' in official quarters at Peking over the 'aggressive policy of Russia in the Pamirs', and he advised against any opposition to the erection of marks by the Chinese on the Karakorum.

37. Enclosures to 1894, Aug. Sec., F. Nos., 26-33, Foreign Deptt. (Indian Archives).

Although the present Peking rulers are never tired of accusing India of an attempt to inherit the frontiers unilaterally laid down by British imperialists, facts, however, prove that the British rulers did not always take towards India's borders an attitude consistent with Indian interests. As an example, we can cite the British bungling over Aksai Chin. Macartney, the British representative at Kashgar presented some books and mathematical instruments to the Chinese provincial Governor in December, 1895. The Governor asked the Tao-Tai of Kashgar to thankfully acknowledge the same on his behalf. The books contained an atlas of the world which showed Aksai Chin as a part of Ladakh. The Chinese, probably under instigation from the Russian Consul Petrovsky drew Macartney's attention to it and lodged a protest. Instead of outright rejecting this absurd protest, Macartney preferred to give an equivocal reply to the Tao-Tai which was completely in tune with the policy of appeasement of the Chinese then followed by the British. Macartney replied :

> Aksai Chin was apparently a general name for an ill-defined and very elevated table land at the north-east of Ladakh and it was as likely as not that the region known by that name was partly in Chinese and partly in British territory.[38]

Macartney's position in Kashgar continued to be unsatisfactory before Petrovsky's officially recognised position. In 1893 he was made 'Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs'—a long meaningless title. Eleven years latter he was unilaterally promoted to the status of a Consul, though the Chinese never officially recognised him in that capacity. The rivalry between the British and the Russian representatives at Kashgar continued right upto 1907 when the Anglo-Russian Convention put an end to it. The Chinese were thereafter quick to recognise Macartney as Consul.[39] Indian trade remained handicapped after 1881, though it was able to maintain itself at a steady level between 20 and 30 lakhs of rupees right upto the Second World War. It experienced a sharp rise for some time after the 1917 October Revolution, when the Russian competition was eliminated. The reasons for Russian ascendancy in trade lay mainly in the 'geo-political' factors favouring them. Their possession of Kokand and Kuldja gave them access to routes 'much easier and shorter' than those on the Indian side. Moreover, the advantage of better transport facilities through the sailways was also with them.

In the constructive work done by Macartney in Sinkiang mention may be made of a valuable collection of manuscripts sent by him to India. To him archaeology also owes much. The idea of archaeological work

38. Kashgar Diaries 1896, (Indian Archives).

39. Lady C.T. Macartney, *An English Lady in Chinese Turkestan* London, 1931, pp. 61-62.

in Sinkiang was first suggested by him to Sir Aurel Stein in 1897, who was given a grant of Rs. 9,000 and leave from his job in the Punjab to take up exploration in Sinkiang. His discoveries made history. Many other westerners followed him and there began an international race for antiquities from Chinese Turkestan. The Germans set out on four expeditions between 1902 and 1914. The Russians, Japanese and French also sent expeditions. By 1914 this rich mine of ancient art was denuded of its treasures.

As this international loot of art-relics was going on, Sinkiang lay helpless, dominated by an old-fashioned Chinese bureaucracy. Before the October Revolution of 1917, the Russians were very strongly entrenched at Kashgar. Their Consul-General generally was a high-ranking diplomat with an escort of hundreds of Cossacks. During the-28-year stay of George Macartney at Kashgar, the British influence also went up tremendously. There lived at Yarkand between 100 to 150 Hindu traders, most of them representing firms in Amritsar and Hoshiarpur. In several other towns the Sindhi money-lenders plied their trade. Besides them, there were British Muslim subjects too, some of them purely peasant immigrants from Kashmir and Chitral. All these people looked to the Consular court for protection of their rights. They enjoyed privileges of extra-territoriality in matters relating to law.[40] But the trade between Sinkiang and India remained strictly limited by the great length and difficulty of the Leh route.

40. C.P. Skrine, *Chinese Central Asia*, London 1926, pp. 61-63.

D. C. Grover

A STUDY IN INDIAN AUTHORITARIANISM

The purpose of this study is to explore authoritarian trends in Indian life and thought, and thereby to contribute to a better understanding of the form and process of Indian political system. The largest democracy is really less than a democracy. India has become the largest democracy in a relatively short time by the expedient of mere introduction of democratic political institutions without experiencing democratic transformation in the social and cultural outlook of her people.

I. Culture State

Sometimes, it is argued that in India religious and philosophical thinkers were able to enjoy nearly absolute freedom for a long period. The freedom of thought in ancient India, it is maintained, was so considerable as to find no parallel in the West before the most recent age.[1] However, this claim needs to be modified. Freedom to speculate was carried on within a very narrow framework of Hindu tradition, and restricted to the class of Brahmins. Thus, the Charvakas, the materialist philosophers of ancient India, were ruthlessly suppressed. Hinduism was "as intolerant as any other religion".[2] The tolerance of Hinduism is one of the myths of modern Indian thinking, kept alive by uncritical repitition, and is one of those easy assumptions, which, on closer examination, is reduced to a very highly qualified truth.

Values in society were not mere empirical accidents, creations of man; they belonged to the realm of spirit. Dharma was both the process and the instrument of integration—the basis of all modes of association. The social life of man was a part, perhaps the end part, of the cosmic drama of becoming. Political thought, to use Mukherji's term, was always integrated with a "morally valid philosophy of life".[3] "Dharma" was "the creation of the state, and the state as such" had "the sanction of Danda.[4]" The notion of Danda reveals that force was a very important element in politics. The Mahabharata, raising Dandaniti to a momentous place, says : "When Dandaniti becomes lifeless, the triple Vedas sink; all

1. D. E. Smith, *India As A Secular State*, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 61-62.
2. J. C. Winslow (ed.), "The Intelligentsia", in *The Christian Task in India*, London : Jon Mckenzie, Macmillan & Co., 1929, p. 162.
3. K. P. Mukherji, *The State*, Madras : Theosophical Publishing House, 1952, p. 363.
4. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, Leipzig : Markert and Petters, 1922, p. 207.

the Dharmas, however developed, completely perish".[5] Likewise, maintains Kautilya that Danda and Danda alone protects this world and the next.[6] The fundamental purpose of political organisation was the maintenance of Svadharma. Hindu political thought as an adherent of Svadharma, thus, led to the growth of culture state, a synthesis of Dharma and Rita[7] (order). The question of 'conquest by Dharma' brings forth the entire question of political ethics, especially of violence which, as Max Weber emphasises, is the decisive means for politics.[8] Violence as the sanction of culture state in India, gave rise to authoritarian rule.

Rule of law was unknown to ancient India. The king enjoyed divine sanction for his office. One need not attach much importance to Samiti and the Sabha, which according to Atharvaveda, are regarded as the two daughters of Prajapati.[9] They were dominated by Brahmins; "other caste had no place".[10] The culture state, according to Manu, had four sources of law. The Vedas are the first; next comes the law treatise, Dharma Shastra; third is custom of holy men; and the last is the conscience.[11] Kautilya compares king to God; whosoever disregards kings will be visited with divine punishment, too.[12] Hence, kings shall never be despised.[13] Kautilya is not an individualist like Hobbes,[14] whose sovereign wields absolute power to secure individual his life and property. Kautilya's king holds authoritarian power in defence of Dharma, to protect the culture state.

II. Negation of Individuality

There is no scope for liberty and equality in Manu's philosophy. The price of freedom is obedience. The individual is a candidate for humanity, and he must learn to be led. Obedience to authority is the foundation of character.[15] A student is not allowed to engage himself in

5. The *Mahabharta*, Santi Parva, Trans. Pratap Chandra Roy, Calcutta : Oriental Publishing Co., n.d.; Vols. 8-10, lxii, 28-29.
6. The Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, Trans. R P. Kangle, Bombay : University of Bombay, 1963, Bk. III, Ch. I, para 22.
7. *The Hymns of Rig Veda*, Trans. Ralph T. H. Griffith, Varanasi : The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963, Vol. I, Bk. IV, hymns II, XII.
8. Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 121.
9. *The Hymns of Atharva Veda*, Trans. Ralph T. H. Griffith, Benares : E. J. Lazarus, 1916, Vol. I, Bk. VII, hymn XII.
10. Radha Kumud Mookerji, *Local Govt. in Ancient India*, Delhi : Moti Lal Banarsi Das, 1959, p. 309.
11. *Manu Smriti*, Trans. Ganganath Jha, Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1924, Part II, Ch. XI, verses, 12, 16.
12. *Arthashastra*, Bk I, Ch. 13, para 11.
13. *ibid.*, para. 12.
14. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited with an introduction by Michael Oakshott, New York : Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. IV-lvi.
15. Manu Smriti, Ch. II, verses 229-237.

heated discussion with his teacher, or suffer any defamation of his character without protest, or sit on a seat level with him.[16] The teacher is the image of Brahma, father of Prajapati, mother of the Earth and brother of oneself.[17] A Shudra is almost an irresponsible person, having no duties since he is not entitled to sacrament.[18] A country where Shudras predominate, atheists abound, and where the upper strata of society is outnumbered by the lower, will perish from disease and famine.[19] There is no expiation for the man, who kisses a Shudra woman, is tainted by her breath, and begets a son by her.[20] The lot of Chandals—sons of a Shudra by a Brahmin woman—is still worse. Chandals, says Manu, must dwell without town. Their sole wealth must be dogs and asses; their clothes must consist of the mantles of deceased persons; their dishes must be broken pot; and their ornaments must consist of rusty iron.[21] Manu's ideal, thus, involoves "the destruction of all individuality."[22] The social order was founded not upon principle of equality but upon "the conception of social hierarchy based upon caste, sanctioned by religion."[23] Therefore, rights tended to be social or caste rights, and it was individual duty to caste which was emphasised- not individual rights against the state. The Hegelian Marxian approach has some elements which find sympathetic response in Indian mind. Hegel[24] and Marx[25] believed that the individual should be politically articulate only as a member of social group or class—not as a mere citizen as in liberal democracies. This subordination of individual to group may have elements in common with the Indian caste. In this respect, Manu and Marx may have more in common than Manu and Hume.[26]

The individual versus the state, the favourite theme of Western political thought is not stressed in Hindu thought. The caste-system prevented the emergence of political individualism. It is true that individualism is a modern conception. Yet in ancient Greece, one finds beginnings of humanistic individualism in Protagoras,[27] and egoistic

16. *Ibid.*, verses 191-204.
17. *Ibid.*, verses 225-228.
18. *Ibid*, ch. III, verse 156; ch. IV, verse 99; ch. X, verse 127.
19. *Ibid.*, ch. VIII, verse 22.
20. *Ibid*, ch. III, verses 17-19.
21. *Ibid.*, ch. X, verses 51-58.
22. James Talboys Wheeler, *Ancient and Hindu India* : *The Brahmanic Period* Calcutta : Punthi Pustak, 1961, p. 5.
23. P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyar, *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideas*, Calcutta : Calcutta University, 1935, p. 93.
24. G W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1942, para 156-157.
25. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chicago : C.H. Kerr and Co., 1910, p. 113.
26. David Hume (1711-1776) is the representative philosopher of eighteenth century individualism in England.
27. T.A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political thought*, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, pp. 51-60.

individualism in Epicurus.[28] A few Sophists like Hippias[29] tried to demolish foundations of established law. But in India, the firmly entrenched caste structure was the greatest bulwark of a conservative corporativism. Even vague elementary and underdeveloped notion of individualism did not emerge in ancient India.

Much is made out of the village republic, yet even its advocates like Beni Prasad had to admit that it operated "on the basis of kinship", and "democracy at the centre either in the Greek or the modern European sense, was, except for a small tribal republic, ruled out by the facts of geography and the difficulties of transport."[30] The early constitutions of a republican character all perished without leaving a trace. "Autocracy is substantially the only form of government with which the historian of India is concerned. Despotism does not admit of development."[31] The basic principle of power in early India was authoritarianism, leading to the negation of individuality. Nor does Muslim theory conflict too seriously with this tradition. In the famous Muslim political work, 'Ain-i-Akbari',[32] one finds the same emphasis on stable authoritarian rule.

III. Political Vedantism and Metaphysical Nationalism

It was, indeed, a bold step on the part of the British rulers to have brought the western education within the reach of Indians. Judged from the point of view of the native culture and traditions, the first generation of the modern educated intelligentsia could be called de-nationalised, because they were more English than Indian. Their religion was the religion of Spencer and Comte, their philosophy that of Bentham and Mill. But they were the first rebels boldly raising a voice, challenging the older order of things, and heralding the birth of new India, which could not come into existence without shattering authoritarian traditions. The liberal national ideal presupposed the development in the Indian mind of a set of political values similar to those characteristic of the British way of life.[33] Indian Liberal constitutionalism was in a sense a hypothesis—an ideal requiring a particular environment as a pre-condition of its realisation.

This process of liberalisation, before it could go far enough, was checked by the militant nationalism of Tilak and the cultural revivalism of

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 244-245.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
30. Beni Prasad, *"Political Theory and Administrative System"*, in R.C. Majumdar (ed.), *he History of Culture of Indian People*, Bombay : Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol II, 1951, p. 319.
31. V.A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 2d. ed., Oxford; Claredon Press, 1923, p. xi.
32. Abul Fazl *Ain-i-Akbari*, Trans. H.S. Jarret, Calcutta : Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1949, p. 57.
33. C.Y. Chintamani (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of Sir Pherozeshah Mehta*, Allahabad : The Indian Press, 1905, pp. 198-200.

Vivekananda. These leaders, who were afterwards joined by Aurobindo Ghose and Bipin Chandra Pal, were the prophets of political Vedantism and metaphysical nationalism. Tilak would emphasise the rajadharma concept once national unity and swaraj were achieved.[34] Hindu mysticism, thus, emerged, as a caricature of Hegelian dialects. It finds expression in the Vedic conception of Earth God, revived by Aurobindo, "Your Common Mother", says Aurobindo, "is not merely the soil. That is not merely a division of land but it is the living thing. It is the mother in whom you move and have your being".[35] Similarly, B.C. Pal believing in the personality of Mother says :

"The mountains, these rivers, extensive plains and lofty plateaus are all witnesses into the life and love of our race, and in and through which the very life and love of the Mother have sought and found uninterrupted and progressive expression. Our history is the sacred biography of the Mother's mind. Our arts, our poetry and our plainting, our music and our drama, our architecture and our sculpture, all—are outflow of the Mother's diverse, emotional moods and experiences. Our religion is the organised expression of the Soul of Mother."[36]

Aurobindo identified it with the Sanatana Dharma itself. Thus, he said, "the Hindu nation was born with the Sanatana Dharma; with it. it moves, and with it, it grows. When the Sanatana Dharma declines, then, the nation declines,and if the Sanatana Dharma were capable of perishing with the nation, it would perish".[37] Thus, Aurobindo's conception of Sanatana Dharma as nationalism made him the advocate of Political Vedantism. The spiritual basis of this Indian idea of the nation strikes to be typically Hegelian.

Transcendentalism of political Vedantism reveals contradiction between free will and determinism, bearing close resemblance to Nietzsche's philosophy.[38] Glorification of state as Mother Earth in metaphysical nationalism has some "logical tendency to diminish or to destroy the moral responsibility of human agents."[39] The result is Hegelianism and Rousseauism. Hegelianism starts by "excluding the major part of human race from the capacity to be moral beings,"[40] whereas Rousseauism "has essentially meant the sacrifice of the individual to an end beyond

34. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, *His Writings and Speeches*, Madras : Ganesh and Co., 1919, p. 38.
35. Aurobindo Ghose, *Speeches*, Calcutta : Arya Publishing House, 1924, pp. 33-34.
36. B.C Pal, *Soul of India*, Calcutta : Chowdhry and Chowdhry, n.d., p. 199.
37. Aurobindo Ghose, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.
38. F.W. Nietzsche (1844-1900), the German philosopher, presented the conception of man as meaningless accident in a cosmic mechanism, the pawn of environmental forces.
39. John Laird, *On Human Freedom*, London : George Allen and Unwin, p. 151.
40. Harold J. Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice*, New York : The Viking Press, 1935, p. 67.

himself."[41] Political Vedantism and metaphysically nationalism destroy "active ethics"[42] in Indian life and set premium on doctrine of Karma. Instead of revolting against injustice, an average Indian finds in it divine dispensation. Freedom, of course, is a relative term, always and everywhere; it is limited by the circumstances of life. Yet the human will is reluctant to give in without resistance. The criminal, while bowing before legal justice, enforced by power of the State is more or less rebellious as regards the religion and morality, which endorse his punishment. But in India, the criminal psychology co-operates with his punishment; it is written in his faith—result of his Karma. The exploited and the downtrodden find no message of revolt in political Vedantism and metaphysical nationalism. Reviewing a socialist publication (Why Socialism by J.P. Narayan), a leading press organ rightly remarked that Indian religion, her institutions, have all been built on the cornerstone of authoritarianism...... democracy in India, whenever it comes, will be more akin to the democracy of the Reich than the democracy of Great Britain."[43] This state of Indian mind is the essence of authoritarian tradition.

IV The Spectre of Monolithic State

Leaders of opinion in India are not quite clear about the significance of democracy as an instrument of social change. Indeed, their commitment to democracy as a way of life is only surface deep, for their cultural orientation is more authoritarian than one would suspect. Some of them make no secret of their authoritarian bias.

Aurobindo's political Vadantism left its impact on Subhas Bose. Following Hegelian terminology, Subhas regarded nationalism and communism as thesis, and anti-thesis, and asserted that the next phase in world history would produce a synthesis. "It would be India's task to work out this synthesis".[44] As Bose saw it, the solution of Indian problems required economic reforms on a socialist basis. Since these reforms could not be put through under democratic form of government, India "must have a political system—a state—of an authoritarian character".[45] He believed in government by a strong party bound together by military discipline as the only means of holding India together and preventing a chaos when India became free.[46] Subhas wanted to be Bismarck of India.

41. Harold J. Laski, *The Danger of Obedience and Other Essays*, New York : Harper and Bros., 1930, p. 197.
42. Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development*, Bombay : Wilco Publishing House, 1960, p. 19.
43. *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, April 20, 1936.
44. Subhas Chander Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, 1920-1934, Vol. I, London : Wishart, 1935, p. 431.
45. Jagat S. Bright, *Important Speeches and Writings of Subhas Bose*, Lahore : Indian Printing Works, 1946, p. 378.

In any society, the family is probably of such importance that the relations and attitudes which characterise it, will find a place in the wider network of social relations. There can be little doubt that authority and status are keynotes of Indian family life. "On the whole, the relationship between father and children is seldom free and easy, for as the main family disciplinarian, the father tends to maintain distance from his children".[47] India's unconditional deference to Gandhi significantly referred to as Bapu, is modelled on the father-son relationship. This placed National Congress and India under Gandhian tutelage. Supporting this contention, Maulana Azad maintains that top leaders like "Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Acharya Kripalani.. rarely tried to judge things on their own, and in any case, they were accustomed to subordinate their judgement to Gandhiji. As such discussion with them was almost useless".[48] Nehru though temperamentally and by education a very different type, could not help stepping into the same role. Therefore, one finds great logic in Koistler statement that "India is a democracy in name only, it would be more correct to call it Bapucracy".[49]

Nehru, so much given to democracy, was not free from authoritarian tinge. Decisions were, says Michael Brecher, Nehru's biographer, "concentrated in his hands to an incredible degree, not only because of objective pressure but also because of all consuming interest in the pettiest of details."[50] More important, he had "never shown a capacity or inclination to delegate asuthority."[51] In general, charisma may be held responsible for arresting the growth of healthy democratic traditions. In one of its circulars, the A.I.C.C. urged its members to take positive stand against criticism of Nehru. It emphasised that those who criticised him should be exposed as "traitors."[52] This circular gave expression in a shocking way to the personality cult, and equated the party with the government. "The danger of tyranrical use of power by a majority still remains one of the great problems of government"[53] in India.

The working of party-system has strengthened authoritarian trend in Indian politics. The National Congress has avoided converting itself from an all-inclusive nationalist movement into a political party. It has not overcome the Gandhian legacy of sole spokesmanship for India. One

46. Bose, *Op. cit.*, pp. 345-347.
47. Aileen D. Ross. *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting*, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 100.
48. Abul Kalam Azad. *India Wins Freedom*. Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1959, p. 75.
49. Arthur Koestler. *The Lotus and the Robot*, London: Hutchinson, 1960, p. 156.
50. Michael Brecher. : *Nehru A Political Biography*, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 622.
51. *Ibid.*
52. A.I.C.C. Circular No. 23/OD-7/57/17491.
53. D. V. Cowen. *The Foundations of Freedom*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 110.

reason for the indifference of the ruling party to public opinion lies in its composition. Drawing its main support from the countryside, especially the middle and rich peasantry, and its finance from the capitalists, it is neither accustomed to, nor interested in criticism from the middle class intelligentsia. The emergence of consensus principle through "The Kamraj Plan"[54] is not a healthy demoratic practice. Generally speaking, consensus permits moderation, and even tolerance. On the contrary, if it is dogmatically based and ideologically rationalised, it may manifest itself in popularly acclaimed witchhunt.

The formation of the non-Congress governments in some states, though a welcome break, may not be treated as orderly alteration between government and opposition. The United Front coalitions have no common urge except to keep Congress out of office. Some of the constituent units never conceal their contempt for democracy. The Jan Sangh[55] serves as a political voice for the R.S.S., whose structure is frankly hierarchal and autocratic; the communication network is one way, from top to bottom.[56] The Communists, availing themselves of the ballot, prepare for the eventual triumph of "the proletarian revolution"[57]. Indeed, parliamentary communism is more embarrasing, and, therefore, more dangerous to democracy in India than is revolutionary communism.

Apart from the failure on the plane of values, the political parties have also ignored the need of going to the roots of reconstructional problem. Except the communists, no political party has considered it necessary to train its cadres in the theory and practice of social action. Even the parties of democratic socialism have behaved as though Fabian Society had never existed. The absence of will to translate ideas into living reality, as John Dewey put it, "is almost sure to result in confusion and disorder"[58]—the breeding ground for authoritarianism.

There is not much enthusiasm about the working of the Indian constitution. Unfortunately, adult franchise has preceded political education, and the result has been an almost total absence of any comprehension of democratic concepts. A devout Hindu has not ceased to be less devoutly caste-conscious because the Indian constitution has laid down the principle of social equality. Caste, as Morris-Jones points out, "is the core of traditional politics. To it belongs a complete social ethos. It embraces all and is all-embracing...When it comes to politics, it comes

54. R. P. Kapur, *Kamaraj: The Iron Man*, New Delhi: Deepak Associates, 1966, pp. 132-135.

55. *Manifesto of Bharatiya Jan Sangh*, Delhi: Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 1951, p. 3.

56. J. A. Curran, Jr., *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics*: A Study of R.S.S. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951, pp. 11-12.

57. Communist International, *Principles of Party Organisation*, Bombay: People's Publishing House, n.d., p. 2.

58. John Dewey, *Problems of Men*, New York: The Philosophical Library, 1946, p. 61.

not with a list of demands but with a way of life"[59]. "The authoritarian taboos of caste"[60] destroy individual liberty, making a farce of franchise.

Although the framers of the constitution wanted the President to act as a constitutional head, yet they wanted in exceptional cases that the President should be able to disregard or go against the advice tendered by ministers.[61] This may enable an ambitious incumbent of office to emerge as Indian Mughal amidst multi-party system in the centre. Including the instant case of Haryana, there have so far been eight instances of Presidential take—over of State Governments since the inception of the constitution. The country seems to be in for something like guided or dictated democracy.

The exercise of the emergency powers by the President has exposed the hollowness of the fundamental rights. The real weakness in the realm of civil liberties is preventive detention. The imbalance in the constitutional exercise of power lies precisely in the removing of the executive power from the judgement of the constitution. The hypothesis is that growth of confidence in democracy is a part of a function of confidence in the processes made available whereby the citizen can influence decision and can obtain protection in defence of cherished rights. Critics of the Preventive Detention Act express a deep-seated anxiety about the habituation of power which may take place within the ruling party.[62] The real danger in India, however, is that non-democratic practices, originally conceived of as temporary, may become institutionalised, and a part of an ideological framework.

The long struggle for independence favoured the development of attitudes incompatible with the democratic system. Most important is the growing belief that only organised intimidation or sustained hunger-strike will compel the government to yield to demands.[63] The association of Gandhi's name with these movements has imparted to them an aura of legitimacy. Consequently, normal channels of public opinion are not allowed to work.

Manipulation and conformism constitute the sovereign evils of Indian public opinion. A note of dissent is hardly relished on internal and external issues. This conformism does not recognise freedom of opinion,

59. W. H. Morris Jones, *India's Political Idioms*, in C. H. Philips (ed.), *Politics and Society in India*, London : George Allen and Unwin, 1963, pp. 138-139.

60. L. P. Sinha, *The Left Wing in India*, Muzaffarpur : New Publishers, 1965, p. 33.

61. Art. 78 (c), Art. 86 (1), and Art. 111 of the Indian Constitution.

62. David H. Bayley, *Preventive Detention in India*, Calcutta : K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962, ch. VIII.

63. David H. Bayley, "The Padagogy of Democracy, Coercive Public Protests in India", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol LVI, September, 1962, p. 663.

which entails "freedom for the opinions of the inarticulate, of cranks and of devils. The answer to error is not repression.[64] Truth is "no fragile thing, and is more likely to flourish in robust debate than in nursery"[65]. Conformism lends authoritarian colour to Indian nationalism. This finds reflection in the retention of unity imposed by 'Pax Britannica' as ideal of Indian nationalism. National State is not necessarily a democratic state. The conformist trends impell nationalists to ignore "religious, communal, cultural and linguistic differences",[66] exposing India to monolithic State.

V. Politics of Despair

More recent years have presented a disheartening picture. The threat arises from the fact that India has skipped over the centuries. The revolution of expectation has overtaken India before she could acquire the technology for satisfying the people's demands. A backlog of frustrated demands can be fatal for any form of government, but most so for democracy because it opens the door to the exact anti-thesis authoritarianism. Revolution, Brinton remarks, leaves behind both a uniting tradition and a memory of successful revolt.[67] Students participated more heavily than perhaps anyother group in Indian struggle for freedom.[68] Theirs was the highest aspirations—theirs also the deepest disappointments—and theirs also the strongest and the most emotive reactions[69]. Education, youth and unemployment produce the explosive mixtures. The chances are that in India, if dictatorship comes, it will be of the Left. Left radicalism appeals more to the science-worshipping youth; it also offers a more complete and intellectually satisfying credo. It has international support as well as international ideology. The first yields tremendous organisational advantages, while the second appeals to urban cosmopolitanism. Few young men seek political activity in the ranks of the party in power. To defend the status quo is not heroic, especially when there are unemployment, poverty, crime, waste, inequality, and corruption all round.

Whether urban educated youth goes Right or Left, it is not likely to be standard-bearer of liberal democracy if social and economic conditions continue to worsen. It is, perhaps, the lower middle class in the cities, unskilled and semi-educated, culturally conservative and confused, and

64. Peter Archer and Lord Reay, *Freedom at Stake*, London : The Bodley Head, 1966, p. 107.
65. *ibid.*
66. Joan V. Bondurant, Regionalism Versus Provincialism : A Study in Problems of Indian National Unity, *Indian Press Digest*, Berklay : University of California, December 1958, p. i.
67. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York : Vintage Books, 1957, pp. 262-264.
68. Prabodh Chandra, *Student Movement in India*, Lahore : All India Student Federation, 1938, p. 76.
69. Government of India, Ministry of Education, *Education in Universities in India, 1951-52*. Delhi : Government of India Press, 1954, p. 3.

politically adrift, whose politics is the most volatile. This floating population in the political arena makes it easier for opportunistic politicians to resign and reenter political parties, and to re-shuffle political alliances with a staggering and confusing frequency. The discredited politicians, discrediting democracy, may bring about, first, rank disorganisation, and, second an authoritarianism of opportunism, founded upon despair and a longing for order. Dictatorship "appeals in the main to unorganised masses of men"[70].

India is facing a dilemma ; it is committed to democratic institutions and method on the one hand, and to national unity and economic development on the other. This desire for national unity and national strength tends to lead to the development of a kind of unprincipled authoritarianism where the ideals of a democratic pluralistic society operate, but, where in reality, government is centralised, decisions are made by relative few, and responsibility, except in the sense of kind of self-imposed responsibility, is weak and remote. Conceivably, the process of building strength through economic development contains some built-in authoritarian consequences. In the short run, "economic growth can, therefore, be politically unstabilizing".[71] At this point, it would be foolhardy, indeed, to argue that authoritarianism cannot evolve in India. The increase in material assets cannot proceed too far ahead of the maturing of human faculties, of the growth in people's power to understand and control the process through a strengthening of their mind, will and character. There has to be a basic parity between material and moral advance, failing which the development of human qualities will be either overwhelmed through an excess of material accumulation or staved through its inordinate lack. In either case, the objective of human growth will be frustrated. The tensions arising from the pursuit of democracy and compulsions of a backward economy are real, and are not likely to be eased for some decades. Over-development of politics in an underdeveloped economy exposes India to the spectre of authoritarianism.

To conclude, it may be stated that India is on the verge of authoritarianism, not totalitarianism. Totalitarianism, in its preliminary characterisation, states Friederich, is "an autocracy based upon modern technology and mass legitimation".[72] There have been many types of autocracy in the history of government, but totalitarianism in a sense, is the adaptation of autocracy to the twentieth century industrial society. What is really the specific difference, the innovation of totalitarian regimes, is the organisation and methods, developed and employed with the aid of modern

70. Frederick Watkins, *The Political Tradition of the West*, Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 356.

71. Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity*, Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1963, p. 255.

72. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigwiew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 4.

technical devices in an effort to resuscitate such total control in the service of an ideologically motivated movement, dedicated to the total destruction and total reconstruction of mass society. "Ideology and terror"[73] have not yet emerged to harness technology for the advent of totalitarianism in India.

This study does not refute the presence of the concept of liberty in Indian political thought. The Charvaka philosophers of the past, the old liberals like Ranade, and the new liberals like Roy, emerged with a liberal political philosophy. Yet they failed to strike roots and create democratic tradition in the country. The Indian political tradition is far more authoritarian than democratic.

73. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, London : George Allen and Unwin, 1958 pp. 459-479.

J.R. Siwach

POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR TO SUMMON THE STATE LEGISLATURE

According to article 164 (1) the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister holds "office during the pleasure of the Governor". But what does the expression "holding an office during the pleasure of the Governor" mean ? Ordinarily pleasure of the Governor means that the Ministry remains in office so long as it enjoys the confidence of the Legislative Assembly. According to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar :

"During 'pleasure' is always understood to mean that the 'pleasure' shall not continue notwithstanding the fact that the Ministry has lost the confidence of the majority. The moment the Ministry has lost the confidence of the majority it is presumed that the President will exercise his 'pleasure' in dismissing the Ministry."[1]

Since article 164 (1) is a carbon copy of article 75 (2), the position of the President and that of the Governor seems to be the same in this respect. The Governor, therefore, can dismiss the Ministry if it does not resign after a vote of no confidence has been passed against it. It should, however, be noted that when the Government is defeated even on a major issue the pleasure may not always be withdrawn, if the Cabinet still commands a majority. There can be a temporary defeat of the Government, particularly of a coalition, on certain specific issues on which the political parties which have formed the Government, may either agree to differ or may differ otherwise. This happened in Punjab in April, 1967. For instance, when the Government was defeated by 53 votes to 49 on the issue of an opposition amendment to the Governor's address the pleasure was not withdrawn.[2] The Governor was of the opinion that "the situation was not so clear as to justify the dismissal of the Government on that day when the Congress opposition amendment to the motion of thanks to the Governor's address was carried."[3] The Governor held that before the pleasure is withdrawn, either a formal vote of no confidence should be passed or a formal vote of confidence should be rejected.[4] Shri K. Santhanam, agreed with this view when he said :

"The passing of an amendment to the Governor's address does not amount to a no confidence motion and need not involve the resignation of

1. *C.A.D.*, Vol. VIII, p. 520.
2. *The Statesman*, April 6, 1967, p. 1.
3. *The Indian Express*, April 12, 1967, p. 1.
4. *Ibid.*

the Ministry. It is always open to the Government to accept the amendment. Even in the case of budget demands a small reduction in a demand need not be treated as no confidence, if the Government is prepared to accept reduction. It is only when the defeat is such that the Government could not secure sufficient funds or pass legislation which is considered to be vital that the resignation of the Ministry becomes necessary.[5]

But the Principle that the Governor should withdraw his pleasure when either a formal vote of no confidence is passed or a formal vote of confidence is rejected can be followed only when the State Legislature is in session. At that time the opposition has an opportunity to test its strength on the floor of the Assembly. This principle, however, cannot be followed when the Legislature is not in session and when there is a large scale defection from the party in power as was the case in West Bengal,[6] Bihar,[7] Haryana[8] and Panjab.[9] What should the Governor do in that case ? Should he ask the Chief Minister to summon the State Legislature in order to prove that he still has a majority with him or should he simply ignore such defections for the time being. The first course of action has been adopted by Mr. Dharam Vira, the present Governor of West Bengal[10] but Shri Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, the Governor of Bihar has ignored these defections.[11]

In Bihar when Shri B.P. Mandal the leader of the newly formed Soshit Dal sent a list of his followers to the Governor, requesting him that he may be invited to from the Government because he along with the Congress comanded the majority, the Governor replied :

"I have not got the machinery to verify your list. It is only the Assembly that can do it under the Constitution on a motion properly moved in the House duly convened."[12]

In Haryana too, the Governor Justice Mehar Singh ignored the defections and did not summon the State Legislature in spite of a request by

5. K. Santhanam, *The Statesman*, April 17, 1967, p. 6.
6. Mr. P. C. Ghosh, a senior Minister defected alongwith 17 members from the United Front on 2nd November, 1967 and thereby reduced the ruling party to 136 in a House of 280, *Patriot*, November 23, 1967, p. 4.
7. Mr. B. P. Mandal, a Senior Minister resigned and formed his own political party Soshit Dal consisting of 20-30 MLAs and claimed that he alongwith Congress has the strength of 185 in a House of 310, *The Statesman*, August 29, 1967, p. 1.
8. Ch. Devi Lal with the following of 6 MLAs left the United Front, *Patriot*, August 8, 1967, p. 1.
9. Shri Lachhman Singh Gill, the Education Minister, alongwith 16 Legislators left the Ruling Peoples United Front and thereby reduced the strength of the ruling party from 57 to 41 in a House of 104, *The Statesman*, November 23, 1967, p. 1.
10. *The Indian Express*, November 15, 1967, p. 1.
11. *The Hindustan Times*, September 13, 1967, p. 1.
12. *ibid.*, September 13, 1967, p. 7.

the defecting leader Mr. Chand Ram[13] who was the Deputy Chief Minister. Even Shri B.N. Chakarvarti who has been appointed as Governor in place of Justice Mehar Singh initially ignored these defections,[14] in the sense that when Rao Birendra Singh temporarily lost the majority in the State Legislature, he was not asked to face the Assembly immediately. He, in fact, permitted him to continue so long as he was the leader of the largest party.[15] But after some time (20 days) when the see-saw game of the defections did not stop, he took note of them and recommended that the President should take over the administration under article 356.[16]

On the point whether the Governor should take note of the defections or not, the view of the Law Ministry is :

"The relative strength of the Government in the Legislature can be tested only on the floor of the House through a relevant vote : and (c) the Governor cannot take any cognisance of any changes in party or personal loyalities on the basis of public parade of its strength by the opposition.[17]

Shri K. Santhanam, agrees with this opinion when he says that "it is entirely wrong to think that it is the duty of the Governor to take note of an increase or decrease in party strength from day to day. Once he has formed the Ministry, it is for the State Assembly to decide whether or not it should continue in office. Neither law nor convention prohibits a Cabinet having only minority support from conducting the Government so long as the Assembly does not record its disapproval by a no confidence motion or rejection of the budget."[18] But the Home Ministry does not agree with this view. Mr. Y.B. Chavan, the Home Minister, said in the Lok Sabha that "as the constitutional head of the State it was the duty of the Governor to watch always that the Chief Executive, namely the Chief Minister, enjoyed the support of the majority of the House. If there was any doubt about it, he had to take cognizance of it."[19]

No doubt Legislative Assemblies are the best places to test the strength of the rival parties but what should the opposition do when the Assembly is not in session and the Chief Minister is not ready to summon it immediately in spite of the repeated advice of the Governor.[20] Then the question arises : should the Governor summon the Legislative Assembly even without the advice of the Chief Minister ? On this point conflicting

13. *The Statesman*, August 23, 1967, p. 1.
14. *The Tribune*, November 1, 1967, p. 1.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *The Statesman*, November 22, 1967, p, 2.
17. *The Times of India*, November 12, 1967, p. 1.
18. *The Statesman*, November 11, 1967, p. 8.
19. *The Times of India*. November, 17, 1967, p. 1.
20. *Ibid*, November 16, 1967, p. 1.

views have been expressed by eminent jurists, politicians, the members of Parliament and State Legislatures, the Home Ministry, the Law Ministry and the Governors. The Law Ministry is of the view that the Governor has no power to summon the State Legislature against the wishes of the Chief Minister in order to ascertain whether the present Government still enjoyned the necessary support.[21] Even some of the Governors agreed with this view at the Governors Conference[22] held in Delhi in November 1967, which was presided over by the President himself.

Since, the controversy about the powers of the Governor in this respect has evoked a countrywide interest, it needs not only a detailed but a careful and dispassionate examination. For this purpose, article 174 (1) of the Constitution will have to be studied carefully along with its background as explained in the Constituent Assembly. The article says:

"The Governor shall from time to time summon the House or each House of the State Legislature to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session."

Since this article is a carbon copy of article 85 (1) which empowers the President to summon each House of Parliament, therefore, the powers of the Governors in this respect seem to be the same as are the powers of the President of India.

If the debates of the Constituent Assembly are studied, it will be found that the summoning of Parliament is more a duty of the President than a right of the Prime Minister. Some of the members of the Constituent Assembly expressed apprehensions that there is no remedy if the President does not summon the Parliament under article 85 (1) in spite of the advice of the Prime Minister. Prof. K.T. Shah therefore, wanted to empower the Presiding Officers of both Houses of Parliament their respective Houses, "provided that if at any time the President does not summon as provided for in this Constitution for more than three months."[23] Opposing this amendment Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the drafting Committee said:

Then we have a right to impeach him, because such a refusal on the part of the President to perform obligations which have been imposed upon him would be undoubtedly violation of the Constitution.[24]

Had the President been bound by the advice of the Prime Minister in this respect, then neither Prof. K.T. Shah would have raised this question nor Dr. B.R. Ambedkar would have given this reply.

21. *Ibid.*, November 12, 1967, p. 1.
22. *The Statesman*, November 11, 1967, p. 1.
23. *C.A.D.*. Vol. VIII, p. 99.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

This reply of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar proves that the summoning of the session of Parliment and of State Legislatures is not only the right but also a duty of the President and State Governors, where they can exercise their individual judgement. In the normal course, the session of the Assembly is summoned by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, provided he has a majority in the State Legislature. But the moment there are doubts about his following in the State Assembly and if the Chief Minister does not want to face it on one pretext or the other, the Governor, it appears, has the power of summoning it even against the advice of the Chief Minister. This is so because the Chief Minister who has lost the confidence of the State Legislature should not be allowed to rule, particularly when the opposition claiming a majority is keen to form the Government as was the case in West Bengal.

Mr. K. Santhanam agrees with this view when he says :

"I think the Governor will also be entitled to call a session if he thinks that the Ministry is trying to evade its responsibilities under the Constitution. To put the matter briefly the Govenor is the guardian of the Constitution but he is not the guardian of party loyalities."[25]

This is also the opinion of Dr. L.M. Singhvi. He says ;

"If and when there is a reason to believe that the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers do not command the support of a clear majority in the Legislative Assembly, the Governor can, in his discretion, take steps to ascertain the position. Notwithstanding any difference of opinion with the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers the Governor is entitled to summon the House "to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit" and he can justifiably treat this as a matter in which he is required to act in his discretion under the Constitution."[26]

It is significant to note that Mr. Dharma Vira, the Governor of West Bengal, dismissed the Ministry when his advice of summoning the State Legislature immediately was not accepted by Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee, the then Chief Minister.[27] But it appears that it would have been better had the Governor instead of dismissing the Ministry on this ground, summoned the Assembly because it is a power clearly given to him by article 174 (1) of the Constitution.

There are certain functions which have been expressly vested in the President and Governors by various provisions of the Constitution. They cannot be delegated to any other person. D.D. Basu has stated :

"The result is that though all the executive power of the Union is also vested in the President by Art. 53 (1), distinction is to be maintained

25. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, November 11, 1967, p. 8.
26. *ibid.*
27. *The Hindustan Times*, November 23, 1967, p. 1.

which are vested in the President by Art. 53 (1) generally, and the other provisions of the Constitution such as Arts. 123, 124, 217, 268-279, 309, 310, proviso (c) to Art. 311 (2), 338, 340, 344, 356, 360, which specifically vest particular functions in the President. The later powers cannot, according to the Supreme Court, be delegated by the President to other person or authority, but must be exercised by the President personally.[28]"

Since article 85 (1) of the Constitution, which empowers the President to summon each House of Parliament, belongs to the category of the articles mentioned above and article 174 (1) is a carbon copy of article 85 (1), it seems that it is a power given to the Governor. which he can exercise independently.

This contention is further supported by the fact that the power of summoning the State Legislature has been given by the same article which has given the Governors the power of proroguing and dissolution and that too in the same unambiguous language. About the power of dissolution it has already been conceded both by the Law Ministry and Home Ministry that the Governor may exercise his discretion.[29] About the power to prorogue, the non-congress opposition parties including some of the jurists are of the opinion that the Governor should exercise his individual judgement.[30] When the powers of summoning, proroguing and dissolution have been clubbed together in the same article and in the same language, it becomes difficult to understand how can it be said that the Governor cannot exercise discretion in this respect.

Therefore, the extra-constitutional twists given by the Home Ministry or by the Law Ministry cannot be accepted, particularly because these Ministries have given different interpretations of this article at different times. For instance, in the case of Madhya Pradesh the Home Minister came forward with a theory that "a defeated Chief Minister had the constitutional right to ask for dissolution of the Legislature and that the Governor had no discretion to refuse it."[31] Even Mrs. Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, told newspapermen that "the Governor has a constitutional obligation to accept the advice of his Chief Minister in regard to dissolution of the Assembly whether the Chief Minister at the time of giving such advice enjoyed majority support or not."[32] However, when Mr. Gurnam Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab, resigned, he advised the Governor to dissolve the Legislative Assembly and order fresh elections,[33] but the advice was not accepted by the Governor.[34] Strangely enough, in that case the legal experts of the Central Government who had already

28. D D. Basu, *Comentary in the Constitution of India*, 5th ed , Vol. II, p. 369.
29. *The Statesman*, November 23, 1967, p. 12.
30. *ibid.*, July 24, 1967, p. 5.
31. *The Tribune*, November 26, 1967, p. 8.
32. *Patriot*, November 25, 1967, p. 2.
33. *The Tribune*, November 26, 1967, p. 8.
34. *ibid.*, p. 1.

given different opinion, agreed with the Governor.[35] This to some extent proves that the advice of the Law Ministry or of the Home Ministry is not dependable and the possibility that the Home Ministry may reverse its stand in respect of summoning the State Legislature by the Governor, cannot be completely ruled out because this position is constitutionally untenable.

If it is accepted that the State Assembly can be convened only on the advice of the Chief Minister, then its logical corollary that the Governor would be bound to advance the date of the session after it has already been announced or prorogue the session, whenever such a advice is given to him by the Chief Minister, will have to be accepted. In other words in the matters of summoning or proroguing the State Legislatures and shifting the dates of the session, the Governors will have absolutely no powers. But strangely enough the non-Congress political parties though they advocate this principle are not prepared to accept it in toto and want exceptions whenever this principle does not suit them, For instance, in 1953 when the President shifted the date of the session of Rajya Sabha, the opposition parties took the stand that after the date of the session has been fixed, the President cannot change it, not even on the advice of the Prime Minister.[36] Similarly, they criticised the Chief Commissioner of Manipur when he deferred the session of the Assembly by a fortnight on the advice of the Chief Minister.[37] The session was to begin on september 20, 1967 according to the summons issued earlier. This was done because Mr. Salam Tombi Singh, expelled Congress leader, who was the Speaker of the Assembly, had announced at a Press Conference the previous day that he had been elected leader of the 17 member opposition United Front and he would move a vote of no confidence against the Ministry in the Assembly.[38] Since the Government did not want to face a vote of no confidence, the Chief Minister advised the Governor to postpone the session. If the Governors are to go purely by the advice of the Chief Ministers in this respect, then there would be either no sessions for six months even if the Government has lost the confidence of Legislative Assembly or the sessions would be deferred or the Assembly would be prorogued in order to save the Ministry from the vote of no confidence and the responsibility of the Government to the Legislativre Assembly would be a mockery.

It is unfortunate that if the Governors exercise their powers on the advice of the Chief Ministers, they are called their tools and if they exercise their discretion, their action is called unconstitutional and arbitrary. For instance, when Mr. K.C. Reddy, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh,

35. *The Statesman*, November 23. 1967, p. 12.

36. A.R. Mukherjee, *Parliamentary Procedure in India*, Ist ed., 1958, pp. 23-24.

37. *The Statesman*, September 21, 1967, p. 1.

38. *Ibid.*

prorogued the Legislative Assembly on the advice of the Chief Minister,[39] his action was described as the "murder of the Constitution" and the "death knell of democracy."[40] Mr. N.C. Chatterjee said :

"The first duty of the M.P. Governor was to see if an alternative Ministry could be formed when the Congress majority in the House became doubtful. The prorogation of the State Assembly was "culpable homicide of democracy."[41]

Mr. Madhu Limaye (SSP) alleged that the Constitution had been throttled in Madhya Pradesh at the instance of the State Chief Minister and Central leaders.[42] Mr. Nath Pai said the Governor seemed to be more concerned about saving the Ministry than the Constitution. He even suggested impeachment of Governor.[43] Even Acharya Kirpalani called the action of the Governor as unconstitutional.[44] The action of the Governor was also criticised by the entire opposition in Rajya Sabha.[45]

This shows that the leaders of the non-Congress political parties want that the Governor should not accept the advice of the Chief Ministers belonging to the Congress party in matters of deferring the session or proroguing the legislative Assembly but the Governor of Bengal should accept the advice of the Chief Minister Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee in summoning the Legislative Assembly because he is a non Congress Chief Minister. In fact, the opposition parties criticised Mr. K.C. Reddy, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh because by proroguing the Legislative Assembly, he prevented them from passing the vote of no confidence and thereby allowed the Government to stay in office for some days more after it has lost the confidence of the Assembly. But does the not summoning of the State Legislature in West Bengal for 42 days not amount to the same? This shows that there is no consistency in the approach of the various political parties so far as the powers of the Governor in this respect are concerned. They want the Governors to exercise their discretion in those States where Congress party is in power but not in those States where non Congress Government exist.

Hence, it can be concluded that in view of the conflicting opinions expressed by the Home Ministry, Law Ministry, leaders of the various political parties and the Governors at different times, the powers of the Governor in this respect though explicitly given by the Constitution will remain obscure, unless some of the Governors exercise this power and

39. *The Statesman*, July 23, 1967, p. 1.
40. *ibid.*, July 24, 1967, p. 5.
41. *ibid.*
42. *ibid.*
43. *ibid.*
44. *The Indian Express*, July 25, 1967, p. 4.
45. *The Statesman*, July 25, 1967, p. 7.

their action is challenged in the Supreme Court. But if the Governor summons the session of the State Legislature without the advice of the Chief Minister, his action may be considered by some of the Pandits of Constitutional law as a violation of the spirit of the Constitution. For their satisfaction the following judgement of the Supreme Court is quoted:

"An argument founded on what is claimed to be the spirit of the Constitution is always attractive, for it has a powerful appeal to sentiment and emotion; but a court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution. What one may believe or think to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the language of the Constitution does not support that view.[46]"

It was because of this approach of the Supreme Court towards the Constitution that in the case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. V. the State of Bihar (1955), in which it had the distinction of hearing Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly argue before it what certain constitutional provisions were intended to mean, it refused to seek help from such sources where the provisions were plain and clear.[47]

Hence, it is difficult to accept that the Governor cannot summon the State Legislature without the advice of the Chief Minister. Mr. G.S. Pathak, the Governor of Mysore (former Law Minister in the Government of India) agrees with this view when he says that the Governor can summon it.[48] Since conflicting opinions have been expressed on this point and by equally eminent persons, it is therefore, suggested that let one of the Governors summon the State Legislature against the advice of the Chief Minister and let it go before the Supreme Court as a test case. In fact, even the request of the Bengal Government that the matter may be referred to the Supreme Court for advisory opinion[49] under article 143 would not have solved the problem finally. The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court is not a substitute for the decision of the Supreme Court because the advisory opinion is not a judicial pronouncement.[50] When this is the case, how can the opinion of Advocate General or that of the Law Ministry be accepted as final ?

Hence, it appears that the Governor has the power of summoning the State Legislature on his own. The non acceptance of this view would mean that, whatever may be the time and size of defections, the Governor would not be in a position to compel Chief Ministers like Messers Ajoy Mukherjee, Rao Birendra Singh and Mahamaya Prasad to agree to an early meeting of the State Legislatures. In other words it would mean

46. D.N. Banerjee, *Our Fundamental rights*, Ist ed., 1960, p. 46.
47. S.R. Sharma, *Supreme Court in Indian Constitution*, 1959, p. 64.
48. *The Statesman*, November 11, 1967, p. 1.
49. *Patriot*, November 19, 1967, p. 1.
50. V.N. Shukla, *Commentary on the Constitution of India*, 3rd ed., 1960, p. 226.

that the Chief Minister cannot be forced to resign immediately even if he forfeits the confidence of the House except when the State Legislature is in session.

The Governors, therefore, if they want to perform the functions of a referee as a constitutional head, must use the powers given to them by the Constitution and it would be desirable that whenever, a situation like West Bengal develops irrespective of the advice of Chief Minister, the State Legislature should be summoned by the Governor. In fact, by this step, the Governors would be doing a service to the nation because that might bring this issue before the Supreme Court in the form of a case.

Ranbir Singh

GENESIS AND EXPOSITION OF THE DEMAND FOR VISHAL HARYANA

The demand for Greater or Vishal Haryana has an interesting history behind it. Its protagonists say that from the medieval period Haryana has been a bigger province than at present. Akbar, the great, organized his provinces in accordance with their natural boundaries.[1] Describing the boundaries of Haryana, then called Delhi Subah, Abul Fazl, the court historian of Akbar, writes, "On its east lies the capital Agra ; on the north-east it marches with Khairabad in the Subah of Oudh; to the north are the (Himalayan) mountains; on the south are the Subahs of Agra and Ajmer; on the west is Ludhiana. The chief rivers are the Ganges and the Jamuna and both of these take rise in the Subah."[2] The boundaries of this Subah, with minor adjustment under Shahjahan and Aurangzeb, remained unchanged upto the days of the fall of the Mughal empire in the 18th century.[3]

With the advent of the British, a new chapter was opened in the history of Haryana. In 1803 this region came under British control and was put under the Bengal Government.[4] From 1833 to 1858 this region formed part of the newly organized state of the North Western provinces (modern Uttar Pradesh). In February 1858, a part of this province was separated from the North Western Provinces and was tagged with the Punjab, probably as a design to punish the people of Haryana for participating in the movement of 1857.[5]

The new change could not lead to social, cultural and linguistic assimilation and the people of Haryana maintained their distinct identity as is clear from the Punjab Administration Report for the year 1892-93. It says that, "a line drawn through Sirhind from North to South marks the Punjab from India proper; that is why the city of Sirhind is called the Head of India; to the east of it is the Hindi-speaking area and to the West the Punjabi speaking region."[6]

1. Tara Chand, *History of Freedom Movement in India* (Delhi : Govt. of India Publication, 1961), Vol. I, p 83.
2. Abul Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari* (Eng. Tr. by Col. H S. Jarret and corrected and annotate by Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1949), Vol. II, pp. 283-314.
3. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
4. Treaty of Sarjiu, Anjan Gaon, December 30, 1803, *Haryana Research Journal*, Vol. I, 1967, p. 19.
5. Sant Singh Sekhon, *Punjabi Suba—A Symposium* (New Delhi : 1965), p. 41.
6. *Punjab Administration Report* (Lahore : Govt. Publication), 1892-93, p. 14.

rigin of the Demand

The demand for Vishal Haryana came to the fore with the rise of »litical consciousness in the nineteen-twenties.[7] Right from the outset is demand has enjoyed wide support. It has been supported by greatmen ke Mahtama Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Asaf Ali, Chhotu Ram, Pirzada ohammad Hussian and Muhammad Ali Jinnah.[8] The case for the tachment of Ambala Division from the Punjab was beautifully made by esh Bandhu Gupta in the following words:

The Ambala Division, excluding Simla District, has never been a part Punjab throughout Indian history and is distinct from Punjab in all respects. agged to the Punjab by the accident of haphazard growth of province, it has en a misfit owing to wide differences of the language, culture, history, adition and mode of life, no less than ethnical distinctions. The population Ambala has remained an unassimilable constituent of that province.

Geoffrey Corbett lent support to this view in the memorandum esented by him to the Second Round Table Conference. According it, "historically the inclusion of the Ambala Division in the province the Punjab was an accident of the British rule. Its language is Hindusni, not Punjabi, and its people are akin to the people of adjoining eerut and Agra Divisions of the United Provinces rather than to the ople of the Punjab"[10] Even parties like the Muslim League supported is demand. Pirzada Muhammad Hussain, Chairman of the Reception ommittee of the All India Muslim League, advocated the expansion of elhi province in 1925. The Delhi State Congress Committee raised this mand at all Parties Conference in 1928.[11] Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya pported it in the All-India Linguistic States Conference on December 8, 46.[12]

The demand for the formation of Vishal Haryana was viewed very riously by the States Reorganisation Commission which was set up by Government of India in 1953 to examine objectively and dispassionately question of the reorganisation of the Indian provinces.

Various persons and organizations put up the case of Vishal aryana before the Commission. The erstwhile Delhi Vidhan Sabha ssed a resolution unanimously on 29th of October, 1953, requesting the elhi State Government to recommend the formation of Maha Delhi ishal Haryana) including the areas of Delhi, Agra Division, Meerut

7. Shri Ram Sharma, *Haryana Ka Itihas*, (Rohtak: 1966), p. 98.
8. Case for Greater Delhi: Memorandum submitted to the S.R.C. on behalf of Delhi State Govt. (Published by Directorate of Public Relations, Delhi: 1954), pp. 9-10.
9. *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi), Dec. 9, 1932.
10. Case for Greater Delhi, p. 8.
11. *ibid.*, p. 9
12. *Symposium on Punjabi Suba*, p. 147.

Division, part of Rohailkhand Division, Ambala Division of the Punjab, and the Hindi speaking areas of Pepsu, Alwar and Bharatpur Districts of of the Rajasthan. The total area of the proposed state was to be 53,472 square miles and population 2,91,53,604 (1951 census). The Delhi State Government, 23 Congress legislators of present Haryana, 97 M.L.A.S. of Western UP., the Punjab Committee of C.P.I. and numerous other organizations submitted memoranda before the S.R.C. to press for Greater Delhi (Vishal Haryana) State.

The Commission dismissed the demand with the following observations : The separation of Haryana areas of Punjab which are deficit areas will be no remedy for any ills, real or imaginary, from which this area at present suffers.[13] As regards Alwar and Bharatpur, the Commission held that there has been no appreciable change in the state of opinion since Shanker Deo Committee went into the question in 1949, which may justify the disturbance in the status quo.[14] They further opined that the separation of 16 districts of Western U.P. as proposed by the protagonists of Vishal Haryana was bound to lead to the dislocation of administration besides creating financial difficulties for one or more units. They observed that a vast majority of people are likely to view with great disfavour and concern the partitioning of a state which has remained a unit by itself for a long period.[15] One of the members of the S.R.C., Sardar K.M. Panikkar, expressed his dissent on this issue.[16]

The S.R.C. Report opened the floodgates of agitations.[17] An Akali demand for Punjabi Suba came to the forefront. The Government, however, used the Regional Formula to appease the Akalis. The State of Punjab was arbitrarily divided into two linguistic zones in 1957.[18] As a result of it, the demand for the reorganisation of the Punjab subsided for a while, but the agitation was revived sooner than was expected due to the dissatisfaction of the Sikhs,[19] the power politics within the Akali Dal and the struggle between the Sant and the Master groups, which culminated into the threat of self-immolation by Sant Fateh Singh. Consequently, a vigorous agitation started but the outbreak of the India-Pakistan War in 1965 gave a lull to it.[20]

The Government of India appointed a parliamentary committee and a cabinet sub-committee for the fresh examination of the Punjabi Suba

13. *The States Reorganisation Commission Report* (Government of India Publication, Delhi : 1955), p. 147.
14. *ibid.*, p. 139.
15. *ibid.*, pp. 158-162.
16. *ibid.*, pp. 244-246.
17. Satya M. Rai, *Partition of the Punjab*, New Delhi, 1965), pp. 243-244.
18. *Punjab Boundary Commission Report*, 1966, p. 5.
19. Khuswant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966), Vol. II, p. 295.
20. P.N. Joshi, *Punjabi State—A Symposium*, pp. 70-77.

issue. The fear of the decimation of Haryana and the apprehension that the Punjab may not be declared a unilingual state led to the revival of the demand for Vishal Haryana.[21] The disparity between the two regions and the evidence of discrimination unfolded by the Haryana Development Committee Report lent further support to it.[22] The Parliamentary Sub-Committee was flooded with memoranda by the representatives of Haryana Lok Samiti, Haryana All Parties Action Committee, Haryana Arya Sammelan, Punjab High Court Bar Association, Congress Legislators belonging to Haryana districts, Delhi Pardesh Congress Committee, the Sponsoring Committee of the Conference of the Representatives of the people of U.P., Punjab, Rajasthan and Delhi, and many other organisations demanding the formation of Vishal Haryana.[23] The Committee, however, refrained from expressing opinion on the demand of Vishal Haryana. Nor did it consider it since these matters did not fall within the scope of their work. The Committee left it to the government to consider it in due course whether it is feasible to join Delhi Municipal Corporation Area with Haryana Prant which the Committee had proposed. It recommended the reorganisation of Punjab on linguistic basis into the States of Punjab and Haryana and merger of hill areas with Himachal Pardesh.[24]

Two members of the Committee, Braham Parkash and Kumari Shanta Vashisth were, however, of the opinion that there is a strong body of opinion for carving out a new state, call it Delhi, Vishal Haryana, Yamuna Pardesh or any other thing. They concluded that it would be wise for government to accede to this demand.[25] Surjit Singh and Maharaja Karni Singh the two other members of the Committee, however, declared their categorical opposition to the formation of Vishal Haryana by changing the boundaries of existing states on the ground that it would lead to the rise of agitations for changing the boundaries of the adjoining states which have been enjoying stable administration and largest measure of emotional integration among these people and in view of the categorical assurances given by the Home Minister, G.L Nanda, in Rajya Sabha that the boundaries of the adjoining states would not be disturbed.[26] The seventeenth states of Haryana comprising the districts of Karnal, Gurgaon, Mohindergarh, Rohtak, Hissar and Jagadhri, Naraingarh Tehsils and Kalka Sub-Tehsil of Ambala District, and Narwana and Jind Tehsils of Sangrur, was carved out by reorganising the Punjab in accordance with the Boundary Commission Report with the singular exception of Chandigarh, on 1st of November, 1966.[27]

21. *The Tribune* (Ambala Cantt.), October 4, 1965.
22. *Haryana Development Committee Report*, 1966.
23. *Report of the Parliamentary Committee on the demand of Punjabi Suba* (Government of India Publication, Delhi: 1965), p. 56.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 46.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
27. *Punjab Boundary Commission Report*, p. 49.

The recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee had mixed repercussions. The Hindus of Punjab reconciled themeselves to it after the display of flared passions, high pitched emotions and an agitation resulting in shocking violence. Except for occasional and sporadic outbrusts, the Sikhs and the people of Haryana welcomed it by and large.[28]

But it was a disappointment for some other leaders. Ram Chander Vikal declared that if a referandum on this issue was taken, it would be supported by 90 per cent of people.[29] Charan Singh remarked that the advocacy of Greater Haryana or Delhi State is not an act of treason or indiscipline on the part of Congressmen. The proposal for Greater Haryana had not been initiated by him, but by Thakur Das Bhargava, Asaf Ali, and Desh Bandhu Gupta decades ago. He further held that had that proposal been accepted at that time, perhaps he would have been living in a United India.[30] About 2,000 representatives of 4,00,000 Meos living in Bharatpur and Alwar Districts and Maharaja Brijendra Singh M.P. of Bharatpur also demanded the merger of Alwar and Bharatpur Districts in Haryana.[31] There was a mixed reaction so far as the city of Delhi was concerned. The dominant group of D.P.C.C. led by Barahm Parkash lent vigorous support to it but the dissident group led by Mehar Chand Khanna opposed it stoutly.[32] As such the demand subsided.

When Rao Berinder Singh became the Chief Minister of Haryana in March, 1967, the demand was revived. Confronted with political instability, meagre resources of the state, its economic backwardness and pressure from the Central Government over Chandigarh issue, Rao Berinder Singh thought that Vishal Haryana was the panacea for all these ills. He, therefore, started a vigorous campaign for Vishal Haryana in the state and the adjoining states.[33] The Vishal Haryana of the Rao's dreams is much larger than the previous proposals. Rao's demand includes territories upto the Sutlej river in Vishal Haryana on the plea that Sutlej has been the line of demarcation between Punjab and the rest of India from time immemorial.[34]

The demand has come in for criticism from political adversaries of the Rao who denounce it as a political stunt. The Swatantra Party and C.P.I. have lent it full support. The Jan Sangh and the Congress are uncommitted.[35]

28. *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi), March 11, 1966.
29. *The Tribune* (Ambala Cantt.), March 21, 1966.
30. *ibid.*, May 1, 1966.
31. *The Statesman* (Delhi), May 2, 1966.
32. *ibid.*, May 3, 1966.
33. *The Vir Arjun* (Jullundur), September 28, 1967.
34. *ibid.*, September 29, 1967.
35. *The Weakened Review* (Delhi : Hindustan Times Publication), September 30, 1967, p. 15.

Exposition of the Demand

Now let us assess the significance of the demand and make a scrutiny of it in the light of the facts. A few objections have been raised against the formation of Vishal Haryana. It is said that the acceptance of this demand shall open the floodgates for the demands for the creation of many new states. The reorganisation will disturb the status quo and cause great disorganization in most parts of Northern India. It is also pointed out that Delhi being a metropolitan city and the capital of the country, can not be made a part of a state and needs special arrangement.

In reply to the above criticism it may be said that once we have accepted the division of India on cultural and linguistic principles, we can not deny any demand to this effect for any reason. There is no denying the fact that the regions, which the protagonists of Vishal Haryana wish to include in the proposed Vishal Haryana, are all linguistically and culturally akin.[36] The western and eastern parts of U.P. are distinct both physically and geographically. U. P. being too big a state for effective aid efficient admmistration, this reorganisation would tone up the administratton.[37] As regards the city of Delhi it has been a part and parcel ofHaryana from quite early times. In fact it was built by the Tomar Rajas of Haryana in early medieval days.[38] The inclusion of Delhi in Haryana would help in the development of this rapidly expanding city. This would also solve the political problem as a Muncipal Corporation or Metropolitan Council does not satisfy the political aspiration of the people of Delhi who have been denied democratic set-up since 1956.[39] As regards the special status of the Union Capital, it can be maintained by separating New Delhi from Old Delhi and the rural areas.[40]

The small state of Haryana with meagre resources, top heavy administration and economic backwardness cannot march towards development. The merger of 10 district of U.P. out of 52 shall go a long way to remove this imbalance. It will be helpful in commercial, agricultural and industrial growth. It will remove barriers in the way of inter-state trade, and be highly favourable to the industrial advancement with Delhi as the centre. The new state shall be the granary of India. The main difficulty, the lack of irrigation facilities that the agriculturist faces in parts of U.P., Haryana, Rajasthan, which are proposed to be included in Vishal Haryana, can be surmounted in the new state as, at present, the schemes cannot be properly executed due to multiple jurisdiction, over-

36. Acharya Bhagwan Dev, *Vir Bhoomi Haryana* (Jhajjar), 1965, p. 99.
37. K.M. Panikkar's Note, *S.R.C Report*, p. 246.
38. Buddha Prakash, *Glimpses of Ancient Haryana*, H.R.J., Vol. I, 1966, p. 13.
39. *Report of Parliamentary Committee on Punjabi Suba*, p. 28.
40. *ibid.*, p. 46.

lapping and divided responsibility.[41] The floods can be better controlled and the agriculturist shall get fair price of his produce. The disparity of prices between Haryana and the adjoining areas of U.P., Rajasthan, Delhi has led to large scale smuggling in foodgrains. This evil will be curbed as Vishal Haryan shall be a good market owing to the increased demand for feeding Delhi and the deficit areas of Bharatpur and Alwar. Now-a-days a feeling prevails in southern states and in Bengal, Punjab and elsewhere that the present structure of Uttar Pardesh has led to the domination of Uttar Pardesh in all-India matters.[42] The formation of Vishal Haryana will remove this feeling by subtracting a substantial part of it and would be helpful in creating harmony and better understanding among the different states of India. A few people have imaginary fear that the proposed Vishal Haryana may be a Jat dominated state. The Jats there, as a matter of fact, do not form more than 10 per cent of the population.[43] How can they dominate 90 per cent people ? Beside this, there is another fear that it would be an 'AJGAR' state i.e. a coalition of Ahirs, Jats, Gujjars and Rajputs. But this is also belied by facts. The total population of the 'AJGAR' coalition would be not more than 18 per cent.[44] Moreover, this is an out-of-date mode of thinking and does not fit in the secular and democratic set up that we have in India.

This is in a nutshell a brief account of the genesis and exposition of the demand for the formation of Vishal Haryana.

41. *ibid*, p. 46.

42. This view was expressed by many people and organisations before the S.R.C. For details see Panikkar's dissenting note, *S.R.C. Report*, p. 244.

43. *The Weekend Review*, p. 15.

44. *ibid.*, p. 15.

Vijay Sen Budhraj

IMMUNITIES OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS

The scope and limits of the immunities granted to foreign diplomats are determined by universally recognised rules of international law, by international customs and conventions and also by the municipal statutes of the various states. In order to meet obligations prescribed by international law pertaining to treatment of diplomatic agents most states have enacted special laws granting certain immunities to diplomatic envoys and providing for the punishment of offences against them. However, it is difficult to state precisely what are the requirements of international law in the matter because the practice as to the extent of immunities varies from state to state and partly because it is sometimes not easy to determine whether a particular immunity, which it is usual to allow, is a matter of law or of courtesy. Although in 1961 an attempt was made by a U.N. Conference of eighty-one states at Vienna to make a comprehensive list of diplomatic immunities, the Convention adopted at the Conference itself stated that the rules of "customary law shall continue to govern questions not regulated by the Convention."[1]

In Great Britain the Act of 7 Anne, 1708, gave legal recognition to diplomatic immunities. Nevertheless, this statute, which was passed after the Russian ambassador in London had been arrested and badly mauled by some merchants to whom he owed money, "has always been considered as declaratory of the existing law in England and not as creating new law."[2] Other states too have promulgated similar acts since then. In Soviet Russia the statue on the Diplomatic Missions and Consulates of Foreign States on the Territory of the U.S.S.R., adopted in 1927,"gives the diplomatic and consular representatives of foreign states all the rights and advantages due to their position in accordance with the rules of international law on a reciprocal basis."[3]

Diplomatic immunities are granted for two main reasons. Firstly, being direct representatives of sovereign states or international persons, diplomatic agents owe no allegiance to the state to which they are

1. For a detailed study of the proceedings of this Conference, see E.L. Kerley, "Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (January, 1962), pp. 88-129.
2. L. Oppenheim, *International Law : A Treatise*, Vol. I (London : Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1955), p. 789, fn. 4.
3. Y.A. Korovin and others, *International Law : A Text book for Use in Law Schools* (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, this is the English translation of the Russian original published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of State and Law), pp. 301-302.

accredited and are said to be outside the jurisdiction of the receiving state. Initially it was asserted that the diplomatic mission personified the sending state and, therefore, the fiction of "exterritoriality" was attributed to it, meaning thereby that the mission territory be deemed as situated outside the territory of the local state so as to exclude the application of local law to persons living within its premises. Although this doctrine has now been rejected, the body of privileges and immunities that flowed from "exterritoriality" are accepted by states as a matter of international comity. Secondly, the nature of the work of diplomatic agents is such that they cannot discharge their responsibilities properly and effectively unless cerain privileges and immunities are assured to them. For example, if they are to submit to the local jurisdiction like other individuals they are likely to be influenced by personal considerations of safety and comfort to a degree which is likely to hamper them in discharging their functions. Or, again, if they are not granted freedom of communication with their home states, it would be impossible for them to send independent and secret reports to, or receive instructions from, the states which have sent them. Evidently, diplomatic privileges and immunities are essential to the performance of diplomatic responsibility. They are, therefore, reciprocally accorded by all states in the conduct of their relations with one another.

Diplomatic privileges and immunities technically begin the moment the diplomatic agent sets his foot in the country to which he is accredited and do not end until he leaves it, whether of his own accord or because he has been expelled. The Pan-American Convention of February 20, 1928, signed at Havana, lays down that "diplomatic officers enter upon the enjoyment of their immunity from the moment they pass the frontiers of the state where they are going to serve and make known their position. The immunities shall continue during the period that the mission may be suspended, and even after it shall be terminated, for the time necessary for the officer to be able to withdraw with the mission." Immunities continue to operate even if the diplomat dies at his post. In 1916 a secretary of the French embassy was shot dead in a hotel bedroom in London. When a local coroner started to hold an inquest, the French ambassador in London objected on the ground that the diplomatic corpse too enjoyed immunity.[4]

They are not affected by the breaking out of war between two countries. In such an event, it is the duty of both parties to the war to take every precaution against insult or violence directed against diplomatic envoys from enemy countries. When a mob attacked the residence of the British ambassador in Berlin on August 4, 1914, the day Britain declared war on Germany, the local police not only acted promptly to suppress the mob, but the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Government of Germany, sent assurances of profound regret.

4. C.W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (Michael Joseph, 1960), p. 198.

The immunities of diplomatic agents can be examined under the following heads: Inviolability, Freedom of Communication, and Exemption from the Local Jurisdiction—criminal, civil, etc.

Inviolability

The person of a diplomat is inviolable in the receiving state. Inviolability implies a higher degree of protection to the diplomatic agent and his belongings than is accorded to a private individual. It extends to "his family, suite, servants, houses, carriages, goods, archives, documents of whatever sort, and to his official correspondence carried by his couriers or messengers."[5]

Since the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents is more sacred than that of the ordinary citizens of the state, international law requires that the receiving state should ensure that proper means exist for the punishment of offences committed by individuals against diplomatic envoys. In most countries special laws have been enacted for the purpose. For example, the laws of the United States provide: "Every person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or in any other manner offers violence to the person of a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned for not more than three years, and fined at the discretion of the court."[6]

The growing popularity of protest demonstrations and picketing in recent years in front of diplomatic missions has posed a problem both for receiving states and foreign embassies. At times demonstrations take a violent turn resulting in the destruction of embassy property. Most states have passed laws making it illegal to demonstrate or picket within a specific area around a diplomatic mission. When the local police are unable to prevent demonstrators from violating the inviolability of a diplomatic mission, the injured state has the right in international law to claim damages from the state which has failed in its duty to protect the premises of its diplomatic mission.

The immunity of the embassy is not always a blessing. An American diplomat, Charles Thayer, relates how a Russian woman, who worked as scullery maid in the U. S. embassy in Moscow, created a serious problem for the embassy staff when she refused to go to a maternity hospital in the mistaken belief that if her child was born in the embassy it would be an American citizen. The Russian police guarding the embassy refused to intervene in this matter as they stated that they were forbidden to enter the premises. An appeal to the Soviet foreign office brought the reply that, since the embassy was extra-territorial, the Soviet government could not intervene. Eventually, the burly administrator of the embassy lifted

5. Sir Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 4th edition (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1959), p. 176.
Revised Statutes of the United States §4062.

the Russian maid, deposited her in an ambulance and took her to the maternity hospital.[7]

Since embassies are outside the limits of police, they can become favourite sanctuaries for fugitives. But diplomatic practice prohibits giving asylum to ordinary criminals or fugitives from justice and in Europe most authorities maintain that embassies do not have the right to grant political asylum as well. In the Soviet Union the Statute of 1927 lays down that the inviolability of the premises occupied by diplomatic envoys "does not give the right forcibly to detain therein any person or to give refuge therein to persons in respect to whom decisions regarding arrest have been taken by the authorized organs of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics or of Union Republics."[8] American foreign service regulations also prohibit granting asylum except to protect persons in immediate danger of mob-violence or other illegal acts.

But the Convention adopted at Havana in 1928 by the twenty-one American Republics stated that asylum might be granted under certain circumstances, specified in part, to political offenders. In South America, therefore, ousted politicians frequently seek safety in foreign embassies from the armed forces of their successors. It is said that there are at least half a dozen ousted politicians living in foreign missions in South America, one of them for the past fifteen years. In Europe too political asylum is occasionally granted by some missions. In 1958 the unsuccessful Portuguese presidential candidate opposing President Salazar took refuge in the Brazilian embassy in Lisbon. Again, two years earlier when the Hungarians made an attempt in 1956 to expell the Soviet forces from their country, the Catholic Cardinal, Mindszenty, sought refuge from arrest by Soviet troops in the American embassy in Budapest. He is still there. Some other revolutionaries fled to the Yugoslav embassy, where they remained for several days until the Kadar regime lured them out by promising safe-conduct to their homes.

One of the more dramatic cases involving granting of asylum occurred in this country on December 20, 1967 when Mr. Aziz Oulog-Zade, a member of a Soviet Communist Party Youth Organization (Komsomol) delegation to India, sought refuge in the American Embassy in New Delhi.[9] The Government of India insisted that it did not recognize the right of diplomatic mission to give asylum to any person and that Mr. Ouleg-Zade must be placed under the protective custody of the government. Consequently, on December 25, he was handed over to the government and on December 31 he was allowed to proceed to Britain, the country he proposed to adopt as his new home.[10]

7. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 201-202.

8. Y.A. Korovin and others, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

9. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, December 21, 1967.

10. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, January 1, 1968.

To make its stand clear on this issue, the Government of India, in a circular sent to all diplomatic missions and consular posts in India, stated that "giving of asylum is not within the purposes of the diplomatic missions" and reminded them that diplomatic privileges and immunities were granted only to enable diplomatic envoys "to enjoy full opportunity to represent the interests of their States and to promote friendly relations between India and their countries."[11] Moreover, the Joint Secretary and Legal Adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Dr. K. Krishna Rao, pointed out that India, like all other States, had never recognized the so-called right of diplomatic asylum by the foreign missions.[12] This practice is well founded in international law. For the International Court of Justice in the Haya de La Torre case held that as diplomatic asylum involved derrogation of territorial sovereignty it "cannot be recognized unless its legal basis is established in each particular case."

Can local authorities enter diplomatic premises in cases of emergency such as fire or imminent danger of crimes of violence ? A strict interpretation of the rules say that prior consent of the chief of diplomatic mission is necessary for entering the premises. When in 1956 the Russian Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, caught fire, the Soviet diplomatic officers refused to allow fire-fighters to enter the premises while embassy members carried important files and equipment from the building to their automobiles. When the Russians finally permitted the fire-fighters to enter, the fire had virtually destroyed the whole building.

Freedom of Communication

Diplomatic envoys cannot exercise their functions properly if they are not able to communicate freely and in all security. Article 27 (1) of the 1961 Vienna Convention states that "the receiving state shall permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes. In communicating with the government and the other missions and consulates of the sending state, wherever situated, the mission may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages in code or cipher." However, within recent years special arrangements have been made between a large number of countries under which diplomatic bags, officially sealed, are transmitted through the ordinary post to and from their diplomatic missions abroad. They come under the special protection of international law and are exempted from all interference.

But diplomatic agents and their governments still employ messengers and couriers who carry official communications. They are inviolable and are, therefore, exempt from visit and search in the states to

11. *The Tribune*, local edition. January 2, 1968.

12. In a talk on "Asylum Under International Law," broadcast from All India Radio, Delhi, on January 1, 1962. Also see *The Tribune*, local edition, January 2, 1968.

which they carry pouches of diplomatic communications which are sealed and exempt from examination by police and customs officials in the receiving state as well as in the third states through which they pass.

The 1961 Vienna Convention also provides that a diplomatic mission "may install and use a wireless transmitter" but "only with the consent of the receiving state" (Article 27, paragraph 1) for the purpose of communicating with the sending state.

Immunity from Local Jurisdiction

A diplomatic agent is completely immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the state to which he is accredited. No case can be cited where, without his consent or that of his government, a diplomat has been subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. But while the law of nations exempts him from criminal suit, it requires of him voluntary obedience to the municipal law of the receiving state. An offence of a flagrant character may justify the state to which he is accredited to detain him temporarily in order to expell him. Certain incidents of this kind have happened in the past, but the present practice seems to be to demand the recall of the offending diplomat.

However, the Government of China resorted to a novel practice in June 1967 when after accusing the Second Secretary of the Indian Embassy of spying announced that he would not be permitted to leave Peking until the completion of "judicial processes." He and the Third Secretary of the Indian Mission in Peking were ordered to appear before a public trial, but New Delhi advised its officials not to comply with the Chinese order which was in violation of the universally accepted rules relating to the treatment of diplomatic envoys. But the mass public trial was staged on June 14 wherein the two diplomats were tried in absentia. They were charged with "surreptitiously surveying and taking photographs of a prohibitory military area in the western suburbs of Peking on June 4, found guilty and awarded the punishment of expulsion from China.[13] Since their recall could have been demanded by the Government of China at any time, the Government of India did not take any notice of the so-called public trial and prosecution.

Diplomats may not be arrested for traffic violations. Since inviolability extends to their servants and carriages as well, their drivers too, even if they happen to be citizens of the receiving state, are immune from traffic regulations. A directive of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, states that in case an Indian driving the car of a *diplomat violates a traffic regulation while* the head of the diplomatic mission is travelling in it, the car should be stopped for the "shortest possible time" and after "courteous" inquiry the matter should be forwarded to the Ministry for action.

13. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, June 15, 1967.

The trouble that the traffic police faces in capital cities in this connection can be visualized from a recent incident in New Delhi. Immediately after the Beating Retreat (a ceremony connected with the Republic Day programme) function in 1966, the Indian driver of a diplomat's car drove his vehicle to Rafi Marg, while the ambassador was watching the function in Vijay Chowk, in disregard of the traffic restrictions for the day. When stopped by the traffic police, he refused to take back the car and with equal vehemence refused to produce his driving licence. When the ambassador arrived and was seated in the car, he challenged the police to arrest the driver knowing quite well that the driver of a diplomat's car cannot be arrested when the head of the mission is in the car. The matter did not end there. Two days later the ambassador lodged a protest with the Ministry of External Affairs. An official of the Ministry while reprimanding the traffic police wrote that but for the "goodwill shown by the ambassador towards India" there might have been an "international incident warranting a question in Parliament."[14]

Immunity from Civil Jurisdiction

In is likewise generally recogized that a diplomat is exempt from the civil jurisdiction of the country to which he is accredited. He may not be sued for debt or other form of contract or for torts of any kind. In Great Britain this immunity was written into the Statute of 7 Anne, 1708. In the United States a law of Congress declares any such judicial process null and void and pronounces the person suing out the process to be "a violator of the law of nations, and disturber of public repose."[15] However, some writers hold that immunity from civil jurisdiction does not extend to such business activities of the minister as have no connection with his official duties. In the Soviet Union the Statute on the Diplomatic Missions, adopted on January 14, 1927, declares that diplomats are subject to the civil jurisdiction of legal institutions only within limits laid down by the rules of international law or by agreements between the states concerned. Soviet jurists maintain that as a rule civil action may be taken against a diplomat in connection with immovables which he owns in the country to which he is accredited and in connection with his conduct of commercial operations.[16]

Exemption from Taxation, etc.

A diplomat is not taxed by the receiving state for his official or personal property. He is exempt from all direct personal taxation and, therefore, need not pay income tax or any other direct taxes. A more important aspect of this immunity is the privilege of duty-free import. Foreign embassies in New Delhi, as in all other capitals, get duty-free imported liquor and wines in unlimited quantities—a privilege prized equally by their Indian guests and

14. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, February 24, 1966.
15. C.G. Fenwick, *International Law*, (Indian edition, 1962), p. 470.
16. Y.A. Ko ovin and others, *Op. cit.* pp. 302-303.

friends. They can also import all sorts of things, including big cars, for their personal and official use without the payment of customs duty. But, in view of high prices foreign cars fetch in India, the Government of India has restricted the sale by diplomats of their duty-free imported cars to the State Trading Corporation alone.

Some publicists are of the view that exemption from direct taxes and the like are diplomatic privileges and that international law impose no obligation of granting them. In practice, and perhaps by courtesy, the municipal laws of almost all states allow diplomats all such facilities.

All these immunities might give the impression that diplomatic envoys are a privileged class, above law, beyond the reach of the tax collector or the customs officials and, therefore, must be often tempted to engage in smuggling and flouting local laws. Although it is sometimes reported that the diplomatic bag had been used for smuggling expensive watches and such other items for sale on the black market; but, as stated by Charles W. Thayer, along with immunities there has developed a diplomatic ethic which possesses powerful sanctions and which compels the diplomat to respect the local laws. A self-respecting government and its ambassadors are too jealous of their good name to permit it to be sullied by the misconduct of the embassy staff. A habitual offender on the staff of a diplomatic mission is likely to be recalled by his government; and for an aspiring young diplomat recall under such circumstances is likely to prove a fatal blow to his career. Moreover, diplomats are aware of the fact that their immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving state does not exempt them from the jurisdiction of the sending state. This is cleary stated in Article 31 (4) of the 1961 Vienna Convention. They also know that in case of a serious violation of the diplomatic ethic a receiving state can declare the offending diplomat *persona non grata*, or no longer welcome, and request his recall or, in extreme cases, it can dismiss him without notice. If such an action has not been takan by way of reprisal the offender is liable to be punished by his government.

It should be noted that "recall" is an accepted practice in diplomatic relations and can be demanded by a state "by reason of real or alleged misconduct of the envoy."[17] Cases of requests by receiving states for the recall of diplomatic envoys have been numerous and it is held that a state may request the recall of a foreign diplomatic representative without any obligation to state the reasons for such a request.

Sanction Behind Diplomatic Immunities

Having mentioned briefly diplomatic privileges and immunities, it may be asked what are the sanctions behind their observance? The ancient rule of retaliation—an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth—continues to be the most important sanction. A state which violates the

17. Oppenheim, *Op. cit.*, p. 816.

privileges of a foreign ambassador must anticipate quick retaliation in kind. In other words, any infringement of diplomatic immunities on the part of a state invariably results in denial of immunities to its diplomats in the aggrieved state. It may be recalled that the Government of India terminated the diplomatic status of the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, Mr. Chen Lu-chih when in June 1967 the Chinese Government took the unprecedented step in depriving the Second Secretary of the Indian Diplomatic Mission in Peking, Mr. K. Raghunath, of his diplomatic status after accusing him of being an "out-and-out spy."[18] Since the Indian diplomat was abused and manhandled, both at Peking and Canton airports, while on his way to India, New Delhi insisted that the Chinese diplomat must get himself registered with the Foreign Registration Bureau as he had ceased to be a diplomatic envoy as far as the Government of India was concerned.

Again, it is often observed that when a state declares a diplomat *persona non grata*, his home state, more often than not, accords a similar treatment to a diplomat of almost corresponding rank of the offending state. In the above mentioned case the Chinese Government accused the Third Secretary of the Indian Embassy, Mr. P. Vijai, too of spying and declared him *persona non grata*. In retaliation the Government of India declared the Third Secretary of the Chinese Embassy, Mr. Hsich Cheng-Hao, *persona non grata*.

Still later, on June 17, the Chinese Government placed "emergency restrictions" on the movement of the entire staff of the Indian Embassy and their wives after they had moved to the Embassy's walled compound in Peking upon the advice of the Chinese Foreign Office.[19] Moreover, hundreds of Red Guards surrounded the Embassy, blocked its gates and "taunted Indian diplomats to come out and face the crowds."[20] The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, protested most emphatically against the actions of the Chinese Government and "the Chinese ruffians who have besieged the Embassy obviously at the behest of the Chinese Government."[21] In apparent retaliation, it ordered all personnel of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to be confined within the Embassy premises "until further notice."[22] As soon as Peking lifted the so-called siege (emergency restrictions) of the India Embassy in Peking on June 20, 1967, the Government of Indian announced the lifting of restrictions on the movements of Chinese diplomats in New Delhi.[23]

There is a trace of irony in the fact that even in the second half of the twentieth century, states find satisfaction in that primitive revenge

18. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, June 13, 1967.
19. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, June 18, 1967.
20. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, June 19, 1967.
21. For full Text of the protest Note delivered to the Chinese Charge d' Affaires in New Delhi, see the *Statesman*, Delhi town edition, June 19, 1967.
22. *The Statesman*, Delhi town edition, June 20, 1967.
23. *The Statesman*, June 22, 1967.

which goes back to the pre-political stage in human history. But it should not escape our attention that such cases are few and far between and that "the rules relating to the treatment of diplomatic missions have become one of the most regularly observed divisions of the so-called law of nations perhaps, indeed, the closest approach to law in the relations of states."[24]

Moreover, infringement of diplomatic immunities by a state leads "to protest by the diplomatic body resident therein."[25] Although the diplomatic Corps (a body consisting of all the diplomatic envoys accredited to the same state) does not perform any legal functions, "it is nevertheless of great importance, as it watches over the privileges and honours due to diplomatic envoys."[26] The head of this body, known as Doyen or Dean, represents the entire group in dealing with the Foreign Office or the Ministry of External Affairs concerning any violation of diplomatic privileges and immunities. When in August 1967 some demonstrations were held outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi as a protest against the treatment given to the staff of the Indian Embassy in Peking, the Mexican Ambassdor to India, as doyen of the diplomatic corps, met the Foreign Minister of India presumably to remind the Government of India of its responsibilities towards diplomatic envoys.

Finally, if diplomatic immunities are persistently violated, it may lead to breaking off diplomatic relations. When Indian diplomats in Peking were manhandled and indignities were heaped upon them in June 1967, it was demanded by several Opposition members in the Indian Parliament that New Delhi should snap its diplomatic ties with Peking.[27] But the Government of India decided to keep its nerves realizing that it is a great deal easier to break off than to resume relations and that, Peking as stated by the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. M.C. Chagla, the Indian Mission in Peking served as an important "window" on China and sent vital information.

Perhaps for the same reasons Britain too acted with restraint when in August 1967 the British Chancery in Peking was burnt to the ground and Mr. Donald Hopson, British Charged' Affaires, and other officials were manhandled.[28] Otherwise, as stated by a political observer, the British had reason to break off relalions "a hundred times over by the standards of 100,50 or even 30 years ago."[29] It is generally believed in the West that the revolutionary hurricane," the cultural revolution and their successors, will blow themselves out eventually and that a Western diplomatic missions may inthe meantime serve usefully as an "observation post."[30]

24. P. E. Corbett, *Law in Diplomacy* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1959) p. 24.
25. Sir Frnest Sataw, *op. cit.*, p 175.
26. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 779.
27. *The Statesman*, June Delhi town edition June, 15 1967.
28. *New York Times Weekly Review*, August 27, 1967.
29. Dona Adams Schmdt, "Britain: Patience is the Word on Peking," *New York Times Weekly Review*, September 3, 1967.
30. *Ibid.*

SANSKRIT

बलदेव सिंह

कालिदास की कृतियों में आश्रम-व्यवस्था

महाकवि कालिदास आश्रम-व्यवस्था के पक्षपाती थे। इस तथ्य का बोध उनकी कृतियों को स्थूल दृष्टि से पढ़ने पर भी हो जाता है। परन्तु उनकी दृष्टि में आश्रमों की संख्या ४ है अथवा ३, इस बात का निर्णय तभी हो सकता है जब उनकी कृतियों में प्राप्त आश्रम विषयक संकेतों का सूक्ष्म दृष्टि से गहन आलोचन किया जाय। प्रस्तुत निबन्ध में इसी विवेचन को अन्तिम रूप देने का प्रयत्न किया गया है।

पूर्व पक्ष के रूप में कालिदास की दृष्टि में आश्रमों की संख्या चार है—यह पक्ष प्रस्तुत किया जा रहा है। आज तक सभी मूर्द्धन्य विद्वान् इसी मत को प्रस्तुत करते रहे हैं। सम्भवतः अभी तक किसी ने इसका प्रतिवाद नहीं किया है। डा० ए०बी० कीथ ने अपने इतिहास ग्रन्थ-ए हिस्ट्री आफ़ संस्कृत लिट्रेचर-में कालिदास की समालोचना करते हुए स्पष्ट लिखा है कि चार आश्रमों की योजना हरेक दृष्टि से भारतीय जीवन में बिलकुल उपयुक्त है, क्योंकि वह भारतीय जीवन के किसी पक्ष को निरशन से नहीं मरने देता।[1] कालिदास पर शोध करने में जीवन के बहुमूल्य १६ वर्ष लगाने वाले डा० भगवतशरण उपाध्याय ने कहा है—'आश्रम अर्थात् जीवन के अवस्था-विभाग भी चार ही थे, जो एक द्विज के जीवन को चार अवस्थाओं में विभाजित करते थे, ब्रह्मचर्य या विद्यार्थी जीवन, *गार्हस्थ्य या गृह व्यवस्थापकता, वानप्रस्थ या जंगल निवास और संन्यास या सब से* विरक्ति।'[2]

कालिदास की कृतियों में संख्या विषयक स्पष्ट निर्देश के अभाव में भी आश्रमों की संख्या चार मानने के दो कारण हैं—परम्परा तथा असाक्षात् निर्देश। भारतीय परम्परा आश्रमों की संख्या चार मानती रही है। अतः कालिदास के समालोचकों ने भी उनके काव्यों में चार आश्रमों के दर्शन करने का प्रयत्न किया है। उनकी कृतियों में कुछ असाक्षात् निर्देश ऐसे हैं जिनसे यह भ्रम होने की सहज सम्भावना है कि वे चार आश्रमों के पक्षपाती हैं। इस भ्रम को जन्म देने का श्रेय रघुवंश के उस श्लोक को है जिसमें वे रघुवंशी नरेशों द्वारा शैशव में विद्याध्ययन, यौवन में विषयोपभोग, वृद्धावस्था में मुनिव्रत तथा अन्त में योग द्वारा शरीरत्याग का उल्लेख करते हैं।[3] कालिदास के प्रसिद्ध टीकाकार मल्लिनाथ ने इस श्लोक की व्याख्या करते हुए कहा है कि इस श्लोक में महाकवि को क्रमशः ब्रह्मचर्याश्रम, गृहस्थाश्रम, वानप्रस्थाश्रम तथा भिक्षाश्रम विवक्षित हैं।[4] इस श्लोक का वास्तविक अर्थ क्या है, इस पर जब विचार किया जायेगा, तब निश्चित रूप से यह स्पष्ट हो जायेगा कि मल्लिनाथ आदि विद्वानों को परम्परा के कारण भ्रम ही हुआ है। इस भ्रम का एक कारण और भी है। कालिदास ने अपने काव्यों में आश्रम शब्द का प्रयोग वर्ण शब्द के

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१. ए हिस्ट्री आफ़ संस्कृत लिट्रेचर—ए० बी० कीथ पृष्ठ ९८
२. कालिदास का भारत-भगवतशरण उपाध्याय, प्रथम भाग पृष्ठ २७०
३. शैशवेऽभ्यस्तविद्यानां यौवने विषयैषिणाम्।
वार्धके मुनिवृत्तीनां योगेनान्ते तनुत्यजाम्॥ रघु १,८
४. टीका-मल्लिनाथ रघु १,८

साथ ही किया है। अनेक स्थलों पर तो उन्होंने वर्णाश्रम शब्द संयुक्त रूप में ही प्रयुक्त किया है।[5] एक अन्य स्थल पर वर्ण के साथ ही आश्रम शब्द का प्रयोग है।[6] वर्णों की संख्या परम्परानुसार तथा स्वयं कालिदास के उल्लेख के अनुसार चार है।[7] अतः वर्ण के साथ प्रयुक्त आश्रम शब्द भी चार का ही वाचक है ऐसा भ्रम होना स्वाभाविक ही है।

परन्तु कालिदास की कृतियों में प्राप्त जीवन की अवस्थाओं के संकेत केवल तीन ही अवस्थाओं अथवा आश्रमों की पुष्टि करते हैं। इनमें प्रथम अवस्था अथवा आश्रम ब्रह्मचर्य है। कालिदास के सभी आदर्श राजा प्रथम अवस्था का उपयोग विद्योपार्जन में करते हैं।[8] उपनयन संस्कार के पश्चात् ब्रह्मचारी गुरु के चरणों में बैठ कर शिक्षा प्राप्त करता है[9] तथा शिक्षा समाप्ति पर गुरु की आज्ञा से ही गृहस्थ आश्रम में प्रवेश करता है।[10] अज, दशरथ, राम तथा अतिथि आदि सभी राजपुत्रों की शिक्षा का उल्लेख कालिदास ने किया है।

कालिदास के अनुसार दूसरी अवस्था अथवा आश्रम गृहस्थ है। उन्होंने स्वयं ही इसे द्वितीय आश्रम कहा है तथा सभी आश्रमों का उपकारक होने के कारण इसे पर्याप्त आदर प्रदान किया है।[11] इस आश्रम में प्रवेश का काल प्रथम आश्रम का समाप्तिकाल ही है। यह काल तब आता है जब व्यक्ति प्रथमावस्था में विद्याध्ययन करके पूर्ण सक्षम हो जाता है। इसी को कालिदास ने दारक्रिया अर्थात् विवाह योग्यदशा कहा है।[12] उनकी दृष्टि में जीवन में वैवाहिक सम्बन्ध अत्यन्त आवश्यक है। क्योंकि वैवाहिक सम्बन्ध ही वह साधन है जिससे सन्ततिलाभ करके पितृऋण से मुक्ति प्राप्त की जा सकती है।[13] इस आश्रम का स्थिति काल तब तक है जब तक सन्तान कुल का भार वहन करने में समर्थ हो। सन्तति के सक्षम होने पर गृहस्थ की समाप्ति और वानप्रस्थ का प्रारम्भ हो जाता है। दिलीप रघु के समर्थ होने तक ही राज्य करते हैं।[14] रघु भी अज के सक्षम होने पर

५. नृपस्य वर्णाश्रमपालनं यत्। रघु १४, ७७
वर्णाश्रमावेक्षणजागरूकः। रघु १४, ८५
भो भोस्तपस्विनः, असावत्र वर्णाश्रमाणां रक्षिता प्रागेव मुक्तासनो वः प्रतिपालयति।
अभिज्ञान० अंक-५
६. यथास्वमाश्रमैश्चक्रे वर्णैरपि षडंशभाक्। रघु १७, ६५
७. चतुर्वर्णमयो लोकस्त्वत्तः सर्वं चतुर्मुखात्। रघु १०, २२
८. शैशवेऽभ्यस्तविद्यानाम्। रघु १.८
९. अथोपनीतं विधिवद् विपश्चितो विनिन्युरेनं गुरवो गुरुप्रियम्। रघु-३.२९।
१०. अपि प्रसन्नेन महर्षिणा त्वं सम्यग् विनीयानुमतो गृहाय। रघु-५.१०
११. कालो ह्ययं संक्रमितुं द्वितीयं सर्वोपकारक्षममाश्रमं ते। वही
१२. तं श्लाघ्यसम्बन्धमसौ विचिन्त्य दारक्रियायोग्यदशं च पुत्रम्। रघु-५.४०
१३. प्रजायै गृहमेधिनाम्। रघु-१.७
परिषेतुः प्रसूतये। रघु-१.२५
कथाभिधानात् स्वयमेव केवलं तदा पितॄणां मुमुचे स बन्धनात्। रघु-३.२०
१४. नृपतिककुदं सूने दत्त्वा सितातपवारणम्।
मुनिवनतरुच्छायां देव्या तया सह संश्रिये। रघु-३.७०

उसे राज्य भार सौंप कर शान्ति मार्ग के अनुयायी हो जाते हैं।[15] परन्तु यदि किसी कारण से सन्तान समर्थ नहीं हुई है तो कारण होने पर भी व्यक्ति को पलायन का अधिकार नहीं था। उसे अपनी सन्तान को योग्य बनाकर ही गृहस्थाश्रम से निवृत्त होने का अधिकार था। इन्दुमती के असामयिक अवसान ने अज के हृदय में जीवन के प्रति निर्वेद उत्पन्न कर दिया था। परन्तु दशरथ अभी बालक ही था इसलिए अज अनिच्छा होने पर उसके समर्थ होने तक प्राणों को ढोते रहे[16] और जैसे ही उन्हें विश्वास हो गया कि अब दशरथ पूर्णरूप से सक्षम हो गया है उन्होंने उपवास करते हुए गंगा सरयू के संगम में प्राणों का परित्याग कर दिया।[17] किसी प्रकार का उत्तरदायित्व न होने पर स्नेहीजन के मरण से उत्पन्न निर्वेद में संसार त्याग को कालिदास ने प्रशंसनीय ही कहा है। मालविकाग्निमित्र में वसुमती की विधवा बहन कौशिकी लूटेरों द्वारा भाई के मारे जाने पर वैधव्य दुःख के कारण संसार से सम्बन्ध विच्छेद करके काषाय वस्त्र धारण कर लेती है। कौशिकी के इस कार्य की प्रशंसा महाकवि ने अग्निमित्र के मुख से कराई है।[18]

ऊपर के विवेचन से स्पष्ट है कि कालिदास की दृष्टि में गृहस्थ में प्रवेश और उसका पूर्ण निर्वाह अत्यन्त आवश्यक है। इसकी सफल समाप्ति पर ही वे तीसरे आश्रम में प्रवेश का विधान करते हैं। तीसरे आश्रम में प्रवेश के समय व्यक्ति घर को त्याग कर वन में मुनिव्रत धारण करते हुए आश्रमों में रहता था। वानप्रस्थ के समय पत्नी भी उसके साथ होती थी। दिलीप सुदक्षिणा के साथ ही मुनिवन में तरु-छाया का आश्रय लेते हैं[19] तथा पति सहित शकुन्तला के पुनः तपोवन में लौटने की सम्भावना इसी आश्रम के प्रारम्भ में की गई है।[20] शास्त्र की दृष्टि से वानप्रस्थाश्रम में वन में रहना ही उचित है। इसी का निर्देश कालिदास के काव्यों में भी हुआ है। परन्तु कालिदास वनवास की इस अपरिहार्यता को नितान्त आवश्यक नहीं समझते। उनके लिए आवश्यक बात बाह्याचार नहीं अपितु मानसिक व्यापार है। इसी लिए कालिदास ने अपने आदर्श पात्र रघु को गृहस्थाश्रम की समाप्ति पर अग्रिम आश्रम में प्रवेश कर लेने पर भी वनवासी नहीं होने दिया है।[21] रघु राजमहल के उपवन में ही वह सब कुछ करते हैं जो मुनि जन आश्रमों में किया करते थे। वहीं पर योगाभ्यास करते हुए उन्होंने परमपद प्राप्त किया था।[22]

वानप्रस्थ के कर्तव्यों में तपस्या अथवा योगाभ्यास प्रमुख थे। अनेक स्थलों पर कालिदास ने मुनियों के तप का उल्लेख किया है। इसी तप का छठा भाग आश्रम की सुरक्षा

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१५ क. तदुपहितकुटुम्बः शान्तिमार्गोत्सुकोऽभूत्।
नहि सति कुलधुर्ये सूर्यवंश्या गृहाय॥ रघु-७.७
ख. रघु-८.११

१६. तेनाष्टौ परिगमिताः समाः कथंचिद् बालत्वादवितथसूनृतेन सूनोः। रघु-८.२५

१७. सम्यग् विनीतमथ वर्महरं कुमारमादिश्य रक्षणविधौ विधिवत् प्रजानाम्।
रोगोपसृष्टतनु दुर्वसतिं मुमुक्षुः प्रायोपवेशनमतिर्नृपतिर्बभूव। रघु-८.९४

१८. परिव्राजिका ततो भ्रातुः शरीरमग्निसात्कृत्वा पुनर्नवीकृतवैधव्यदुःखया मया त्वदीयं देशमवतीर्य, इमे काषाये गृहीते।
राजा युक्तम्। सज्जनस्यैव पन्थाः। मालविका० ५.११

१९. रघु-२.७०, ७.७१

२०. अभिज्ञान० ४.२०

२१. स किलाश्रममन्त्यमाश्रितो निवसन्नावसथे पुराद् बहिः। रघु-८.१४

२२. तमसः परमापदव्ययं पुरुषं योगसमाधिना रघुः। ८.२४

का प्रबन्धक होने के नाते राजा को भी प्राप्त होता था।[23] उनके अधिकांश वानप्रस्थी तपस्वी हैं। परन्तु कालिदास के आदर्श रघु इस आश्रम में योगाभ्यास को प्रमुखता देते हैं तथा योग के द्वारा ही प्राणों का उत्सर्ग करते हुए ब्रह्म में लीन हो जाते हैं।[24]

जीवन की अवस्थाओं में यही अवस्था अन्तिम है। इसके पश्चात् कालिदास ने किसी अवस्था या आश्रम का उल्लेख नहीं किया है। रघु के प्रसंग में उन्होंने इसी तद्वल्कल-धारियों की पद्धति को[25] अन्तिम आश्रम कहा है।[26] शास्त्रों में जिस संन्यास आश्रम का विधान है कालिदास में उसका उल्लेख नहीं है। रघुवंशी राजाओं में जिन आदर्श गुणों की कल्पना की गई है वे सभी किसी न किसी रूप में रघु में विद्यमान है। यदि कालिदास को संन्यास इष्ट होता तो कम से कम रघु के विषय में वे अवश्य ही इसका प्रतिपादन करते —

> शैशवेऽभ्यस्तविद्यानां यौवने विषयैषिणाम् ।
> वार्धके मुनिवृत्तीनां योगेनान्ते तनुत्यजाम् । रघु १, ८ ।

इस श्लोक में वर्णित तीनों अवस्था तथा उनके कृत्य केवल रघु पर ही पूर्ण रूप से घटित होते हैं। वास्तव में इस श्लोक में केवल तीन ही आश्रमों का विधान है जिन्हें उन्होंने शैशव, यौवन और वार्धक शब्दों से अभिव्यक्त किया है। ये तीनों ही शब्द भाव वाचक हैं। अन्तिम पंक्ति का अन्त शब्द केवल प्राणान्त काल वाचक है। मल्लिनाथ ने इसका यही अर्थ किया है।[27] यदि कालिदास को अन्तिम चरण में अवस्था का बोध अपेक्षित होता तो वे अन्त शब्द का प्रयोग न करके अन्त्य शब्द का प्रयोग करते जिससे अवस्था का बोध होता। रघुवंश के आठवें सर्ग में उन्होंने अवस्था अथवा आश्रम का बोध कराने के लिए अन्त्य शब्द का ही प्रयोग किया है।[28] परन्तु इस श्लोक में उन्होंने केवल अन्तिमक्षण का बोध कराने के लिए ही अन्त शब्द का प्रयोग किया है। यह अन्तिम क्षण तीसरे अर्थात् वानप्रस्थ आश्रम के अन्त में ही आता था। रघु ने वृद्धावस्था में—वानप्रस्थी होकर योगाभ्यास करते हुए अन्तिम क्षण में योग से प्राणों का त्याग किया था।

रघुवंश के आठवें सर्ग में वर्णित रघु की अन्तिम अवस्था के विषय में यह भी कहा जा सकता है कि वह अवस्था वानप्रस्थी की नहीं संन्यासी की ही है। इसके पक्ष में दो तर्क प्रस्तुत किये जा सकते है। पहला तो यह है कि कालिदास ने रघु को यति वेशधारी कहा है[29] तथा उनका अन्तिम संस्कार भी यतियों के साथ किया है।[30] यति शब्द संन्यासी का वाचक है। दूसरा प्रबल तर्क यह है कि शरीरान्त होने पर रघु का अग्निसंस्कार नहीं

२३. रघु-१७-६५ तथा
यदुत्तिष्ठति वर्णेभ्यो नृपाणां क्षयि तत् फलम् ।
तपः षड्भागमक्षय्यं ददत्यारण्यका हि नः ॥ अभिज्ञान० २.१३

२४. रघु-८.२४

२५. गुरुवत् पुनरोपितश्रियः परिणामे हि दिलीपवंशजाः ।
पदवीं तरुवल्कवाससां प्रयताः संयमिनां प्रपेदिरे ॥ रघु-८.११

२६. स किलाश्रममन्त्यमाश्रितः । रघु-८.१४

२७. अन्ते-शरीरत्यागकाले । मल्लिनाथ-रघु-१.८

२८. रघु-८.२४

२९. यतिपार्थिवलिंगधारिणौ । रघु-८.१६

३०. विदधे विधिमस्य नैष्ठिकं यतिभिः सार्धमनग्निमग्निचित् । रघु-८.२५

किया जाता।[31] भारतीय समाज में केवल संन्यासियों का ही अग्नि संस्कार नहीं होता शेष सभी का होता है—यह प्रथा अब तक भी प्रचलित है। अतः रघु भी संन्यासी थे। मल्लिनाथ ने रघु के अग्नि संस्कार का उल्लेख करने वाले श्लोक की व्याख्या करते हुए इसी ओर संकेत किया है।[32] साथ ही उन्होंने रघुवंश के ८.१४ श्लोक की व्याख्या करते हुए स्पष्ट ही रघु को परिव्राजक कहा हैं। वैसे इस श्लोक की व्याख्या करते समय मल्लिनाथ रघुवंश के ८-२५ श्लोक से प्रभावित हैं यह व्याख्या से स्पष्ट प्रतीत हो जाता है।[33]

ये दोनों ही तर्क निर्मूल हैं। यति शब्द कालिदास में संन्यासी का वाचक है यह कहना हठधर्मी ही होगी। इसी प्रकरण में उन्होंने रघु को तरुवल्कलवाससों की पदवी का अनुयायी तथा संयमी कहा है।[34] इससे स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि कालिदास में यति शब्द मात्र वानप्रस्थ का वाचक है। दूसरे तर्क भी निर्मूल ही हैं। वास्तव में मल्लिनाथ के भ्रम का कारण परम्परा ही रही है। वे चार आश्रमों से कम या अधिक की कल्पना भी नहीं कर सकते थे। इसी लिए उन्होंने लोक परम्परा के प्रवाह में संन्यासियों के अनग्नि संस्कार को देख कर रघु को संन्यासी या भिक्षु मान लिया। शास्त्र के अनुसार संन्यासी या योगध्यान में रत व्यक्ति के अग्नि संस्कार की आवश्यकता नहीं है।[35] कालिदास ने रघु के प्रसंग में स्पष्ट कहा है कि योग द्वारा प्राणत्याग के कारण उनके अग्नि संस्कार की आवश्यकता नहीं है। ऐसे व्यक्तियों को किसी प्रकार के पिण्ड-दान आदि की भी आवश्यकता नहीं होती। परन्तु अज प्रेम के कारण पिण्डदान आदि कार्य अवश्य करते हैं।[36] यदि कालिदास की दृष्टि में रघु संन्यासी या भिक्षु होते वे तो इस प्रकार के पिण्डदानादि का विधान नहीं करते।

एक शंका मानविकाग्निमित्र की परिव्राजिका कौशिकी के विषय में की जा सकती है। वह परिव्राजिका है तथा काषाय वस्त्र धारण करती है, इसका उल्लेख पहले हो चुका है। परन्तु इस पात्र से तीन आश्रमों के सिद्धान्त पर कोई आंच नहीं आती। कौशिकी वसुमती की विधवा बहन है। वह गृहस्थ है। भाई के मरने पर पुनर्नवीकृत वैधव्य से वह गृहस्थ का त्याग कर काषाय वस्त्र ग्रहण करती है। आश्रमों की दृष्टि से उसका यह तीसरा आश्रम ही है। इस रूप में भी वह राजपरिवार की अंग ही है।

अब एक प्रश्न शेष रह जाता है। कालिदास भारतीय संस्कृति के अनुरागी होते हुए भी संन्यास को क्यों नहीं मानते। इसका उत्तर अत्यन्त सरल है। कालिदास के काल में बौद्ध धर्म पर्याप्त प्रकर्ष पर था। प्रव्रज्या की प्रवृत्ति समाज को प्रायः अकर्मण्य बना रही

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३१. वही

३२. वही

३३. रघु-८.१४

३४. रघु-८.११

३५. सर्वसंगनिवृत्तस्य ध्यानयोगरतस्य च।
न तस्य दहनं कार्यं नैव पिण्डोदकक्रिया॥ शौनक-मल्लिनाथ द्वारा उद्धृत।
रघु-८.२५

३६. श्रुतदेहविसर्जनः पितुश्चिरमश्रूणि विमुच्य राघवः।
विदधे विधिमस्य नैष्ठिकं यतिभिः सार्धमनग्निमग्निचित्॥
अकरोत् स तदौर्ध्वदैहिकं पितृभक्त्या पितृकार्यकल्पवित्।
नहि तेन पथा तनुत्यजस्तनयावर्जितपिण्डकाङ्क्षिणः। रघु-८.२५, २६

की। ब्रह्मचर्य से सीधे संन्यास का आश्रय लिया जा रहा था। वैदिक धर्म—जिसे पाश्चात्यों ने ब्राह्मण धर्म का साम्प्रदायिक नाम दिया है—कालिदास का मान्यधर्म था। उसकी प्रतिष्ठा के लिए भिक्षु धर्म पर प्रहार आवश्यक था। इसके लिए कालिदास ने अपने काव्यों में वर्णाश्रम धर्म का प्रतिपादन करते हुए गृहस्थ पर पूरा बल दिया तथा संन्यास की उपेक्षा की। गृहस्थ को सर्वोपकारक्षम कह कर उन्होंने भिक्षु आश्रम अर्थात् सन्यास की परोपकार परायणता को पीछे धकेल दिया है।[३७] इसका तात्पर्य यह नहीं कि वे अखण्ड ब्रह्मचर्य के एकदम विरोधी हैं। उनके कण्व सनातन ब्रह्मनिष्ठ हैं।[३८] परन्तु वे किसी भी सद्गृहस्थ से बड़े गृहस्थी हैं। वे एक नहीं तीन कन्याओं के पालक पिता है। शकुन्तला की विदा से उन के मन को परितोष होता है। प्रियंवदा और अनसूया अभी विदा होनी है।[३९] स्त्रियों के विषय में भी कालिदास आजन्म ब्रह्मचर्य की बात करते हैं।[४०] परन्तु उनकी अपनी रुचि उन्हें विवाहिता देखने में ही है। इसी लिए अरण्यवासी होने पर भी शकुन्तला, अनसूया और प्रियंवदा सभी प्रदेय हैं। समाधिलीन शिव को भी पार्वती-प्रेमी बनना पड़ता है। राजाओं की तो बात ही और है। वरतन्तु के शिष्य कौत्स में भी वे सद्-गृहस्थ होने की आशा करते हैं। कालिदास के काव्यों में वैवाहिक जीवन के प्रति इतना आग्रह उनके काल में फैली हुई संन्यासप्रियता की प्रतिक्रिया ही कहा जा सकता है।

ऊपर के विवेचन से स्पष्ट है कि कालिदास के काव्यों में वर्णित आश्रमों की संख्या तीन ही है चार नहीं। इसी को उन्होंने शैशव, यौवन और वार्धक नाम दिया है। गृहस्थ के बाद एक ही आश्रम था। सम्भवतः आजकल के समान कालिदास के काल में भी गृहस्थ के बाद सीधा संन्यास ही लिया जाता हो तथा वानप्रस्थ की कोई स्थिति ही न हो, जैसा कि कौशिकी के प्रसंग में कवि ने कहा है। परन्तु वे इस आश्रम को वानप्रस्थ ही मानते हैं। क्योंकि इस काल में व्यक्ति प्रायः वन में निवास करते हुए तपस्या अथवा योगाभ्यास करके प्राण त्याग किया करते थे। इसके पश्चात् कोई चौथा आश्रम नहीं था। इस मत की पुष्टि के लिए निम्न तर्क विचारणीय हैं :

(क) कालिदास ने तीन आश्रमों के प्रवेशकाल, कर्तव्य तथा समाप्तिकाल का संकेत किया है। चौथे के विषय में कुछ नहीं कहा।

(ख) उनके काव्यों का कोई भी पात्र चारों आश्रमों का भोक्ता नहीं दिखाया गया है। आदर्श पात्र रघु भी तीन ही आश्रमों का भोग करते हैं।

(ग) रघु के प्रकरण में वानप्रस्थ को ही अन्तिम आश्रम कहा है। उस समय भी वे राजोद्यान में ही रहते हैं परिव्राजक या भिक्षु नहीं बनते।

(घ) उन्होंने गृहस्थ को द्वितीय तथा वानप्रस्थ को अन्तिम कह कर चौथे आश्रम की बात ही समाप्त कर दी है।

३७. कालो ह्ययं संक्रमितुं द्वितीयं सर्वोपकारक्षममाश्रमं ते। रघु-५.१०
३८. राजा-भगवान् काश्यपः शाश्वते ब्रह्मणिस्थित-इति प्रकाशः। अभिज्ञान० अंक-२
३९. इमे अपि प्रदेये अभिज्ञान-अंक ४ तथा वही ४.२२
४०. अभिज्ञान० अंक १-२४

Vinay Mohan Sharma

KRSNA THEME IN SANSKRIT KĀVYAS

Kṛṣṇa has dominated the themes of Mahākāvyas, Khaṇḍakāvyas, Campūs, lyrics and dramas of not only Sanskrit Literature but "Bhāṣā" Literature also (The word "Bhāṣā" is used for all Prākṛtas including modern languages).

The age of Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa is not certain. The Chāndogyopaniṣad would suggest a date in the sixth or seventh century B.C. The author of the Chāndogyopaniṣad mentions Kṛṣṇa Devakīputra as a disciple of ṛṣi Ghora of Āngirasa family. Some scholars do not agree with the view that Kṛṣṇa Devakīputra can be identified with Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva by Devakī of Yādava clan of Mathurā region. The Bhāgavat religion propounded by Vāsudeva gave birth to Vaiṣṇavism. At a later date, a pastoral character was attributed to Kṛṣṇa. Açcording to Hopkins, Kṛṣṇa was not a living person but a divinity : "The stories regarding the early life of pastoral Kṛṣṇa probably developed partly out of the Vedic legends. Viṣṇu is called Gopa in the Ṛgveda and Govinda and Dāmodara in the Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra. Most of the stories about Kṛṣṇa's early life, especially the late tales about his questionable relation with cowherd women, appear, however, due to his identification with certain god worshipped by Ābhīras and other allied peoples."

Viṣṇu in Ṛgveda is described "as clothed with the rays of light". In other words he is the manifestation of the sun. Viṣṇu is also connected with sacrifice. He is referred to as a garbha of ṛta which may mean sacrifice. Viṣṇu, in later writings, has been identified with the "Parā Śakti" the soul of the universe and, in Paurāṇika literature, he is the incarnation of that very Śakti descended on earth to exhibit His Līlā. Kṛṣna is the "Līlāvatāra of the Almighty. The whole universe is His Līlā. The Bhāgavat Purāṇa deals with the cult of complete surrender (Prapatti Mārga) to Līlāvatāra Kṛṣṇa.

Sources of Krsna Kāvya

The Mahābhārata is a great source of our ancient culture. Its main story and legends have inspired several literary compositions in ancient and modern periods. The writers have freely borrowed themes from the ancient lore and enriched their works. About the Mahābhārata, Winternitz remarks" It is only in a very restricted sense that we may speak of the Mahābhārata as an epic and a poem. Indeed in a certain sense, the Mahābhārata is not one poetic production at all, but the whole literature. The battle between the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas occupies the main position in the epic, but it contains a number of other legends and more popular of them is

Kṛṣṇa Caritra." But it does not relate the full life story of Kṛṣṇa. It only relates the heroic deeds of the Super Man. His youth coloured with erotic sentiment and glowing with Rāsalīlā at the bank of Kālindī (Yamunā) on the full moon night has no trace in the great epic. There he is painted as a great Yogī and a warrior, who upholds the cause of righteousness and preaches the philosophy of Gītā *i.e.*, great life. He is a symbol of Indian culture. The Bhāgavat, Viṣṇu, Bramhavaivarta, Skanda, Vāmana and Kūrma Purāṇas portray various aspects of Kṛṣṇa's life.

Here is given the brief survey of Kāvyas, which are connected with the deeds of Kṛṣṇa. In Sanskrit, Kāvya includes poetical as well as dramatical and prose compositions. There are a few epics written on the life of Śrīkṛṣṇa worth the name.

Māgha, who flourished in the latter half of the seventh Century A.D., composed '*Śiśupālavadha*' which is styled as Mahākāvya par excellence. The theme is derived from an episode in the Mahābhārata. It consists of twenty cantoes with 1650 ślokas. Nārada instigates Kṛṣṇa to slay 'Śiśupāla' as he is a constant source of trouble to the Devatās and the gentry at large. Śrīkṛṣṇa, on receiving the invitation from Yudhiṣṭhira to participate in the Rājasūya Yajña, reaches Indraprastha. In the council of kings Bhīṣma proposes and Yudhiṣṭhira bestows highest honour on Śrīkṛṣṇa, This enrages Śiśupāla, who ruthlessly resents and leaves the hall. The quarrel ensues, which ends in the slaying of Śiśupāla by Kṛṣṇa with his 'Cakra'. The glow of the spirit of Śiśupāla merges into Śrīkṛṣṇa. The speeches in the epic are very forceful. When Yudhiṣṭhira honours Kṛṣṇa, Śiśupāla thunders :—

> अनृतां गिरं न वदसीति जगति पटहैर्विघुष्यसे ।
> निन्द्यमथ च हरिमर्चयत: तव कर्मणैव विकसत्यसत्यता । (शिशु० १५, १६)

(You proclaim by beat of drum that you do not utter lie, but by worshipping this despised Kṛṣṇa, you have been exposed).

The story is devoid of incidents, but it is full of speeches which provide opportunity to the poet to exhibit his poetic imagination. It is said that Māgha composed this epic in competition with Bhāravi. At places, no doubt, he has even surpassed him. His imagery attains a fine diction. His love of alliteration, śleṣa, yamaka and upamā is too known. One example will amuse the reader.

> क्षूर: क्षौरिरक्षिक्षिरैराक्षाक्षीराक्षु राक्षिक्ष:
> क्षराक्ष: क्षीक्षरीरेक्ष: क्षुक्षुरेक्षुरिक्षिर: क्षरै: ॥ (शिशु० १९, १०८)

(Laxmīpati Śrīkṛṣṇa with his sharp arrows cut down the head of his enemies in no time).

In this śloka only two letters have been used.

There is another example where the poet has used only one letter in the śloka.

दारीदरदरिद्रोऽरिदारूदारोऽद्रि दूरद:
दूरादरोद्रोद दरद्रो दोरुद्दारुरादरी । (शिशु० १६, १०६)

(Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa, who has several wives and who is bold, generous, calm and all pervading, pierced off the enemies, who were like logs of wood)

The poet's laboured craftsmanship has no parallel in Sanskrit Literature. It has been said of him that he possesses the qualities of poetic excellence of Kālidāsa, Bhāsa and Daṇḍīn in Upamā, Arthagaurava and Padalālitya respectively. Līlāśuka's *Kṛṣnakarṇāmṛta* contains three 'Āśvāsas' of more than a hundred verses each. The southern and western manuscripts present the text in expanded form but the Bengal recension appears to have presented it in one Āśvāsa only, namely the first, with 112 verses. The time of the poet Līlāśuka is uncertain. He may have lived between 9th and 15th centuries A.D.

Kṛṣnakarṇāmṛta is a collection of devotional lyrics in which praises and prayers are bestowed on Kṛṣṇa. It is not a descriptive poem on the life of Kṛṣṇa nor it contains his "sports" (Līlā). Yet passionate eulogy in amorous words pervades all through. In the words of Dr. S.K. De "If any anology is permissible, it resembles, to some extent, the medieval Christian lyrics, which are laden with passionate yearning for the youthful Christ as the beloved and of which the song of Soloman, "I am my beloved's and my beloved is mine "is the sacred archetype. But the difference lies in conceiving the youthful Kṛṣṇa in a background of extremely sensuous charm in the vivid exuberance of erotic fancy and in the attitude of pathetic supplication and surrender (Prapatti)."

Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda* is a love lyric, which may be compared with Līlāśuka's poem in many respects. Poet Jayadeva lived in the beginning of the 12th centrury A.D. He was an adherent of Viṣṇu cult, though some say that he was a 'Śaiva', but his passionate yearning for Kṛṣṇa is unquestionable. The poem, though it has no originality in thought, yet, on account of its unique lyrical style (probably borrowed from the folk songs current in his part during his days), has gained unprecedented popularity, which has not waned even today. It has several translations in various languages, Indian and Foreign, and more than a dozen imitations. The theme of the poem which is styled as "Pastoral Drama" is pain of separation in love. Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa both sigh restlessly to meet each other. The Dūtī ultimately unites them. As stated above, there is nothing new in the expression of emotion which is conventional. In the words of George Keyt "The physical aspect is not something distinct from the spiritual nor is it on that account a parallel in any sense whatever to the sort of

love that is sexual in the manner of the "Ays Amatoria" and other suc expression of profane love in Europe. But on the contrary there is th endowment of the physical side with all the real and enduring qualities the spiritual".

We must not forget that the theme is not derived from Bhāgava Purāṇa which does not mention the name of Rādhā. It is also not influer ced by Līlāśuka's poem. On account of its literary form, it is also style as opera (melodrama) and refined Yātrā. Its form defies convention classification. Here lies its originality. Though introductory verses are i orthodox meters, the entire work can be termed as 'Padāvali' which sung by all classes of people with devotional fervour.

A stanza from the 'spring song' is quoted here to illustrate t beauty of language and diction—

'ललित लवंग लता परिशीलन कामल मलय समीरे ।
मधुकर निकर करम्बित कोकिल कूजित कुंज कुटीरे ।
बिरहति हरिरिह सरस वसन्ते ।
नृत्यति युवति जनेन सम सखि विरहिजनस्य दुरन्ते ।
उन्मद मदन मनोरथ पथिक वधूजन जनित विलापे ।
अलिकुल सकुल कुसुम समूहनिराकुल बकुल कलापे ।।

In spring, when tender malaya breezes fondle the beautiful creepe of cloves and huts and bowers respond with the mingled noise of bees a Kokila birds, Hari here in the forest, dwells, in eager dance with women folk—

It is hard to endure being in spring, my friend! In spring, when women of absent traders wail and lament, distracted with love, wh swarms of bees on the tidy 'bakula' branches fill the clustering flowers.

Hari here in the forest dwells, in eager dance with the women.

It is hard to endure being parted in spring my friend. (translation George Keyt)

The English rendering by George Keyt does not give us the pleasu of the alliteration employed by the poet in Sanskrit. Gītagovinda really 'a thing of beauty' and 'a joy for ever'.

Kṛṣṇalīlātaranginī of Niranjan Tirtha comprehends in twe 'tarangas' the entire story of Kṛṣṇa from birth to the dwelling at Dvāra and includes songs in musical modes. It is sometimes ranked with poem of Līlāśuka and Jayadeva as the third great work of Kṛṣṇa L But it is a laboured imitation, which could never attain much populari

With Jayadeva we are practically at the end of what is best, not in erotic religious poetry but also in Sanskrit poetry in general and later imitations are dull and need not be mentioned.

Stavamāla of Rūpa Gosvāmi

Rūpa Gosvāmi was one of the immediate disciples of Caitanya Mahā prabhū. He wrote in Sanskrit. He had a great attraction for Vṛndāvana. Stavamālā is a collection made by his nephew Jīva of some sixty stotras and 'Gītas' composed by Rūpa himself, which evinces his literary merit but some betray the influence of Līlāśuka. Successful reproduction of Jayadeva's manner of diction can also be seen, but his love of rhetoric is supreme. *Stavāvali* of Raghunatha, his fellow disciple, though inferior in art, surpassess Rūpa in devotional passion. Bhakti Rasa overpowers the reader and probably this is the aim of the poet.

Campūkāvya. (Mixture of Prose and Poetry.)

Bengal Vaiṣṇava school made use of campū for religious propaganda., in the Kṛṣṇa legend they presented erotic religious pictures of great sensuous charm. The *Muktacaritra* of Raghunatha Dasa relates a short tale in which Kṛṣṇa demonstrates that pearls could be grown as a crop by sowing and watering them with milk. The real object seems to show the superiority of Kṛṣṇa's free love for Rādhā over Satyabhāmā.

Jīva Gosvāmi's *Gopikā campū* and *Vṛndavana campu* of Parmānanda are artificial, though extensive works. The themes are taken from Harivaṁśa Purāṇa and Bhāgavat Purāṇa. The early childhood and youth of Kṛṣṇa in rhetorical style is described. Jiva's huge campū paints the entire life of Śrīkṛṣṇa but the legend is modified in accordance with the Vaiṣṇava theology of the Bengal School. It has very little poetic charm to attract a casual reader without religious background.

Ślesha and Viloma Kāvya

There are some compositions called Viloma Kāvya like śleṣa Alankara. Śleṣa Kāvyas contain simultaneous themes of more than one sentiment but there is another variety of Kāvya as Viloma Kavya. The famous astronomer Shri Sūrya wrote Rāma-Kṛṣṇa Viloma Kavya, which has 36-38 stanzas. It praises in alternate half verses Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, text given by the second half when read backward in the same as that of the first half read forward. Shri S.K. De calls this sort of composition 'poetical monstrosities.'

Yamaka Kāvya

The Sanskrit poets showed great liking for the use of Śleṣa and Yamaka Alaṁkāras in their works. *Yudhiṣṭhira Vijaya* is a great specimen of Yamaka Mahākāvya written by Vāsudeva whose date is uncertain, but it is presumed that he lived between the tenth and twelfth centuries A.D. The story begins with the hunting expedition of Pāṇḍu and ends in Yudhiṣṭhira's victory over the Kauravas. The Kāvya is divided into eight āśvāsas. It is interesting to find Yamaka in every line of the composition

used with ease and clarity. The Āśvāsa of the Kāvya narrates the incidents of Rājasūya yajña. The verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa are most beautiful. A verse is quoted to illustrate the skill of the employment of Yamaka by the poet—

Jaya Jagadāmodara te caraṇam,
Śaraṇam Śaraṇam gatosmi dāmodara te,
Tyaja roṣam aripuram jagatam,
Prāpnuhi caive prasādam aripumagatam.

(Dāmodara you are interested in the merriment of the world, I have taken refuge at your feet. Please give up anger for your enemies and thus receive the felicitation of your sudarśana cakra by all people and the world).

The days for showing skill in words, meters and alaṁkāras are gone. The poetry holds mirror to life and it should reflect it in a simple, graceful style.

Dramas

Kṛṣṇa theme in Sanskrit dramas can be traced as early as pre Kalidasa-age. It is not known when Bhaśa, the forerunner of Kālidasa, actually lived. Before 1912 his name was only heard. Mahāmahopadhyaya Gaṇapati Śastri published his thirteen plays in Trivandrum series, and from that time scholars began to evaluate his plays. He seems to be a devotee of Kṛṣṇa.

Dūtakāvya is a one act play—Vyāyoga—its theme is derived from Udyogaparvan of Mahābharata. When Duryodhana was holding a war-council to select the general to lead his army and Bhīṣma Pitāmaha was being chosen unanimously, Kṛṣṇa appeared on the scene as a messanger of Pāṇḍavas. Duryodhana disliked the presence of Srīkṛṣna. When Kṛṣna entered the council-hall, persons present paid respects to him, but Duryodhana in utter disgust fell from his throne. He rejected his message and ordered his enchainment, but nobody dared to touch him. Thereupon Duryodhana himself tried to enchain him. Kṛṣna then assumed bigger form and thus the attempt of Duryodhana to enchain Kṛṣna failed. Kṛṣṇa also invoked his celestial weapons in anger, but subsequently withdrew them and Dhṛtarāṣṭra honoured him and the last curtain fell. The special traits of Kṛṣṇa's character are well portrayed against the background of wicked character of Duryodhana.

Bālacarita

It is a drama of five acts depicting the early life of Śri Kṛṣṇa. The plot is not well-knit.

The incidents are loosely connected. The drama is devoid of softer feeling. There are commotions and fighting all through. The slaying of

demons and other beasts by Kṛṣṇa annoy the spectators. The author has shown sympathy with Kansa, but, on the whole, the drama does not bring credit to the author. It utterly lacks in unity of action.

Especially that part of the life of Kṛṣṇa which deals with Līlā at Vṛndāvana has been the subject matter of more of lyrical compositions than Mahākāvyas, Khaṇḍakavyas or Dramas. The erotic sentiment has been transformed into devotional sentiment (Bhakti Rasa) by Vaiṣṇava poets who have indulged in unproportionate depiction of Gopī Bhāva.

1. The Cultural Heritage of India Volume IV. (Ram Kiṛṣṇa Mission Calcutta Publication).
2. Epic Sources of Sanskrit Literature.
3. Bhāsa Nāṭaka Cakram, compiled by Deodhar.
4. Śiśupāla Vadha (Māgha).
5. History of Sanskrit Literature Vol. I, by S.K. De.
6. Gītagovinda (George Keyt).

FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

1.	Place of Publication	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
2.	Periodicity of its Publication	...	Biannual
3.	Printer's Name	...	Shri T. Philip
	Nationality	...	Indian
	Address	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
4.	Publisher's Name	...	Dr. Buddha Prakash
	Nationality	...	Indian
	Address	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
5.	Editor's Name	...	Dr. Buddha Prakash
	Nationality	...	Indian
	Address	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
6.	Name and address of individuals who own the magazine and partners or share-holders, holding more than one per cent of the total capital	..	The paper is owned by the Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra

I, Buddha Prakash, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated 12-3-68

Signature of Publisher
BUDDHA PRAKASH

1023/Research Journal—500 Books—14-3-68—K.U. Press, Kurukshetra.

Vol. II, Part 2.

KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH JOURNAL

[ARTS AND HUMANITIES]

EDITOR
VINAY MOHAN SHARMA

KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY
KURUKSHETRA

September, 1968

Publisher
Dr. Vinay Mohan Sharma
Dean, Faculty of Arts and Languages,
Kurukshetra University,
Kurukshetra.

Price Rs. 10.00 (per volume)

Printed in India by : T. PHILIP,
at the Kurukshetra University Press,
Kurukshetra.

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Sanskrit

Hindi

English

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A.K. Sinha

TELIC THEORY OF EDUCATION

Education is communication of systematized experience which a person acquires in course of his active interaction with the environment to his fellow-beings. It is basically dynamic and productive in its nature because human experience constantly increases and accumulates with the development of the intellectual history of mankind. It consists in the transmission of accumulated and systematized experience to a learner. It enables a learner to understand the nature of the environment relatively clearly, and thereby enables him to interact with the changing environmental situations more effectively for creative living.

The aim of education is to impart relatively clear understanding of Nature to a learner. The strategies which are used for the transmission of information in the educative process are of two main types, namely, natural strategies and artificial strategies. The natural strategies which are used in the educative process for the transmission of information to the learner include the use of natural language and simple signs and gestures. The artificial or devised strategies which are used in the educative process for the transmission of information to the learner include use of various types of instruments, logical and mathematical symbols, and so on. The process of education involves transition from the stage of naturalness and simplicity to stage of ever-increasing artificiality and complexity in course of the development of human civilization. It is obvious, then, that the function of education is relative to the stage of the conceptual development of mankind.

It is the main contention of this paper to show that a realistic theory of education can be formulated in the context of a realistic theory of Nature and a realistic theory of culture. It has been the central theme of the author of this paper that the telic principle constitutes the very core of Nature and human culture, and that, therefore, a realistic theory of education can be adequately explained from the standpoint of telic theory of Nature and telic theory human culture. A brief resumé of the telic theory of Nature and the telic theory of human culture is given below in the context of which the telic theory of education will be discussed.

Telic Theory of Nature

Nature has a basically telic structure. Despite the fact that a vast majority of scientists do not accept the teleological interpretation of Nature, during recent years certain empirical researches have revealed that certain aspects of telic action can be traced in the behaviour of elementary particles and living organisms.

Researches in the field of microphysics have led to a sort of 'dematerialization of matter'. Matter has been analysed into 'energy' and 'quantized field'. These energy particles do not have any of the properties of matter which were hitherto described by Democritus and Newton. Heisenberg has found that an atom or an electron does not 'in itself' display the simplest geometrical and mechanical properties, but that it is made to display these properties through instrumental interference.[1] Hans Reichenbach made a very important observation that spontaneity of motion is inherent in the physical particles.[2] He found that the quantum occurrence violate some of the essential requirements of causal laws. George Gamow found that even though the behaviour of a particle is unpredictable from the standpoint of causal laws the wave gives guidance to its associated particle for its motion.[3] Recently the researches of T.D. Lee and C.N. Yang have demonstrated that some of the subatomic particles have even preference for certain specific directions for their movement.[4]

There are certain vague indications in the behaviour of microphenomena which seem to suggest that teleology or purpose is implicit in physical systems. David Hawkins has put forth the suggestion that contemporary physicists have replaced Aristotle's conception of 'telos' and 'final cause' by the conception of 'law of nature'. He writes, "Materialism finds no need for ends or natures in the plural, but only a kind of telos in Nature, renamed 'law'. When we appeal to laws of Nature in explaining anything, we are just doing the kind of thing Aristotle talked about under the heading of ends".[5]

The telic principle which is perhaps germane in physical systems became sufficiently explicit when the latter got transformed into living systems in course of approximately two billion years of organic evolution. The organic processes of assimilation, recuperation, development, reproduction, and so on give sufficient indications of purposiveness in living systems. The development of a living system is partly regulated by its genetic messages. Pask maintains that the development of a organism from a single cullular system to a multi-cellular system is a self-organizing process.[6] Apter maintains that the coherent development of a

1. Heisenberg, W., *Philosophical Problems of Nuclear Physics*, London, Faber and Faber, McMLII, p. 86.

2. Reichenbach, H., *Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1946, p. 15.

3. Gamow, G. 'The Principle of Uncertainty', *Scientific American*, Vol. 198, No. 1, 1958, p. 55.

4. Morrison, P., 'The Overthrow of Parity', *Scientific American* Vol. 196, No. 4, 1957, p. 52.

5. Hawkins, D., 'The Thermodynamics of Purpose', *Beyond the Edge of certainty*, Ed. R.G. Colodny, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1955, p. 104.

6. Pask, G., *An Approach to Cybernetics*, London, Hutchison, 1961, p. 103.

multicellular organism takes place through intercommunication and close unison between cells.[7]

Recent researches in the application of Cybernetic principles to organic development give certain indications that the behaviour of a living system is not only guided by its innate genetic instructions, but also by its future goals. The genetic information is transmitted by a living organism to its offspring mainly through its pattern of DNA and RNA molecules. Recent researches in the field of genetics give certain indications that there is the transmission of accumulated experience of a living organism to its offspring. A living organism interacts with the environment, and makes the best possible adjustment to the changing environmental situations with the aid of its inherited strategies of experience. It also makes new 'innovations' through trials and errors for better adjustments to changing environmental conditions.

The spontaneous directional property of physical particals got transformed into purposeful behaviour in living organisms in course of pre-organic and organic evolution. Dobzhansky writes, "The genetic basis of organism changes, perhaps gradually, but relentlessly in a definite direction."[8] Organic evolution takes place under the guidance of the telic principle for aeons of years which finally leads to the emergence of human personality.

Purposiveness is most well-defined in human personality. The creative purpose in human personality is not only expressed through biological creativity, but also through utilitarian creativity, intellectual creativity, and aesthetic creativity. The behaviour of human personality is value-oriented because it is guided by its telic principle. The creative purpose in human peronality gives it orientation to the creation of novel and original values. A telic person interacts with the telic structure of Nature, controls the environment with the aid of technological devices, and ushers human civilization into existence. The telic person evolves out of the natural systems like the physical systems, living systems, and the like, and thereafter constructs devised systems, such as logico-mathematical systems, machine systems, and so on. In this way telic person stands on the apex of the architecture of ever-increasing complex systems to give new orientation to the future development of human civilization. The very structure of the human nervous system is such that it is capable of operating on the sensory stimuli which are chaotic in their nature and transforming them into orderly physiologic events with their systematic

7. Apter, J.M., *Cybernetics and Development*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1966; p. 46.

8. Dobzhansky, T., 'Scientific Emplanation-Chance and Antichance in Organic Evolution', *Philosophy of Science*, The Delaware Seminar, New York, Interscience Publishers, 1963, Vol. I, p. 213.

subjective counterparts.[9] Besides this, there are ample neurophysiological evidences which indicate that the experience of a person is teleological in its nature.[10] The human brain has biologically inherited the capacity for programming, learning, thinking and remembering; and it has also the capacity for changing its programme in course of its interaction with the changing environment.[11] In brief, the human brain has the capacity for dealing with vague ideas and transforming them into orderly experience.[12] It has the innate potentiality for systematic planning and creative ingenuity. That is the reason why almost every activity of human personality and every social group or institution is associated with some purpose or a number of purposes[13]. A telic person has the freedom of decision making and creative adventure. He has the innate potentiality for controlling and transforming the environment in course of his interaction with Nature. This is, in fact, the basis of his cultural activities and educative processes.

Telic Theory of Culture

Culture is a human invention. Human personality as a natural system transforms the environment, and creats various types of devised systems including the cultural system. Various types of sociocultural systems have evolved in course of active human interaction with the environment and its subsequent transformations. Telic person interacts with the telic structure of Nature with the aim of ushering into existence sociocultural systems with more and more comprehensive and well-defined purpose. The function of education consists in the transmission of the cultural theme by the educator to the learner. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the foundational principles of a socio- cultural system prior to the formulation of a theory of education.

Unfortunately, however, the foundational principles of a cultural system have not been clearly understood by a majority of social scientists and philosophers. This confusion has been mainly due to the fact that most of the social scientists and philosophers tried to explain the sociocultural system in terms of the concepts and methodology of biological and physical sciences. The early pioneers of social science were under the spell of the revolutionary doctrine of organic evolution and constructed

9. Case, R.A., 'An Information Flow Model of the Organization of Motor Activity : Transduction, Transmission and Central Control of Sensory Information', *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, Vol. 140, No. 4, 1965, p. 240.

10. Grossman, S.P., *An Textbook of Physiological Psychology*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1967, 821.

11. Simon, H A., *The New Science of Management Decisions*, New York, Harper and Row, 1960, p. 25.

12. Wiener, N., *God and Golem Inc.*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1964, p. 76.

13. Sadowski, W., *The Theory of Decision-Making*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1965, p. 1.

theories of society on the model of a living organism. Contemporary social scientists got over that spell and realized that the organismic model of society was merely a metaphorical expression. The contemporary social scientists, however, are at present under the more powerful spell of physical and technological science and explain the structure of society in terms of physical and mechanistic concepts. Recently the inadequacy of the physical and mechanistic standpoints for the explanation of social phenomena has been recognized by some contemporary theorists. David Bohm recognizes the qualitative infinity of Nature. Norbet Wiener ridiculed those social scientists who accept the models of physics as the most perfect models for the explanation of societal processes[14]. Ludwig von Mises remarks that many social scientists are working under the false belief that by imitating the methodology of physical sciences, they will be able to quantitatively describe social phenomena[15]. Social structure has not only a quantitatively measurable structure, but it has also a qualitative significance. Devaraja aptly maintains that culture is value-centered, and that human behaviour is creative[16].

The author of this paper maintains that a society is a system of telic persons who organize themselves to realize a number of natural or artificial goals[17]. In his view, a social system is sustained by the telic principle. The creative and the appreciative activities of the members of a social system are guided by the telic principle. The telic principle is the principle of individuation[18]. It guides a person in making a decision and freely choosing an alternative out of a multitude, and planning for the future. It is a source of creation and appreciation of values by creative and appreciative persons. It it the matrix of social cohesiveness by virtue of which a person is an inseparable member of individuo-social reality[19]. It sustains creative advance and cultural flux in a society[20]. It also sustains the openness of a social system by the free creative and appreciative activities of creative-appreciative persons.

The author of this paper has applied his telic theory of society to his theory of culture. In his view, culture refers to the common orientation

14. Wiener, N., *God and Golem, Inc.*, p. 92.

15. Mises, L, von, *Epistemological Problems of Economics*, Princeton, D. Van Nostrand, 1960, p. 10.

16. Devaraja, N.K. *The Philosophy of Culture*, Allahabad, Kitab Mahal, 1963. p. 7.

17. Sinha, A.K., 'Telic Theory of Open Social System', *Kurukshetra University Research Journal*, Vol. II, Part 1, 1968, p. 117.

18. Sinha, A.K., 'Principle of Individuation', *Indian Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. I, 1656, p. 36.

19. Sinha, A.K., *Prolegomena to the Philosophical Foundations of Society*, Calcutta, Sinha Publishing House (P) Ltd., 1965, p. 36.

20. Sinha, A.K., 'Philosophy of Social Progress', *University of Rajasthan Studies*, Vol. VII, 1961–62, p. 93.

of a group of creative-appreciative persons towards creative ends.[21] A cultural system refers to the living experiences and a system of values of an organized group of creative-appreciative persons. It emerges when the fields of creativity and appreciation of two or more creative appreciative persons intersect. A socio-cultural system has, therefore, a field structure. Cultural nuclei are formed whenever there are intersections between the fields of creativity and appreciation of two or more telic persons. The range of a cultural system depends upon the number of its cultural nuclei. The refinement of a cultural system, on the other hand, depends upon the qualitative richness of its cultural nuclei.

The concept of 'culture', however, has been changing from epoch to epoch in course of the development of human civilization. During the earliest stages of human civilization religion formed the foundation of some of the socio-cultural systems. At some later stages of the development of human civilization certain types of metaphysical doctrines formed the foundations of some cultural systems. During the contemporary period science constitutes the foundation of some of the economically and technologically advanced cultural systems. There has been rapid acceleration in the creation of intellectual values in a society in which science constitutes the foundation of its cultural system. The members of a newly emerging scientific culture have an unusual experience of intellectual freedom which was hitherto unknown for centuries. Science as the central theme of a cultural system is the promise of the modern world. The scientific attitude has produced a firm confidence in the scientists that the cultural system which they are in the process of fast ushering into existence has an empirical foundation, and is, therefore, worth-striving after.

Critical Examination of Theories of Education

Theory of Nature as well as theory of culture has impact upon the formulation of a theory of education. Theory of Nature gives a systematic world-view, and theory of culture gives a life-view which is consistent with its corresponding world-hypothesis. The function of education consists in transmission of accumulated experience which is gained through theorizing efforts of mankind for further intellectual and aesthetic adventures by learners. It may be now shown that drawbacks in certain earlier theories of education are due to tacit or open acceptance of certain empirically unconfirmed world-hypotheses and cultural themes. It is obvious, then, that those theories of education which are based upon certain metaphysical assumptions, religious dogmas, and ethical prescriptions are empirically unsound. Now, let us critically examine some theories of education which are based upon empirically unconfirmed

21. Sinha, A.K., 'Telic Theory of Culture', *Quarterly Journal of Indian Studies in Social Sciences*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1967, p. 63.

concepets and undefined notions. An arbitrary critertion will be adopted here for critical examination of some of the theories of education as follows :—

1. Education as control of Learning

Some educational thinkers maintain that the function of education consists in the control of learning process in accordance with a preconceived plan. This preconceived plan may be inspired either by a metaphysical doctrine or a religious dogma.

According to ancient Hindu thinkers, the function of education consists in thorough control of the mind. Knowledge of the objective world was not considered to be the main aim of education[22]. An individual gains real knowledge when he withdraws his mind from the external environment and concentrates his consciousness on his inner self for self-realization. Hence, the pursuit of metaphysical truth is the ultimate aim of education.

In ancient India only a few members of the upper castes could receive education, and thereby obtain 'subjective passport' to heaven. The Hindu educational doctrine of *adhikaribheda* debarred Sudras and females from receiving education. Manu was most emphatic on this point. Free thinking was discouraged in ancient India. This educational policy was perhaps adopted to exploit the members of unprivileged castes and perpetuate the institution of slavery.

In the West the educational theories of Plato and Aristotle were based on grandois metaphysical concepts. Plato maintained that Ideas are the real things, and that they manifest themselves through the objects and attributes of the seeming world. In his view, the philosopher-king tries to bring into existence an ideal state by trying to approximate the Ideas as far as possible. A good and just society can be brought into existence if the management of the government is in the hands of wise men. The education of the governing class, therefore, must be strictly controlled by the State[23]. Higher education must be selective in its nature. Only those individuals who are able to get education upto the highest level are fit to govern. Aristotle's doctrine of education is similar to that of his master, Plato. According to Aristotle, the task of imparting education should be the State-monpoly, and that it should be imparted on citizens according to a rigid programme[24].

Plato wrongly assumed that the detailed blue-prints of talents were already imprinted in the soul of a person, and that the function of education was to unfold them. Obviously, Plato had a conception of closed

22. Mukerjee, R., *Ancient Indian Education*, Delhi, Motilal Banarasi Das, 1947, 1960, p. 52.
23. Plato, *The Republic*, Cleveland, The Fine Editions Press, 1146, pp. 120-21.
24. Aristotle, *Politica*, VII, 3.

personality inhabiting in a closed reality. Such a point of view rules out the possibility of creative freedom of a person. Furthermore, the State controlled education is likely to thoroughly indoctrinate a person. Karl Popper is, therefore, justified in branding Plato as an enemy of the free and open society. Plato erroneously identified the concept of 'justice' with the 'principle of class rule and class prejudices.' He, therefore, advocated that all types of intellectual activities and innovations should be censored by the State. Popper very aptly remarks that Plato's conception of the ideal State is a form of totalitarianism in which the function of education consists in indoctrination of its citizens.[25] John Dewey also rightly commented that Plato's doctrine of education was aimed at binding individnals to static ideas for the final aim of life was fixed by the State.[26] Aristotle was also an advocate of totalitarianism, and recognized the distinction between free persons and slaves. Aristotle's theory of education aimed at indoctrination of the ruling class so that the institution of slavery could be perpetuated by the former.

The Platonic philosophy of education did produce its impact on some of the societies with strong tendencies towards imperialism and capitalistic domination. In England the revival of Platonic ideal of education took place at Oxford and Cambridge; and in U.S.A. the intellectual aspect of Plato's philosophy of education produced its impact on Harvard University. The ideal of public school education which aims at imparting education to the members of the privileged class is also in conformity with the Platonic tradition.

Cohen and Travers aptly remark that the ideal of public school education fosters a false sense of superiority in the students of such institutions. The theory of public school education is a real threat to free society.[27] Some votaries of certain religious institutions maintain that moral and religious education should form the firm foundation of educational policy. This approach to educational policy is positively harmful for the development of a free society. In brief, an educational philosophy which aims at indoctrination of a particular type irrational and scientifically unconfirmed belief in credulous persons merely fosters bigotry, fanaticism and narrowness; and therefore, it has to be discarded in a free society.

While Manu, Plato, Aristoitle and others maintained that only a selected class of people are entitled to receive a rigidly planned programme of education for the perpetuation of rule of the elite in society, Marx

25. Popper, K.R., *Open Society and Its Enemies*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, Vol. I, p. 47.

26. Dewey, J., *Democracy and Education*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1941, p. 106.

27. Cohen, J.I. and Travers, R.M.W., (Eds.), *Education for Democracy*, London, Macmillan Co., 1939.

maintained that the function of education consists in the awakening of the working classes who have been under the yoke of slavery and exploitation of the capitalist class.[28] Engles advocated the spread of 'proletarian education' which was free from the corrupt influences of the bourgeoisie.[29] The workers and their children who receive education in a socialist system may easily usher into existence a classless society. Marx, however, suggested reform in the socialist system of education in making it free from state interference. In actual practice, however, the system of education in a socialist system education is used as a means for the propagation of the communist ideology.

Karl Kautsky pointed out that in the socialist system of education intellectual liberty is completely destroyed because intellectuals must adhere to the avowed communist ideology of the State.[30] Bertrand Russell has aptly remarked that the world is far more complex in its structure than what Marxist philosophy tried to expound by its simplified formula for bringing into existence a classless society. The educational programme which constantly harps upon socialist ideology is likely to drive a person into a state of insanity.[31] A propagandist programme of education paralyses the intellect and incapacitates it for free thinking. Darlington points out some of the experiments which have been claimed to be performed successfully in Russia by Michurin and Lysenko cannot be repeated outside the Soviet land which simply means that such research conclusions are false stories.[32] Intellectual freedom has been destroyed in Soviet Russia and other socialist countries due to the propagandist policy in education.

To conclude, then, it may be pointed out that a philosophy of educasion which aims at controlling the learning process tends to foster narrowness of outlook and minimizes the importance of intellectual freedom. If a philosophy of education aims at indoctrination of certain beliefs in the learners, then it paralyses their critical thinking and initiative for original thinking. The philosophy of education as control of learning process is, therefore, scientifically unsound.

II. Education as Transmission of Information

There was modification in the theory of education under the impact of democratic ideas. William James and John Dewey were influenced by

28. Marx, K. and Engles, F. *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 27.
29. Engles, F., *The Conditions of the Working Classes in England in* 1892, London, 1892, p. 238.
30. Kautsky, K., *Commuism and Socialism*, Eng. tr. J. Shaples, New York, American League for Democratic Socialism, 1932, p. 37.
31. Russell, B., *Education and Social Order*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1933, p. 194.
32. Darlington, C.D., *Facts of Life*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1953, p. 229.

Hegelian theory of education as the "march of intellect." According to Dewey, the function of education consists in communication of experience so that it becomes the common possession of the people. Education is a necessity of life, and an end in itself.[33] It is a process of growth which takes place with the growth of life itself. It has no end beyond itself. It forms fundamental intellectual and emotional dispositions in learners towards Nature and their fellow beings. In this sense philosophy itself may be defined as the general theory of education.

Dewey regarded education as a social process in the sense that a learner understands the significance of his cultural environment by participating in the activities and experiences of his society.

The function of education, then, is socialization of learners through communication of experience which are prevalent in society. Even though socialization has some cultural significance, it cannot be regarded as the main purpose of education. Dewey is mistaken in believing that education has no end beyond itself and that philosophy is synonymous with general theory of education. Education is, in fact, a prerequisite for intellectual adventure and creativity; and hence, it is a preparation for experimentation with new ideas and theory-constructing activity. An individual does not receive education for merely accumulating information, but for utilizing the relevant information for creating new knowledge. Whitehead rightly remarks that merely well-informed person may be the greatest bore on earth.

John Dewey's philosophy of education, however, has produced a great impact on contemporary educational thinkers like Kilpatrick, Perry and others. Kilpatrick maintains under the influence of Dewey that the aim of education consists in realizing those values in life which are conceived through philosophising.[34] In his view, the dynamic philosophy of life is actualized through the process of education. The ethical overtones of Dewey's philosophy of education have influenced R. B. Perry's philosophy of education. Perry believed that the corrupting influence of political democracy may be remedied by moral education.[35] In his view, the ideal of liberal education is consistent with moral education because it cultivates the art of free choice in realizing the aim of life. The pragmatic undercurrent can be traced in the philosophies of education of all those thinkers who came under the influence of Dewey.

33. Dewey, J., *Democracy and Education*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1916, 1941, p. 59.

34. Kilpatrick, W.H., *Philosophy of Education*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1951, 1963, p. 32.

35. Perry, R.B. *Realms of Value*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 428.

It may be pointed out, however, that many educational philosophers could not get rid of their unconscious metahpysical presuppositions even during the present stage of human civilization. Hilda Taba talks about the 'all-round development of the individual' through educational guidance.[36] In her view, the aim of education is to the lead individuals to rich forms of experience through educational guidance. Taba does not clearly state what she means by "all-round development of the individual". Ortega y Gasset also maintains that the aim of general education consists in the "whole development of an individual." In his view, any person who receives education must have knowledge of physics, biology, history, sociology and philosophy.[37] An individual may be able to develop an all-round personality by getting education of these great cultural disciplines. Ortega's philosophy of education suffers from those defects which are found in the doctrine of eudaemonism or self-realization. Some educational thinkers maintain that the function of education is to prepare an individual for building a world-order.[38] Obviously, this is an utopian type of philosophy of education which has very little importance from the standpoint of scientific realism.

III. Education as Incentive for Creation and Appreciation of New Intellectual Values.

It will now be briefly discussed that the function of education is neither merely control of learning process nor merely communication of information for socialization of learners, but to produce an academic atmosphere wherein individuals may create and appreciate novel and original intellectual and aesthetic values. This is the central theme of the author's theory of education.

Some educational philosophers of great eminence have already enunciated educational theory of this type. A.N. Whitehead maintained that the function of education does not consist in imparting stale and inert ideas. In his view, the purpose of education is to acquire the art of utilizing knowledge.[39] An individual who receives education passes through the stage of intellectual romance, intellectual precision and intellectual generalization. The intellectual atmosphere produced by education stimulates the creative imagination in the learners by utilizing which they may transform knowledge. In brief, the function of education consists in

36. Taba, H., *The Dynamics of Education*, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1932, p. 221.

37. Ortega y Gasset, J., *Mission of the University*, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1948, p. 58.

38. Counts, G.S., 'Education for World Society', *Education for a World Society*, Ed. C.O. Adndt ann S. Evereth, New York, Harper Brothers, 1951, p. 8.

39. Whitehead, A.N., *The Aims of Education and Other Essays*, London, Williams and Norgate, 1932, 1955, p. 6.

stimulating intellectual adventure. It may be commented here that despite the fact that Whitehead made a few valuable suggestions for developing a sound theory of education he regarded the ultimate aim of education to be a sort of mystical religious experience.[40]

A brief reference may be made now to the empirical researchs which throw light on the foundations of creative education. It is now recognized by many psychological scientists that the factor of 'creativity' in human personality is empirically measurable. Hughes writes, "All children possess creativity. It is part of their inheritence as human beings."[41] In her view, the function of education consists in nurturing creativity. Newell, Shaw, and Simon have defined 'creative thinking' as behaviour which involves organization of information into novel combinations.[42] C.W. Taylor maintains that 'Creativity is a many-splendored, complex thing' which can be nurtured by education.[43] In his view, the function of education must be radically changed in the present stage of human civilization, and the learner needs to understand how to function effectively in a situation in which knowledge in fast accumulating.[44] Creative processes and creative behaviour in students may be elicited through a new approach to educational process.[45] Jackson and Messick maintain that human invention results from the interaction between the creative person, his product of creativity, and the respones of the environment to it.[46] In their view, there is close transaction between these three stages of invention.

Creative education which leads to the creation of new intellectual values by an individual is a unique experience for him. Maslow characterizes the experience of creativity as 'peak-experience'. He points out that creation of a scientific theory may give a thrill of the highest order.

40. Holmes, H.W., 'Whitehead's Views on Education', *The Philosophy of A.N. Whitehead*, Ed P.A. Schlipp, New York, The Library of Living Philosophers, 1941, 1951, p 639.

41. Hughes, M M., 'Integrity in Classroom Relationships', *Creativity in Teaching*, Ed. Alice Mill, Belmont, Wardsworth, 1961, p. 80.

42. Newell, A., Shaw, J.G. and Simon, H.A. 'The Process of Creative Thinking', *Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking*, Ed H.E. Gruber *et al*, New York, Atherton Press, 1963, p. 63.

43. Taylor, C.W., 'Creativity-What is it ?' *Accent on Talent*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1966, p. 1.

44. Taylor, C.W., 'Cultivating Creativity in the Class Room', *A Publication of Psychology Department*, University of Utah, p. 9.

45. Taylor, C.W., 'Cultivating New Talents : A Way to Reach the Educationally Deprived', *Publication of the Department of Psychology*, University of Utah, p. 9.

46. Jackson, P.W., and Messick, S., 'The Person, The Product, and the Response: Conceptual Problems in the Assessment of Creativity', *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1965, p. 327.

He writes, "Science can be a way of marring with that which you love, with that which fascinates you, and with whose mystery you would love to spend your life."[47] Victor E. Frankel maintains human personality has the ability for self-transcendence and joy through creativity because his life embodies meaning and purpose.[48]

Finally a passing reference may be made to cybernetic science which gives support to the theory of creative education though in a slightly different sense. K.U. Smith has proposed the thesis that the cybernetic theory of learning throws light on the nature of training science. In his view, the defect of cognitive learning has been hitherto due to 'capturing time by spatially organized systems'. This drawback in cognitive learning can be remedied by an individual who learns to understand the temporally organized relationships. From the cybernetic point of view behaviour systems are *homeokinetic* in the sense that their normal state is one of self-generating activity.[49] From the standpoint of the cybernetic theory "modern man is partly product of his own educational design, for his ability to exercise control over the physical and social environment and the particular behaviour pattern he uses in such control are defined by feedback interactions with tools, instruments, machines, symbol systems, and institutions of human design."[50]

In brief, man has himself created the human civilization through his educational designs. The future state of human civilization will be freely determined by man himself through the development of his educational skills and the formulation of his symbolic systems.

Telic Theory of Education

In the conclusion, a brief resumé of the author's theory of education will be given. Human personality has passed through a fairly long duration to envolve out the natural systems and stand at of the apex of the architecture of complex systems. He now makes creative adventure to devise artifical systems like the machine systems and symbolic systems. He is thus able to transform the environment through the strategies of systems engineering and symbolic systems. In fact, the human civilization with its fast increasing complexity of technical and conceptual systems has been ushered into existence by the free creative efforts of man. The rapid advancement of technical science and symbolic science (i. e., logic, mathematics, syntactics, etc.) have revolutionized the

47. Maslow, A.H., 'The Changing Image of Human-Nature', *The American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2. 1966, p. 154.

48. Frankel, V E., 'The Concept of Man in Logotherapy', *The Journal of Existentialism*, Vol. VI, No. 21, 1955, p. 56.

49. Smith, K.U., 'Cybernetic Foundations of Learning Science', *Proceedings of the Association for Computing Machinary*, 1965, p. 17.

50. Smith, K.U. and Smith, M.F., *Cybernetic Principles of Learning and Educational Design*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, p. 8.

theory of education. Man has been able to devise high-speed computers which have the ability for 'thinking', and learning, remembering, and problem-solving. Computers are basically different from mechanical machines in the sense that they employ heuristic principles for the 'sudden' solution of problems.[51] Spectacular advancements in pure sciences have thrown open new horizons of knowledge for new creative adventures.

The modern man finds himself in an entirely new world of highly advanced civilization which is fundamentally different from the natural world in which his ancestors were born. This breath-taking civilization with advanced pure and technical sciences presents a novel exhilarating atmosphere which stimulates and unleases his creative talent. Education acquires new dimensions and adopts new strategies within this conceptually and technologically transformed human civilization. Educational strategies have to be adopted in this new civilization to evoke creative talents in the learners so that they get transformed into intellectual aristocrats and supermen. Educational policy adopts a positive rôle in acquainting the learners with the history of human achievements down the ages. The learner has critical appreciation for the intellectual and aesthetic values which have been hitherto created by great galaxies of creative persons. Thereafter he turns to contribute his own share to rich fund of human knowledge through his free and original creative efforts. Creativity, then, is the supreme end of educative process.[52]

In sum, according to the present author the theory of educational science throws light on the philosophical foundations of education.[53] The philosophy of creative education is constructed on the super-structure of educational science. Philosophy of education strictly speaking refers to metatheory of educational science. Reunion between philosophy and science is inevitable because "philosophy without science in ineffective, and science without philosophy lacks clear and comprehensive vision".[54] Philosophy of education in the sense of metatheory of educational science is the only possible intelligible theory of education at the present stage of man's intellectual development.

51. Newell, A., Shaw, J.C. and Simon, H.A., 'Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving', Santa Monica, *The Rand Corporation,* 1957, p. 30.

52. Sinha, A.K., 'Philosophy of Education', *Journal of Education,* Vol. I, No. 1, 1959, p. 9.

53. Educational science is taken in the sense of praxiological science or the science of guiding action.

54. Sinha, A.K., *A World-View Through a Reunion of Philosophy and Science,* Calcutta, The Library of Philosophy, 1959, p. 458.

H.S. Sinha

HISTORICAL MYTHOLOGY AND MARXIAN UTOPIA

Historical Materialism is a fascinating myth of the modern age, which has become the strongest conviction of mankind. In order to argue against the individual liberty and personal freedon, and therefor, to justify the dictatorial notions of any conspiratorial organisation, assuming the title of revolutionary vanguards, one of the various "enemies of open society" (to use strictly the phraseology of Karl Popper), Marx weaved a mighty cosmological myth in which the nature of universe had been conceived in a way that man was in a process of developing a new consciousness conditioned by his socialized existence.[1] Mysterious and invincible "forces of production" with their rhythmic dialectical movement, are directing the course of events for the transformation of the "atomized" into a "socialized" humanity. On its pre-destined path from the "primitive Communism," to the "full (scientific) Communism" the Supreme historical agency reposes at four clear cut stages viz., (i) the slave owning (ii) the feudal, (iii) the capitalist and (iv) the transitory dictatorship of the proletariat, for the recapitulation and realisation of all its hidden potentialities. This mysterious process of history can neither be telescoped nor bye-passed; Every stage is pre-determined and, therefore, inevitable. Marx was definite on the point that no social order could ever disappear before all the productive forces for which there is room in it, have been developed[2] : Since the style in which the economic forces will behave (wirtschaftsstile) was revealed to Marx, he, like all other millennialist cults, assumed the responsibilty of assuring the depressed and dejected masses, that beneath the apparent turmoil and upheaval of the present, there lay a paradisal era for the realization of which the invisible forces of production, are automatically binding the "workmen together into a brigade". Such a teleological interpretation of socio-historical process is based on confusing the historical movement with false philosophical assumptions of historicism that there must be real ends in the physical order. This type of obscurantism was the infantile disease of Hegelian philosophy and his Absolutism and was tacitly borrowed by young Marx[3] from the official philosophy of Hegel; Although in his old age Marx himself protested against the historico-philosophical theory of the "Marche

1. Karl Marx and F. Engels; 'The German Ideology' (N. York-1947), p. 13-15
2. K. Marx—'Selected Works'—1942 (I), p. 357
3. The idea finds its place in Marx's Economic and Political Manuscripts of, 1844. Vide "obscurities and utopianism" quoted 'Problems of Communism' July-Aug. 66, p. 28

generale" imposed upon every people by fate[4], yet this did not alter his conviction of dialectical progression as the "inevitable law of history"; specially he could never give up the Hegelian idea that "there was a cosmic force which governs the human history independent of human volitions". The only modification that Marx could make in Hegelian Absolutism was that the "forces of production" took the place of "world Spirit" but the phantom of "inscrutible Law of Dialectic" always haunted Marx's mind. The relics of Hegelian belief lurk so much in Marxian concepts that Huxley could easily detect[5] all religious elements to be present in the communist doctrines including the loss of self-criticism in the flood of emotional certitude. Like most dogmatic and obscurantist faiths, it has high degree of hysteresis. In the form of the materialist conception of history, Marx preached his "Gospel of Deliverance" to the poor "and in preaching the Gospel, he propagated the same historical myth of Divine justice helping the poor, which early Islam and christianity used in order to win over the frustrated ones to their side. The messianic myths become the strongest conviction of the frustrated people only if they guarantee them an unverifiable bright future with indisputable certainty. Under the Jewish dogma of "chosen people"[6] which Marx always carried with him, this prophetic soul of the wide world, dreaming on the things to come" (Shaskespeare) burdened himself with the idea that he was the man whom the mysterious power of History had selected to consumate the evolution of historical change"[7]. The revelation came in a London Musuem, where the Dialect whispered in his ears what the future has in store for the masses and that "a day will come when the knell of the private capitalistic property sounds".[8] Since the historic questions of futuristic character are a matter of faith, and they do not admit of any rational enquiry, the pronouncements of Marx do not differ in any way from the prohesies of Daniel and the Revelation of John, about the "Promised Land." Marxist myth, is only a secularised version of Judeo-christian eschatology. It is a creed, a catechism or a confession of faith and its adherents are supposed to be zealots moved by the intensity of their faith or of their personal commitment to the party in order to assume the mentle of their prophet Marx. The party in turn has devised a heirarchy of special pundits, who are the carriers of the historic message and are responsible for the maintenance of its doctrinal purity. Their words of interpretation cannot be challenged. Thus speaking, doubt which is the virtue of Science is considered to be a sin in this creed. For centuries men have died for their faith. Other men equally sincere also died for their right to disbelieve but Marxism teaches its followers to die with a fanatical fervour for their faith *i.e.* that the proletariat who are burdened with agonising misery to-day, will build enduring citadel of econemic prosperity tomorrow. This

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4. Karl Marx—Selected Correspondence, p. 354
5. Huxley Julian—Man in the Modern World (1950), p. 138
6. Karl Popper—in 'Theories of History' (Ed.) Patrick Gardiner. p. 278 ff.
7. Ludwin Von Mises (London, 1958) 'Theory of History, p. 399
8. Karl Marx—Das Capital (7th Ed.) 1.728.

is the inescapble will of the History. Men burdened with the sin of craving for private property have no right to scan the Almighty Dialectic, but simply to surrender to it. 'Die weltgenschichte ist das weltgericht' (The history of the world is the world's court of judgment), is Hegels' famous aphorism and Marx adopted the same as his religious slogan that history is the judge, its excutioners, the proletariat.[9] Such mythical pronouncements about the course of superhuman forces (be it a Divine decree or the forces of production) are based on sheer mysticism and leave no doubt that Marx was not only influenced by 'Hegelian Dialect' but also by Hegelian obscurity of a purposive principle' working behind all the facts' in holding that history is a progressive development towards the realization of a certain approved goal". The esoteric mystry about the historic behaviour of the 'forces of production, is revealed only to the class-conscious members of the Marxian sect and conveyed to the credulous vanguards of cataclysm like a theological dictum. "Believe and you will understand, Trotsky used to say." Just a movement's reflection with faith is needed, and great light will come......". Engels once wrote, "How greatly superior the uneducated workers, for whom one can easily make comprehensible the most difficult economic analysis, are to our 'conceited educated people,' to whom such intricate questions remain insoluble their whole life long.[10] Another Marxist also holds, "Any one who has taught Marxist economic theory to British Coal miners, knows that they grasp its intricacies more easilv than the Oxford dons."[11] Facts every where corroborate that the dogmatic pronouncements and speculative anticipations of Marx about the future state of human existence had their ambitious sweep among the semi-educated or illiterate masses. The vision that Marx saw, aroused a responsive chord in hearts of common men and the naive myth of a full communism' *i.e.*, of a final classless communist society of plenty, still serves a real psychological purpose by directing the attention of the people to a brighter future simply because the frustrations and adversities of man's temporal suffering create in them a hope for a blessed future, 'a fabulous golden age",[12] beyond which no historical research can ever go, and once you succeed in creating a fanatical faith in the inevitability of fulfledged communism, it will not be difficult for you to twist all the reality to conform to this dogma. Carr, therefore, rightly concludes that as a matter of fact, Marx is the outstanding example in the history of truth, which is sometimes ignored or denied, that fanaticism is as easily compatible with intellect as with emotion......"[13].

9. Marx, Karl; Selected Correspondence, p. 91
10. Engles F., Selected Works, 1942:1; p. 243.
11. Blake W.J 'An American looks at Karl Marx (N. York-1939), p. 114
12. Such praxeological predictions of Marx sound like chiliastic prophecies of christians that 'Christ will rule over this earth for a thousand year when no suffering would remain. Having dropped the christian theology, Marx might have utilized their prophesies so as to make its adherents inbibed with a highly emotional or fanatical zeal for "a cause".
13. CARR. E.H., 'Karl Marx; A study in Fanaticism (London 1935), p. 61-62

The central themes of Marxian myth were developed in various ways. The whole theory of Marxism has arisen as a reaction against the politico-economic and socio-philosophical trends sweeping Europe during 19th Century, and Marxism is summarily described as the illegitimate off-spring of the 19th century liberalism.[14] Lenin the official torchbearer of communist ideology, has recognised three sources of Marxism and confesses that almost all the ideas woven into a system were already put before the world. Some predecessors of Marx, like Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cabet and Louis Blanc had proposed a socialistic remedy of the unequal distribution of goods so much so that to many great scholars of Economics, the socialism of Marx remained hardly distinguishable from that of Lassale.[15] Much before the pronouncement of the Communist Manifesto (1848), Sismondi had criticized the evil of competition and the doctrine of absolute Laissez faire and showed how the social inequality necessitated the submission of the weak to the will of the strong. The Simonians who later organized themselves into a sect, hurled a bitter criticism of private property,[16] much before Marx wrote his Das Capital. Idea of collectivism also originated with Saint-Simon and socialism found its greatest protagonist in Proudhan. Even the concept of class struggle as the means by which dialectic has found social expression and which is the most vital concept of Marxism, is given in explicit terms, in Simon's view that economic relationship and class-conflict are the determinants of historical changes. What remained for Marx to add to all this paraphernalia of Socialism ? With a provoking swagger Marx simply added a "sermon of political opportunism;" He took the responsibility to provide a historico-philosophical myth 'to lessen the birthpangs of impending political development'"[17] and proposed that a strong dictatership will be needed to build a bridge between the capitalism and fuller communism. Marx wrote "we are in favour of the state withering away and at the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which represents the most powerful and mighty authority of all forms of state which have existed upto the present day........This contradiction is a living thing and reflects Marxist dialects[18]. Such creed as gives a ruthless weapon of dictatorship, can be adopted as an official cult and popularised by any nation which wants to force her people into conformity to rulers wishes, and in this political usage lies the key source of strength of the Marxian myth.

Analysing the various factors which gave rise to the historical mythology of Marx, the most important role is played by the Pessimist School of Economists, which discovered the antagonism between the

14. Carew Hunt, R N , p. 74.

15. Gide and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines (VII-Ed.), p. 434.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

17. Mayo H.B., An Introduction to Marxist Theory, p. 95.

18. Marx Karl-Selected works, 1942. I, p. 184 with note by J. Statin.

capitalists and workmen.[19] With the help of their hypothetical 'Law of Diminishing Return', they drew a dismal conclusion that there was a definite limit to the production of the necessities of life beyond which it cannot be increased and therefore mankind had no prospects of bettering its lot. To substantiate these gloomy conclusions further, there appeared in 1826, the revised Edition of Malthus' Book, 'An Essay on the Principles of Population etc. which showed a competitive race between hunger and sex in which there was a universal tendency of Sex to over-run the means of subsistence. In nut-shell, Malthus concluded that hunger will always remain the basic problem of humanity unless some restraints were imposed to check the vageries of the blind instinct of sexuality which is driving mankind on the road to misery. Malthus created panic in the masses that the burden of the distress will be borne by the poorer section of the society because the rate of proliferation is always higher in the low-income groups.[20] Two other master-minds of the age, Adam Smith and Ricardo also used the inexorable laws of economics to justify a pessimistic view of society and convinced the masses why they should always remain poor. However, to keep the poor classes always at the mercy of the philan thropists, Adam Smith held that the rich are led by an invisible hand in such a way that they, without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of society.[21] Masses started feeling that they cannot be saved from this inevitable disaster. Malthus blocked all chances of amelioration and further discouraged the poors by placing all blame on them for their wretched condition. He held that 'the people must comprehend that they are themselves the cause of their poverty, due to their own incorrigible bad habits,[22] and thereby he furnished the rich classes with a good pretext for dissociating themselves from the fate of the working classes and let them always remain in drudgery. The corruptive influence of Malthus aroused a wide-spread indignation. It gave rise to a spate of furies; voices of protest were raised against it. Godwin condemnend Malthus as 'that black and terrible demon that is always ready to stiffle the hopes of humanity.[23] On the other hand the striken mankind feeling the burden of sufferings imposed on them by Malthus and dreading the dismal future assigned to them by the Pessimist School of Economists, were hecticly searching for a word of solace. Ambitious Marx, who had lost the power-game once in Germany and again in France and who had recluded into a London Museum, found it the proper time to win over the dejected and depressed classes to his side, because the blood of the poor class has always been the cheapest commodity for ambitious leaders to build their glory. To Marx, it was safer to commit mistakes than to lose the opportunity. Therefore,taking Malthusian speculative calculations for granted,

19. Gide and Rist op. cit., p. 133:
20. *Ibid.*, p. 137, Foot-notes.
21. Adam Smith 'Theory of Moral sentiments Pt. IV-Chap. I (1813), p. 419.
22. Malthus quoted in Gide and Rist-op. cit., p. 130 and Foot note, p. 134.
23. Gide and Rist op. cit., p. 145.

Marx, started with a faulty assumption that whenever capital ripens, the proletariat becomes steadily pooer and more numerous, whereas bourgeoise becomes rich and fewer.[24] Malthusian law was never put into practice; it projected only an ideal vision of things. But instead of pointing out the limitations in the operation of Malthusian demographic principle, Marx started building imaginary fortifications against imaginary insecurity. To the last, Marx could not bring himself to believe that the workers would share the benefits of mass production or that the improvement in it will do away with the miseries of industrial masses.[25] The atmosphere of economic prohibitions created in Edmund Wilson's "To the Finland station",[26] was itself very dreadful for the industrial labour and reaction to it was bound to be sharp. When Marx came to read Malthus, he could not bear the gloom that Malthusian system painted. Engels, the co-pioneer of communism was convinced that 'capitalist society was an endless horror.'[27] Considiring Malthus to be a confirmed ideological weapon used by the bourgeois (i) to fight against social revolution and (ii) to demoralise the workers, Marx and Engels anathematized him and cursed his population theory with great gusto, with the typical phraseology of their creed e.g., 'The vulgar economist,' "Sycophants of the bourgeoise,' the contemptible Malthus, 'the fundamental meanness of his outlook', 'a libel on the human race', 'this repulsive blasphemy against man and nature,' mad-brained reactionary scheme on population".[28] With the exception of coining certain abuses, Marx could not detect the inherent defects of Malthusian doctrine. On the contary, in his doctrine of 'surplus value' Marx uncritically assumed the Malthusian theory of population to be an absolute word. Malthus had created a crisis of man living with unlimited wants in the world of limited resources and there were two alternatives to come out of this wilderness viz. (i) either to increase the means of subsistence, which according to Law of Diminishing Return could not be increased beyond a particular limit (ii) or to somehow prevent the growth of population. Marx assumed that these solutions were totally exhaustive. Accordingly since, no defences can be erected against the vageries of sex, the masses were bound to follow the slope towards perdition, which Malthus predicted. Disgusted with the Malthusian horror, Marx had to invoke the german wizard Hegel and in strictly Hegelian style, he suggested that if Malthus is to be counteracted, a perfect political control will be needed over the allocation of resources and over the distribution of economic goods. Thus, due to his false assumptions as well as his "argumemtun ad populum" Marx provided a good justification of

24. Mayo H.B., op. cit. P/65.

25. Marx Karl, seleced works 1942, II P/437.

26. Quoted by Willim T. Bluhm-Theories of the Political system. (1965 Printice Hall) P/419.

27. Engels. F. Anti-Duhring-Hand book P/301.

28. Ronald L. Meek (Ed) Marx and Engels on Malthus (London 1953) P/60 and P/115-53.

bureaucratic political super-structure and in the name of welfare of masses he pleaded for the restoration of Machiavillian 'Princes' and Hobbes' 'Leviathan', which the enlightened world had already discarded. Any bid to thrall totalitarianism was bound to arouse a sense of indignation and condemnation in a country like England which was proud of her traditions of parliamentary democracy. Marx feared that he may not have to lose his last assylum. He transferred the responsibility on the mythical Dialectic and to avert that he pronounced an utopian scheme that it was not he who foresaw the collapse of English liberalism but the forces of production will automatically create circumstances making the self-destruction of Capitalism inevitable.[29] Engels also lended his full support to this utopia saying that under the guidance of the blind invisible hands, the humanity will take a leap from the "realm of necessity" into the"realm of freedom",[30] and the mighty Dialectic forces were on the side of labourers. In order to boost the morales of the demoralised workers who were helplessly waiting for their dismal fate under the spells of Malthusians, history was projected to be rolling along its set dialectical grooves, which would create circumstances to make the mass men triumphant in the end. History, however, refused to grant any ontological status to Malthusian system. But Marx could never detect that Malthesian type of laissez faire and a social order based on it was a purely imaginary scheme, nor he could realise that the sufferings painted by Malthus were also unreal, although consistent with his speculative scheme. Marx, rather made some laws to liquidate the imaginary Malhusian society. Accordingly, the whole of 'Das Capital' is a critique of inflated and exaggerated account of the cruelties involved in the industrial system as reported by the Royal Commission. Marx mistook it as due to the essential operation of Malthusiam Laws. The sufferings to which Marx sharply reacted were largely imaginary, and the solution sought for them, should also, for the most part be irrelevant to the real issues of life, since it could be applicable to an imaginary world, full of gloom : The Sociological evidence has overwhelmingly proved it that all miseries of mankind are not grounded in the unfateful race between hunger and sex, as Malthus tried to establish and the progressive man craves for something more than food, shelter and clothes. That is why the messianic myth of Marx that orthogenetic march of history was indisputably communism-oriented, could become popular only in those parts of the globe where it appealed to the elemental feelings of the semi-civilized communities *i.e.* the hunger for bread. There is a reason for that. The philosophers reflecting upon the problems of any sick society (may it be real or a creation of their own imagination), have always been consoling themselves and the masses around them with the visions of distant future, which are generally the generalisations conditioned by their own personal

29. For an eloquent statement of this, see Communist Manifesto where the proletariat has been projected as "The subjective agent of transformation." of capitalist society into a communist society.

30. Engels F. Anti-Duhring (N. York) 1939 Ed. PP/309-310.

experiences and Marx could hardly be an exception to that. Marx insisted that political contol over the hunger-satisfying activities of man, in the form of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' will destroy the undue competition which was the bane of a bourgioise society and dialetically, which was the fundamental ingredient of the revolutionary over-throw of the competitive society. Engels, however, later on corrected him saying that not only the economic factors, but 'greed and lust for (politico-social) power are also the levers of historical development'.[31] Engels was more realistic on this point and if we accept Engels' verdict on social dynamism, we can have no hesitation in subscribing to the views of Karl Popper that "indeed the divergence of interests within the ruling and the ruled classes goes so far that Marx's theory of classes must be considered as a dangerous over-simplification, even if we admit that the issue between the rich and the poor is always of fundamental importance. One of the great themes of medieval history, the fight between popes and emperors, is an example of dissension within the ruling class. It would be probably false to interpret this quarrel as one between exploiter and exploited."[32] Marx committed a fallacy in his unwarranted asumptions that cataclysmic transformation of men will satisfy his hedonistic and selfish instinct and that the human happiness will be determined in exact proportion of "how the economic goods are exchanged." He confused between distribution of goods and "the distribution of happiness" and like a gross quantitative hedonist, he thought that with the equal distribution of goods, the happiness can also be distributed equally, between man and man. Thus Marx is left in the unfortunate and uncomfortable position between the two paradoxical principles of which communism *per se* has no answer. If the economic goods excite a degree of pleasure proportional to their quantity, then all pleasures will have to be taken to be of the same quality *viz.* the quantity of pleasure being equal the pleasure of pushpin will be as good as that of poetry (Bentham) and ignoring the utilitarian criterion of his comtemporary J. S. Mill, Marx will have to admit that the pleasures of a Socrates can be equated to those of a fool, which is *prima facie* absurd. Some persons would prefer to be 'human beings dissatisfied rathar than to be a pig satisfied'. But if we agree with Sigwick's principle that pleasures of a scientist or an intellectual will always differ from that of a fool or of a morone and that some individuals are capable to draw greater enjoyment from a particular economic good than others, marxists will have to admit that all persons are not absolutely equal. The communist aphorism that given equal share in the economic goods, people will become equally happy, will remain a pious myth. Antagonism between man and man will prevail even when the economic goods are equally distributed. Pleading for the utopian scheme was, therefore, only an opportunity to demonstrate how disturbed Marx really was over his own deprivations.

31. Engels F., Selected works (1942), I-p. 447.

32. Popper Karl. The open Society and its Enemies, p. 307.

Another source of the fallacy committed by Marx in the genesis of his myth is a common confusion prevalent amongst the German thinkers of Kant-Hegel school. Since Marx was philosophically very much obsessed by the Hegelian convictions, he in order to pay back the intellectual debt of his great master, borrowed all the great fallacies of Hegelianism and applied them indiscriminately against his political rivals. Accordingly, he thought that what is 'morally desirable' must be 'naturally inevitable' also. First of all Kant made this mistake in proving the existence of God on the basis of his ethical 'ought' (God is, because He ought to be). Although Marx posited himself to be an opponent of idealism yet he could not get rid of the idealist conviction that "so and so must exist" because it "ought to exist". Even if he considered a particular type of the socio-economic order of society (communism) to be morally desirable, he was not justified in concluding from it and asserting that it was a factual possibility also. This apart, the identity of logic and ontology is also an infantile disease of Hegelian idealism, which infected the sensitive and wishful mind of young Marx and he, like his Master also, confused between *Ratio cognoscendi* (that dialectic was a logico-methodological device) and *Ratio essendi* (that dialect was the essence of the things). The Marxists even today never bother to rectify this confusion although a scientific philosophy would never allow such unwarranted confusion of methodology and ontologism. It is not that the problem did not worry Marx but Marx tried to evade this acute and critical problem, holding that "the dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking, which is isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question."[34] Confusion of moral and ethical categories i.e., the bonum consumatum (communism) with the ontological character of material phenomenon (that all natural phenomena is directed towards the pre-conceived end which we think desirable), is nothing but an ego-centric predicament of all those thinkers who wish the nature to move according to their personal ideosyncracies. They indulge in myth making to satisfy their whims : Marx was embittered by the disillusionment which swept over Europe after the French Revolution of 1848. He saw the disasterous collapse of socialism with his own eyes. The rise of English Laissez faire system which produced unbearably dismal consequences in the economic affairs, and the powerful currents of individul economic competition was driving their strength from Darwinian doctrine of "copetitive struggle for the means of subsistence". The laissez faire economists arguing from the Darwin's law of Selectivism and of the survival of the fittest, denounced all forms of state relief to the poors and also discouraged the collective efforts on behalf of the distressed, as all such efforts tended to perpetuate the weakness by protecting the inferiors (whom nature, according to Darwin, did not want to survive) and thereby hindering the course of evolution. The distressed people of Europe were craving for a new type of social system which could protect them against the

34. Marx Karl, "Eleven Theses on Feuerbach-quoted-Emile Burns, in Handbook of Marxism (N. York 1935), p. 229.

implications of the Darwins 'Selectivism'. To Marx it became a burning problem as to how the forces of competition could be nullified in order to remedy the despairs of life. Nullified, because he thought that competition was neither beneficial to the wage earners nor it was effective as the regulator of the capitalist enterprise, and the only remedy was to nullify the system itself. The danger posed by Darwin was serious as it shattered the hopes of the masses for survival. Man has always longed for protection against the dangers of life to which he is exposed or can possibly be exposed. Marx, who was already embittered due to repeated failures and disappointments took the lead to sharply re-act against the theoretical vageries of the competitive capitalist economy of later 19th century. The only refuge against the danger which Marx could seek was there in Hegelian dialect, and all its fallacies. Mayo has aptly assessed its consequences stating that 'despite its greatness, the philosophy of Hegel will remain always one of the best armories whence weapons may be drawn by any one who wishes to launch an attack on liberty, reason and individual freedom. If people can he permanently spoiled by too much bad philosophy in their youth, then Marx is a prime example."[35] Accordingly Marx applied the Law of "Iron Logic in Nature," to crush English liberalism without realising its consequences that the remedy proposed would prove more fatal than the disease. Much of the obscurity of Marxist creed, therefore, is traceable in his attempts to allegorize all such fallacies of Hegelian closed system of society, as he thought useful for his political ambitions to justify dictatorship as against the liberal democracies.

Restricting the population within the means of subsistence through "Communism of wives" and selective breeding was, advocated by Plato also. But seldom this problem was given so much prominence as in the age of Malthus. Darwin, in his richly documented book "Origin of Species", published in 1859, extended support to Malthusian theory of hunger-sex competition, and acknowledged his indebtedness to Malthus specially in formulating his principles of "the struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest.' Thus Darwin put a seal of confirmation on the Malthusian horror by declaring that nature selects only those who are "fit for survival." When this book was published it was greatly appreciated by Marx, since Darwinianism gave an idea that nature was "red in her tooth and claws", and that the struggle among of contending species has been an struggle among the organised groups.' This idea, as Marx himself points out,[36] served as the basis in natural science for his theory of class struggle in history. Engels also greatly applauded the idea and held that "Darwin transferred the socio-economic struggle to Nature, whence it was transferred back again to society (by Marx) to prove the "eternal laws of society."[37] Not only that Darwin's law inspired these two

35. Mayo Henry B., op. cii. p/5.

36. Marx Karl; Selected Correspondence p/125-126.

37. Engels F. Dialectic of Nature p/208.

pioneers of Communism, but it also helped Marx to re-assert in his socio-economic terminology that a new species viz the "Communist man" was in the offiing, which would be 'the crown of creation.' Darwin's law of Natural selection advocated that favourable varieties would automatically be accumulated and that if a particular habit were to require less and less practice over many generations, it would become inseparable from instinct.[38] Since Marx himself was not a biologist, and he himself could not work out any theory of phylogenetic change in the structure of organism, he incorporated the Darwinian idea in his theory of human history and advocated a political dictatorship on the grounds, that if the environment is controlled politico-economically during the transition period of proletarian dictatorship, the habits created during this period, will become a hereditory behaviour just like a morphological character (since Darwin had treated behaviour of animals just like a morphological character) Later on, however, these communist thinkers realised to their great dismay that Darwin had betrayed all their hopes and had joined the bourgeoise fold in attacking the masses. Darwin's principle of prolific reproduction and capability of adaptation to the environment substantiated on scientific grounds, the conclusions of Mathusian essay on Demography that natural state of man is extreme poverty and insecurity. Engels, therefore, had to draw a line of self-defence against the operation of Darwinian curse and cautioned his followers to avoid, in the interest of communism itself, the confusion of Physics, (physical modes) with economics[39]. Lenin also had to caution his comrades that biological ideas should not be transferred to the domain of social sciences[40]. The scientific generalisations of Darwin gave a new weapon in the hands of the privileged classes to exploit the inferior masses. Since the authenticity of the conclusions of science was considered unchallengable those days, the mechanistic scheme of Darwin was widely accepted uncritically. It was beyond the competence of the non-scientists to launch any rational philosophical criticism against the scientists, howsoever vague their conclusions may be. Marx could not, therefore, expose the basic fallacies of applied-Darwinianism, but he was shocked to find that in the process of prolific reproduction, nature was producing the species in abundance and out of that enormous production she was selecting only a few by eliminating many. This enormous wastage of Natural resources was due to the fact that nature was behaving in a very chaotic manner because Darwin's system failed to provide any plan. This plan was available in Hegel's myth of 'planned march of History', which always haunted the mind of Marx. He, therefore, in order to check the vagaries of Darwinianism, threw the aura of Hegelianism and thereby arrested the unwarranted wastage in the liberal competitive society; consequently, as a rememdy of the liberal political economy of later 19th Cent. England, which found its support in the

38. Darwin C The Origin of Species (N. York) p/185.
39. Engels F. Selected Correspondence p/411.
40. Lenin N., Materialism and Empireo Criticism. p/284.

Darwin's law of competition for survival, Marx once again posited the mytho-historical justification in favour of a rigid dictatorship of the workers regulating all the natural resources. But how long this dictatorship was to last and when the masses were to be released from the realm of necessity to jump into the realm of freedom, i.e. when the fetters of politi cal serfdom were to break, Marx himself was vague about it. All the Marxian maxims are, therefore, nothing but deliberate b'd to pursuade the masses to succumb, in their own interest, to the will of the totalitarians and bear the tyranny ungrudgingly. Following the political traditions of his master Hegel, Marx also, by some miraculous and obfuscating pieces of verbal jugglary, put his philosophical benediction upon the political dictatorship and in very sophisicated but shrewd words he forced the discontented labour to obey the dictates of those ambitious leaders who claim to be the vanguards of history and of the communist movement. The horrified and frustrated masses, who accepted, under the allurements presented by the new creed, the marxian solutions of their miseries, are still consoling themselves with dreams of a false dawn that ultimately the political movement will turn its course in their favour and their chains will be loosened. In essence, the positive Marxian pronouncements have not gone beyond the Aristotalian dictum that men turn to revolution when they think that they are not being granted what is due to them. The whole of communist manifesto re-iterates the age old, common sense political aphorism that such rulers as cannot provide the adequate means of subsistence to their masses, are not competent to rule and their fall is inevitable. To give it a religious ecstasy, Marxist added only some shrewed slogans from which their creed draws strength. In its negative aspect, marxism is anti-religious, anti-Darwinian, anti-Malthusian, anti-liberal etc. etc. and an attitude which is anti-everything is only a reaction and nothing else.[41]

The prophetic vision of Marx however, failed. Just as the heavenly bodies ignored the laws of motion prescribed to them by Newton, and the laws of heredity and mutations of germ plasm refused to obey the decree of atheists like Darwin in order to follow the dictates of a religious priest Mendel; Nature rejected the idea of a classless world, as a sociological myth and instead of heading towards communistic behaviour," it has given rise to complex and divergent classes in every field of organic world; History, in the same way, has belied the hopes of historical materialists. The prophet Marx pronounced that historical process would follow the course prescribed to it by him, which would lead to (i) the sinking impoverishment of labour, (ii) the disappearance of the middle class and thereby polarization of the society into two mutually hostile classes. But history seems to have conspired against this design and adopted a new course which is giving rise to the exploiting class of bureaucrate

41. Ortega Y Gasset 'Treasuay of Philosophy (Commonwealth Ed 1964), p. 877.

managers. Everywhere, where the followers of Marxian creed staged a communism-oriented revolution, it was the bureaucracy that took the state in its possession. It is therefore the universal bureaucratic class and not the proletariat, as Marx visioned that has succeeded the capitalist class after its overthrow in the dialectical process. When the proletariat class will take over the charge of history from this newly emerged class, the Marxian law nowhere mentions. Marx himself confessed[42] that bureaucray uses the state machinary for its own selfish interests. Prima-facia, the exploited masses, still remain exploited even after the fall of capitalist system; only the modes of exploitation have changed. Strangulating the masses under totalitarian regime and thereby thinking that their miseries have been cured, has proved to be a great historical myth and history has disproved the utopian pronouncements of Marx. But it is the common tendency of the frustrated masses to console themselves with the enigmatical messages from the nocturnal realm, and there is no wonder if Marxian communism of a better future humanity still remains to them a dream when they will be the rulers.

42. Marx Karl, Selected works-1, p. 249-250.

C. L. Jain

ON PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN SCIENCE

'Philosophy of Science' (hereafter POS for abbreviation) though comparatively of recent origin, has, nevertheless, been recognised as a distinct discipline firmly established in its own right. The necessity of recognising it as distinct from philosophy (pure or general), on the one hand, and from science, on the other, did not emanate from some kind of a desire on the part of men of philosophy or of science but from the inevitable logic that led to the emergence of philosophical problems from out of situations of crisis in which human knowledge found itself in the various phases of its development. Such situations were frequent and pronounced in physical science, particularly in the last quarter of the nineteeth century and the first quarter of the current one. Most of the modern theories of physical science, such as the theories of relativity, quantum mechanics etc., are the outcome of deep philosophical insight and sound mathematical creativity.

But there are deep-rooted misconceptions about POS in philosophic as well as scientific circles. Leaving aside the common layman, who might find it hard even to appreciate the very significance of science, and hence the importance of POS, the professionals treat POS sometimes as a hoax created by philosophically minded scientists and scientifically minded philosophers. One very serious misconception about POS, that has emerged in recent times, is that POS is a link between science and philosophy.[1] Such a misconception arises from confusions resulting on various counts. Firstly, there is a much cherished belief that philosophy has many functions to perform; one such alleged function is to provide a comprehensive world-view based on the implications of modern theories of cosmology, physics, biology and other fields of science.[2] The construction of such synoptic world-views based on the results of science and aided by the speculative flights of 'synthetic' metaphysicians are said to provide the ground work for POS as the link between science and philosophy. Secondly, this confusion results from a failure to distinguish between metaphysics and philosophy; between metaphysical assumptions that science is alleged to make and the philosophical and methodological foundations of

1. Phillip Frank's *Philosophy of Science* (1958-Prentice Hall) carries at its sub-title 'the link between philosophy and science'.

2. Jain, C.L. (Science, Theory and philosophy) *Kurukshetra University Research Journal (Arts and Humanities)* Vol. I No. 1 (1967) pp. 149-50.

science.* Thirdly, it also resutls from a failure on the part of some 'Men of Ideas' to demarcate correctly the field of philosophy from that of science. Science is an epistemological discipline that aims at understanding the universe and communicating such an understanding to others. Philosophy is not an epistemological discipline in the sense in which science is; it is essentially critical and reflective activity and not a methodological discipline that aims at attaining empirical or rational knowledge. Philosophy is not a set of doctrines, dogmas or beliefs, nor is it a kind of constructed theory. Philosophy is a second order discipline.[3] In what follows, an attempt has been made to dispel the above confusions by purging philosophy of its various pseudo-functions, by distinguishing it from metaphysics and science. It is also the aim to establish the thesis that POS is a discipline distinct in its own right and is independent of the so-called 'pure' or 'general' philosophy. In other words, the contention is that problems clustered under the title 'POS' are problems pertaining to the various departments of science and have no or little relation with the problems under the traditional metaphysical approach to philosophy.

(2)

The early Greeks were "natural philosophers" in the sense that their main quest was to understand nature. Thales, the traditionally acclaimed father of science as well as of philosophy is said to have raised one of the most important problems of natural philosophy, namely, "What is the stuff of the Universe ?" Thales' recognition as the father of philosophico-scientific tradition does not lie in the answer he gave but in the fact that he raised a problem that provided stimulus to his immediate and later successors to carry on the process that he initiated. The above problem generated a host of other problems till we find, that with Plato one of the crucial problems is to find out the nature and criteria of 'true knowledge'. Plato condemned the world of sense as illusory and, therefore, unreal and thereby imparted the status of reality to the world of 'forms', which transcends the boundries of space and time, Plato's disciple and successor,

*It is interesting to note that in 1924 E.A. Brutt published *The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science*-Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1924. thereby claiming to have unearthed the historico-critical development of the metaphysical pre-suppositions of physics (natural philosophy). Recently, we find Errol E. Harris has published his work under the appellation *The Foundations of Metaphysics in science*-1965, Allen and Unwin-thus reversing the order, realising the absurdity of Brutt's approach. The reversal of order indicates the awareness of the fact that science does not have its roots in metaphysics, but, on the contrary, it is the metaphysicians who have to look for the roots of their field embeded in science. The scientist as such is unconcerned with the *Being* of metaphysicians.

3. Korner, Stephan (Some relations between philosophical and scientific theories) *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 17 No. 4 (1967) pp. 270.

Aristotle, took over the problem and attempted an answer in his own characteristic way.

'All men desire to know', thought Aristotle and he set out to find out the criteria of true (scientific) knowledge in contradistinction to mere opinion and myth. Indeed Aristotle's problem was to find out what constitutes scientific knowledge, as science was understood in his days. The answer Aristotle attempted in pursuance of the above question resulted in the systematization of various branches of what can come within the epistemic domain (environments) of man. Aristotle, it must be admitted, was the first who made such an attempt and thus laid the foundations for systematization that later came to be known as science. The credit for initiating the process for diverting into well-disciplined channels, the stream of knowledge, goes to him. He set the ball rolling and the process was carried on by his successors, as and when methodological necessities and organisational needs pressed as they did. In course of time, a clear distinction came to be made between science and philosophy (metaphysics); the former was conceived as aiming at acquiring knowledge of special aspects of the universe and later dealing with the fundamental or the first principle(s) of all existence. The historical development of the inter-relation between science and philosophy could, perhaps, be stated best as follows. In the early periods of Greek thought such a distinction was absent. In their formative period, therefore, both science and philosophy, as we understand these terms to-day, were hardly distinguishable from each other and thus everything relating to the universe fell within the purview of 'natural philosophy'. In the early stages, the job of a 'natural' philosopher was to *accumulate* wisdom (or true knowledge). In the subsequent period of their adolescence, from Aristotle's classificatory days to the beginning of modern scientific era, both science and philosophy developed in a spirit of rivalry. Philosophy, under the metaphysical cloke, continued to keep its illegitimate hold on science, even when the latter had chosen to tread on a seperate path. Philosophy grew somewhat unduly hostile to scientific adventure and science remained unduly subdued to metaphysical dogmatism and religious fanaticism. The free spirit of scientific enterprise, however, strove hard for emancipation from the haunting dogmas of metaphysical philosophy. The struggle continued, till, finally in the seventeenth century, science came out victorious. Science denounced metaphysical philosophy as an unbearable obstruction in its progress and marched on with a kind of indifference to the speculative flights of the metaphysicians. From then on, it became sufficiently clear that science will lead and philosophy will follow. The history of human thought of the last three hundred years will bear witness to this phenomenon.

To-day, a distinction between science and philosophy has been acknowledged. The mere fact that a distinct discipline such as POS has

been given recognition is sufficient to warrant from among philosophers, theoreticians and experimenting scientists. a distinction that has been due between science and philosophy.

POS remains to be distinguished from metaphysics; in particular from 'inductive' or 'synthetic' metaphysics. Metaphysicians, who are enamoured by the success that science has achieved, set out to build up metaphysical theories (world-views) on the results of science, thereby giving gratification to their much cherished speculative urges. These 'synthetic' metaphysicians are little aware of the fact that, apart from producing a hybrid child which has characteristics neither of science nor of pure speculation, the produce of their labours will have little or no impact upon the working scientists or the experts / critics. A scientist as such is not a metaphysician; conversely, a metaphysician is not a scientist and, in matters where speculation plays a vital role, is in no way better placed than the men actually working in the field. Even a professed 'synthetic' metaphysician like E.E. Harris holds that "..........science sets its own standards and its competence can only be presumed by the philosopher at the start. He cannot dictate, if only because he is (initially at least) ignorant of the criteria and credentials which validate science and for this reason he must, in order to discover what they are. examine the practice of the scientists".[4] A philosopher of science is not concerned with any kind of synthetic or synoptic activity, with which a metaphysician is concerned. POS is a second order discipline concerned chiefly with the critical study of science. Science is a first order discipline mainly concerned with the study of the phenomena of nature. Criticism presupposes understanding and understanding, in turn, presupposes analysis. Hence, any critical activity about science involves proper understanding of science, which requires an analytical study of the language, logic etc. of science. POS is only a critical activity and not a synthetic tool for use by the metaphysicians.

There is another view maintained which subsumes scientific activity (practical as well as theoretical) within the framework of metaphysical 'programming'. It is held that scientific interests may be shown to be connected with some metaphysical problem of the day...... the interest that dominates the tradition in that science and that this general interest springs from, and flows back to, metaphysics.[5] A view of the type is however, harmless, in so for as scientific research is concerned, since the working men of science seem to care little for the metaphysical guidelines of the day, while undertaking their co-ordinative activity. In fact, situations could be traced from the history of science, wherein the theoretician was purposely compelled to counteract the prevailing metaphysics or any

4. Harris, E.E. : *The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science* 1965, Allen and Unwin, pp. 31.

5. Agassi, Joseph : (The nature of scientific problems and their roots in metaphysics) *The Critical approach to Science and Philosophy* (Ed.) M. Bunge pp. 191

other kind of pseudo-scientific view that impeded his progress towards comprehensive theory-construction.

Metaphysics is a matter of attitude. Attitudes alone determine what one desires to believe and consequently know. And what one desires to believe is to a great extent arbitrary and subjective. It would not, therefore, be an unfounded assertion that metaphysics, by and large, stems from out of one's basic attitudes towards his environments; the speculative flights run in the form of creative imagination as a reaction thereto, It is the arbitrary and subjective character of speculation which renders all metaphysical activity useless for scientific purposes. But, nevertheless, speculation has a limited role to play in the acquisition of genuine knowledge. The chief role that speculation plays in the context of the methodology of science is to enable the experts to co-ordinate the relevant and sometimes even the diverse kind of data into a coherent but a verifiable whole. But such a role is restricted and around it are fetters that would always keep it bound to experience. In the absence of such fetters a distinction between genuine scientific theories on the one hand, and metaphysical adventures and pseudo-scientific activity, on the other, will be indefensible. As such metaphysics has outlived its purpose.

(3)

POS as a discipline distinct both from science and metaphysics means that it is something *concerning* science. POS is not part of science itself, as physical, biological and social science might form part of what is collectively called as 'natural or empirical science'. Men of science investigate happenings and events, by making osbervations and performing experiments in the physical universe and aim at constructing, theories, laws and generalizations, through the process of concept formation and with the help of empirical techniques and logico-mathematical tools. Broadly speaking, science is a systematized body of statements arrived at by the application of the methods appropriate for its various branches. Theorising, which is the core of scientific activity, is idealization upon human experience. A theory is an ideal and never can exactly correspond to its empirical co-relates but, then, it is the only way of facilitating an authentic and verifiable understanding of nature. The ideal of science is theory-construction of the highest order in accordance with the methods universally acceptable.

The subject-matter of POS, if one may choose to define it in this sense, is science itself.[6] But there are various ways of talking about science, as in the context of its historical development, its methods, its language and logical structure, its relation to the social environments, its value to mankind and so on. But everything relating to science will

6. Brodbeck May, (The nature and function of Philosophy of Science) in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (Ed.) Feigle, M. and Brodbeck, May, (1953)

not, perhaps, come within the purview of what is called POS. Accordingly, it seems necessary to precisely demarcate the sphere of POS so as to distinguish it from other allied disciplines.

It is a commonplace to hear remarks of the kind that a study of the historical development of science is an essential pre-requisite for its proper understanding. Some historians of science go to the extent in saying that POS cannot be appreciated without a grasp of the history of science. But such a view is mistaken in as much as it puts the cart before the horse. In order to appreciate the historical development of a scientific theory one must first grasp the philosophical foundations underlying it and of those that it claims to replace. The history of a scientific theory may, in its turn, contribute to the philosophical analysis of it by disclosing the various vissitudes in the scientist's philosophical outlook. Taking the Special Theory of Relativity as a paradigm, A. Grunbaum seems to suggest that there is always a kind of symbiosis of the philosophy and history of a scientific theory, which leads to the development of scientific thought.[7]

Scientific activity as a social phenomenon is one among many. There are various aspects that call for study. A few of them such as the sustaining force for continued scientific research activity, the impact of the results of science on the various aspects of social life, the stresses and strains of the social environments on scientific enterprise, the choice of problems and conditions under which the scientists operate their vision and instruments, are matters for investigation under a certain discipline. 'Sociology of Science' is the current name designed for a study which investigates into the above mentioned aspects of scientific activity. Obviously, such a study comes within the field of behavioral sciences like social psychology and sociology, and as such is itself a kind of scientific activity and not a way of talking about seience. We may conclude that 'Sociology of Science' does not form part of POS but might constitute a fit subject for study by a social theorist.

The extent of the impact of science on social phenomena can be assessed only after one had understood the language, structure and significance of science. One of the chief aims of POS is to produce such an understanding. After ear-marking fields for disciplines like 'Sociology of Science' etc., it becomes comparatively easier to demarcate those aspects of science that fall within the purview of POS.

(4)

POS is chiefly concerned with *problems* that pertain to the structure and substance of a certain branch of science. As such the discipline might appear of dubious character. It is problems that engage the attention of a serious student irrespective of the scope and subject-matter of the

7. Grunbaum, A. (The bearing of Philosophy on the history of science) *Science*, 1964 Vol. 143; pp. 1406

professional disciplines. The compartmentalization of disciplines according to subject-matter is only a matter of organisational convenience. A discipline should be circumscribed by the set of problems that it has to pursue. We are all students not of subject-matters or disciplines but, strictly speaking, as Karl Popper says, of problems and search for a possible solution of a problem might force the individual to cut through various disciplines. From the point of view of this approach, the distinctions among various disciplines on the grounds of subject-matters is comparatively unimportant, even though they seem to be pretty important from the organisational point of view.

In the contemporary period, it has been promptly recognised that a genuine philosophical problem orginates in a situation of crisis particularly, that obtaining in science. It has also been recognised that only in terms of the importance of a philosophical problem, the significance of philosophical activity could be considered. As already said, philosophy is not a discipline in the sense in which science etc. is. The essence of philosophical activity consists in its contemplative effort to resolve the philosophical problem, which in order to be a genuine problem ought to have its roots in science.[8] It should spring from the ever uncertain edifice of scientific knowledge. It is indeed a rare opportunity for the philosopher to resolve a crucial situation and thereby restore the tottering foundations of science.

Broadly speaking, the problems concerning science could be split into two main domains. One set of problems relating to science is concerned with its structure and methods. These problems may be grouped under the appellation 'methodological problems of science'. Such problems emerge from consideration of the theoretical foundations of the methods of science; the subject is also known these days as the 'methodology of science'. It includes problems regarding the basis of observations; conditions of experimentation; problems regarding measurement; concept formation in various branches; explication of qualitative concepts into quantitative concepts; the problms of confirmation of scientific generalizations, laws and theories; problems pertaining to the relation of 'theoretical constructs' with the statements of empirical character through the 'rules of correspondence'. These problems are mainly concerning the structurisation of science. Michael Scriven calls such problems as the 'structural problems of science.'[9] These problems are essentially problems pertaining to the application of logic (including applied mathematics).

The other set of the problems of science emerge from the content or substance of science. To mention only a few, so far this domain of

8. Popper, K.R. (The nature of philosophical problems and their roots in science) *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III, (1952)

9. Scriven, M. (Explanation, Description and Laws) *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III (Ed.) Feigel, M. and G. Maxwell. (1962)

science is concerned, we have such problems, as the absolute or relative conception of space, time, motion, simultaniety and accelration; problems relating to forces and fields and so on. Scriven calls such problems as the 'substantial problems of science', as they belong to the substance or content of a scientific theory.[10] Substantial problems are essentially problems of pure logic. Though it seems difficult to draw a sharp distinction as regards problems of science in terms of structure and substance, nevertheless, for analytical purposes such a distinction can be justified. The majority of the philosophers of science seem to agree that their discipline has to concern itself with critical analysis of the logical problems relating to the structure and substance of science. Such an analysis is essential so that a solution to such problems is feasible. In certain cases such a problem analysis gives an insight into the solution of a problem, or, it may turn out on analysis, that the problem is a pseudo-problem. The main function of such an analyst is to undertake logical analysis of the systems of science (scientific concepts, laws and theories), their linguistic pattern and logical structure from the point of view of rigour, precision and consistency. But to be in a position to do justice to the subject, the researcher in the field must be a practical investigator, an acute observer and experimentalist so that he is well acquainted with the know-how of the scientific enterprise before he undertakes theoretical and critical adventure in the field. Only an individual equipped properly with the techniques of science can be in a position to evaluate and critically analyse the basic concepts of science. Perhaps, as P. W. Birdgman has said, the three roles, namely, that of experimentalist/observer, theoreticain and critic in the fields of science, have to be assumed by one and the same individual, though it is a rather difficult task.[11] But there is no getting away from this that, in order to be in a position to criticise or evaluate a certain subject-matter, the individual must be, in a certain measure an expert (experimentalist/theoretician). In the advanced stages of physics, for instance, the theoretician has to act as the philosopher of physics also. The theoretical physicist is indeed, in a sense, the philosopher of science.

A philosophical problem in science will have to be distinguished from a technical (non-philosophical) problem. A technical problem in a certain field of science relates only to the difficulties arising out of the imperfect techniques and tools, such as imprescion and inexactness of measurement, non-availability of certain data, absence of mathematical techniques and so on. Technical problems are first order problems. they are problems *in* the body of science. A philosophical problem is a second order problem being a meta-scientific querry occurring in the meta-language of science.[12] It may be buried underneath the debris of technical

10. *Ibid.*
11. Bridgman, P.W., *The nature of physical theory* p 2.
12. Ayer, A J. (The Philosophy of Science) in *Scientific Thought in the twentieth century* (Ed.) A.E. Heath. pp. 8.

problems. The distinction between a technical and a philosophical problem is only *contextual*. A technical problem in physics, such as the non-avilability of a certain mathematical technique, may well be a philosophical problem in mathematics. In view of this, it might appear superfluous to draw a hard and fast line between a technical and a philosophical problem. As regards a philosophical problem it is extremely difficult to say something in very certain and positive terms about its nature. One of the few things that can be said about it is that it is a crucial problem posing a serious bottleneck in the further development of scientific enterprise; the solution of the philosophical problem, if forthcoming, brings a revolution in the field concerned. For instance, the problem relating to the detection of *ether* in space was, for a long time, regarded as a technical problem but in the long run it turned out to be a major philosophical problem of epochmaking importance in the history of scientific thought. A major philosophical problem arising in the context of science is essentially either a 'structural' problem or a 'substantial' problem : one thing seems common to both that they are contextual and pose a serious obstacle in the progress of scientific enterprise. An acceptable solution of such problems alone can pave the way for progressive devolopment of science and towards comprehensive theory-construction (co-ordinatization), which is the goal of human endeavour in the effort to understand nature.

All problems pertaining to POS in the ultimate analysis are problems of logic (pure or applied) and hence any attempt towards their solution involves logical analysis and critical understanding of science. The scientific problems belong to the object-language of science and the philosophical problems belong to the meta-language. The problems of second order are problems of meaning and evidence and as such do not belong to any special branch of science but are general problems relating to the entire field of science. Thus, it seems correct to say that interesting philosophical questions concern its structure and its validation.[13]

We may conclude that POS deals with those problems which are about science but are outside the purview of science. On the other hand such problems cannot be treated within the traditional scheme of philosophy owing to their peculiar nature. The recognition of a discipline like POS, was, therefore, necessitated by the unsuitability of the traditional approach to the philosophical problems of science. POS emerged out of the bankruptcy of traditional philosophy and the pressing needs of modern science. For purposes of historical ancestry, all what has been said under traditional philosophy and is relevant to the problems of science has been brought well within the scope of POS.

13. Caws. Peter, (Aspects of Hempel's philosophy of Science) *Review of Metaphysics* June 1967, Vol. XX-pp 701.

SANSKRIT

Parmanand Gupta

RIVERS IN ANCIENT INDIAN INSCRIPTIONS*

The rivers, mostly, are referred to in the inscriptions when a place is described as situated on the bank of a river. It is along the banks of the rivers and in close proximity to them that we can trace the growth of tribal settlements and mighty kingdoms, prosperous towns and fertile villages, religious shrines and peaceful hermitages.

The cool surfaces of the river Lohitya (Brahmaputra) were used by the siddhas, who slept in the shades of the betel-plants that were in full bloom.[1] The capital of the kadambas, the town of Vanavāsī, is said to have there the chain of the lines of the swans sporting in the lofty waves of the river Varadā.[2] The city at the site of modern village Gaṅgadhār stood on the bank of the river Gargarā.[3] Gaṅgadhār inscription describes various means of adornment affecting this city,[4] Nagardhan Plates[5] of Svāmirāja record that the town Acalapura was situated on the bank of Śūlanadī. Similarly the famous city Prasannapura decorated with the series of gardens and forests, was situated on the banks of the river Niḍilā.[6] The name of the fort Gomati-Koṭṭaka[7] indicates that the fort stood along the river Gomatī.

Not only the cities and towns, but several villages also have been referred to as situated along the banks of the rivers. The villages Tiverekheṭa and Ghuikheṭa were situated on the south bank of the river Amveviaraka.[8] The modern village Tiwarkhed in the Multai Tehsil of the Betul district, Madhya Pradesh, on the south bank of modern Ambhorā (Amveviaraka), represents the village Tiverekheṭa. The river Ane flowed through the hamlet Javalā (Jaoli in Satara district).[9] The villages Kathūraka,[10] Āśramaka,[11] Thānaka[12] and Carmāṅka[13] were situated along the rivers Umā

* Inscriptions from 272 B,C. to 650 A D. only have been dealt with.

1. लोहित्यस्य तटेषु शीतलतलेषूत्फुल्लनागद्रुमच्छायासुप्तविबुद्धसिद्धमिथुनैः स्फीतं यशो गीयते (Aphsad Stone inscription of Ādityasena, CII, III, 203).
2. Aihole inscription, EI, VI, 5.
3. *CII, III, 75.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. EI, XXVIII, 9,
6. EI, XXIV, 49.
7. CII, III, 212.
8. EI, XI, 279.
9. MAR, 1929, 198.
10. EI, XXVI. 160.
11. CII III, 127.
12. IHQ, XX, 285.
13. CII, III, 237.

(Wunna), Tamasā (Tons), Primati and Madhunadī respectively. The river Kardamilā flowed to the east of the village Vaiśyavāṭaka.[14]

Many pious acts were performed by the people on the banks of the rivers. The king Usavadāta himself is said to have made gifts of cows, gold and tīrthas, *etc.* on the bank of the Barnāsa river.[15] Moreover, he established free ferries by boats on the rivers Dahanukā (Dahanu in Thana district), Pāradā (Pardi in Surat), Ibā (Ambikā in Surat), Damana (Daman-Gaṅgā in Daman), and Tāpī[16] A place called Alanda-tīrtha was located on the south bank of the river Bhīmarathī (modern Bhima).[17]

Rivers, not unoften, formed the boundary line between 'Janapadas', and witnessed many a struggle for supremacy between contending kings and emperors. The Lauhitya (Brahmaputra) formed the dividing line between Puṇḍravardhana and Kāmarūpa[18], and witnessed the glorious march of Yaśodharman and Mahāsenagupta.[19] The Bhaimarthī saw the struggle between Pulakeśin II and Āpyāyika and Govinda[20]. The king Mādhava-varman is said to have crossed the river Godāvarī with the desire of conquering the eastern region[21]. Eran Stone inscription[22] of Budhagupta mentions a country which lay between the rivers Kālindī and Narmadā.

Inscriptions, in some cases, give a vivid description of the rivers, their sources, banks and their waters, etc. The waters of the Gaṅgā have been described, at one place, as washing the sins of the Maitraka rulers[23], and, at another place, purifying the Bhāraśivas[24]. The heavenly descent of the Gaṅgā, and the waters of the Gaṅgā flowing through the matted hair of God Śiva are depicted at several places[25]. The relation of the Gaṅgā with the Himālayas is another topic in the inscriptions, which is depicted in poetic manner. 'High and Low torrents of the Gaṅgā spreading abroad from the Himavat'[26], 'the waters of the Bhāgīrathī being split and dashed outside by many masses of the rocks at her fall on the top of the snowy mountains'[27], and the table-lands of the Himālayas embraced by the Gaṅgā[28], are a few examples of such descriptions.

14. EI, XIX, 131.
15. Nasik inscriptions, EI, VII, 57; VIII, 78, 85,
16. EI, VIII, 78.
17. IA, XIX, 309
18. CII, III, 46.
19. *Ibid.*, 203.
20. EI, VI, 5
21. JAHRS, VI, 21
22. CII, III, 89.
23. *Ibid.*, 166, 174.
24. *Ibid.*, 237, 245.
25. EI, XXVII, 141, VI, 144, III 43, XXX, 266, JKHRS, II, 60, CII, III, 9.
26. CII, III, 153.
27. EI, VI, 144.
28. CII, III, 146

Another poetic description is of the river Palāśinī which is represented as the hand of the Ūrjayat mountain, (hand) decorated with the numerous flowers that grow on the edges of the banks of the river. This hand is stretched forth with the desire of appropriating the wives of the mighty ocean[29]. Junagadh inscription[30] of Rudradāman refers to the excessively swollen floods of the Suvarṇasiktā, Palāśinī and other streams of the Ūrjayat.

The river Kāverī is described as having the darting carps for her tremulous eyes.[31] The waters of the Niḍilā are said to be divided by striking with the hips of the beautiful ladies[32]. The moon-origin of the extensive moss of waters of the 'Revā' flowing from the slopes of the summits of the Vindhyas is mentioned in one of the Mandsaur inscriptions[33], Aihole inscription records the neighbourhood of the Vindhyas destitute of the lustre of many sandbanks of the Revā[34]. The banks of the Śālimā river are said to have been covered with flowers of various excellent trees and with pools of water[35]. The seven feeders of the river Sindhu are described as its seven mouths in Mehrauli Iron Pillar inscription of king Candra.[36]

29. CII, III, 64.
30. EI, XIII, 42.
31. *Ibid.*, VI, 6.
32. *Ibid*, VIII, 43.
33. CII, III, 153.
34. EI, VI, 6.
35. *Ibid.*, 144.
36. CII, III, 141.

S.N. Batra

DAŚAGRĪVA OR DAŚĀNANA OF THE RĀMĀYAṆA (THE TEN-HEADED RĀVAṆA)

The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata present a graphic and vivid picture of the civilization and culture, the political and social life and the religion and thought of the epic age. The two together reflect almost all the aspects of the period. The Rāmāyaṇa is immeasurably superior to the Mahābhārata in its delineation of those gentler and deeper emotions which elevate the hero and the heroine to almost unattainable heights of human behaviour and conduct. The righteous devotion, divine generosity, unparalleled self-sacrifice, enviable nobility and ideal friendship of Rāma and the exemplary faithfulness, unique self-abnegation, super-human endurance, unprecedented purity and conjugal love of Sītā run like threads of pure gold through the entire fabric of the epic and ennoble and sanctify it in the eyes of one and all.

The style of the Mahābhārata is fluent and natural and there is seldom visible any attempt at pedantry or undue ornamentation. The style of the Rāmāyaṇa, on the other hand,is charming in its ornateness and the poetry is of the first order. Ever since the modern languages of India began to form out of Sanskrit and the Prakrits, the Rāmāyaṇa had the greatest influence in inspiring our poets, both religious and secular. The Kamban Rāmāyaṇa in Tamil, Ranganātha Rāmāyaṇa in Telegu, Krittivasa's Rāmāyaṇa in Bengali, the Balarāmdāsa Rāmāyaṇa and the Vilanka Rāmāyaṇa in Oriya and Tulasīdāsa's Rāmcharitamānasa in Hindi are deeply indebted to the proto-genetic composition of the 'Ādi Kavi'.

Notwithstanding the reverence in which the Rāmāyaṇa has been held through the centuries, the great popularity it has enjoyed and the immense magnitude of its influence on the thought and conduct of the people of India and the countries in her east aud souh-east for countless generations, it contains personal characterisations and episodes which tax the credulity of the modern reader and make him highly critical. For instance, in this scientific age, how can we justify a flying Hanumān possessing miraculous energy or reconcile ourselves with the astounding tales of Sugrīva and Jāmbavān's prodigious strength? Even fabulous places like Mithialā referred to in this Mahākāvya are yet to be located accurately. Modern archaeological discoveries do not permit us to accept the description of the material culture given in this epic as genuine. The nature of the finds laid bare by the latest explorations and excavations runs counter to such descriptions given in the Rāmāyaṇa.

One of the knottiest problems posed by Vālmīki is the ten heads of Rāvaṇa. At numerous places we come across epithets like Daśagrīva and Daśānana, which credit the king of Laṅkā with the possession of ten heads, necks, faces and mouths. Occasionally in his desire to be consistent, the poet calls Rāvaṇa as twenty-armed. Below are given some verses in this context :

अथ नामाकरोत्तस्य पितामहसमः पिता ।
दशग्रीवः प्रसूतोऽयं दशग्रीवो भविष्यति ।।[1]

"His father who had Brahmā-like glory, baptized his son, saying, "he will be (famed) as Daśagrīva, as he is born ten-necked."

and

एवमुक्ता तु सा कन्या राम कालेन केनचित् ।
जनयामास बीभत्सं रक्षोरूपं सुदारुणम् ।।
दशग्रीवं महादंष्ट्रं नीलांजनचयोपमम् ।
ताम्रोष्ठं विंशतिभुजं महास्यं दीप्तमूर्धजम् ।।[2]

"Kaikasī after some time gave birth to dreadful and cruel Rāvaṇa with ten necks, big jaws, copper-like lips, twenty arms, a big face, lustrous hair and a body as black as coal."

Again,

व्याघ्रो वराहो जीमूतः पर्वतः सागरो द्रुमः ।
यक्षो दैत्यस्वरूपी च सोऽदृश्यत दशाननः ।।[3]

"At that time ten-faced Rāvaṇa appeared in the form of tiger, pig, cloud, mountain, sea, tree, yaksha and daitya."

These fantastic descriptions and shapes of Rāvaṇa show that the poet is indulging his imagination to the full. No such human being as is portrayed in these verses is possible under the sun. The archaeological excavations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and other parts of the world have not so far yielded any skeleton of a demon (if at all such a being ever existed) answering to this description, nor of a human being with the unusual number of heads. The skeletons recovered from the cemeteries of Mesopotamia, Harappa and Lothal and the Egyptian mummies clearly show that the ancient inhabitants of these regions possessed one head. The fossilized remains of "Pekin man" of the palaeolithic ages discovered from the cave near Pekin (Pei-ping)[4] also go to prove the above statement. According to scholars like V. Gordon Childe even Sinanthropos and Homo sapiens, both the species, had one and only one head.[5]

1. Uttarakāṇḍa, Sarga 9, Śloka 32—"Nirnaya-Sāgar" Press, Bombay, 1929 (For all the references given in the Article, this edition of the *Rāmāyaṇa* has been used).
2. *Ibid.*, Sarga 9, Ślokas 27-28.
3. *Ibid.*, Sarga 15, Śloka 32.
4. Gordon Childe V., *Man Makes Himself*, p. 45, 6th printing, (New York), 1958.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-49.

Should, then, the statements of Vālmīki be considered as altogether wrong ? Only a century ago, all these descriptions were readily acceptable to an Indian mind as eternal truths. Nothing said by Vālmīki and forming part of the story could be conceived of as untrue or baseless. This dogmatic attitude was shaken with the development of the scientific outlook. Beliefs passionately held by the older generations were questioned and attempts made by different scholars to study the Rāmāyaṇa from scientific and rational point of view and also to explain the curious phenomenon of ten heads in different ways.

Rāvaṇa's erudition[6] and penance[7] have been regarded as proverbial and it is contended by some that 'his ten heads were symbolic of his vast knowledge and proficiency in the six Śāstras and the four Vedas."[8]

Another explanation of the peculiar anatomy is to be found in the Jaina tradition.[9] According to it Rāvaṇa bore a garland of nine big jewels round his neck. Each of these big jewels is said to have reflected Rāvaṇa's head and these reflections together with the real head, gave the impression of his being possessed of ten heads. But the explanation is not convincing. It may not be fantastic, but it cannot appeal to the modern minds.

Another ingenious explanation offered is that like the great Mughal emperor, Akbar, Rāvaṇa had a galaxy of nine sagacious, brilliant and quick-witted courtiers. He used to summon all of them together for consultation. Thus, ten heads would think together and this gave rise to the belief that Rāvaṇa had ten heads. But this explanation is puerile and has to be dismissed straightway, as in the Rāmāyaṇa there is no mention of Rāvaṇa having a council consisting of nine ministers.

F.E. Pargiter[10] and Jai Chandra Vidyalankar[11] are of the opinion that this ruler of Laṅkā was also called Daśagrīva (and synonymously Daśaśīrsa, Daśānana, etc.) and that Rāvaṇa was probably the royal title of all the kings of his tribe and not a personal name. The Rāvaṇa, who killed Anaranya King of Ayodhyā, and the Rāvaṇa, who was contemporary of Arjuna Kārtavīrya of the Haihaya line, were definitely different from Rāvaṇa of the Rāmāyaṇa. Rāvaṇa is a Sanskritized form of the Tamil word iṟeivaṉ or iraivaṉ which means 'god', 'king', 'sovereign' and 'lord'.

6. *Mahābhārata*, Vanaparva, 275, 3—Śree Mahabir Printing Press, Lahore, 1936; Pargiter, F.E., *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, fn. p. 277, London, 1922; Radhakamal Mukerjee, *A History of Indian Civilization*, Vol. 1, p. 254, Bombay, 1956.
7. *Rāmāyaṇa*, Uttarakāṇḍa, Sarga 10; *Mahābhārata* Vanaparva, 275.
8. Thomas P., *Epics, Myths and Legends of India*, Bombay, p. 51.
9. *Padmāyanam* (4th century A.D.); Hemachandra, Triśaṣṭhaśalakapuruṣhacharita.
10. Pargiter, F.E., *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, pp. 242, 276, London, 1922.
11. Jai Chandra Vidyalankar, *Bhārtiya Ithas Ki Rūpārekhā*, Vol. I, p. 153, Allahabad, 1933.

Radhakamal Mukerjee also corroborates the above-mentioned views. He remarks that "Rāvaṇa is a title of kings derived from the Tamil Iraivaṇ." He adds that "in respect of the ten heads of the King of Laṅkā (Daśānana) the explanation may be that Rāvaṇa's personal Dravidian name when Sanskritised accounted for this monstrosity."[12]

In the Mahābhārata, he is designated as Daśagrīva and Daśānana and the title 'Rāvaṇa' is explained as under :

राक्षसा: पुरुषादाश्च पिशाचाश्च महाबला: ।
सर्वे समेत्य राजानमभ्यषिचन्दशाननम् ।।
दशग्रीवश्च दैत्यानां देवानां च बलोत्कट: ।
आक्रम्य रत्नान्यहरत्कामरूपी विहंगम: ।।
रावयामास लोकान्यत्तस्माद्रावण उच्यते ।
दशग्रीव: कामबलो देवानां भयमादधत् ।।[13]

"The powerful and man-eating Rākshasas and Piśāchas, having assembled together, invested Daśānana with their Sovereignty. Daśagrīva, capable of assuming any form at will, terrible in prowess and capable also of passing through the air, attacked the gods and daityas and wrested from them all their valuable possession and made them weep and cry, so he was called Rāvaṇa "

The word "Rāvaṇa" is thus formed from the casual form of √रु and implies Rāvaṇa is one who makes others cry.

The following verses can be quoted from the Rāmāyaṇa as giving an interpretation of the epithet Rāvaṇa :

प्रीतोऽस्मि तव वीरस्य शौटीर्यांच्च दशानन ।
शैलाक्रान्तेन यो मुक्तस्त्वया राव: सुदारुण: ।।
यस्माल्लोकत्रयं चैतद्रावितं भयमागतम् ।
तस्मात्त्वं रावणो नाम नाम्ना राजन्भविष्यसि ।।[14]

Mahadeva said :

"Daśānana ! you are brave. I am pleased with your valour. You cried terribly when pressed under the weight of the (Kailāśa) mountain. Frightened by that the denizens of the three worlds cried woefully and on this account you will be known as Rāvaṇa."

C.V. Vaidya, the well-known scholar and critic of the Indian Epics, tries to solve the riddle of the ten heads of Rāvaṇa thus :

"Rāvaṇa had a big head and a big neck as many powerful men have.

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12. **Radhakamal Mukerjee**—***A History of Indian Civilization*, Vol. I, p. 254 Bombay, 1956.**

13. **Vanparva, 274, 38-40, Śree Mahabir Printing Press, Lahore, 1936.**

14. **Uttarakāṇḍa, Sarga 16, Ślokas 37-38.**

On account of this fact he was, probably, originally called Daśagriva figuratively, i.e., a man having a neck as large as ten necks put together."[15]

Sardar M.V. Kibe has expressed the view that the ten heads or mouths of Rāvaṇa were merely ornaments and not his natural growth.[16]

According to Shudha Mazumdar, Rāma's father was called Daśaratha, because "his victorious chariots pierced the ten corners of India."[17] Accordingly, it may be suggested that Rāvaṇa was a very keen observer and wide-awake. He kept himself abreast of the knowledge of all the ten quarters. He is, therefore, said to have had ten heads.

These are the various explanations, reasonable or otherwise, that have been given for the ten heads of Rāvaṇa. But Rāvaṇa had only one head and this contention is also clearly borne out by the Rāmāyaṇa in various contexts.

In the Uttarakāṇḍa, we find that in his early life he was a confirmed sinner, and as often as he could, captured women from their protectors, and if they were not compliant, violated them. In this Kāṇḍa, it is related that Kubera's son, Nalakūbara, had an appointment with Rambhā, the divine damsel, and when she was going to the tryst, Rāvaṇa met her on the way and, yielding to her charms, ravished her. She reported the matter to Nalakūbara who pronounced a curse :

अकामा तेन यस्मात्त्वं बलाद्भद्रे प्रधर्षिता ।
तस्मात्स युवतीमन्यां नाकामामुपयास्यति ॥
यदा ह्यकामां कामार्तो धर्षयिष्यति योषितम् ।
मूर्धा तु सप्तधा तस्य शकलीभविता तदा ॥[18]

"Because he ravished you when you were not agreeable, he shall not violate the chastity of any damsel without her consent. When he attempts the honour of any other woman against her will, his head shall go into seven pieces."

Again, when the head of Rāvaṇa's council proposed to him to outrage the modesty of Sītā, the monarch has scruples and relates the reason for these in the following verses :

महापार्श्व प्रवक्ष्यो रहस्यं किंचिदात्मनः ।
चिरवृत्तं तदाख्यास्ये यदवाप्तं पुरा मया ॥
पितामहस्य भवनं गच्छन्तीं पुञ्जिकस्थलाम् ।
चञ्चूर्यमाणामद्राक्षमाकाशेऽग्निशिखामिव ॥

15. Vaidya, C.V.—*The Riddles of the Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 146, Bombay, 1906.
16. Kibe M.V.—*Location of Laṅkā*, p. 49, Poona, 1947.
17. Shudha Mazumdar, *Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 16, Calcutta, 1958.
18. Uttarakāṇḍa, Sarga 26, Ślokas 54-55.

सा प्रसह्य मया भुक्ता कृता विवसना ततः ।
स्वयंभूभवनं प्राप्ता लोलिता नलिनी यथा ।।
तच्च तस्य तथा मन्ये ज्ञातमासीन्महात्मनः ।
अथ संकुपितो वेधा मामिदं वाक्यमब्रवीत् ।।
अद्यप्रभृति यामन्यां बलान्नारीं गमिष्यसि ।
तदा ते शतधा मूर्धा फलिष्यति न संशयः ।।[19]

"I shall tell you something secret that happened to me. Once the young vivacious lady Punjikasthalā was going to the palace of my grandfather (Brahmā), avoiding my sight. She was under a spell of fright because of me. I disrobed and ravished her forcibly. She went to Brahmā. Brahmā came to know of this. He shouted in a state of fury, "Surely, hereafter, if you do a similar deed with an unwilling woman, your head shall burst into a hundred pieces."

Beyond all question one curse goes against the other, but the subject at hand is to determine the number of heads that Rāvaṇa possessed. Both the above illustrations show that he was one-headed. Rāvaṇa's own statement is exceedingly significant in this connection.

When Rāvaṇa, disguised as a holy mendicant, approached Sītā in Panchavaṭī, he had neither ten heads nor twenty arms. It is related by Vālmīki that when Sītā rebuked the wooer, Rāvaṇa, he flew into a rage and threw off the guise of the gentle hermit and assumed his own form, which had only two hands :

सीताया वचनं श्रुत्वा दशग्रीवः प्रतापवान् ।
हस्ते हस्तं समाहत्य चकार सुमहद्वपुः ।।[20]

"Majestic and powerful Rāvaṇa, on listening to Sītā, struck one of his hands on the other in a state of fury and enlarged his body."

Again, in the tenth Sarga of the Sundarakāṇḍa, it is reiterated that Rāvaṇa had one head and two arms. Hanumān, when he went to Laṅkā, found him to be a normal man asleep in his palace. There are a number of Ślokas which elucidate this fact. A few of them may be quoted here in support of this:

कांचनाङ्गदसंनद्धौ ददर्श स महात्मनः ।
विक्षिप्तौ राक्षसेन्द्रस्य भुजाविन्द्रध्वजोपमौ ।।[21]

"He (Hanumān) beheld the two outstretched arms of the strong and sturdy Rāvaṇa; ornamented with gold armlets, they appeared like the (two) flags of Indra."

19. Yuddhakāṇḍa, Sarga 13, Ślokas 10-14.
20. Araṇyakāṇḍa, Sarga 49, Śloka 1.
21. Sundarakāṇḍa, Srgaa 10, Śloka 15.

Again,

दर्दश स कपिस्तस्य बाहू शयनसंस्थितौ ।
मन्दरस्यान्तरे सुप्तौ महाहीरुषिताविव ॥[22]

"Hanumān saw the two arms on bed. They took after the two enraged dragons asleep in the Mandarāchala cave."

Similarly in proof of his having one face, the following quotations may be added :

मुक्तामणिविचित्रेण कांचनेन विराजता ।
मुकुटेनापवृत्तेन कुण्डलोज्ज्वलिताननम् ॥[23]

"His lotus-like face illuminated with the glowing ear-rings was glistening with the lustrous golden crown bedecked with jewels and pearls,"

Further,

तस्य राक्षसराजस्य निश्चक्राम महामुखात् ।
शयानस्य विनि: श्वास: पूरयन्निव तद्गृहम् ॥[24]

"The scented air, breathed out of the big mouth of the sleeping Rāvaṇa, was perfuming the entire palace."

The Editor of the 'Mahābhārata', Gita Press, Gorakhpur, also comments :—

"In this Kāṇḍa (Sundara) there has been a mention of one head and two arms of Rāvaṇa asleep in his bed-room. It indicates that Rāvaṇa in a normal state used to have this form. He, however, on particular occasions, as in battles, willed himself into a ten-headed and twenty-armed figure."[25]

Also, in Yuddhakāṇḍa the "Ādi Kavi" has depicted Rāvaṇa as a usual man having normal human structure.

The following verse clearly bears out the fact that he was a man with two eyes :

तस्य क्रुद्धस्य नेत्राभ्यां प्रापतन्नश्रुबिन्दव: ।
दीपाभ्यामिव दीप्ताभ्यां सार्चिष: स्नेहबिन्दव: ॥[26]

"Tears were trickling down from the two eyes of the enraged one. It appeared as if oil-droplets were dropping from the lamps."

And even in the battle-field after his death, he is represented as having one and only one head. Rāma addresses :

अद्य ते मच्छरैश्छिन्नं शिरो ज्वलितकुण्डलम् ।
क्रव्यादा व्यपकर्षन्तु विकीर्णं रणपांसुषु ॥[27]

22. *Ibid*., Sarga 10, Śloka 21.
23. *Ibid*., Sarga 10, Śloka 25.
24. *Ibid*., Sarga 10, Śloka 24.
25. *Mahābhārata*, fn., p. 886, Varsha 5, Aṅka 7, Gita Press Gorakhpur, July 1960.
26. Yuddhakāṇḍa, Sarga 92, Śloka :2.
27. *Ibid*., Sarga 103, Śloka 20.

"To-day let the carrion-eaters drag your forehead lying in the battle-field, gleaming with ear-rings and pierced by my arrows."

Rāvaṇa's real brother, Vibhīṣhaṇa, reached there and described Rāvaṇa's dead body in its true colours :

निक्षिप्य दीर्घौ निश्चेष्टौ भुजावङ्गदभूषितौ
मुकुटेनापवृत्तेन भास्कराकारवर्चसा ॥[28]

"Your two long arms adorned with ornaments are lying still. Your crown, which is as lustrous as the sun, has been thrown here."

When the widows of Rāvaṇa came to the battle-field and looked at his face, they mourned his loss thus :

उत्क्षिप्य च भुजौ काचिद्भूमौ सुपरिवर्तते ।
हतस्य वदनं दृष्ट्वा काचिन्मोहमुपागमत् ॥[29]

"One raising her two arms fell down and rolled on the ground and another, seeing the face of her dead husband, became unconscious."

Again,

काचिदङ्के शिर: कृत्वा रुरोद मुखमीक्षती ।
स्नापयन्ती मुखं बाष्पैस्तुषारैरिव पङ्कजम् ॥[30]

"Another gazing at her husband's head on her lap, shed tears on his lotus-like face."

Even verses from the Mahābhārata support the point of view that Rāvaṇa had one head. It may be instanced thus :

पूर्णे वर्षसहस्रे तु शिरश्छित्वा दशानन: ।
जुहोत्यग्नौ दुराधर्षस्तेनाऽतुष्यज्जगत्प्रभु: ॥[31]

"At the close of a thousand years the invincible 'Daśānana' cutting off his own head, offered it as an offering to the sacred fire. At this act of his, the Lord of Universe was pleased with him."

A close observation of the above verses proves that Rāvaṇa, like other human beings, had usual limbs.

From the pedigree given in the Uttarakāṇḍa,[32] it is evident that Rāvaṇa was a descendant of righteous ṛishis. Sage Pulastya, the son of Brahmā, took in marriage the daughter of an ascetic Tṛiṇabindu, Ilavila and was blessed with a son, Viśravas. The latter, who possessed a saintly

28. *Ibid.*, Sarga 109, Śloka 3.
29. *Ibid.*, Sarga 110, Śloka 9.
30. *Ibid.*, Sarga 110, Śloka 10.
31. Vanaparva, 275, 20, Śree Mahabir Printing Press, Lahore, 1936.
32. Uttarkāṇḍa Sargas 2, 3, 10.

character, first married the daughter of the famous seer Bhāradvāja, Devavarṇinī, who gave birth to Kubera. Then he married Kaikasī, daughter of Sumāli, as his second wife and Rāvaṇa, Kumbha-karṇa, Śūrpanakhā and Vibhīṣaṇa were born of her.

Considering the noble genealogy, it is impossible to believe that such parents could ever beget a physical 'monster'. In fact he had an attractive form. Hanumān found him asleep as :

वृतमाभरणैर्दिव्यैः सुरूपं कामरूपिणम् ।[33]

"He was decorated with celestial ornaments, was handsome and could change his form at will."

Now the geographical background of the Rāmāyaṇa provides another approach to this problem. It enables us to determine the exact position of Laṅkā and of the regions inhabited by the principal tribes mentioned in the Rāmāyaṇa. It also furnishes information about the nature and physical appearance of the people inhabiting these regions.

While in exile, Rāma first went to the woods round Prayāga, thence to Panchavaṭī and Kiṣhkindhā and finally to Laṅkā. According to general belief Laṅkā is 'Simhala' and Panchavaṭī is 'Parnaśālā' on the bank of the river Godāvarī, either in Nasik or Bastar. But on the basis of the data given in the Aranya and Kiṣhkindhā Kāṇḍas Panchāvaṭī is about 78 miles from Chitrakūṭa and 96 from Kiṣhkindhā,[34] Similar conclusions about the distances have been drawn by scholars like Sardar M. V. Kibe[35], Hira Lal,[36] and Jai Chandra Vidyalaṅkār.[37] In the Gondi-Dravida dialect, Laṅkā is a word with three distinct meanings-island, doab (land between two rivers) and high hillock. It is still used in this sense in the Uriya and Telugu regions.[38] Godāvarī in that dialect implies river and it goes as Godāvarī in Sanskrit. There is a strong tradition among Gonds to trace their descent from Rāvaṇa.[39] Even in the census of 1891, when sub-castes were required to be recorded, several lakhs of Gonds returned themselves as Rāvaṇavaṁśis and a great Gond King, who rules about 400 years ago, inscribed his name on his gold coins as "Śri Sangrāma Śhāha, Paulastya-vaṁśa", thus mentioning prominently his connection with Rāvaṇa, as Paulastya-vaṁśa is an alternative for Rāvaṇa-vaṁśa.[40] The

33. Sundarakāṇḍa, Sarga 10, Śloka 9.
34. Araṇyakāṇḍa, Sargas 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 68, 69, 73, 74; Kiṣhkindhākāṇḍa, Sargas 1, 6, 12, 13, 14.
35. Kibe M.V.—*Rāwaṇa's Laṅkā Discovered*, pp. 8-13, Indore, 1919, *Location of Laṅkā*, pp. 8-13, 23-28, Poona, 1947.
36. Hira Lal. *Jha. Comm. Vol.*, p. 156, Poona, 1937.
37. Jai Chandra Vidyalaṅkār, *Itihās Praveśa*, p. 67, Allahabad 1956-57.
38. Hira Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
39. *Imp. Gaz.*, Vol. XII, p. 323.
40. Hira Lal, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-54.

said tradition is in consonance with the generally accepted view that the Rāmāyaṇa is the story of the penetration of the Indo-Āryans into the regions of the south inhabited by the Dravidians. Keeping all this in view and the existence of a striking phonetic similarity between the names Salakataṅkaṭa, the family name of Rāvaṇa, and Amarakaṅṭaka, along with the drawings of great antiquity in the caves of the Vindhya range, eminent research scholars have concluded that Laṅkā was the peak of Amarakaṅṭaka[41] which is the source of two rivers-the Narmadā emerging from one side and the Sona emanating from the other. Some scholars like Vaidya[42] and Pargiter[43] identified Laṅkā with the present 'pearl-shaped' Ceylon, while Jacobi[44] made a *futile attempt to* locate it *in* Assam. But it is evident from the Rāmāyaṇa that Rāvaṇa's Laṅkā was neither located in Assam, nor beyond the southern end of India—a view to which Jacobi veered later on.[45]

The Gonds are aborigines of the region round Amarkaṅṭaka and the Oraons and the Śabaras live in their neighbourhood. The Oraons and the Śabaras are the monkeys and bears of Rāmāyaṇa, respectively.[46] Imagination has vested them with curious forms and figures. But they were all human beings and used to have matrimonial alliances with the Aryans.[47] Even to-day, according to Sardar M.V. Kibe,[48] several tribes of Gonds who inhabit this tract call themselves—(1) Rāvaṇa-vaṁśī (descendents of Rāvaṇa), (2) Vānar-vaṁśi (descendents of monkeys), (3) Komār-vaṁśi (descendents of Komārs, sons of Rājas) and even Raghu-vaṁśi (descendents of Rāmachandra). They are divided into these four principal sections.

Pargiter[49] has made it clear that the people of Kiṣhkindhā, who have been called monkeys in the Rāmāyaṇa were a Dravidian tribe and the

41. Kibe M. V., *Rāvṇa's Laṅkā Discovered* pp. 14-15, Indore, 1919; *Location of Laṅkā*, pp. 17-18, 29, 47, 50, Poona, 1947; Ghose J.C., *Annals BORI*, XIX, pp. 84-86; *Ind. Hist.* Q.V., pp. 355-56; *New Ind. Anti.*, I, p. 463; Hira Lal, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-163; Ramdas G., *Ind. Hist.*, 1940, Jai Chandra Vidyalaṅkār, *Itihās Praveśa*, p. 67, Allahabad, 5th Edition, 1956-57.
42. Vaidya C.V., *The Riddles of the Rāmāyaṇa*, pp. 102, 162, Bombay, 1906.
43. Pargiter F.E., *op. cit.*, p. 278.
44. Jacobi H, *Das Rāmāyaṇa*, pp. 90-93, Bonn, 1893.
45. Kibe M.V., *Location of Laṅkā* p. 37, Poona, 1947.
46. Jai Chandra Vidyalaṅkār, *Bhārtya Itihās kī Rūparekhā*, Vol. I, p. 252, Allahabad, 1933 (The author supports the opinion enunciated by Hira Lal in his article मवधी-हिन्दी-प्रान्त में रामरावण-युद्ध. कोशोत्सव-स्मारक संग्रह, ना० प्र० सा०): Hira Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
47. Vaidya C.V., *op. cit.*, p. 154; Pargiter F.E , *op. cit.*, pp. 288-91; Hira Lal, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-60; Jai Chandra Vidyalaṅkār, *Bhārtya Itihās kī Rūparekhā*, Vol. I, p. 153.
48. Kibe M.V., *op. cit.*, p. 51 (this information was supplied to M.V. Kibe by his friend, Rai Bahadur Brojendranath Chaturvedi, Political and Finance Minister of Reva., *Ibid.*, p. 54).
49. Pargiter F.E., *op. cit.*, *p*. 278.

kinsmen of the people of Laṅkā. These two tribes had brotherly relations, as is evident from the following verse :

अहं सुग्रीवसंदेशादिह प्राप्तस्तवान्तिके ।
राक्षसेश हरीशस्त्वां भ्राता कुशलमब्रवीत् ॥[50]

"O King ! I have approached you with a message from Sugrīva. Sugrīva, the King of monkeys, is your brother. That is why he has enquired after your well-being."

While sending his messenger to Sugrīva, Rāvaṇa addressed him as follows :

त्वं वै महाराजकुलप्रसूतो
महाबलश्चर्क्षरजः सुतश्च ।
न कश्चनार्थस्तव नास्त्यनर्थ-
स्तथापि मे भ्रातृसमो हरीश ॥[51]

"King of monkeys ! you are born in the royal family of the Vanaras. You are the son of revered Rikṣharāja and are brave yourself. I regard you as my brother. If you have not been benefited by me, I have not landed you into any harm."

It may be added that primitive people all over the world worshipped beasts, trees, etc., and figured the objects of their adoration on their bodies The people were named after what they worshipped. While describing Totemism, John B. Noss writes, "It is natural for the primitive to think of animals in an especially intimate way, for they are closely related to them in behaviour and interests ; they are mobile individuals who seek food, take to flight, or to do battle, much as he himself does. He does not feel it repugnant, in fact he finds it natural, to think that he and the animals have a common ancestry, or that some animal, a long time ago, was the ancestor of his clan. The sense of an intimate relationship with other orders of life, including even inanimate objects, is the essence of totemism. It takes several distinct forms in different parts of the world. It seems to be rooted in such intuitive realizations as this : "We are akin to the beaver, while our neighbours are akin to the grizzly".[52] All who belong to the particular clan or group call themselves by the name of the totem, and adopt it as their badge or hereditary mark-very much as Boy Scouts call themselves Peewits, Wolf-cubs, Foxes and so on.[53] An Australian native belonging to the frilled lizard clan regards this creature as sacred

50. Sundarakāṇḍa, Sarga 51, Śloka 2.

51. Yuddhakāṇḍa, Sarga 20, Śloka 10.

52. John B. Noss, *Men's Religions*, p. 26, New York, Revised Edition, 1956.

53. *Oxford Junior Encyclopaedia*, Vol. I, 474, Revised Edition, 1952.

and calls it 'father'.[54] John B. Noss.[55] while describing the various ceremonies and rites of the followers of totemism in south-east Australia refers to a tribe named Tidnamadukas (members of the totem-group of the Tidnama, a small frog). Similarly the Oxford Junior Encyclopaedia[56] mentions the crow tribe which inhabited certain parts of North America, between the Mississippi and the Rockies. Totemism was prevalent among many races in ancient India also and it is highly probable that monkeys and bears, which were amongst the totems, were worshipped by these races. The two tribes, Vānaras and Ṛikṣhas, which stand out in prominence in the Rāmāyaṇa, might have been named after these animals.[57] The Gazetteer says : "All Bhuiyas affect great reverence for Rikhman or Rishiasan, some as a patron deity, and others as a mythical ancestor. It seems Rikhman was originally the bear-totem of a sept of the tribe. The bear-cult is peculiar to the Bhuiyas and links together the scattered branches of the tribe".[58]

The Gonds were originally cannibals and used to eat offal of almost every kind. Even to-day, they kill animals and do not hesitate to use cows for ploughing. They are exceedingly filthy, as "still in certain wild tracts they continue to clean themselves with a stone without using any water after easing themselves. So there is nothing to wonder at the Aryans calling the Gonds as Rākshasas or Dānavas "![59]

Pargiter[60] and Majumdar[61] are of the view that the Asuras, the Dānavas, the Daityas, and the Rākshasas denoted human beings. But since they were generally the enemies of the Aryans, their names came to mean hostile or savage men and became synonymous with 'demon'. Even certain Aryan kings were termed Dānavas, Rākshasas or Asuras due to their evil character. Madhu, a great king of the Yādavas and Krishṇa's ancestor, from whom the latter obtained the patronymic Mādhava, is styled a Daitya and king of the Dānavas, although his descent from Yayāti and Yadu is acknowledged. On account of being Madhu's descendent, Lavana Mādhava is called Dānava, Rākshasa and Asura. It is very likely that similarly Rāvaṇa is stigmatized as a 'demon' on account of his wicked deeds, otherwise he was a human being.

Thus, Rāvaṇa and his kinsmen, who have been dubbed as Niśācharas (Night-prowlers), were none other than the original inhabitants of India, whom the Indo-Aryans wanted to subdue in the course of their

54. *Ibid.*, 419.
55. John B. Noss, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
56. *Oxford Junior Encyclopaedia*, Vol. I, 11, Revised Edition, 1952.
57. Jai Chandra Vidyālaṅkār, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-55.
58. *Imp. Gaz.*, (Provincial Series, Central Province), pp. 264-65, 1911.
59. Hira Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
60. Pargiter, F.E., *op. cit.*, pp. 288-291.
61. *The Vedic Age*, Vol. I, p. 313, London, 1951.

conquest of the country. It was the hauteur of the conqueror with a superior civilisation of a material type which led the Āryans to call the militarily inferior aborigines as Rākshasas. Otherwise, they had regular features which were often striking and charming. When Hanumāna entered Laṅkā, he beheld ugly as well as comely beings:

विरूपान्बहुरूपांश्च सुरूपांश्च सुवर्चसः ।[62]

"Some were ugly, some could assume different forms and some were beautiful."

This should dispel the superstition that Rāvaṇa was a preter natural creature with ten-heads. He was certainly a human being of normal physical structure.

62. Sundarakāṇḍa, Sarga 4, Śloka 19.

HINDI

डॉ० छविनाथ त्रिपाठी

महाकवि जायसी : व्यक्तित्व, बहुज्ञता और मानवतावादी दृष्टि

मलिक मुहम्मद जायसी सूफी कवियों में प्रतिनिधिभूत माने जाते हैं। दाउद की रचना 'चंदायन' के डेढ़ सौ वर्ष बाद जायसी ने काव्य-रचना के क्षेत्र में पदार्पण किया। इस समय तक सूफी काव्यों की अपनी काव्य-पद्धति निश्चित रूप से विकसित हो चुकी थी। जायसी ने स्वयं पूर्ववर्ती प्रेमकाव्य-परंपरा-सपनावती, मुगुधावती, मिरगावती, मधुमालती और प्रेमावती—का उल्लेख किया है।[1] इनकी तीन कृतियां उपलब्ध हैं—१ पद्मावत, २ अखरावट और ३ आखिरी कलाम। पद्मावत की रचना हिजरी सन् ६२७ में तथा आखिरी कलाम की रचना हिजरी सन् ६३६ में हुई थी। अखरावट इन दोनों के बीच की रचना है। दाउद की अपेक्षा जायसी अपने भावों और विचारों की अभिव्यक्ति में अधिक स्पष्ट हैं। उनकी आध्यात्मिक-भावना और काव्य-सम्बन्धी विचारों पर उनके व्यक्तित्व का गहरा प्रभाव दिखाई पड़ता है, अतः स्वयं जायसी के कथनों के आधार पर उनके व्यक्तित्व की एक संक्षिप्त झांकी देखी जा सकती है।

जायसी शारीरिक दृष्टि से सुन्दर नहीं थे। चेचक के कारण बाल्यकाल में ही एक आंख की दर्शन और एक कान की श्रवण क्षमता खो देने और सारे शरीर पर उसी के दाग के कारण अदर्शनीय बन गये थे;[2] परन्तु उनकी वाणी की असीम क्षमता ने इस कमी को पूरा कर दिया था। जो भी उनकी कविता सुनता, विमुग्ध हो उठता था।[3] भाव-सौन्दर्य से समृद्ध जायसी को यह गौरव प्राप्त था कि सारे रूपवान व्यक्ति चाव के साथ उनका मुंह निहारें।

सूफी साधना में लीन होने और प्रभु के विरह-संताप का अनुभव करने के कारण वह क्षीण-काय भी हो गये थे ; इससे उनकी कुरूपता बढ़ गई थी, उन्हें देखते ही लोग हँस पड़ते थे पर जिसने भी उन्हें सुना उसकी आँखों में आंसू भर आया—

> मुहमद कवि जो विरह भा, ना तन रकत न मांसु।
> जेइ मुख देखा तेइ हँसा, सुनि तेहि आयउ आंसु॥ पद्मा० १।२३।

यह निष्कर्ष सहज ही निकाला जा सकता है कि उनकी शारीरिक असुन्दरता पर अन्तः की सुन्दरता और कवित्व-शक्ति ने विजय प्राप्त कर ली थी।

जायसी ने अनेक स्थलों पर अपने लिए 'कवि' और 'मुहमद कवि' का प्रयोग किया है।[4] इस 'कवि' शब्द में निहित अर्थ को जायसी अच्छी तरह समझते थे। उन्होंने बड़ी विनम्रता और आदर के साथ पूर्ववर्ती कवियों, उनकी लोक-प्रसिद्ध प्रेम कथाओं, और पौराणिक आख्यानों एवं काव्यों का उल्लेख किया है।[5] महाभारत के रचयिता व्यास को

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१. पद्मावत-खंड २३।१७।

२. पद्मावत-१।२१।

३. सब रूपवंतह पांउ गहि, मुख जोहहिं कै चाउ॥
सोइ बिमोहा जेहि कवि सुनी। पद्मावत १।२१॥

४. द्रष्टव्य-पद्मावत-१।२१, २२, २३ ; १२।१०, २५।८।

५. द्रष्टव्य-पद्मावत-२१।२, २३।२, २४।१७, २३।१७, २५।८, २७।५।

तो वह परम प्रामाणिक मानते हैं और 'अस कवि कहा वियास' (पद्मा० १२।१०) जैसी उक्ति से अपने कथन की पुष्टि करते हैं। प्रसंग वश, रावण के अहंकार और राम के साथ उसके विरोध तथा दुर्गति का तो उन्होंने विस्तृत वर्णन-संकेत कर दिया है।[6] रामायण और महाभारत के पात्रों की विशेषताओं और युद्ध-कौशल का उन्होंने दृष्टान्त या पद्मावत के पात्रों से सादृश्य के लिए उपयोग किया है।[7]

डॉ० जयदेव के मतानुसार जायसी की 'पाठशाला प्रकृति का व्यापक क्षेत्र थी, उसके शिक्षक सांसारिक घटनायें और व्यापार थे।···जायसी बहुश्रुत थे। कुशाग्रबुद्धि थे। उन्होंने जो कुछ सुना, उसका प्रयोग यथावसर सुन्दर रीति से किया है'[8]। इसी प्रसंग में उन्होंने जायसी को अनाथ और निरक्षर तक कह दिया है। ग्रियर्सन के इस विचार का भी उन्होंने खंडन करने का प्रयत्न किया है कि 'जायसी संस्कृत भाषा के ज्ञाता थे'[9]। डॉ० जयदेव को तो इसमें भी सन्देह है कि जायसी इस्लाम धर्म से परिचित थे क्योंकि उन्होंने 'कुरान' को 'पुरान' कह दिया है'[10]। इनकी दृष्टि में केवल बहुश्रुत व्यक्ति साधारणतः अव्यवस्थित विचारों के होते हैं, क्योंकि उनके समक्ष किसी भी भाव का स्वच्छ और स्पष्ट रूप नहीं आने पाता। यही कारण है कि जायसी के विचार नितान्त स्पष्ट नहीं हैं। कभी यह एकेश्वरवाद के समर्थक प्रतीत होते हैं तो कभी अद्वैत के। वस्तुतः वे इन दोनों के सूक्ष्म भेद को समझने में असमर्थ थे'।[11]

एक शोध-प्रबन्ध में व्यक्त किये गये इन विचारों की सर्वथा उपेक्षा नहीं की जा सकती, यद्यपि ये विचार अत्यंत भ्रामक एवं अपने आपमें परस्पर विरोधी हैं। 'कुशाग्र-बुद्धि' यदि सूक्ष्म भेद न समझ सके, भावों और विचारों को स्पष्ट रूप से ग्रहण न कर सके तो उसे 'कुशाग्रबुद्धि' कहना ही व्यर्थ है। 'अखरावट' के लेखक को 'निरक्षर' कहना बुद्धि-दोष ही समझा जा सकता है। 'कुरान' को 'पुरान' कहने से जायसी को इस्लाम धर्म से भी अपरिचित मान लेना मध्यकाल में प्रचलित इनके सामान्य अर्थ 'धर्म-ग्रन्थ' से अनभिज्ञता प्रगट करना है। महाकवि चंद ने भी तो 'षट्भाषा पुरानं च कुरानं कथितं मया' कहा है। क्या 'पृथ्वीराज रासो' कुरान है? अथवा उसमें कुरान की आयतें लिखी हुई हैं? धार्मिक कवियों और सन्तों के जिस सामूहिक मंच पर हिन्दू और मुसलमानों में प्रेम तथा सद्-भाव उत्पन्न करने का प्रयत्न चल रहा था वहां कुरान और पुरान समान रूप से धार्मिक ग्रन्थ थे। महात्मा गांधी की प्रार्थना-सभा में विविध धर्मों के पदों और उद्धरणों को सुन कर उन्हें किसी ने भी हिन्दू-धर्म से अनभिज्ञ नहीं कहा। मध्यकालीन कवियों के दृष्टिकोण को अधिक गहराई से समझा जाना चाहिये।

जायसी के कवि-व्यक्तित्व की अभिव्यक्ति के लिये उनकी कृतियों में आये संकेत अधिक महत्वपूर्ण हैं। ज्ञान से उत्तम व्यक्तित्व का निर्माण होता है। जायसी भी विविध प्रकार के लौकिक और शास्त्रीय विषयों से परिचित थे। कोई भी काव्य न तो कोरा

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६. रावन गरब बिरोधा रामू। पद्मा० २५। १०।

७. द्रष्टव्य-पद्मावत-५२।२।

८. सूफी महाकवि जायसी-पृष्ठ ४१।

९. वही-पृ० ४७।

१०. वही-पृ० १४८।

११. वही-पृ० १६१॥

धर्म-ग्रन्थ होता है, न किसी विशिष्ट विषय का सूक्ष्म विवेचन करने वाला चिन्तन-प्रधान या दर्शन ग्रन्थ । प्रसंगवश आये संकेत, कवि के सम्बद्ध-विशिष्ट-विषय के ज्ञान की सूचना मात्र देते हैं ।

जायसी ने पद्मावत में जिन कृतियों का उल्लेख किया है उनके वर्ण्य-विषय की जानकारी उन्हें थी । हिन्दू धर्म और उसके अन्तर्गत सुव्यवस्थित जीवन के षोडश संस्कारों से उनका परिचय था । कुछ उद्धरणों द्वारा उनकी बहुज्ञता का संकेत किया जा रहा है—

१. वेद चार हैं और विद्यायें चौदह होती हैं—

चतुरवेद मत ओही पांहा । रिग जजु[१२] साम अथरबन मांहा । पद्मा० १०।१०
चारिउ चतुरदसा गुन पढ़ै ।१।२२।

२. पांच वर्ष की अवस्था विद्यारंभ के लिए उपयुक्त है—

पांच बरस मँह भय सो बारी । कीन्ह पुरान पढ़ै बैसारी ।। प० ३।४।

३. अध्ययन के विषय शास्त्र और वेद हैं—

रहहिं एक संग दोऊ, पढ़हिं सासतर वेद ।३।५।

४. 'पुरान' शब्द का जायसी-अभिहित अर्थ 'धार्मिक-ग्रन्थ' है—

जस पुरान मँह लिखा बखानू ।१।८
लिखा पुरान जो आयत सुनी ।१।१२।
जो पुरान विधि पठवा, सोई पढ़त गरंथ ।
और जो भूले आवत, सो सुनि लागे पंथ ।।१।१२।।
कतहूं पंडित पढ़हिं पुरानू । धरम पंथ कर करहिं बखानू ।२।१५
भा बिहान पंडित सब आये । काढ़ि पुरान जनम अरथाये ।३।३। पद्मावत

ये उद्धरण स्पष्ट करते हैं कि जायसी की दृष्टि में 'पुरान' का अर्थ-पुराण, कुरान, ज्योतिष ग्रन्थ-अर्थात् सामान्य रूप में धार्मिक ग्रन्थ है । चन्द पृथ्वीराज रासो को पौराणिक या धार्मिक काव्य-ग्रन्थ की महत्ता प्रदान करना चाहते थे, अतः उन्होंने भी उसे 'पुरान-कुरान' कहा ।[१३] जायसी का पद्मावत भी धार्मिक आधार लेकर लिखा गया । यह मध्यकाल की सामान्य प्रवृत्ति रही है । इस आधार को ग्रहण करने से किसी की विशिष्ट धर्म के प्रति अज्ञता नहीं सिद्ध होती । यह कवि की समन्वयवादी दृष्टि की अभिव्यक्ति मात्र है । सूफी कवियों और सन्तों को इसी कारण हिन्दू-मुसलमान दोनों का समान आदर प्राप्त हुआ ।

५. सामुद्रिक एवं ज्योतिष शास्त्र का ज्ञान—

कुंवर बतीसो लच्छनी, अस सब मांह अनूप ।२।२५।
कुंवर बतीसो लच्छन राता । दसएं लछन कहे एक बाता ।२०।११।
परिवा छट्ठि एकादसि नंदा । दुइज सत्तमी द्वादसि मंदा ।
तीज अष्टमी तेरसि जया । चौथि चतुरदसि नवमी खया ।
पूरन पूनिउं दसमी पांचै । सुक्र नंदै बुध भए नाचै ।३२।१४। पद्मा० ।

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१२. जायसी ग्रन्थावली में आचार्य शुक्ल ने 'जजु' पाठ दिया है (पृ० ४४) जो शुद्ध है । डॉ० बलदेव को कहीं से 'जुग' पाठ मिल गया है । महाकवि जायसी पृ० ४३ ।

१३. पृथ्वीराज रासो १ । ८३ ।

नंदा, भद्रा, जया, रिक्ता और पूर्णा के रूप में तिथियों का वर्गीकरण ज्योतिष शास्त्र के अनुकूल है।

६. संस्कृत ज्ञान

ज्योतिष और सामुद्रिक शास्त्र की भारतीय पद्धति से जायसी परिचित थे, यह संस्कृत ज्ञान के अभाव में संभव नहीं था। रत्नसेन विदाई खण्ड में तो यात्रा-मुहूर्त देखने की भारतीय-ज्योतिष-रीति का ही वर्णन है। इस खंड के अन्तर्गत (९ से १४ कड़वक) दिक्शूल, चक्र, योगिनी, नक्षत्र, चन्द्रमा, ताराबल आदि का ठीक-ठीक वर्णन हुआ है।

कहीं-कहीं संस्कृत की मनोहर सूक्तियाँ भी भाषा का कलेवर बदल कर प्रस्तुत हुई हैं—

सात सरग जो कागद करई। धरती समुद दुहूं मसि भरई।
सब लिखनी कै लिखु संसारा। लिखि न जाइ गति-समुद अपारा॥ प० १।१०

ये पंक्तियां निम्नलिखित श्लोक की छाया हैं—

असित गिरि समं स्यात्कज्जलं सिन्धु पात्रे,
सुरतरुवरशाखा लेखनीपत्रमुर्वी।
लिखति यदि गृहीत्वा शारदा सर्वकालं,
तदपि तव गुणानामीश पारं न याति॥

इसी प्रकार का भाव 'आखिरी कलाम' के छठे कड़वक की कुछ पंक्तियों में भी है।

संस्कृत की एक अत्यन्त मनोरम एवं प्रसिद्ध भावाभिव्यक्ति है—

रात्रिर्गमिष्यति भविष्यति सुप्रभातम्,
भास्वानुदेष्यति हसिष्यति पंकजश्रीः।
इत्थं विचिन्तयति कोशगते द्विरेफे,
हा हन्त-हन्त नलिनीं गज उज्जहार॥

जायसी ने इसके पूरे भाव को निम्नलिखित दोहे में व्यक्त किया है—

भंवर जो पावा कँवल कहँ, मनचीता बहु केलि।
आइ परा कोइ हस्ती, चूर कीन्ह सो बेलि॥

जायसी ने रत्नसेन द्वारा अश्व-परीक्षा[14] का उल्लेख किया है। नाम परिगणन शैली के कारण युद्ध-सज्जा के समय उन्होंने अश्वों की विविध जातियों का वर्णन किया है, पर 'तुरयरोग हरि माथे आये' (८।४) कह कर तो उन्होंने यह स्पष्ट कर दिया है कि पंचतंत्र की इसी से सम्बद्ध कहानी का ज्ञान उन्हें था।

७. पौराणिक नामों एवं घटनाओं का उल्लेख

जायसी ने प्रसंगवश ऐसे अनेक नामों का उल्लेख किया है, जिनसे स्पष्ट होता है कि वह केवल हिन्दू जन-जीवन से ही परिचित नहीं थे अपितु उसकी पौराणिक परम्परा के भी विज्ञ थे। बररुचि, भोज (पृ ३७),[15] चारों वेद, इन्द्र, ब्रह्मा, अमर (अमरकोष), भागवत, पिंगल, गीता, भासवती, व्याकरन, (पृ० ४४) गोपीचन्द, राघव, रावन, भरथरी,

१४. पद्मावत २।२२
१५. पृष्ठ संख्या जायसी ग्रन्थावली ना. प्र. सभा, पंचम संस्करण की है।

सीता (पृ० ५५) लोक में प्रचलित सगुन (पृ० ५६), व्यास (पृ० ५७), सप्त पाताल, सप्त स्वर्ग (पृ० ६३), चन्द्र, सूर्य, राहु, ऊषा, अनिरुद्ध (पृ० ८५), भर्तृहरि-पिंगला, पार्वती-महेश (पृ० ९०) अप्सरा द्वारा तप भंग, महादेव की कृपा से राम का रण जीतना (पृ० ९१), जगत्-मिथ्या, योग-तन्त्र (पृ० १०५), हनुमान द्वारा लंका-दाह, अगस्त तारा (पृ० १०६) अंगद, का पदारोपण (पृ० ११६), विक्रम-भोज (पृ० ११८), प्रथम नाद की उत्पत्ति तब वेद का उत्पन्न होना (पृ० १२५), हिन्दू विवाह-विधि (पृ० १२६) अभिमन्यु (पृ० १२९), वामन-बलि कथा, जालंधर-गोपीचंद, कृष्ण-गरुड़, पट्ट महादेवी (पृ० १५१), समुद्र-मंथन (पृ० १८२), लक्ष्मी की चंचलता (पृ० १८३) नल-दमयन्ती (पृ० १८३), पुनर्जन्म (पृ० १८४), पंडित सहदेव (पृ० १९९) हिन्दू तीर्थों के नाम (बादशाह दूती खंड), हनुमान, अंगद अर्जुन, भीम, जगदेव, मालकदेव, हमीर, हरिश्चन्द्र, कृष्ण-चाणूर तथा अन्य अनेक ऐतिहासिक और पौराणिक नाम, विशेषतः रामायण और महाभारत से सम्बद्ध (पृ० २८०-२८१) मिलते हैं। निश्चय ही जायसी इन पात्रों और घटनाओं से पूर्णतः परिचित थे, अन्यथा इनका यथावसर उचित प्रयोग करने में अवश्य त्रुटि होती।

८. अन्यविध-ज्ञान

जायसी ने 'परकाय-प्रवेश' का दो बार उल्लेख किया है।[16] भारतीय वाद्य-यन्त्रों[17] तथा विविध राग-रागिनियों का उल्लेख उनके संगीत-प्रेम का साक्षी तो है ही। चित्र, मूर्ति और स्थापत्य-कला से अपने परिचित होने का भी उन्होंने संकेत किया है। काम-शास्त्रीय परंपरा के अनुसार स्त्रियों के लक्षण और भेद का भी वर्णन उन्होंने किया है।[18] पद्मिनी के सम्पूर्ण लक्षणों का वर्णन जायसी ने राजा-सुआ संवाद खंड में किया है। जायसी ने रसायन शास्त्र और मरजीया (गोताखोर) का भी उल्लेख किया है।[19]

दर्शन सम्बन्धी उनके परिज्ञान के अनेक उद्धरण प्रस्तुत किये जा सकते हैं। 'आखिरी कलाम' उनके इस्लाम के धार्मिक ज्ञान का सूचक है। इसके अतिरिक्त अद्वैत-वेदान्त, सूफी प्रेम-साधना, प्रतिबिम्बवाद तथा हठ-योग की साधना का भी उन्होंने प्रसंगवश निर्देश किया है।[20]

९. लोक-व्यवहार का ज्ञान

जायसी ने लोक-जीवन का प्रत्यक्ष अनुभव किया था। हिन्दू जीवन-पद्धति के जन्म से लेकर मृत्यु-पर्यन्त सभी प्रमुख विधि-विधानों से वह परिचित थे। राजपूती जीवन की उस विशेषता का तो उन्होंने प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान प्राप्त किया था कि स्त्रियां किस प्रकार सती होती थीं, जौहर करती थीं और पुरुष केसरिया बाना पहन युद्ध में प्राण-त्याग करते थे। सामान्य जीवन के व्यवहारों का भी उन्होंने स्थान-स्थान पर उपयोग किया है। इनमें अनेक सूक्तियाँ और लोकोक्तियाँ भी हैं।[21] सगुन का वर्णन जोगी खंड में है। राजपक्षी केवल

१६. जायसी ग्रन्थावली, पृ० १०६, १७५।
१७. वही, पृ० ८२।
१८. वही, पृ० २३५, १८, १२७, १४, १५, २०।
१९. वही, पृ० १२६, १८२
२०. प्रतिबिम्बवाद के लिए-ग्रन्थावली-पृ० २५, २८, २९ आदि तथा आध्यात्मिक संकेतों के लिए पृ० १, १७ आदि द्रष्टव्य।
२१. द्रष्टव्य-पद्मावत-७।२ पंक्ति ६।, ८।२।२, ८।५।५, १०।२०।७, १२।७।१, १२।१२।१, १४।१।१, १५।१।१।

लोक-कथाओं में मिलता है, जायसी ने इसका वर्णन बोहित-खंड में किया है। ग्राम्य-जीवन के उपमानों का प्रयोग भी जायसी के लोक-व्यवहार ज्ञान का परिचायक है।"

१०. इतिहास, राजनीति, पूर्ववर्ती हिन्दी साहित्य और सामाजिक आन्दोलनों का ज्ञान—

डा० जयदेव ने यह स्वीकार करते हुये भी कि 'जायसी ऐतिहासिक घटनाओं और राजनैतिक हलचलों से अनभिज्ञ न थे' यह निर्णय कर डाला है कि 'जायसी ने इन ऐतिहासिक ग्रन्थों का अध्ययन किया था, यह तो नहीं कहा जा सकता'।" साथ ही उन्होंने यह भी कह डाला है कि वे हिन्दी-साहित्य की परम्पराओं से भी सुन कर ही परिचित थे।"

इतिहास और राजनीति से उनके परिचय का साक्षी तो स्वयं 'पद्मावत' का उत्तरार्ध है। यहां पद्मावत में उपलब्ध कुछ ऐसे संकेत उद्धृत किये जाते हैं, जिनसे उनके पूर्ववर्ती हिन्दी-साहित्य से भी परिचित होने का निष्कर्ष निकाला जा सकता है। सूफी प्रेमाख्यान काव्यों से उनका घनिष्ठ परिचय था ही।

(क) भाट बरनि कहि कीरति भली।
पावहिं हस्ति घोड़ सिंघली ।।२।२०।७

(ख) भाट अहै संकर कै कला ।।२५।११।२।

(ग) भाटहि काह मीचु सो डरना।
हाथ कटार पेट हनि मरना ।।२५।१२।२

(घ) स्वामिकाज सो जूझै, सोइ गये मुख रात ।।४३।३।। पद्मा०।

चारण-साहित्य से ही नहीं, अपितु चन्दकृत पृथ्वीराज रासो एवं उसमें वर्णित चन्द की मृत्यु-घटना से भी जायसी परिचित थे। चन्द द्वारा पृथ्वीराज रासो में प्रस्तुत स्वामि-धर्म के महत्व का भी उन्होंने संकेत किया है। ग और घ उद्धरण इसके साक्षी हैं।

अखरावट की निम्नलिखित पंक्तियां भी महत्त्वपूर्ण हैं—

ना-नारद तब रोइ पुकारा। एक जोलाहै सो मैं हारा।
प्रेम तन्तु निति ताना तनई। जप-तप साधि सैंकरा भरई।
दरब गरब सब देइ बिथारी। गनि साथी सब लेहिं सँभारी।
पांच भूत मांड़ी गनि मलई। ओहि सो मोर न एको चलई।
बिधि कहँ संवरि साज सो साजै। लेइ-लेइ नाव कूँच सो मांजै।
मन मुर्री देइ सब अंग मोरे। तन सो बिनै दोउ कर जोरे।
सूत-सूत सो कया मंजाई। सीझा काम बिनत सिधि पाई ।।४३।।

इन चौपाइयों के भाव से स्पष्ट है कि जायसी, कबीर और उनकी साधना, तप-पद्धति और सिद्धियों से परिचित थे। सामाजिक जीवन पर पड़ने वाले कबीर के प्रभाव से भी वह अनभिज्ञ न थे।

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२२. इन्द्रचन्द्र-जायसी ग्रन्थावली की भूमिका, पृ० १६८, सूफी महाकवि जायसी पृ० २११-२१४, नागमती का विरह-वर्णन।
२३. सूफी महाकवि जायसी पृ० ४६।
२४. वही, पृ० ४८।

विद्यापति ने अपने काव्य-नायक के लिए 'सुपुरुष' शब्द का अनेक स्थलों पर प्रयोग किया है। उनकी दृष्टि में सुपुरुष के दो मुख्य लक्षण हैं—युद्ध काल में वीरता का प्रदर्शन और शान्ति काल में कला-विलास-संलग्नता। यह शब्द जायसी के समय तक अपने इसी पारिभाषिक अर्थ में रूढ़ हो गया था। उन्होंने भी इसी अर्थ में इसका प्रयोग किया है—

> राजै दीन्ह कटक कहं बीरा। सुपुरुष होहु करहु मन धीरा। प० १५।८।१।
> दुवौ मिले मनावा भला। सुपुरुष आपु आपु कहं चला।
> लीन्ह उतारि जाहि हित जोगू। जो तप करै सो पावै भोगू ।।२५।२४।३ प०।
> धन्नि पुरुष अस नवै न नाये। औ सुपुरुष होइ देस पराये।प० २६।४।७।
> जेंह सत पुरुष तहां सुरसती। प० २८।२८।१।

जायसी ने विद्यापति के द्वारा अत्यधिक प्रयुक्त प्रणय-प्रतीकों-मालती और भँवर का प्रचुर उपयोग किया है। प्रसंग भी संयोग-वियोग का ही है। नागमती वियोग खंड का अन्तिम दोहा तो विद्यापति के एक पद की छाया ही लगता है—

> नहिं पावस ओहि देसरा, नहिं हेवन्त बसन्त।
> ना कोकिल न पपीहरा, जेहि सुनि आवै कंत ।। पद्मावत ३०।१६।।
> जाहि देस पिक मधुकर नहिं गूँजए।
> कुसुमित नहिं कानने ।।विद्यापति।।[25]

उक्त तथ्यों और जायसी के संकेतों को उद्धृत करने का प्रयोजन यह है कि पद्मावत के रचयिता को निरक्षर और बहुश्रुतमात्र मानने की धारणा को निरस्त किया जा सके। जायसी एक महाकवि के लिए अपेक्षित गुणों से सम्पन्न व्यक्ति थे। प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास, तीनों के समन्वय से उनके कवि-व्यक्तित्व का निर्माण हुआ था। काव्य-सृजन के लिए सहायक विविध तत्वों पर उनका अधिकार था। वह पूर्ववर्ती कवियों की कृतियों और साहित्य से परिचित थे, उसका रसास्वादन भी कर सकते थे और यथा स्थान उनके भावों को मनोहारी और संक्षिप्त रूप से प्रस्तुत भी कर सकते थे।

विनम्रता—

गर्वीले चन्द को छोड़ कर किसी भी अन्य कवि ने अपने काव्य की स्वयं स्तुति नहीं की है न 'घटि बढ़ि कोइ मत्तह पढ़ै मुहिं दूषन न विसिष्ष' कहा है। जायसी अत्यन्त विनम्र व्यक्ति थे। वह अपने आप को पंडितों का अनुसरण करने वाला कहते हैं। अपने ज्ञान और ज्ञान-शक्ति को भी पंडितों की देन कह कर अपनी विनम्रता प्रकट करते हैं—

> औ विनती पंडितन सन भजा। टूट संवारहु नेरवहु सजा।
> हौं पंडितन केर पछलागा। किछु कहि चला तबल देइ डगा ।।
>
> प० १।२३।२-३।
>
> मैं एहि अरथ पंडितन्ह बूझा। कहा कि हम्ह किछु और न सूझा।
> पंडित पढ़ि अखरावटी, टूटा जोरहु देखि। जायसी ग्रन्था० पृ० ३०३।
> ना मोहि गुन न जीभ रसबाता। पद्मा० १७।१।६।

२५. बिहार राष्ट्रभाषा परिषद् से प्रकाशित पदावली का २६२वां पद द्रष्टव्य।

सहृदयता—

जायसी प्रेम की पीर से स्वयं सम्पन्न थे ही, मित्रता को अन्त तक निभाने वाले व्यक्ति थे। अन्य जनों के प्रति वह अत्यन्त उदार थे—

मुहमद बारिउ मीत मिलि, भए जो एकै चित्त।
एहि जग साथ जो निबहा, ओहि जग बिछुरन कित्त। पद्मा० १।२२॥
मुहमद कबि जो बिरह भा, ना तन रकत न मांसु॥ प० १।२३।
भंवर आइ बन खंड सन, लेइ कंवल कै बास।
दादुर बास न पावई, भलहि जो आछै पास॥ प० १।२४।
तेहि कत बुधि जेहि हिये न नैना। प० ३।८।७।

गुणी और गुणों के प्रति दृष्टि—

जायसी यह मानते थे कि गुण छिपाने की वस्तु नहीं, पर वह अनुभव करते थे कि गुणी व्यक्ति को आत्म-स्तुति करने वाला नहीं बनना चाहिए—

गुन न छपाइय हिरदय मांहा। प० ७।३।५।
गुनी न कोई आपु सराहा। प० ७।८।६।

कवि—

जायसी ने स्वयं अपने लिए 'कवि' शब्द का प्रयोग अवश्य किया है, किन्तु वह 'कवि' की सार्थकता उसके काव्य की प्रभावशीलता में ही मानते हैं—

सुनि तेहि आयउ आंसु। प० १।२३।६।
जो कवि सुनै सीस सो धुना। प० ३८।१।४।

जायसी यह उचित नहीं मानते थे कि पंडित और कवि अर्थ-लोभ में पड़ें। यद्यपि वह स्वयं फकीरी का जीवन व्यतीत करते थे, फिर भी राजदरबारों की व्यवस्था से पूर्ण परिचित थे। वहां की घूसखोरी और भ्रष्टाचार को वह शासन की बड़ी दुर्बलता समझते थे—

लोभ पाप कै नदी अंकोरा। सत्त न रहै हाथ जो बोरा।
जहं अंकोर तहं नीक न राजू। ठाकुर केर बिनासै काजू॥ प० ५३।४।१-२।

ऐसे दरबारों और वहां के समाज से अर्थ-प्राप्ति को वह हीन कार्य मानते थे। उनका दृष्टिकोण था कि सरस्वती के साधक कवि को लक्ष्मी की कामना भी नहीं करनी चाहिए—

पंडित होइ सो हाट न चढ़ा। चहौं बिकाय भूलि गा पढ़ा॥ प० ७।३।३।
चहै लच्छि बाउर कबि सोई। जंह सुरसती लच्छि कित होई।
कबिता संग दारिद मति भंगी। कांटे कूंट पुहुप के संगी।
कबि तो चेला बिधि गुरू, सीप सेवाती बूंद।
तेहि मानस मैं आस का, जो मरजिया समुंद॥ ३८।४।६-८॥

विधाता के शिष्य कवि की मानस-समृद्धि ही पर्याप्त है। जायसी कवि की क्षमता से पूर्ण परिचित थे। कवि की जीभ को वह दुधारी तलवार मानते हैं जो एक ओर आग

और दूसरी ओर पानी से युक्त है। वह ओजस्विता भी भर सकती है और शान्ति तथा शीतलता भी प्रदान करती है—

कवि कै जीभ खडग हरद्वानी। एक दिसि आगि दुसर दिसि पानी।

प० ३८।५।४।

समन्वयवादी दृष्टि—

जायसी इस्लाम के अनुयायी थे। इस्लाम की मान्यताओं और परंपराओं से उन्हें अनभिज्ञ कहना उचित नहीं है। हिन्दू रीति-रिवाजों और धार्मिक मान्यताओं से वह निकटतम परिचित थे। यहां के हिन्दू समाज, उसके इतिहास, उसकी लोक-कथाओं और उसके साहित्य, विशेषतः रामायण-महाभारत को वह आदर की दृष्टि से देखते थे। प्रेम का साधक हिन्दू मुसलमान का भेद कर ही नहीं सकता था। डा० जयदेव भी यह मानते हैं कि 'उस युग की एक विशेष भावना थी सामंजस्य की' जिसकी ओर हमारे कवि (जायसी) की पूर्ण दृष्टि थी।[26] आचार्य रामचन्द्र शुक्ल के कथनानुसार 'इस उदार सारग्राहिणी प्रवृत्ति के साथ ही साथ उन्हें अपने इस्लाम धर्म और पैगंबर पर भी पूरी आस्था थी।'[27]

जायसी कवि, सहृदय और उदार थे। हिन्दू और इस्लाम धर्म में जो कुछ उत्तम और समन्वय के योग्य था, उसकी ओर उनकी सजग दृष्टि पहले पड़ी है। अखरावट और आखिरी कलाम में अपने सिद्धान्तों की अभिव्यक्ति उन्होंने इसी दृष्टि से की है। समन्वय में न कोरे इस्लाम धर्म के सिद्धान्तों की अपेक्षा की जा सकती है न कोरे हिन्दू धर्म के सिद्धान्तों की। यह अस्पष्टता नहीं है अपितु मानवता के धरातल पर उदात्त वृत्तियों से निर्मित नूतन मूर्ति की प्रतिष्ठा का प्रयत्न है—

बलि विक्रम दानी बड़ कहे। हातिम करन तियागी अहे। पद्मा० १।१७।२।
बाउर सोइ जो पाहन पूजा। सकत को भार लेइ सिर दूजा। २१।४।६।
महादेव देवन्ह कै पिता। तुम्हरी सरन राम रन जिता। २२।५।६।
कीन्ह अरगजा मरदन, औ सखि कीन्ह नहानु।
पुनि भइ चौदसि चांद सो, रूप गएउ छपि भानु॥ २७।४३।
पदमावति भइ पूनिउ कला, चौदसि चांद उई सिंघला। २६।८।२।
आदम हौवा कंह सृजा, लेइ घाला कविलास।
पुनि तंहवां ते काढ़ा, नारद के बिसवास॥ अखरावट ६।
तिन्ह संतति उपराजा, भांतिहि भांति कुलीन।
हिन्दू तुरुक दुवौ भए, अपने अपने दीन॥ अख० ७॥
मनुवा चंचल ढांप, बरजे अहथिर ना रहे।
पाल पेटारे सांप, मुहमद तेहि बिधि राखिये॥ अख० ३८॥
जो जम आन जिउलेत है, संकर तिनहूँ कर जिउ लेव।
सो अवतरे मुहम्मद, देखु तहूँ जिउ देव॥ आखिरी कलाम २०॥

हातिम और कर्ण को एक पंक्ति में बिठाना, पाहन पूजने की निन्दा करते हुए भी महादेव को सब देवताओं में श्रेष्ठ बताना, भारतीय काव्य-परंपरा में रूढ़ पूर्णिमा की कला को फारसी काव्य-परम्परा की चतुर्दशी के चांद से समवेत करना, आदम और हौवा को

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२६. द्रष्टव्य-सूफी महाकवि जायसी पृ० ३५०
२७. जायसी ग्रन्थावली-भूमिका पृ० १०

नारद के साथ स्वर्ग में उपस्थित दिखाना तथा मुहम्मद को शंकर का अवतार सिद्ध करना विचारों या इस्लाम और हिन्दू धर्म के ज्ञान की अस्पष्टता नहीं है। हिन्दू और तुरक के 'दीन' पृथक्-पृथक् अवश्य हैं पर वे दोनों एक ही माता-पिता की सन्तान हैं। वस्तुतः ये तथ्य इस दृष्टिकोण के साक्षी हैं कि जायसी का उद्देश्य हिन्दू और तुरक को सम धार्मिक धरातल पर एक ही प्रभु की सन्तान के रूप में खड़ा करना था। मन को संयमित कर सभी प्रेम-साधना करें, इस ओर सबको प्रेरित करना ही उनका लक्ष्य था।

मानवता की पूर्ण प्रतिष्ठा और साधना के द्वारा मानव को उच्चतम स्थान तक पहुंचाने की ओर निर्देश करने में जायसी के व्यक्तित्व का भव्य रूप स्पष्ट होता है—

पुरुषहि चाहिय ऊंच हियाऊ। दिन दिन राखै ऊंचे पांऊ।
सदा ऊंच पै सेइय बारा। ऊंचे सो कीजिय बेवहारा॥
ऊंचै चढ़ै ऊंच खंड सूझा। ऊंचे पास ऊंच मति बूझा।
ऊंचै संग संगति निति कीजै। ऊंचे काज जीउ पुनि दीजै॥
दिन दिन ऊंचे होइ सो, जेहि ऊंचे पर चाउ।
ऊंचे चढ़ता जो खसि परे, ऊंच न छांड़िय काउ॥ पद्मा० १६।५।

जायसी मानव-प्रगति में विश्वास रखने वाले और उसे सदा प्रगति-पथ पर बढ़ने की प्रेरणा देने वाले कवि थे। अखरावट और आखिरी कलाम उनको इस्लाम का सच्चा अनुयायी सिद्ध करते हैं, पर वहां भी वह मानवता को नहीं भूलते—

सोइ सोधु लागा रहे, जेहि चलि आगे जाइ।

न तु फिरि पाछे आवई, मारग चलि न सिराइ॥ अख० ग्रन्था० पृ० ३२०।

जायसी ने यद्यपि पद्मावत में अलाउद्दीन के भोज के समय आमिष पदार्थों का वर्णन किया है, पर वह स्वयं निजी आचार में किसी वैष्णव से कम प्रतीत नहीं होते—

छाड़हु घिउ औ मछरी मांसू। सूखे भोजन करहु गरासू।
दूध मांसु घिउ कर न अहारू। रोटी सानि करहु फरहारू।
एहि विधि काम घटावहु काया। काम क्रोध तिसना मद माया॥

अख० ग्रं० पृ० ३२८।

सूफी साधना के चरम लक्ष्य प्रेम की पीर से सम्पन्न, सदाचार में वैष्णव, फकीर जायसी, हिन्दू और इस्लाम धर्म एवं उनकी साहित्यिक तथा सांस्कृतिक परंपराओं से पूर्ण परिचित थे। वह प्रबन्ध-काव्य के सृजन के लिये सहायक एवं आवश्यक प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास के गुणों से युक्त थे। इतिहास और राजनीति के मर्मज्ञ थे। वह विनम्र, सहृदय, गुणी और एक ऐसे कवि थे, जो स्वान्तः सुखाय के साथ जनता के पथ-प्रदर्शन के लिए काव्य-रचना में प्रवृत्त होता है। वह सच्चे अर्थों में जन-कवि थे। अपनी समन्वयवादी दृष्टि के कारण वह मानवता के पोषक थे। उनकी कृतियां उनके इसी दृष्टिकोण की काव्याभिव्यक्तियां हैं। 'क्या लोकपक्ष में और क्या भगवत्पक्ष में, दोनों ओर उनकी गूढ़ता और गंभीरता विलक्षण दिखाई देती है।'[१८]

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१८. जायसी ग्रन्थावली-भूमिका-पृ० १२।

डॉ० मनमोहन सहगल

गुरु ग्रंथ साहिब में ब्रह्म का स्वरूप : सांस्कृतिक परम्परा की देन

गुरु ग्रंथ शुद्ध भारतीय संस्कारों में रचित-संकलित एक ऐसी रचना है, जिसमें के संकल्प भारतीय-चिन्तन की परम्पराओं पर निर्मित हुए हैं। पाश्चात्य विचारधारा से प्रभावित होकर ग्रंथ में ब्रह्म के अस्तित्व के प्रमाण खोजने और जुटाने की आवश्यकता नहीं पड़ी, न ऐसा कोई संशय ही उदित हुआ। गुरु ग्रंथ चिन्तन में ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्ष है[1], स्पष्ट है, अनुभव किया जा सकता है;[2] तो फिर प्रत्यक्ष के लिए प्रमाण क्या ? पाश्चात्य विचारक डेकार्ट का ईश्वर सम्बन्धी प्रथम प्रमाण 'मैं विचारता हूँ, इसलिए मैं हूं' (Cogito, ergo sum) अन्ततः भारतीय उपनिषदों एवं वेदांत के 'अहम् ब्रह्मास्मि' के महावाक्य में समा जाता है ; जबकि गुरु ग्रंथ चिन्तन 'मैं' में अहंकार की गंध लेता हुआ 'तू' और 'वह' तक ही सीमित है। यहाँ अपनी सत्ता को उसी पर आश्रित माना है, इसलिए यदि अंश को अंशी का ज्ञान प्राप्त करने का प्रश्न उठे तो कम-से-कम अंशी के अस्तित्व का प्रमाण जुटाना आवश्यक नहीं होगा, क्योंकि अंश का विद्यमान होना ही अंशी के अस्तित्व का प्रमाण है। ऐतरेयोपनिषद् की मान्यता है कि ब्रह्म ने अपने ही एकांश को मनुष्य रूप देकर देवताओं को उसमें रहने के लिये प्रेरित किया। यह अंश सदैव स्रोत के प्रति खिंचता रहता है, इसलिए उसमें (मनुष्य में) अंशी की (ब्रह्म की) चेतना सदैव सजग रहती है।

यद्यपि गुरु ग्रंथ की वाणी ब्रह्म की अवतारवादी धारणा को विशेष स्वीकृति नहीं देती, तथापि ग्रंथ में ब्रह्म-चर्चा के समय अनेकानेक पौराणिक, अवतारवादी एवं विशेषण-धारी संज्ञाओं[3] का प्रयोग किया गया है। कुछ इस्लामी नाम[4] भी, जो तब तक भारतवर्ष में प्रचलित हो चुके थे, प्रयुक्त हुए हैं, किन्तु अधिक बल पौराणिक नामों पर ही दिया गया है। इससे वाणीकार सन्तों के सामाजिक नेतृत्व का आशय तो स्पष्ट ही है, साथ ही भारतीय संस्कार-शब्दावली से उन महाविदों का मोह भी द्रष्टव्य है। ग्रंथ में मूल सत्य को 'ओंकार' नाम से पुकारा गया है। १, सतिनाम, करता पुरख, निरभउ, निरवैर, अकाल-मूरति, अजूनी, सैभं आदि शब्द ओंकार के गुणों और विशेषणों को दर्शाते हैं। यही सब मिलकर ग्रंथ-चिन्तन में ब्रह्म की संकल्पना का मूल-मंत्र बन जाता है।[5]

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१. नानक का पातिसाहु दिसै जाहरा। ४:३:१०५, आसा म० ५, पृ० ३९७।

२. अहम्रु दीसै महम्रु सुणीऐ......। १७. बिलावल म० ५; पृ० ८४६।

३. भगवान, राम, कृष्ण, केसव, चक्रपाणि, मधुसूदन, हरि, गुसाईं, ईशर, प्रभ, पीताम्बर, दमोदर, बिश्न, बिशम्भर, गोबरधन धारी, माधव, कान्ह, बासदेव, रघुराइ, गोबिन्द, गिरधारी चक्रधर, गोपाल, गोपीनाथ, मुरारी, नाराइण आदि (अन्य अनेक नाम भी उपलब्ध हैं, जिनकी संख्या सैंकड़ों तक है।)

४. अल्लाह, मौला, मालिक, पाक, रब्ब, रहीम, राजिक, साहिब आदि।

५. १ ओंकार सतिनामु करता पुरखु, निरभउ, निरवैरु,
अकाल-मूरति, अजूनी, सैभं, गुर प्रसादि। (मूल-मंत्र)

ब्रह्म के लिए ओ३म् अथवा ओंकार शब्द का प्रयोग उपनिषदों में प्रायः मिल जाता है। 'ओमिति ब्रह्म' (ओ३म् ब्रह्म है)[५], 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं' (ओंकारमय अविनाशी ब्रह्म है[६]) अथवा 'सर्वमोंकार एव' (सब ओंकार ही है)[७] आदि उक्तियों को देखते हुए यह निश्चित रूप से कहा जा सकता है कि भारतीय संस्कार वाङ्मय में प्रचलित प्रसिद्ध ओंकार संज्ञा ही ग्रंथ-चिन्तन का मूल अंग बनी है। ब्रह्म को 'एक' कहा जाना तो वेदों से ही आरम्भ हो गया था। प्राचीनतम भारतीय ग्रंथ ऋग्वेद में—य एको अस्ति दंसना महाँ उग्रो अभि व्रतैः[८]—कहकर ब्रह्म की एकता स्वीकार की गई है। उपनिषद्कार भी ऐसा ही कहता है :—

> एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्व भूतान्तरात्मा।[९]
> (परमात्मा एक, सब प्राणियों में गूढ़, सर्वव्यापी एवं सर्व भूतों का अन्तरात्मा है)

गुरु नानक द्वारा मूल-मंत्र में ब्रह्म के लिए 'एक' तथा 'ओंकार' की जो संज्ञाएँ अपनाई गई हैं, वे निस्सन्देह सांस्कृतिक परम्परा की रिक्थ हैं। इन दोनों शब्दों का इकट्ठा प्रयोग गुरु साहिब ने सम्भवतः ऐकेश्वरवाद पर बल देने के लिए किया है। गुरु ग्रंथ में ब्रह्म के एक-भाव सम्बन्धी अनेकानेक पद उपलब्ध हैं, जो निरन्तर भारतीय परम्पराओं को पुष्ट कर रहे प्रतीत होते हैं—यथा,

> एको एकु-एकु हरि आपि। तिसु बिनु दूसर होआ न होगु।[१०]
> साहिब मेरा एको है। एको है भाई एको है।[११]
> हरि इको दाता वरतदा दूजा अवरु न कोइ।[१२]

ग्रंथ से ऐसे और भी सैकड़ों पद्यांश उद्धरित किए जा सकते हैं। इसकी तुलना में अथर्ववेद पहले से ही ब्रह्म को एक मानकर उसमें दो, तीन या चार की सम्भावना का निषेध करता हुआ देखा जा सकता है।

> य एतं देवम् एकवृतं वेद। १५।
> न द्वितीयः न तृतीयश् चतुर्थो नाप्युच्यते। १६।
>
> × × × ×
>
> तमिदं निगतं सहः स एष एक एकवृद् एक एव। २०।[१३]
> (जो प्रभु को मात्र एक मानता है, उसे।१५।, उसे दूसरा, तीसरा या चौथा नहीं कहा जाता।१६। वही अपरिमित शक्ति का स्वामी है, वही एक है, केवल एक।२०।)

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६. नारद परिव्राजकोपनिषद् : अष्टमोऽपदेश, श्लोक २।
७. माण्डूक्योपनिषद् : श्लोक १।
८. ऋग्वेद ८/१/२७।
९. श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद् श्लोक ११।
१०. पद ६, गउड़ी म० ५, पृ० २८६।
११. पद १५, आसा म० १, पृ० ४२०।
१२. पद २:२४:५७, सिरी म० ३, पृ० ३६।
१३. अथर्ववेद, काण्ड १३, सूक्त ४, मंत्र १५, १६, २०।

एक में अनेक ; निर्गुण-सगुण—यहाँ प्रश्न उठता है कि गुरु ग्रंथ विचारधारा जह ब्रह्म को एक मानती है, वहाँ अनेक का रूप भी उसमें पा जाती है। जिस सत्ता क सर्वव्यापक कहा है, वह निश्चय ही स्थान-स्थान पर विभिन्न नाम-रूप में विद्यमान होगी अतः एक से अनेक हो जायगी। इसी समस्या का उत्तर खोजते दूसरा प्रश्न उठता है कि वह एक जब देश-काल की सीमाओं में बंधा अनेक अनुभव होगा, तब निराकार अथव निर्गुण से सगुण भी हो जायगा। अतः गुरु ग्रंथ में इन दोनों प्रश्नों का उत्तर वेदान्ति 'एकता में अनेकता' और 'अनेकता में एकता' तथा निर्गुण-सगुण की एकरूपता के माध्यम से प्रस्तुत किया गया है।

> निरंकारु आकारु आपि निरगुण सरगुण एक।
> एकहि एक बखाननो नानक एक अनेक।
> ओअं गुरमुख कीओ अकारा। एकहि सूत परोवन हारा।
> भिनं-भिनं त्रैगुण बिसथारं। निरगुन ते सरगुन दृसटारं।[14]

परमेश्वर स्वयं अनेक आकारों का रचयिता है। वह उन आकारों में स्वयं निवसित होता है, इसलिए एक से अनेक दीखने लगता है। किन्तु सबको एक सूत्र मे बाँधकर एकता का तत भी बनाए रखता है। इसी प्रकार तीनों गुणों के प्रसार से विभिन्न लोकों की रचना क आकारों तथा गुणों को जन्म देता है, इसीलिए निर्गुण से सगुण दीखने लगता है; परन्तु व एक है और निर्गुण ही कहलाता है।

गुरु ग्रंथ की प्रस्तुत विचारधारा भारतीय संस्कृति के उत्स उपनिषदों की ऋणी है। कठोपनिषद्[15] में विद्वान विचारक ने एक-अनेक की समस्या का समाधान इसी प्रकार प्रस्तुत किया था। निर्गुण-निराकार तथा सगुण-साकार की एकता स्थापित करने के लिए गुरु ग्रं में विभिन्न घटों और आकाश तथा बरतनों और जल के उदाहरणों से एक रूप को अने रूपों में प्रकट होते दिखाया गया है। उपनिषद्कार यही बात वायु को उपमान बनाकर क चुका है—

> वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं-रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव।
> एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च।[16]
> (जैसे वायु एक होते हुए भी विभिन्न रूपों वाला हो रहा है, वैसे ही सब प्राणियों में निवास करने वाला परमेश्वर एक होते हुए भी देहधारियों अनुरूप रूप वाला रहता है। वह उनके बाहर भी स्थित है।)

बाणी में इसी सत्य को 'अनिक कोठरिआ भिन भिन भिन भिन करीआ'[17] अथवा 'घटि-घटि

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१४. 'श्लोक' २, गउड़ी बावन अक्खरी म० ५, पृ० २५०।

१५. एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा, एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति।१२। कठ, अध्यास २, वल्ली २ (सब देहधारियों में आत्मा रूप से निवास करने वाला तथा सबको नियंत्रण के रखने वाल परमेश्वर एक रूप वाला होकर भी अनेक रूप धारण कर लेता है।)

१६. कठोपनिषद्, अध्याय २, वल्ली २, श्लोक १०।

१७. वार १:१:४४, सूही म० ५, पृ० ७४६।

रवि रहिआ सभ थाई पूरन पुरखु बिधाता"[18] कहकर व्यक्त किया गया है। निर्गुण और सगुण में अभेद स्थापित करते हुए गुरुवाणी का कथन है—

> निरगुनु आपि सरगुनु भी ओही।
> कला धारि जिनि सगली मोही।[19]

वाणी की निजी विशेषता इस बात में है कि उसमें ब्रह्म के सगुण और निर्गुण रूपों के अतिरिक्त एक निर्गुण-सगुण समन्वित रूप की कल्पना भी की गई है। विद्युत शक्ति की घर-घर में विभिन्न रूपाकार में कार्यान्वित ऊर्जा एवं जल में निराकार रूप में अदृश्य ऊर्जा के अभेद की भांति विश्व के सर्वाकारों में प्रकाशित ब्रह्म तथा निराकार अदृश्य ऊर्जा के सत्तारूप में विद्यमान ब्रह्म में कोई भेद नहीं है। ग्रंथ के वाणीकारों ने इसी तथ्य पर आधारित एक समन्वित रूप की चर्चा की है—

(i) निरगुणु-सरगुणु हरि-हरि मेरा कोई है जीउ आणि मिलावै जीउ।[20]

(ii) आपे सूह किरणि बिसथारु, सोई गुपतु सोई आकारु।
सरगुण-निरगुण थापै नाउ, दुह मिलि एकै कीनो ठाउ।[21]

(iii) ईवै निरगुन ऊवै सरगुन केल करत बिचि सुआमी मेरा।[22]

ब्रह्म को पृथक-पृथक निर्गुण तथा सगुण बताने के लिए पचासों पद उद्धरित किए जा सकते हैं। एक बानगी प्रस्तुत है—

निर्गुण : (i) तिसु रूप न रेखिआ वरनु न कोई गुरमती आपि बुझावणिआ।[23]

(ii) अदिसटु अगोचरु अलखु निरंजनु सो देखिआ गुरमुखि आखी।[24]

सगुण : (i) जो दीसै सो सगल तूं है पसरिआ पासारु।
कहु नानक, गुरि भरमु काटिआ सगल ब्रहमु बीचारु।[25]

सत्य : मूलमन्त्र में ब्रह्म संकल्पना करते हुए ग्रंथवाणी उसे 'सत्यनाम' (जिसका नाम सत्य है) अर्थात् सत्य स्वरूप स्वीकार करती है। जो तत्त्व देश-काल की सीमाओं से ऊपर नित्य, अनश्वर, स्थायी तथा अपरिवर्तनीय होगा, वही सत्य कहलाएगा। ब्रह्म ही एकमात्र सत्य है, गुरु ग्रंथ चिन्तन की ऐसी मान्यता है। 'जपुजी' में उसे 'आदि सचु। जुगादि सचु। है भी सचु'। 'नानक होसी भी सचु'। कहा गया है। अभिप्राय यह कि आदि शक्ति परब्रह्म ही सत्य है, और वही चिर-सत्य बना रहेगा। उसका सर्वस्व सत्य है—

> रूपु सति जाका सति असथानु। पुरखु सति केवल प्रधानु।
> करतूति सति सति जाकी बाणी। सति पुरख सभ माहि समाणी।
> सति करमु जाकी रचना सति। मूलु सति, सति उतपति।

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१८. पद १:२, आसा म० ५, पृ० ४५१।
१९. पद ८;१८, गउड़ी सुखमनी म० ५; पृ० २८७।
२०. पद १:५:१२, माझ म० ५, पृ० ९८।
२१. पद १।१७:६८, आसा म० ५; पृ० ३८७।
२२. पद १:१:११७, बिलावल म० ५, पृ० ८२७।
२३. पद १:१८:१९, अष्टपदी, माझ म० ३, पृ० १२०।
२४. पउड़ी १२, वार सिरी म० ४, पृ० ८७।
२५. पद ४:२५:९५, सिरी म० ५, पृ० ५१।

सति करणी निरमल निरमली । जिसहि बुझाए तिसहि सभ भली ।
सतिनामु प्रभ का सुखदाई । बिस्वासु सति नानक गुर ते पाई ।[26]

प्रभु को एकमात्र सत्य स्वीकार करने की परम्परा शुद्ध भारतीय है। इसमें संदेह नहीं कि कुछ अभारतीय चिन्तन-धारायें भी ब्रह्म को केवल सत्य रूप में पहचानती हैं, तथापि गुरु ग्रंथ में प्रस्तुत संकल्प का आगमन छान्दोग्योपनिषद् की देन है।

एतस्य ब्रह्मणो नाम सत्यमिति ।[27]

इसमें स्पष्ट शब्दों में कहा गया है कि ब्रह्म का नाम ही सत्य है। मूलमन्त्र के 'सतिनाम' वाले अंश को इसी भाव का छायानुवाद कहा जा सकता है। ऋग्वेद के श्लोक ८/६२/१२ में भी प्रभु को 'सत्य' कहा गया है।[28]

करता-पुरख : ग्रंथ विचारधारा ब्रह्म को सृष्टि का रचयिता एवं विश्व के सर्वाकारों का स्वामी मानती है। कर्त्ता, कर्म एवं क्रिया की त्रिविध स्थिति को उसी अनादि सत्ता में केन्द्रित किया गया है। यथा—

हरि आपे सारिंग अम्रितधारा । हरि अंम्रितु आपि पीआवणहारा ।[29]

निर्माता के रूप में ब्रह्म की प्रशस्ति इस प्रकार की गई है—

(i) आपि कराए करता सोई । होर कि करे कीतै किआ होई ।[30]

(ii) तू करता पुरख अगंम है आपि स्रिसटी उपाती ।[31]

तीनों देवता, प्रकृति के तीनों गुण, दसों अवतार और अन्य समूची सृष्टि उसी के हुकम से निर्मित है—

(i) ब्रह्मा, बिसनु महेसु देव उपाइआ ।[32]

(ii) त्रैगुण आपि सिरजिअन माइआ मोहु वधाइआ ।[33]

(iii) हुकमी उपाए दस अउतारा । देव दानव अगणत अपारा ।[34]

ब्रह्म को त्रिविध स्थिति का स्वामी एवं सर्वकर्त्ता स्वीकार करने का संकल्प भी पुरातन भारतीय संस्कारों का ही एक अंग है। उपनिषद्‌कार पहले ही ब्रह्म को उत्पत्ति, स्थिति एवं विनाश का आधार तथा समूची रचना का कारणभूत बता चुका है—

एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ।[35]

(यह ब्रह्म ही सब भूतों की उत्पत्ति, स्थिति और प्रलय का स्थान है। वही सर्वज्ञ, अन्तर्यामी, सब संसार का कारणभूत तथा सबका ईश्वर है)।

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२६. पद ६:१६, गउड़ी सुखमनी म० ५, पृ० २८४।
२७. छान्दयोपनिषद्, अध्याय ८, खंड ३, श्लोक ४।
२८. सत्यम् इद् वा उतं वयम् इन्द्रम् स्तवाम नानृतम् । (यहाँ इन्द्र को ही प्रभु रूप देखा है।)
२९. पद ३:६:४४, गउड़ी गुआरेरी म० ४, पृ० १६५।
३०. पद ८:२३:२४, अष्टपदी माझ म० ३, पृ० १२४।
३१. श्लोक ४, वार माझ म० ५, पृ० १३८।
३२. पद ३:१७, वार मलार म० १, पृ० १२७९।
३३. श्लोक म० १, वार सारंग, पृ० १२३७।
३४. पद १३:४:२६, मारू सोलहे म० १, पृ० १०३७।
३५. माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, श्लोक ६।

ब्रह्म को 'करता-पुरख' कहने से रचयिता के संकल्प के साथ-साथ उसमें पौरुष की कल्पना भी सजग हो उठी है। कुछेक विद्वानों ने तो इस शब्द के माध्यम प्रभु के पुरुष रूप को मुसलमानी प्रभावान्तर्गत 'अपूर्व' स्थापना कहा है।[३६] उनकी सीमित दृष्टि गुरुवाणी में प्रभु से जोड़े जाने वाले स्त्रैण संबन्धों[३७] को तो नहीं ही देख पाई, साथ ही उन्होंने यह भी घोषित कर दिया है कि भारतीय संस्कार साहित्य में ब्रह्म को मात्र पुरुष रूप में देखने वाला चिन्तन सर्वप्रथम गुरुग्रंथ में ही उपलब्ध है। इस भ्रम का निवारण वेदों के सूक्ष्म मनन से संभव है। चारों वेदों में एक प्रसिद्ध श्लोक प्राप्त है, जिसमें ब्रह्म को 'पुरुष' की संज्ञा दी गई है। 'सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः 'सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपात्'[३८] अर्थात् उस परम पुरुष के सहस्रों शिर हैं, सहस्रों नेत्र तथा चरण हैं। अथर्ववेद में 'महस्रबाहु पुरुषः' (१६/६/१) परब्रह्म की सत्ता के लिये प्रयुक्त हुआ है। फिर भी क्योंकि वह निर्गुण है, इसलिये उसका कोई शिर, नेत्र, चरण या बाहु नहीं। गुरुनानक के निम्न पद में यही भाव लक्षित है—

> सहस तव नैन नन नैन हहि तोहि कउ सहस मूरति नना एक तोही।
> सहस पद बिमल नन एक पद गंध बिनु सहस तव गंध इव चलत मोहि।[३९]

तात्पर्य यह है कि ब्रह्म का पुरुष रूप हमारी सांस्कृतिक परम्परा की देन है। गुरु ग्रंथ चिन्तन में इसका यथातथ्य रूप स्वीकार कर लिया गया है। हां, 'करता-पुरख' कहकर वाणीकारों ने सांख्य की जड़ और स्त्रीवाचक प्रकृति में कर्तृ-शक्ति निश्चय ही खंडित कर दी है।

निरभउ-निरवैरु (निर्भय-निर्वैर) : गुरु ग्रंथ के विचारक रचनादाताओं ने ब्रह्म की अन्य विशेषताओं के नाते उसे निर्भय एवं निर्वैर कहा है।

> (i) सगलियां भउ लिखिआ सिरि लेखु।
> नानक निरभउ निरंकारु सचु एकु।[४०]
>
> (ii) जुगि-जुगि थापि सदा निरवैरु। जनमि मरणु नहीं धंधा धैरु।[४१]

वह सबका स्वामी है, सब उसके हाथ के खिलौने हैं; वही सबका सर्जक, पोषक एवं विनाशक है, अतः उसके लिये भय और शत्रुता दोनों अजानी संवेदनाएं हैं। प्रभु के प्रति गुरु ग्रंथ प्रदत्त प्रस्तुत संवेदनाओं के बीज भी भारतीय संस्कृति के पुरातन कीर्ति एवं चिन्तन ग्रंथों में खोजे जा सकते हैं। श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्[४२] में ब्रह्म को जो सर्वव्यापक, सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा, कर्माध्यक्षः, सर्वभूताधिवासः, साक्षी, चेता आदि कहकर पुकारा गया है, वह निर्भयता का ही प्रमाण है। सबके भीतर रहने वाला, सबका अन्तरात्मा, सबके कर्मों का नियंता, सबका साक्षी किसी से क्योंकर भयातुर हो सकता है? अपने ही प्रसार तथा निर्माण से डरने का

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३६. 'One thing, which is particularly Muslim or more correctly Semetic is the male character of God'. Dr. Sher Singh : The Philosophy of Sikhism. p. 141.

३७. यथा 'तू' मेरा पिता, तूं है मेरा माता'। २ माझ म० ५, पृ० १०३।

३८. ऋग्वेद १०/९०/१, यजुर्वेद अ० ३१, मंत्र १, एवं अन्य वेद।

३९. पद २, सोहिला, गउड़ी दीपकी म० १, पृ० १३।

४०. पद १:४, वार आसा म० १, पृ० ४६४।

४१. पद १२, रामकली म० १, पृ० ९३१।

४२. अध्याय ६, श्लोक ११।

प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। पुनः मनोवैज्ञानिक सत्य है कि जिसका हमें डर नहीं होता, उसके साथ किसी प्रकार की शत्रुता या वैर का प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। अस्तुः, क्योंकि ब्रह्म निर्भय है, उसका निर्वैर होना स्वप्रमाणित सम्बद्ध विशेषता बन जाता है। तथापि वेदों में ब्रह्म को सबका मित्र एवं शिवम् कहा गया है—

मा किर् न एना सख्या वि यौषुः तव चेन्द्र विमदस्य च ऋषेः।
विद्महि ते प्रमतिं देव जामिवद् अस्मे ते सन्तु सख्या शिवानि।[४३]

(भावः, हे प्रभु तुम्हारी मैत्री सदैव बनी रहे, इसमें कभी कटुता न आए—हमारे लिये यह कल्याणप्रद है।)

अकाल-मूरति : गुरु ग्रंथ-चिन्तकों ने ब्रह्म की संकल्पना में उसे देश-काल से परे का परम-तत्त्व कहा है। वह अडिग, अडोल और अपरिवर्तनशील है, वह शाश्वत सत्य है, सर्वांगीणसुन्दर है; वह परिस्थितियों के बंधन से मुक्त है, कण-कण में समाया है, विश्व के समस्त नाम-रूप उसी के होते हुए भी उसका कोई विशेष नाम-रूप नहीं—वही 'अकाल' है। वाणी-प्रमाण है—

तू अकाल पुरखु नाहीं सिरि काला। तू पुरखु अलेख अगंम निराला।XXX
त्रै वरताई चउथै घरि वासा। काल विकाल कीए इक ग्रासा।[४४]

'काल बिकाल कीए इक ग्रासा' कहकर यह भी स्पष्ट कर दिया गया है कि निम्नस्तरीय निबद्ध काल-शक्तियाँ तो उसके द्वारा ग्रसित हैं, अर्थात् उसकी दासियाँ मात्र हैं। वही एकमात्र ऐसी सत्ता है, जो काल रहित है। यथा—

अलख अपार अगंम अगोचरि न तिसु कालु न करमा।[४५]

प्रभु के अकालत्व का वर्णन उपनिषदों में भी हुआ है। अधिकतर उपनिषदिक चिन्तन में प्रभु को तीनों कालों से परे, अविनाशी और सम्पूर्ण बताया गया है। लिखा है—

ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानं भूतं भवद्भविष्यदिति सर्वमोङ्कार एव।
यच्चान्यत् त्रिकालातीतं तदप्योङ्कार एव।[४६]

(ओंकारमय अविनाशी ब्रह्म है, उसकी महिमा को प्रत्यक्ष लक्षित कराने वाला यह सम्पूर्ण विश्व है। भूत, भविष्यत्, वर्तमान आदि तीनों कालों वाला यह संसार ओंकार ही है और तीनों कालों से परे भी जो अन्य तत्त्व है, वह ओंकार ही है।

ब्रह्म को मन-वाणी से परे त्रिगुणातीत कहकर भी उसके अकालत्व का समर्थन किया गया है—

निर्गुण गुणत्रयम्। विवेक लभ्यं मनोवागगोचरम्। (निर्वाणोपनिषद्)

(ब्रह्म तीनों गुणों से रहित है। वह विवेक द्वारा प्राप्य है, मन और वाणी का विषय वह नहीं है।)

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४३. ऋग्वेद, मण्डल १०, सूक्त २३, मन्त्र ७।
४४. पद ४:१८, मारू सोलहे म० १, पृ० १०३८।
४५. पद १:६, सोरठ म० १, पृ० ५९७।
४६. माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, श्लोक १।

अजूनी : ब्रह्म आवागमन अथवा योनि-बन्धन से मुक्त है। गुरुजी ने इसीलिये उसे 'अजूनी' अर्थात् योनि-रहित कहा है। वास्तव में ब्रह्म को अजन्मा तो उपनिषदों में भी स्वीकार किया गया है, और अवतारवाद का कोई विशेष पहलू भारतीय संस्कृति के इन स्रोत-ग्रन्थों में उपलब्ध भी नहीं, तथापि ग्रंथ-चिन्तन में प्रयुक्त 'अजूनी' शब्द का अर्थ मात्र अजन्मा न होकर 'जो कभी संसार में जन्म नहीं लेता' ऐसा भी निकलता है। यह तो लगभग सभी धर्मशास्त्र मानते है कि वह अजन्मा है—जब कुछ न था, केवल वही था। उपनिषद् में कहा है—

दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः।
अप्राणो ह्यमना: शुभ्रो ह्याक्षरात् परतः परः।[४७]

(वह परमेश्वर दिव्य और निराकार है, वह विश्व के भीतर-बाहर सर्वत्र व्याप्त है। अजन्मा है और प्राण, मन आदि से रहित विशुद्ध एवं परिपूर्ण है, इसीलिये वह अमरात्मा से भी परम श्रेष्ठ है।)

गुरु ग्रंथ-चिन्तन में वाणीकारों ने ब्रह्म सम्बन्धी स्व-अस्तित्व की संकल्पना को तो स्वीकारा ही है, साथ ही बाद में भी कभी सृष्टि के किसी क्लेश के शमनार्थ उसके जन्म न लेने की कल्पना गुरु ग्रंथ में की गई है। यह भारतीय संस्कारों को ग्रंथ-चिन्तन की निजी देन है। ग्रंथ में ब्रह्म को अजूनी सिद्ध करने वाले कई पद विद्यमान हैं। यथा—

जाति अजाति अजोनी संभउ ना तिसु भाउ न भरमा।
ना तिसु मात पिता सुत बंधपु ना तिस काम न नारी।
अकुल निरंजन अपर परंपरु सगली जोति तुमारी।[४८]

संभउ (स्वयंभू) : जो ब्रह्म योनि-चक्र में नहीं आता, स्वयंभू होना उसकी संबद्ध विशेषता है। ग्रंथ में प्रयुक्त शब्द 'संभउ' वास्तव में संस्कृत शब्द 'स्वयंभू' का अपभ्रंश रूप है। परमात्मा को भारतीय संस्कृति में युग-युग से स्वयंभू की संज्ञा से स्मरण किया जाता रहा है। यजुर्वेद[४९] में प्रभु को कवि, परमज्ञाता एवं अपने-आप अस्तित्व में आने वाला कहा गया है—कविर्मनीषी परिभूः स्वयंभूर्। यही सत्य ग्रंथ साहिब में अनेक स्थानों पर पुनरावृत्त हुआ है—

(i) तुधु आपे आपु उपाइया।[५०]

(ii) हरि आपे आपु उपाइदा हरि आपे देवै लेइ।[५१]

(iii) आपीनै आपु साजिउ आपीनै रचिओ नाउ।[५२]

(iv) थापिआ न जाइ कीता न होइ। आपे आपि निरंजन सोइ।[५३]

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४७. मुण्डकोपनिषद्, द्वितीय मुण्डक, प्रथम खंड, द्वितीय श्लोक।
४८. पद २:६, सोरठ म० १, पृ० ५९७।
४९. यजुर्वेद, (वाजसेनीय संहिता), अध्याय ४०, मन्त्र ८।
५०. पद २०:१, सिरी म० १, पृ० ७३।
५१. पद ४:१, वणजारी सिरी म० ४, पृ० ८२।
५२. श्लोक १, आसा की वार म० १, पृ० ४६३।
५३. पउड़ी ४, जपुजी, पृ० २।

इतना ही नहीं, गुरु ग्रंथ के मूल-मंत्र के अन्तिम शब्द 'गुरु-प्रसादि' का अभिप्राय 'उक्त संकल्पित ब्रह्म की जानकारी केवल गुरु कृपा से ही सम्भव है' भी भारतीय संस्कार वाङ्मय की देन है। योगवाशिष्ठ (६/४१/१६) में स्पष्ट कहा गया है कि 'गुरुपदेश शास्त्रर्थे बिना आत्मा न बुध्यते।' अस्तु:, प्रिंसिपल तेजासिंह[५४] सरीखे विद्वानों द्वारा गुरु ग्रंथ चिन्तन को भारतीय संस्कृति से भिन्न विचार-सरणी घोषित करना न केवल सत्यता से आँखें मूंदना ही कहा जायगा, प्रत्युत मूल संस्कार ग्रंथों के ऋण की अस्वीकृति कृतघ्नता की भी द्योतक होगी। हमारा विश्वास है कि गुरु ग्रंथ साहिब मध्यकालीन चिन्तन का 'महाभारत' है, जिसे भारतीय संस्कृति के विकास का एक पड़ाव-मात्र कहा जा सकता है।

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५४. Principal Teja Singh ; Essays in Sikhism (Are Sikhs Hindus ?)

रणजीत सिंह एम० ए०, पीएच० डी०

निश्चलदास की माया या अज्ञान

"रामायण के उपरान्त यदि भारतीय साधारण जनता में किसी ग्रन्थ का सर्वाधिक प्रचार है, तो यह ग्रन्थ निश्चलदास जी का "विचार सागर है" ये शब्द स्वामी विवेकानन्द जी के हैं। विचार सागर के रचयिता सन्त निश्चलदास जी हरियाणा निवासी हैं। इनका जन्म संवत् अठारह सौ अड़तालीस में हुआ था। इनका मूल जन्म-स्थान "धनाना" जिला हिसार था। निश्चलदास जी ने अपने जीवन में न्याय, वेदान्त और सांख्य सिद्धान्तों का तलस्पर्शी अध्ययन किया और तदनन्तर किढ़ौली ग्राम जिला रोहतक में आकर नए दादू देहरे को स्थापित किया। निश्चलदास जी दादू पंथ के उत्तराद्धी सम्प्रदाय से सम्बन्धित थे। इस सम्प्रदाय का बड़ा भारी देहरा रतिया जिला हिसार में है।

निश्चलदास जी ने अपने जीवन काल में हिन्दी और संस्कृत की लगभग दस पुस्तकें लिखीं। इनमें से वृत्तिप्रभाकर विद्वानों के लिए और विचार सागर जन साधारण के लिए "अद्वैतवेदान्त" का मार्ग प्रशस्त करती हैं। अद्वैत सम्प्रदायों में भी निश्चलदास जी शांकर अद्वैत मत के अनुयायी थे। प्रस्तुत लेख में इनके ग्रन्थों के आधार पर माया या अज्ञान का संक्षिप्त विवरण प्रस्तुत किया जा रहा है।

अज्ञान, अविद्या, प्रकृति, माया, शक्ति और प्रधान ये सब नाम एक ही पदार्थ के हैं, ऐसे विचार हमें निश्चलदास जी के ग्रन्थों में उपलब्ध होते हैं।[1] ज्ञानाभाव को अज्ञान कहते हैं "नैयायिकों की यह परिभाषा निश्चलदास जी को मान्य नहीं। उनके मत से तो" आवरण विक्षेप शक्तिमान, अनादि एवं भाव रूप पदार्थ का नाम अज्ञान है।[2] वृत्तिप्रभाकर में इस अज्ञान को विद्या द्वारा नाश्य होने के कारण अविद्या, प्रपंच का उपादान होने से प्रकृति व प्रधान, दुर्घट को भी सम्पादन करने वाली होने से माया और स्वतन्त्रता के अभाव से शक्ति नाम दिया गया है। विवरणकार के मत से भी माया और अविद्या एक ही हैं। पर व्यवहार भेद से विक्षेप की प्रधानता होने से माया, और आवरण की प्रधानता से अविद्या है। शंकराचार्य ने भी सृष्टि का हेतु बताने में दोनों शब्दों का प्रयोग किया है। सर्वज्ञात्म मुनि के गुरु सुरेश्वराचार्य अज्ञान शब्द का प्रयोग करना पसन्द करते हैं। परन्तु बाद के वेदान्तियों ने लोक-मत अथवा लौकिक प्रयोग का ध्यान रखते हुए अविद्या और माया में भेद कर दिया है[3]। उन्होंने "शुद्ध सत्व प्रधान माया और मलिन सत्व प्रधान अविद्या है", दोनों की यह परिभाषा देनी उत्तम समझी है।

स्वरूप—माया अथवा अज्ञान के स्वरूप के विषय में अनेक मत हैं। कुछ आचार्य तो माया अज्ञान को अनादि व भावरूप कहना उचित नहीं समझते। क्योंकि ऐसा कहने से उनकी दृष्टि में अद्वैत ग्रन्थों से विरोध होता है। इसी प्रकार इन आचार्यों के विचार से

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१. वृत्ति प्रभाकर अष्टम प्रकाश।

२. वृत्ति प्रभाकर अष्टम प्रकाश।

३. दर्शन शास्त्र का इतिहास नन्द किशोर पृ० ४०६

अज्ञान में सावयवता अथवा निरवयवता भी सम्भव नहीं होती।[4] इसी दृष्टि से बहुत से ग्रन्थों में अज्ञान को अनिर्वचनीय ही कहा है।

निश्चल दास जी अज्ञान या माया को भाव रूप एवं अनादि मानते हुए अनिर्वचनीय भी कहते हैं। वे अपने मन्तव्य की पुष्टि के लिए अपने विचार युक्ति-युक्त ढंग से निम्न प्रकार कहते हैं।

१. निश्चलदास जी अपने भाव एवं अनादि रूप विचारों को प्रकट करते हुए कहते हैं कि "अज्ञान को भाव रूप श्रवण कर के जो उत्कर्ण होते हैं, वे केवल अल्पश्रुत हैं।[5]

२. यह बात नहीं कि वे केवल अल्पश्रुत कह करके ही अपने मन्तव्य की सिद्धि को इतिश्री समझ बैठे, परन्तु वे उक्त शंका का समाधान विवेचनात्मक ढंग से भी प्रस्तुत करते दीखते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि जैसे अज्ञान सद्विलक्षण है, वैसे ऊसद् विलक्षण भी है। अतः अज्ञान में अबाध्यत्व रूप सत्व तो नहीं, किन्तु इसमें तुच्छरूप असत् से विलक्षणवत् सत्व का ही अंगीकार है। इसीलिए इसे सत्-असत् से विलक्षण अनिर्वचनीय कहा गया है।

सर्वथा वचन के अगोचर को ही अनिर्वचनीय नहीं कहा जाता। किन्तु पारमार्थिक सत् स्वरूप ब्रह्म से विलक्षण, और सर्वथा सत्ता स्फूर्ति शून्य शशश्रृंगादिक असत् से विलक्षण ही अनिर्वचनीय शब्द का पारिभाषिक अर्थ है। अतः माया व अज्ञान को अनादि एवं भाव रूप कहना सम्भव है।

न्याय मतोक्त ज्ञानाभाव रूप निषेधामुख प्रतीति का विषय अज्ञान है। इस विचार को निश्चलदास जी उपयुक्त नहीं मानते। अपितु वे तो कहते हैं कि जैसे रज्जु में सर्वादिक ज्ञानबाध्यविधि मुख प्रतीति के विषय होते हैं, तथैव अज्ञान ज्ञान से निवर्तनीय विधि मुख प्रतीति का विषय है। अज्ञान शब्द में निश्चलदास जी के विचारानुसार "अकार" का विरोधी अर्थ न होकर निषेध अर्थ है। अतः अज्ञान में भावरूपता कहनी उचित है।

इसके साथ ही वे प्राचीन आचार्यों का उदाहरण देकर भी यह सिद्ध करते हैं कि प्राचीन आचार्यों विवरणकाणदिकों ने अत्यन्त उद्घोष के साथ प्रकाश विरोधी अंधकार को भावरूप प्रतिपादन करके ज्ञान विरोधी अज्ञान को भी भाव रूप ही प्रतिपादित किया है।[1] उत्पत्ति रहित होने से अनादि है परन्तु घट के समान अवयवसमवेत रूपसावयव नहीं किन्तु अन्धकार के समान सांश हैं।

विचार सागर में निश्चलदास जी ने स्पष्ट रूप से माया का स्वरूप इस प्रकार कहा है :—

जीव ईस भेद हीन चेतन स्वरूप माँहि,
माया सो अनादि एक सांत ताहि मानिये।
सत् औ असत तैं विलच्छण स्वरूप ताको,
ताँहि कूं अविद्या और अज्ञान हु बखानिये॥

अर्थात् जीव ईश्वर भेद रहित शुद्ध चेतन के आश्रित माया है। वह माया अनादि है और एक है। माया साना अर्थात् अन्तवाली है, ज्ञान से उसका अन्त हो जाता है।

४. वृति प्रभाकर अष्टम प्रकाश पृ० १४६।
५. वृति प्रभाकर अष्टम प्रकाश।
१ १।

सत्-असत् से विलक्षण है। जिसका तीनों कालों से बाधन हो वह सत् है, ऐसा सत् तो केवल चेतन है।

माया का ज्ञान से बोध होता है, अतः सत् से विलक्षण है। जिसकी तीनों कालों में प्रतीति नहीं होती, वह असत् है। जैसे शशृंग; बन्ध्यापुत्र आकाश कुसुम। ज्ञान से पहले माया और उसके कार्य प्रतीत होते हैं। जाग्रत में 'मैं' अज्ञानी हूं और ब्रह्म को नहीं जानता "इस प्रकार माया प्रतीत होती है। स्वप्न में जो नाना पदार्थ प्रतीत होते है, उनका उपादान कारण माया है। सुषुप्ति के बाद अज्ञान की निम्न प्रकार स्मृति होती है :—

"मैं सुखपूर्वक सोया और कुछ भी सुध नहीं रहीं" यह स्मृति अज्ञान वस्तु की हो नहीं सकती अतः सुषुप्ति में अज्ञान का भान होता है। अज्ञान और माया एक ही वस्तु है, इनमें कोई भेद नहीं। तीनों अवस्थाओं में माया की प्रतीति होती है, अतः असत् से विलक्षण है।

माया और उसके कार्य से द्वैतापत्ति की आशंका करने वालों को निश्चलदास जी कहते हैं कि जैसे चेतन सत् स्वरूप है, वैसे ही यदि माया और उसका कार्य सत् रूप हो तो द्वैतापत्ति हो सकती है। पर माया और उसका कार्य सत्-असत् से विलक्षण होने से मिथ्या है और मिथ्या पदार्थ से द्वैतापत्ति सिद्ध नहीं होती माया या अविद्या के कार्यों के मिथ्यात्व के विषय में उन्होंने इस प्रकार कहा है।[7]

सकल अविद्या कारज मिथ्या।
सिष। तामैं रंचकहु न तथ्या।।

अर्थात् अविद्या के सम्पूर्ण कार्य मिथ्या हैं, उन्हें सत्य रूप में नहीं मानना चाहिए।

अज्ञान का आश्रय और विषय

अज्ञान अनादि और भावरूप है परन्तु यह अज्ञान रहता कहां है? अज्ञान का आश्रय क्या है और इसका विषय क्या है? इस विषय में वाचस्पति का यह मत है कि "अज्ञान जीव के आश्रित है और ब्रह्म को विषय करता है तथा अज्ञान है" निश्चलदास जी को मान्य नहीं है। निश्चलदास जी कहते है कि "ईश्वर जीव के अज्ञान से कल्पित है" यह कहना श्रुति के विरुद्ध है। नाना अज्ञान मानने भी असंगत हैं। नाना अज्ञान मानकर ईश्वर और सृष्टि एक माने यह नहीं हो सकता। क्योंकि जीव ईश्वर प्रपंच-अज्ञान कल्पित है। अनन्त अज्ञान मानने से एक-एक अज्ञान कल्पित जीव की भांति ईश्वर और प्रपंच भी अनन्त ही मानने होगें। अतः अज्ञान एक है यह मत समीचीन है।

वह एक अज्ञान भी जीव के आश्रित नहीं अपितु शुद्ध ब्रह्म के आश्रित हैं। इसमें निश्चलदास जी निम्न कारण प्रस्तुत करते हैं :—

१. क्योंकि जीव भाव अज्ञान का कार्य है, वह अज्ञान कदापि स्वतन्त्र नहीं रह सकता। अतः निराश्रय अज्ञान से तो जीव भाव बन ही नहीं सकता। पूर्व में अज्ञान को किसी के आश्रित होना चाहिए, उसी समय अज्ञान का कार्य जीवभाव बन सकता है। जीवत्व की भांति ईश्वरता भी अज्ञान नहीं, किन्तु शुद्ध ब्रह्म के आश्रित अनादि अज्ञान है।

७. विचार सागर पृ० १६७।

२. यद्यपि "मैं अज्ञानी हूँ" इस प्रयोग से अज्ञान जीव के आश्रित प्रतीत होता है, तथापि शुद्ध ब्रह्म के आश्रित अज्ञान का जीव को "मैं अज्ञानी हूँ" ऐसा अभिमान होता है।

३. जीव अज्ञान का कार्य है। अतः अज्ञान का अधिष्ठान-रूप आश्रय जीव कभी नहीं बन सकता अपरंच शुद्ध ब्रह्म ही अज्ञान का अधिष्ठान आश्रय है।[८]

शुद्ध ब्रह्म अधिष्ठान के आश्रित जो अज्ञान है वह उस ब्रह्म को ही आच्छादित कर लेता है। उसी शुद्ध ब्रह्म के आश्रित माया को अविद्या और अज्ञान भी कहते हैं। अचिन्त्य शक्तिशाली होने पर भी युक्ति को सहन नहीं कर सकती अतः माया है। विद्या से नष्ट हो जाती है अतः अविद्या है। स्वरूप को आच्छादित करती है, अतः अज्ञान है। जिस सामान्य चेतन के आश्रित यह माया है वह इसका विरोधी है।[९]

माया ईश्वर को ही आच्छादित करती है। इस विषय की पुष्टि के लिए निश्चल दास जी संक्षेप शारीरक, विवरण, वेदान्तमुक्तावली अद्वैत सिद्धि अद्वैत दीपिका आदि ग्रन्थों का आश्रय लेते दिखाई पड़ते हैं।

यह अविद्या (माया या अज्ञान) तुला है और मूला भेद से दो प्रकार की है।[१०] जगत् की व्यवहारिक सत्ता का कारण मूलाविद्या है। तूलाविद्या का अर्थ व्यवहारिक अज्ञान समझना चाहिए। शुक्ति में रजत-ज्ञान या रजत के अध्यास का कारण तूलाविद्या है, और ब्रह्म में सम्पूर्ण व्यवहारिक जगत् का अध्यास मूलाविद्या का परिणाम है। "तूलाविद्या" का नाश प्रमाणादिको से हो जाता है। किन्तु मूलाविद्या बिना ब्रह्मज्ञान के नष्ट नहीं हो सकती।

अविद्या का नाश—इस अविद्या का नाश "तत्त्व ज्ञान" से होता है परन्तु यह नाश पूर्णरूप से नहीं होता, अपितु इनका लेश रहता है। ऐसी विचारधारा कई ग्रन्थकारों की है। वे कहते हैं कि अविद्या का लेश तीन प्रकार से रहता है—

१. जैसे प्रक्षलित लशुन भाण्ड में गन्ध रहती है तथैव अविद्या के संस्कार रहते हैं।[९]

२. अथवा अग्नि एवं पट की भांति ज्ञानबाधित, परन्तु स्वकार्य में असमर्थ अविद्या को अविद्या का शेष लेश समझना चाहिए।

३. यद्वा आवरण शक्ति और विक्षेप शक्ति रूप अंश द्वयवती अविद्या होती है। उनमें से तत्त्व ज्ञान से आवरण शक्ति विशिष्ट अविद्या अंश का नाश हो जाता है। परन्तु प्रारब्ध कर्मरूप प्रतिबन्ध के शेष रहने से विक्षेप शक्ति विशिष्ट अविद्या अंश का नाश नहीं होता। अतः तत्त्व ज्ञान के उत्तर काल में भी देहादिक विक्षेप का उपादान विक्षेप शक्ति विशिष्ट अविद्या अंश शेष तो रहता है, परन्तु उसके स्वरूप का आवरण नहीं होता।

इसके विपरीत सर्वज्ञात्म मुनि के अनुसार ज्ञानोत्तर अविद्या का कोई भी लेश नहीं रहता। निश्चल दास जी के विचार से इस मत में अनुभव से विसंगति दृष्टिगोचर होती है।

८. विचार सागर पंचम तरंग।
९. विचार सागर पंचम तरंग।
१०. वृत्ति प्रभाकर अष्टम प्रकाश।

क्योंकि जिस "तत्व ज्ञान" से अविद्या की निवृत्ति होती है, उस तत्व ज्ञान की निवृत्ति का यही प्रकार माना जा सकता है कि तत्व ज्ञान से अविद्या की निवृत्ति होती है।

यदि सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि का मत स्वीकार करके अविद्या लेश न माना जाय तो उस क्रम से "तत्व ज्ञान" की निवृत्ति न होगी।

निश्चलदास का मत—निश्चलदास जी तत्व ज्ञान की निवृत्ति में अपना मत इस प्रकार देते हैं कि जल में प्रक्षिप्त कतकरज से जैसे ही जलगत पंक का विश्लेष होता है वैसे ही उसी के साथ कतक रज का भी विश्लेष हो जाता है। कतकरज के विश्लेष के लिए साधनान्तर की अपेक्षा नहीं। जिस प्रकार तृणकूट में अगार के प्रक्षेप से जब तृणकूट भस्म हो जाता है तब उसके साथ अंगार भी भस्म हो जाता है।

इसी नियम के अनुसार जब तत्व ज्ञान से कार्य सहित अविद्या की निवृत्ति हो जाती है, तब निवृत करने योग्य वस्तु शेष न रहने से तत्व ज्ञान भी स्वतः निवृत्त हो जाता है।

इसके साथ-साथ निश्चलदास जी पंचपादिकाकार पद्मपादाचार्य का मत भी अंशतः स्वीकार किया है। इस मत में प्रारब्ध के अभाव सहित अविद्या की निवृत्ति ही तत्व ज्ञान की निवृत्ति का हेतु है।

माया के कार्य—माया से ही सृष्टि की उत्पत्ति होती है ईश्वर की इच्छा से माया तमोगुण प्रधान होकर आकाशादि पंचभूतों की उत्पत्ति करती है। सब सृष्टि का मूल कारण ईश्वर है। उसके माया और चेतन दो भाग हैं मिथ्या पन माया का भाग है। इस प्रकार वेदान्त मत में अनादि सान्त तो माया है, परन्तु वह अभाव नहीं, अपितु जगत् उपादान कारण है। यदि माया अभाव रूप हो तो उसमें उपादान कारणता सिद्ध नहीं होती, अतः माया भाव रूप है। इसको निष्कार्य रूप मे निश्चलदास जी इस प्रकार कहते हैं—

जीव ईश भेद हीन चेतन स्वरूप मांहीं,
माया सो अनादि एक सांत ताहि मानिये।
सत औ असत् तै विलच्छण स्वरूप ताको,
ताहि कूं अविद्या औ अज्ञानहु बखानिये॥
चेतन सामान्य न विरोधी ताको साधक है,
वृत्ति मैं आरूढ़ वा विरोधी वृत्ति जानिये।
माया मैं आभास अधिष्ठान अरु माया मिल,
ईस सरवज्ञ जग हेतु पहचानिये।

(वि० सा० पंचम तरंग)

शशिभूषण सिंहल

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास : हिन्दी के सन्दर्भ में

इतिहास के स्वरूप-विश्लेषण के उपरान्त उसकी निम्नलिखित मुख्य प्रवृत्तियां स्पष्ट होती हैं :—

(क) इतिहास मानव-जीवन-परम्परा के अध्ययन एवं स्पष्टीकरण मे सहायक है। इसके विकास के अन्तर्गत, विगत और वर्तमान की पारस्परिक क्रिया-प्रतिक्रिया लक्षित होती है।

(ख) इतिहास का अध्ययन निरन्तर गतिशील है। उसमें प्रयोग और पुनर्विचार की संभावनायें निहित रहती हैं।

(ग) इतिहास विगत घटनाओं को अर्थ प्रदान कर उनका मूल्यांकन करता है। इसके अध्येता में अन्तर्दृष्टि तथा तटस्थता, इन दोनों तत्वों का समुचित सामंजस्य होना अपेक्षित है।

(घ) इतिहास, मनुष्य की भौतिक उपलब्धियों के साथ उसके सांस्कृतिक विकास का भी साक्षी है। उसकी गति साभिप्राय है।

(ङ) इतिहास, समाज और राष्ट्र का अध्ययन है। व्यक्ति का महत्व उसकी दृष्टि में केवल एक कण के रूप में है। व्यक्ति जब सामाजिक शक्तियों का प्रतिनिधित्व करता है, तभी और केवल उतना ही, इतिहास को स्वतन्त्र रूप से ग्राह्य है।

(च) सहृदयों द्वारा इतिहास का अनुशीलन रसात्मक हो सकता है।

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार अपनी रचना में इन सभी प्रवृत्तियों को सहज भाव से ग्रहण करता है और अपनी रुचि एवं प्रतिभा के अनुसार इनका उपयोग करता है। इतिहास मुख्य रूप से उसके लिए रस-सृष्टि का अचूक साधन है। वह उसके द्वारा पाठक के चित्त को एकाग्र कर लेता है। साथ ही, इतिहास के आश्रय द्वारा अपने वृत्त तथा कथ्य को प्रामाणिकता प्रदान करता है। वह रचना को भरपूर ऐतिहासिक रंग देकर उसे वर्तमान के लिए अधिकाधिक ग्राह्य बनाता है तथा कथ्य को युग विशेष की परिधि से उठाकर सार्वकालिक, मानवीय सत्य का रूप देने का प्रयत्न करता है। सामाजिक और सांस्कृतिक तत्वों का अध्ययन उसकी कला को सप्राण बनाता है। प्रचलित-अप्रचलित तथ्यों का अन्तर्दर्शन कर उन्हें नित नूतन प्रयोगों से मंडित करना उसे सर्वाधिक प्रिय है। इन बातों में ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार इतिहासकार के सन्निकट है।

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास में व्यक्ति-चित्रण

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार अपनी बिम्बात्मक शैली तथा कल्पना-प्रयोग की दृष्टि से इतिहासकार से भिन्न है। उसका कलाकार घटना के अंकन-विवेचन से आगे बढ़कर चित्रण द्वारा उसे बिम्बात्मक रूप प्रदान करता है। बिम्ब की छाप पाठक के हृदय पर छोड़ना उस का उद्देश्य रहता है। बिम्बांकन के लिए वह घटना में समाज और राष्ट्र को गौण स्थान

देकर व्यक्ति को प्रमुखता देता है। उपन्यास के रंगमंच पर व्यक्ति उभर कर अपनी लीला प्रदर्शित करता है और समाज उसकी पृष्ठभूमि का कार्य करता है। उपन्यासकार पात्रों के व्यक्तित्व खड़े करके, उनके अन्तर में पैठ कर उनके मनोविज्ञान को प्रत्यक्ष करता है। मानव-चरित्र-चित्रण की इस प्रक्रिया में वह प्राप्य ऐतिहासिक तथ्यों के कंकड़ों को हृदयंगम कर—चूर कर, गीलाकर—प्रयोगार्ह बनाता है। फिर उस चिकनी लचीली मिट्टी को कल्पना के हाथों और डोरी से मोड़-तोड़कर, काट-छांटकर मनोरम कथा के रूप में ढाल देता है। इतिहासकार प्रामाणिक तथ्यों के संग्रह तथा विवेचन, व्याख्या तक सीमित रहता है किन्तु ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार तथ्यों के मध्य रिक्तांशों को भरने, उनमें कार्य-कारण का सम्बन्ध स्थापित करने तथा उन्हें मानव-चरित्र सापेक्ष बनाने के लिए जीवनसुलभ कल्पना का आश्रय लेने को स्वतन्त्र है। वह उपन्यास में वैज्ञानिक की भान्ति परिस्थितियां उत्पन्न कर, उन पर सामाजिक, मनोवैज्ञानिक प्रयोग करता है। वह पात्रों को सहज मानव की दृष्टि से अपनाता है। मनुष्य—व्यक्ति—के वास्तविक जीवन का अधिकांश इतिहास में अव्यक्त रहता है। उपन्यासकार उसके जीवन के अनपेक्षित व्यक्त को त्याग कर उल्लेखनीय अव्यक्त को व्यक्त करता है।

मानव-चरित्र के सूक्ष्म अध्ययन की दृष्टि से उपन्यासकार का इतिहास से अपेक्षित स्वतन्त्रता लेना सहज स्वाभाविक है। वह इतिहास के महारथियों को व्यक्ति—मानव—के रूप में देखता है और घटना के परिणामों पर केन्द्रित होने की अपेक्षा उसके मूल कारण पर प्रकाश डालता है।[1] ऐसा कलाकार पूर्ण अर्थों में ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार है किन्तु वर्तमान से मुक्ति पाने अथवा अतीत में पलायन मात्र के उद्देश्य से रचा गया उपन्यास इतिहास के साथ न्याय नहीं करता। वह लेखक इतिहास का आभास मात्र देकर अपनी कल्पनाजन्य रचना को अतिरिक्त आकर्षण भले ही प्रदान कर दे किन्तु उसकी कृति इतिहास की गहन प्रगतिशील प्रवृत्तियों के प्रभाव से वंचित रहेगी।[2] ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की संज्ञा से

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१. Tolstoy in his appendix to 'War and Peace' writes : "An historian and an artist describing an historic epoch have two quite different tasks before them. As an historian would be wrong if he tried to present an historical person in his entirety, in all the complexity of his relations with all sides of life, so the artist would fail to perform his task were he to represent the person always in his historic significance...The historian has to deal with the results of an event, the artist with the fact of event...Either from his own experience, or from his letters, memoirs and accounts, the artist realises a certain event to himself, and very often (to take example of a battle) the deductions the historian permits himself to make as to the activity of such and such armies prove to be the very opposite of artists' deductions.

२. ...रस की सृष्टि ही उद्देश्य है, अतएव उसको उत्पन्न करने के लिए जिस मात्रा में ऐतिहासिक उपकरणों की आवश्यकता होती है—कवि लोग उतनी ले लेने में कुछ भी संकोच नहीं करते। ...उपन्यासकार एक मात्र इसी ऐतिहासिक रस के लालची होते हैं। उन्हें सत्य की कुछ विशेष परवाह नहीं होती। यदि कोई व्यक्ति उपन्यास में इतिहास की उस विशेष गन्ध और स्वाद से ही सन्तुष्ट न हो और उसमें से अखण्ड इतिहास को निकाले तो वह व्यंजन में साबित जीरे, धनिए, हल्दी और सरसों को ढूंढेगा।—रवीन्द्रनाथ ठाकुर, 'साहित्य', पृ० १२४, १२५।

अभिहित होने वाली अधिकांश रचनायें अपने मूल उद्देश्य की उपेक्षा कर अन्य मार्ग ग्रहण कर लेती हैं। ऐसी रचनाओं को मोटे तौर पर तीन वर्गों में विभाजित किया जा सकता है। ये वर्तमान से पलायन मात्र कराती हैं, प्रचार करती हैं या शिक्षा देती हैं। ये तीनों ही प्रवृत्तियां इतिहास के उपयुक्त अध्ययन, विश्लेषण के मार्ग की बाधायें हैं। इन में कथाकार अतीत का भ्रम उत्पन्न कर पाठक को आकृष्ट करता है। प्रामाणिक अध्ययन के अभाव में यह प्रक्रिया पं० रामचन्द्र शुक्ल द्वारा, रसात्मक बोध के विविध रूपों के अन्तर्गत प्रतिपादित 'स्मृत्याभास' तथा 'अनुमानित प्रत्यभिज्ञान रूप कल्पना' के समीप जा पहुंचती है।[3] इसमें इतिहास के तत्व का अभाव हो जाता है।

उपन्यासकार और ऐतिहासिक पात्र

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार प्रामाणिक तथ्यों तथा पात्रों को ग्रहण करने के उपरान्त उनके अन्तर में झांकता है। पात्रों के अन्तर के विश्लेषण-कार्य में वह सामाजिक अथवा मनोवैज्ञानिक उपन्यासकार की भान्ति पूर्ण स्वतन्त्र नहीं होता। उसे अपनी असाधारण प्रतिभा तथा अनवरत साधना के बल पर ऐतिहासिक पात्र के प्रकट स्वरूप एवं गुह्य आत्मा से साक्षात्कार प्राप्त करना होता है। एक सुन्दर कविता में रॉबर्ट ग्रेव्ज ने रोचक ढंग से इस तथ्य पर बल दिया है। उसने लेखक को ऐतिहासिक चरित्रों की समाधि पर जाकर उन के साक्षात् दर्शन करने की अपूर्व प्रेरणा दी है। उसका आशय है कि लेखक वर्ण्य पात्र की चाल-ढाल, बोल-चाल, वेशभूषा, भावनाओं, आकांक्षाओं, आशा-निराशाओं से हार्दिक तादात्म्य स्थापित कर अपने कल्पना-नेत्रों में उसकी सजग, साकार प्रतिमा प्रतिष्ठित कर ले। तभी लेखक पात्र से एकात्म हो उसे पुनर्जन्म प्रदान करने में समर्थ होगा।[4]

३. देखें 'चिन्तामणि' भाग १ में संगृहीत रामचन्द्र शुक्ल का निबन्ध 'रसात्मक बोध के विविधरूप'।

४. To bring dead to life
Is no great magic.
Few are wholly dead :
Blow on a dead man's embers
And a live flame will start.

Let his forgotten griefs be now,
And now his withered hopes;
Subdue your pen to his handwriting
Until it proves as natural
To sign his name as yours.

Limp as he limped,
Swear by the oath he swore;
If he wore black, affect the same;
If he had gouty fingers,
Be yours gouty too.

Assemble tokens intimate of him—
A ring, a hood, a chair :
Around these elements then build
A home familiar to
The greedy revenant.

ऐतिहासिक प्रतीत की सीमा-रेखा

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की रचना-प्रक्रिया के प्रसंग में 'अतीत' तथा 'वर्तमान', इन दोनों शब्दों का बारंबार प्रयोग किया गया है तथा उन्हें पृथक् रखकर विचारकों ने उनकी परस्पर क्रिया-प्रतिक्रिया को आँकने का प्रयास किया है। जो इस समय वर्तमान है, वह क्षण भर बाद प्रतीत बन जाता है; यह प्रक्रिया अनवरत रूप से जारी है। ऐसी स्थिति में ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार किस काल-खंड को अतीत माने और किसे वर्तमान, यह समस्या है। उदाहरण के लिए, भारतीय राष्ट्रीय आन्दोलन, भारतीय स्वतंत्रता-प्राप्ति, भारत-विभाजन आदि की घटनायें विगत हो चुकी हैं और इतिहास की विषय बन गयी हैं। फिर भी, हम यशपाल के भारत-विभाजन की घटना पर आधारित उपन्यास 'झूठा सच' को सामाजिक अथवा किसी अन्य किसी कोटि का उपन्यास मानते हैं किन्तु उस के ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास होने की संभावना की कल्पना तक भी नहीं करते। इस शंका के समाधान के लिए हमें इतिहासकार की कार्य-प्रणाली पर विचार करना होगा। इतिहासकार अपने अध्ययन के विषय का स्वयं द्रष्टा नहीं होता वरन् विषय पर प्रकाश डालनेवाली सामग्री के सूत्र अन्य स्रोतों से प्राप्त करता है। वह घटना का स्वयं साक्षी न हो कर, प्राप्य साक्ष्य-सूत्रों पर अपना निर्णय देता है। उस की तुलना एक निर्णायक अथवा न्यायाधीश से की जा सकती है। न्यायाधीश विचाराधीन विगत घटना से दूर बैठकर तर्क के आधार पर उसके कार्य-कारण-क्रम की संगति-असंगति पर विचार कर किसी निष्कर्ष पर पहुंचता है। ठीक इसी प्रकार इतिहासकार अपनी विवेच्य घटना का प्रत्यक्ष साक्षी नहीं होता। वह घटना संबंधी प्राप्य साक्ष्यों को एकत्र कर उनके कार्य-कारण-क्रम पर विचार करने के फलस्वरूप कुछ निष्कर्ष प्राप्त करता है। अप्रत्यक्ष प्रणाली द्वारा प्राप्त ये निष्कर्ष उसके अध्ययन की देन है।

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास तथा अन्य किसी प्रकार की कथा में प्रत्यक्ष निरीक्षण के प्रश्न को लेकर, मौलिक अन्तर देखा जाना है। ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासकार जिन बाह्य साक्ष्यों के आधार पर जिस युग और उसके निवासियों का पुनर्सृजन करता है, वह स्वयं उनका अंग नहीं होता। वह तटस्थ द्रष्टा तथा विवेचक के रूप में, प्राप्य विभिन्न, पूर्ण अथवा आंशिक तथा परस्पर विरोधी दृष्टिकोणों का व्याख्याता होता है। यशपाल 'झूठा सच' में घटित घटनाओं के स्वयं द्रष्टा अथवा साक्षी होने के कारण अपनी कृति को ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की संज्ञा नहीं दे सकते। वे उपन्यास में चित्रित युग के स्वयं एक अनुभूतिशील अंग रहे हैं। यदि वे उपन्यास में प्रस्तुत किए गए वृत्तों, पात्रों तथा समाज को अन्य स्रोतों एवं साक्ष्यों से प्राप्त कर उनके औचित्य एवं प्रामाणिकता पर विचारकर अपने निष्कर्ष रूप में उन्हें प्रस्तुत करते तो यह रचना ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की संज्ञा की अधिकारिणी होती। अतः ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास में अतीत का चित्रण रहता है; यह चित्रण ऐसे अतीत का होता है जो पर्याप्त पूर्व घट चुका है और उपन्यासकार के व्यक्तिगत अनुभव की पहुँच से परे है।

So grant him life, but reckon
That the grave which housed him
May not be empty now:
You in his spotted garments
Shall yourself lie wrapped.

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास के अनिवार्य तत्त्व

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास का इतिहास संबंधी अवयव प्रामाणिकता की अपेक्षा रखता है। यह प्रामाणिकता रचना पर अतीत की छाप लगने से आती है। रचना में अतीत की छाप लगाने या उसमें अतीत का आभास उत्पन्न करने के लिए रचयिता इन तीनों या तीनों में से किसी एक तत्त्व का आश्रय लेता है—

१. वातावरण,

२. घटना या कथा,

३. पात्र

(क) वातावरण

युगानुकूल वातावरण का चित्रण ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास का सर्वप्रथम एवं अनिवार्य लक्षण है। ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास पाठक को वर्तमान से भिन्न किसी विगत संसार में ले पहुंचाता है। पाठक उस संसार की, उस युग की पहचान वहां के वातावरण से करता है। यदि उपन्यास की वातावरण-सृष्टि मन को आश्वस्त करने वाली नहीं है तो पाठक को ऐतिहासिक कथा तथा पात्र भी निराधार, हवा में उड़ते जैसे जान पड़ेंगे। वातावरण का तत्त्व उपन्यास में बड़ा सूक्ष्म तथा बहुव्यापक है। जिस प्रकार ब्रह्म सम्पूर्ण सृष्टि में व्याप्त है और बाह्य चक्षुओं को दृष्टिगोचर नहीं होता, कुछ-कुछ इसी प्रकार वातावरण सम्पूर्ण उपन्यास में रमा रहता है किन्तु बिना सूक्ष्म निरीक्षण के लक्ष्य नही होता। कह सकते हैं, उपन्यास में पात्रों के कथोपकथन तथा क्रियाकलाप को छोड़ कर शेष सामग्री देश-काल अथवा वातावरण से संबंध रखती है। ध्यान दें तो पात्रों के कथोपकथनों की भाषा तथा उन में व्यंजित उनकी मनोवृत्ति युग की छाप से अछूती नहीं रह सकती। इसी प्रकार पात्रों के क्रियाकलाप में भी युग की झलक रहती है। उदाहरण के लिए प्रागैतिहासिक काल, बुद्ध काल, मुस्लिम काल तथा अंग्रेज़ी काल के पात्रों की भाषा, मनोवृत्ति तथा कार्य-व्यापार की विशेषताओं को पृथक्-पृथक् स्पष्ट रूप से देखा जा सकता है। इन सभी प्रकार के पात्रों के क्रियाकलाप में युगीन चारित्रिक विशेषताओं की छाप अनिवार्य रूप से लक्ष्य होगी। वातावरण के अन्तर्गत कथा के सभी बाह्य उपकरण, उसकी योजना में सहायता करने वाले पात्रों के आचार-विचार, रीति-नीति तथा रहन-सहन, प्राकृतिक पीठिका और परिस्थिति आ जाते हैं। वातावरण के निर्माण में योग देने वाले विभिन्न तत्त्वों का स्पष्ट वर्गीकरण करना तनिक कठिन है। ये परस्पर कुछ ऐसे उलझे हुए हैं कि एक तत्त्व दूसरे से मिला होने पर भी पृथक् दीखता है और स्पष्ट रूप से स्वतंत्र दीखनेवाले तत्त्व मूल में कहीं अभिन्न जान पड़ते हैं।[१]

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१. वातावरण के अन्तर्गत मुख्य रूप से निम्नलिखित तत्त्वों पर प्रकाश डाला जाता है (ये काल विशेष का बोध कराते हैं)

क. **स्थल की भौगोलिक स्थिति**—प्रकृति तथा भूखंड, नगर, ग्राम। स्थल विशेष की प्रकृति संबंधी विशेषताएँ साधारणतः विभिन्न युगों में एक-सी रहती हैं। प्राकृतिक परिवर्तनों (भूकम्प, नदी का मार्ग बदलना, पृथ्वी का उर्वर या ऊसर हो जाना आदि) तथा सभ्यता के विकास-निर्माण से देश की प्राकृतिक स्थिति यत्किंचित् बदलती रहती है। अतीत का चित्रण करते समय उपन्यासकार अतीत की ऐसी ही प्राकृतिक विशेषताओं को ध्यान में रखता है। वह उस के तत्कालीन मूल स्वरूप का परिचय देता है। मुर्दों का टीला (रांगेय राघव),

(ख) कथा और पात्र

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास में प्रतिबिंबित अतीत को प्रामाणिकता प्रदान करने वाले अन्य तत्त्व, घटना या कथा तथा पात्र हैं। उपन्यासकार को इतिहास से अपनी रुचि तथा उद्देश्य पर खरी उतरने वाली समूची कथा मिलनी असंभव नहीं तो कठिन अवश्य है। इसीलिये, प्रायः सभी ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासों की कथा में उपन्यासकार की कल्पना का कुछ न कुछ अंश अवश्य विद्यमान रहता है। उपन्यासकार ऐतिहासिक तथ्यों की रक्षा करते हुए उन के पल्लवन में कल्पना का प्रयोग कर सकता है तथा वह तथ्यों की नवीन व्याख्या करते हुए उन्हें अपनी कल्पना के आधार पर कार्य-कारण-शृंखला प्रदान करता है। कभी-कभी वह, प्राप्य एक ऐतिहासिक घटना से काम चला लेता है और शेष कथांश की, कल्पना के बल पर सृष्टि करता है। इसी प्रकार उपन्यास में ऐतिहासिक पात्रों के प्रयोग की स्थिति है। पहले कहा जा चुका है कि इतिहास से प्राप्त व्यक्तियों को उपन्यासकार ठीक उसी रूपमें नहीं देखता वरन् अपनी कल्पना-शक्ति से उन्हें पूर्ण मानव बनाता है, उनका मनोविश्लेषण प्रस्तुत करता है। और, जिस समय प्राप्य पात्र उसकी उद्देश्य-पूर्ति के लिये यथेष्ट नहीं होते तो वह कल्पित पात्रों की सृष्टि करता है। हां, उसे इतना ध्यान अवश्य रखना होता है कि कल्पित पात्र की आत्मा और उसका रंग-ढंग ठीक युगानुकूल हो। उपन्यासकार का उद्देश्य ऐतिहासिक आवरण में से शाश्वत जीवन-मूल्यों की खोज करना रहता है। जिस समय उसे इतिहास की खान में से इन मूल्यों की प्रतिष्ठा में सहायक, वांछित रुचि एवं कोटि के मानव-रत्न नहीं मिलते तब वह विशेषकर कल्पित पात्रों का आश्रय लेता है। ये पात्र उपन्यास में पदार्पण कर उसमें नये अर्थ भर देते हैं। उपन्यासकार की पात्र-चित्रण-कला की उत्कृष्टता की दृष्टि से कभी-कभी काल्पनिक पात्र ऐतिहासिक पात्रों की अपेक्षा अधिक मूल्यवान् होते हैं।[1]

हिन्दी ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासों के प्रकार

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास के उपजीव्य—अतीत का आभास, वातावरण, घटना या कथा तथा पात्र के आधार पर उसके प्रमुख छः प्रकार निम्नलिखित हैं। इन सबके उदाहरण हिन्दी ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासों में प्राप्य हैं—

(क) **केवल अतीत का आभास प्रस्तुत करने वाले उपन्यास**—इनमें कथा-पात्र

वैशाली की नगरवधू (चतुरसेन शास्त्री), भुवनविक्रम (वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा) आदि उपन्यासों में ऐसे अनेक उदाहरण द्रष्टव्य हैं।—देश की राजनीतिक सीमाएं तथा नगर, ग्राम की स्थिति बदलती रहती है।

ख. राजनीतिक व्यवस्था—नीति, कूटनीति। शासन-व्यवस्था, न्याय, युद्ध-प्रणाली। अर्थनीति, आर्थिक व्यवस्था, व्यापार प्रणाली।

ग. सामाजिक व्यवस्था—जाति-व्यवस्था, परिवार-व्यवस्था जीवन-व्यवस्था (विभिन्न आश्रम), सामाजिक व्यवहार एवं संबंध। सामाजिक संस्कार, रीति-नीति। खान-पान वेश-भूषा, रहन-सहन। सामाजिक मनोवृत्ति।

घ. धार्मिक मान्यता—देवी-देवता, विभिन्न मत, पूजन-विधि, यज्ञ, बलि आदि।

ङ. मनोरंजन-प्रणाली—क्रीड़ा, व्यंग्य-विनोद, उत्सव-विधि।

च. जीवन-मूल्य—कला, साहित्य, शिक्षा-पद्धति।

छ. लोक-जीवन तथा लोक-विश्वास।

1. जैसे कचनार ('कचनार'—वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा), अमिता ('अमिता'—यशपाल), करभिका ('आचार्य चाणक्य'—सत्यकेतु विद्यालंकार) आदि।

तो कल्पित होते ही हैं किन्तु इनका वातावरण युग-विरुद्ध न होते हुए भी आंशिक, अपूर्ण तथा कथा एवं पात्राश्रित मात्र होता है । भगवतीचरण वर्मा का 'चित्रलेखा' उपन्यास इस प्रकार का उदाहरण है । वर्मा जी ने उपन्यास में चन्द्रगुप्त मौर्य के युग का आभास मात्र दिया है और वे अपनी कथा कह चले हैं । इस युग की प्रतिष्ठा, तथा युग एवं कथा की प्रवृत्ति में संगति बिठाने की ओर उन्होंने ध्यान नहीं दिया है ।

ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की संज्ञा से अभिहित रचनाओं के शेष प्रकारों के विवेचन से पूर्व यहां उल्लेखनीय है कि इन सबमें ऐतिहासिक वातावरण की सृष्टि एवं सुरक्षा का तत्त्व होना अनिवार्य है। जिन तथाकथित ऐतिहासिक उपन्यासों में वातावरण-तत्त्व की अवहेलना की जाती है और किंचित् ऐतिहासिक पात्रों तथा घटनाओं के उल्लेख-मात्र से अतीत का भ्रम उत्पन्न किया जाता है उन्हें ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की किसी भी कोटि के अन्तर्गत ग्रहण नहीं किया जा सकता।[७] इस मान्यता का मुख्य कारण है कि ये सब रचनाएं मनोरंजन (वर्तमान से पलायन), प्रचार अथवा शिक्षा के लिये सृजी जाती हैं और इनमें पूर्वोल्लिखित ऐतिहासिक प्रवृत्तियों का नितान्त अभाव रहता है ।

शेष, ऐतिहासिक वातावरण से युक्त उपन्यासों के प्रकार ये हैं—

(ख) **ऐतिहासिक वातावरण मात्र प्रस्तुत करने वाले उपन्यास**—इनमें ऐतिहासिक कथा तथा पात्रों का प्रयोग नहीं होता । यशपाल के 'दिव्या' तथा 'अमिता' और रांगेय राघव का उपन्यास 'मुर्दों का टीला' इस कोटि में आते हैं ।

(ग) **केवल ऐतिहासिक पात्र के आधार पर रचे गये उपन्यास**—इनमें ऐतिहासिक वातावरण रहता है, कथा कल्पित होती है । केवल एक या एकाधिक पात्र इतिहास-सम्मत होते हैं । उदाहरण—वैशाली की नगरवधू (चतुरसेन शास्त्री) बिराटा की पद्मिनी (वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा), बाणभट्ट की आत्मकथा (हजारीप्रसाद द्विवेदी) ।

(घ) **केवल ऐतिहासिक कथा के आधार पर रचे गये उपन्यास**—इनमें वातावरण तथा कथा के गौण अंश प्रामाणिक होते हैं किन्तु कथा का मुख्यांश तथा मुख्यांश के पात्र काल्पनिक होते हैं । वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा का उपन्यास 'टूटे काँटे' इस कोटि का है । इसमें मुख्य कथा नर्तकी नूरबाई और सिपाही मोहन की है । ये दोनों पात्र तथा इनका वृत्त कल्पित है किन्तु पृष्ठभूमि में चलने वाला, नादिरशाह के भारत पर आक्रमण का प्रकरण ऐतिहासिक है ।

(ङ) **केवल किसी ऐतिहासिक घटना के आधार पर रचे गये उपन्यास**—इनमें वातावरण ऐतिहासिक होता है और इतिहास-प्रसिद्ध कोई एक या दो घटनायें होती हैं, शेष कथा तथा पात्र पूर्णतया काल्पनिक होते हैं । यशपाल का 'अमिता' उपन्यास यहां उल्लेखनीय है । इसके अन्त में कलिंग पर अशोक के आक्रमण तथा उसके हृदय-परिवर्तन का उल्लेख है । शेष कथा तथा पात्र सर्वथा काल्पनिक हैं । इसी प्रकार वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा के 'भुवन विक्रम' उपन्यास में राजा रोमक की अपदस्थता की ख्यात घटना है, शेष कथा कल्पित है ।

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७. वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा-पूर्वकाल में, विशेषकर किशोरीलाल गोस्वामी आदि लेखकों के अनेक उपन्यास इस प्रकार के हैं ।

(ब) ऐतिहासिक वातावरण, कथा तथा पात्र से युक्त उपन्यास—इन्हें शुद्ध अथवा पूर्ण ऐतिहासिक उपन्यास की संज्ञा दी जाती है। इनमें उपन्यासकार कलाकारसुलभ कल्पना का यत्र-तत्र आश्रय लेता है किन्तु वह मूल रूप से ऐतिहासिक सूत्रों से बंधकर चलता है। इस प्रकार के उपन्यास प्रमाणिक अधिक किन्तु सुगठित एवं रोचक कम होते हैं। इन्हें सफल उपन्यास बनाने के लिये रचयिता में असाधारण कौशल की अपेक्षा है। उदाहरण के तौर पर वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा के 'झांसी की रानी', 'अहिल्याबाई' तथा सत्यकेतु विद्यालंकार का 'चाणक्य' उपन्यास हैं। अमृतलाल नागर का 'शतरंज के मोहरे' भी यहां उल्लेखनीय है। यह उपन्यास रोचक बन पड़ा है। नागर जी ने इसमें कथा और पात्रों की ऐतिहासिकता की रक्षा करते हुए वातावरण-चित्रण पर अधिक बल दिया है। इसीलिये, कथा कुछ बिखर गयी है। इसी प्रकार, 'झांसी की रानी' के तथ्य प्रधान हो जाने के कारण आलोचक प्राय: शंका कर बैठते हैं कि यह रचना उपन्यास है या जीवनी? 'अहिल्याबाई' को उपन्यास मानने में इस पंक्तियों के लेखक को भी संकोच है।[८]

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८. 'अहिल्याबाई' के उपर्युक्त विवेचन के लिये देखें लेखककृत 'उपन्यासकार वृन्दावनलाल वर्मा' के पृ० २२ से २५।

डॉ० शिवप्रसाद गोयल

'गंगावतरण' का काव्यरूप

श्री जगन्नाथदास 'रत्नाकर' के संवत् १९८१ में प्रकाशित 'गंगावतरण' के काव्यरूप के सम्बन्ध में विद्वानों में पर्याप्त मतभेद है। श्री कृष्णकुमार कौशिक इसकी गणना महाकाव्यों की कोटि में करते हैं[1] तो डॉ० उषा जायसवाल इसे खण्डकाव्य मानती हैं[2] और आचार्य विश्वनाथप्रसाद मिश्र एकार्थ काव्य।[3]

महाकाव्य एकार्थकाव्य और खण्डकाव्य—तीनों प्रबन्धकाव्य के महत्वपूर्ण अंग हैं। तीनों विधाओं की रचना-शैली भी लगभग समान होती है। महाकाव्य में नायक का समग्र जीवन अथवा जाति अथवा युग-विशेष के समग्र जीवन के विविध पक्षों के प्रतिनिधि चरित्र या चरित्रों के महत्वपूर्ण जीवनवृत्त का पूर्ण या आंशिक, सुनियोजित, सांगोपांग और जीवन्त लम्बा कथानक होता है जो अवान्तर घटनाओं और वर्णनों को विस्तारपूर्वक ग्रहण करता हुआ काव्य-कौशल के साथ प्रस्तुत होता है।[4] खण्डकाव्य में नायक अथवा जाति या युग-विशेष के जीवन की प्रमुख महत्वपूर्ण घटना का स्वतः पूर्ण, सुनियोजित और जीवन्त वर्णन होता है जिससे जीवन के सम्बन्धित पक्ष की झाँकी मिल जाती है।[5] एकार्थकाव्य में नायक के जीवन के उद्दिष्ट पक्ष से सम्बन्धित घटना-विविधता होती है। महाकाव्य, एकार्थकाव्य और खण्डकाव्य में क्रमशः अपेक्षाकृत वस्तु-लाघव होता है तथा कथा-योजना अपेक्षाकृत कसी हुई और सुनियोजित।

'गंगावतरण' को महाकाव्य मानने वाले विद्वान् उसके बाह्यावरण— सर्ग-बद्धता, आठ सर्गों से अधिक की योजना, धीरोदात्त नायक आदि—की ओर ही दृष्टि डालते हैं। यद्यपि आचार्यों ने महाकाव्य के कथानक का सर्गों में विभाजन आवश्यक माना है[6] और सर्गों की संख्या भी आठ से अधिक निश्चित की है जो आकार में न बहुत छोटे हों और न बहुत बड़े[7], तथापि सर्गों की संख्या का यह बंधन हिन्दी के महाकाव्यों में नहीं अपनाया गया। हिन्दी के सर्वश्रेष्ठ महाकाव्य 'रामचरितमानस' में केवल सात ही सर्ग हैं। सर्गबद्धता महाकाव्य का आवश्यक नियम अवश्य रहा है किन्तु उनकी संख्या के सम्बन्ध में कवियों ने प्रायः स्वतंत्रता से काम लिया है। एकार्थकाव्य की सर्ग-बद्धता के सम्बन्ध में आचार्य विश्वनाथ के सूत्र के दो पाठ मिलते हैं। साहित्य-दर्पण के विभिन्न संस्करणों में से नवलकिशोर प्रेस लखनऊ, निर्णयसागर प्रेस बम्बई तथा श्री शालग्राम शास्त्री द्वारा सम्पादित प्रतियों में तो

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१. रीतिकाल और रत्नाकर, कृष्णकुमार कौशिक, पृ० १४५-१४६।
२. रत्नाकर और उनका काव्य, उषा जायसवाल, पृ० ११६।
३. वाङ्मय विमर्श, विश्वनाथप्रसाद मिश्र, पृ० ३६।
४. हिन्दी महाकाव्य का स्वरूप विकास, डा० शम्भूनाथसिंह, पृ० ४०-१२१।
५. हिन्दी में खण्डकाव्य, डा० शिवप्रसाद गोयल, पांडुलिपि, पृ० ६३।
६. सर्गबन्धो महाकाव्यम्।

—साहित्यदर्पण, विश्वनाथ, ६। ३१५।

७. नातिस्वल्पा नातिदीर्घाः सर्गाः अष्टाधिका इह।

—वही, ६। ३२०।

'सर्गसमुत्थितम्' पाठ मिलता है।[8] किन्तु डॉ० सत्यव्रतसिंह तथा पी० वी० काणे द्वारा सम्पादित प्रतियों में 'समुत्थितम्' के स्थान पर 'समुज्झितम्' पाठ मिलता है। यदि 'समुत्थितम्' पाठ ठीक मान लिया जाय तो एकार्थकाव्य की सर्ग-बद्धता स्वीकार करनी होगी और यदि 'समुज्झितम्' पाठ ठीक समझा जाय तो उसकी सर्गहीनता। यह तो हुई संस्कृत साहित्य-शास्त्र की सैद्धांतिक बात, किन्तु व्यावहारिक रूप में हिन्दी में सर्गबद्ध और सर्गहीन दोनों प्रकार के एकार्थकाव्य मिलते हैं। अधिकतर वे सर्गबद्ध शैली में लिखे गये हैं किन्तु उनमें सर्गों की कोई निश्चित संख्या नहीं मिलती। यही बात खण्डकाव्यों के सम्बन्ध में भी सत्य है। सम्भव है, संस्कृत साहित्यशास्त्र में 'सर्गबन्धो महाकाव्यम्' कह कर खण्डकाव्य और एकार्थ काव्य (या केवल काव्य) की सर्गहीनता की ओर संकेत किया गया हो। यह भी सम्भव है कि महाकाव्य में आठ से अधिक सर्गों की योजना आवश्यक बता कर एकार्थकाव्य और खण्डकाव्य में आठ सर्गों तक का विधान अनुमेय रहने दिया गया हो। हिन्दी के कवियों ने सर्ग-बद्धता और सर्गों की संख्या के सम्बन्ध में खण्डकाव्य और एकार्थकाव्य दोनों की रचना में पर्याप्त स्वतंत्रता से काम लिया है।

गंगावतरण तेरह सर्गों में रचित सर्गबद्ध काव्य है। सर्ग-बद्धता के आधार पर उसके काव्यरूप का निर्णय नहीं किया जा सकता। इसके आधार पर केवल इतना कहा जा सकता है कि गंगावतरण प्रबन्धकाव्य है क्योंकि सर्ग-बद्धता प्रबन्धकाव्य में ही सम्भव है, मुक्तक काव्य में नहीं।

गंगावतरण वर्णनात्मक काव्य है। उसमें महाराज सगर से लेकर गंगा के भूमि पर अवतरण तक की सुनिश्चित कथा-योजना है। अतः वह प्रबन्धकाव्य तो है किन्तु देखना यह है कि उसे प्रबन्धकाव्य के किस भेद के अन्तर्गत ग्रहण किया जाय।

महाकाव्य का कथानक विस्तार-सापेक्ष होता है। उसमें जीवन की अनेकरूपता और कथा के अनेक मोड़ होते हैं। गंगावतरण में महाकाव्योचित कथा-विस्तार और गरिमा का सर्वथा अभाव है। इसमें जीवन के समग्र या विविध रूप के दर्शन भी नहीं होते। महाकाव्य में देश और जाति के लिए कोई महदुद्देश्य सन्निहित होता है। इसमें ऐसा कोई महान् उद्देश्य नहीं मिलता। सर्ग-बद्धता, आठ से अधिक सर्गों की योजना, धीरोदात्त नायक का ग्रहण आदि काव्य के आनुषंगिक तथ्य हैं, केन्द्रवर्ती तथ्य नहीं। किसी काव्यरूप का निर्णय करने से पहले उसके केन्द्रवर्ती तथ्य पर ध्यान रखना पड़ता है। गंगावतरण काव्य का केन्द्रवर्ती तथ्य, जैसा ऊपर विवेचन किया जा चुका है, महाकाव्य के अनुरूप नहीं है। अतः यह महाकाव्य नहीं।

गंगावतरण में राजा भगीरथ की तपस्या और उसके फलस्वरूप गंगा के देवलोक से भूलोक पर आगमन की प्रमुख घटना का वर्णन होने से यह काव्य एक उत्कृष्ट खण्डकाव्य हो सकता था। कवि ने भगीरथ की तपस्या से आरम्भ करके हरिद्वार तक गंगागमन की कथा इस काव्य में पहले प्रस्तुत की भी थी[9]। खण्डकाव्य के लिए इतनी कथा का खण्ड-

८. भाषाविभाषानियमात्काव्यं सर्गसमुत्थितम्।
एकार्थप्रवणैः पद्यैः सन्धिसामग्र्य वर्जितम्॥ ६। ३२८।
—साहित्यदर्पण, विश्वनाथ, टीका शालग्राम शास्त्री, पृ० २२६।

९. गंगावतरण, जगन्नाथदास 'रत्नाकर', प्राक्कथन, पृ० ४-५।

काव्योचित ट्रीटमेंट पर्याप्त होता। किन्तु बाद में मित्रों के आग्रह और अवधेश्वरी महारानी जगदम्बा देवी के आदेश से कवि ने कथा को सांगोपांग बनाने के लिए कुछ आदि में और कुछ अन्त में तथा जह्नु की कथा भी जोड़ दी"[10]। इससे इसमें महाराज सगर, उनके एक रानी से साठ हजार पुत्रों और दूसरी से असमंज का जन्म, सगर का अश्वमेध-यज्ञ, इन्द्र के षड्यंत्र, सगर के साठ हजार पुत्रों का पाताल-प्रवेश और कपिल मुनि की तपस्या में बाधा, कपिल मुनि द्वारा उनका भस्म किया जाना, अंशुमान का पितृव्यों की खोज में निकलना, गरुड़ जी से भेंट, उनके द्वारा गोलोक की रास-कथा सुनाना और गंगा की उत्पत्ति का वर्णन करना आदि प्रसंगों का मुख्य घटना से हट कर विस्तार से वर्णन हुआ है जिसका गंगावतरण की मुख्य घटना से कोई प्रत्यक्ष सम्बन्ध नहीं है। ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि अवधेश्वरी रानी जगदम्बा देवी को गंगावतरण की कथा सुनाना तथा गंगामाहात्म्य-वर्णन के साथ-साथ अवधपुरी और उसके पूर्व सम्राटों की महत्ता का गान करना भी कवि को इष्ट था जिससे इस काव्य की पूर्वलिखित कथा में वृद्धि की गयी। पं० कृष्ण शंकर शुक्ल का अनुमान है कि इस ग्रन्थ को लिखते समय कवि का उद्देश्य गंगा की भक्ति का प्रचार करना अवश्य रहा होगा।"[11]

इस प्रकार इस काव्य में नायक के जीवन की प्रमुख घटना का प्रबन्धकाव्योचित विस्तार न कर सगर से लेकर भगीरथ तक अवध के राजाओं के गौरव-गान में कवि अधिक प्रवृत्त रहा। तेरह में से प्रथम पांच सर्ग इसी कार्य में खपायें गये हैं। गंगावतरण की मुख्य कथा तो केवल छठे, सातवें और आठवें सर्गों तक ही सीमित है। नवें सर्ग से तेरहवें सर्ग तक गंगा की पर्वतों से लेकर सागर तक की यात्रा का वर्णन है जिसे अनेक पुनरुक्तियों के साथ अनावश्यक विस्तार दिया गया है। इन अन्तिम पांच सर्गों में कथानक भी अवरुद्ध-सा हो गया है। इस काव्य का केन्द्रवर्ती तथ्य है अवध के सम्राटों की महत्ता का गान और गंगा के माहात्म्य का वर्णन। इस एक अर्थ या प्रयोजन की सिद्धि इस काव्य में हुई है। अतः यह काव्य एकार्थकाव्य की कोटि में परिगणित किया जाना चाहिये।

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१०. वही, पृ० ६।
११. कविवर रत्नाकर, कृष्णशंकर शुक्ल, पृ० २८५।

ENGLISH

Bhim Singh

THE OLD MAN AND THE SEA : AN INTERPRETATION

The story of the old man has generally been read in three distinct ways : as "an allegory of human life",[1] an allegory "of the Crucifixion"[2] and an allegory of "the artist's struggle with his material".[3]

The first of these readings is too imprecise for a critical consideration, the second not convincing and the third far-fetched. Let us, first of all, consider the third reading. Of course, Santiago's going "far out" and catching a big fish may mean the hazardous outgoing of the artist's imagination to come out with meaningful insights. The old man may be the writer himself, with his lines set accurately (i.e. following exactly the rules of the game of writing), sailing out to produce his finest piece of art. But the limitation of a reading of this kind is that it can fit in with many works of very diverse kind, ranging from *Kubla Khan* to the latest existential piece of writing. It does not tell us much about the specific human context of any particular work. Such an allegorical meaning, therefore, does not explain the interest that we take in a work of fiction.

The second reading of the novel is indeed worthy of consideration, for it is this reading that has been put forward at some length by more than one critic of Hemingway, though none of them has been able to offer a sustained translation of the whole story within the limits of this theme. It will, therefor, be worthwhile to consider this reading of the book. Carlos Baker, one of the prominent critics, looks at *The Old Man and the Sea* in terms of this theme.

> "Santiago shows, in his own right, certain qualities of mind and heart which are clearly associated with the character and personality of Jesus Christ in the Gospel Stories."[4]

A close examination of the personality of the old man would show how farfetched this interpretation is and how it is tenable only if we abstract the story by eliminating all the psychological and descriptive specificity that Hemingway gives to it.

1,2,3. Steward Sanderson : *Hemingway*, Oliver And Boyd, Edinburgh And London, 1961 p. 117.

4. Carlos Baker : *Hemingway the writer as Artist*, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 299. In further references to this book, I will simply be mentioning the abbreviation, C.B.H.

Now let me quote a few lines from the text of *The Old Man And the Sea* which also reflect a certain quality of the old man's mind and heart:—

> "It is silly not to hope, he thought. Besides, I believe it is a sin. Do not think about sin, he thought. There are enough problems now without sin. Also I have no understanding of it.
>
> "I have no understanding of it and I am not sure that I believe in it. Perhaps it was sin to kill the fish......"[5]

No Christ figure could be so uncertain about his beliefs as the old man in this passage. The old man seems to have lost the sense of good and evil; and whenever the question of morals arises, he seems to slide off quickly from the issue. There are other problems that seem to him to be of more immediate concern than the abstract morality. Hemingway makes the old man specifically disclaim any religious interest that we might attribute under compulsion, if we impose the crusifixion theme upon the story :—

> "I am not religious," he said. "But I will say ten Our Fathers and ten Hail Marys that I should catch this fish, and I promise to make a pilgrimage to the Virgin de Corbc if I catch him. That is a promise".[6]

Again,

> "I have all those prayers I promised if I caught the fish he thought. But I am too tired to say them now. I better get the sack and put it over my shoulders".[7]

The old man's prayers are presented at a level which makes them look fatuous. His "ten Our Fathers and ten Hail Marys" has killing of the fish as its immediate context. And then follows his apology : "I am too tried to say them now". And finally, he prefers to put the "sack" over his shoulders to saying prayers, because the former will give him immediate physical comfort whereas the latter is just a mechanical response of conventional piety. It is really difficult to see any parallel between this kind of man and Jesus Christ. The only parallel possible seems to be that of parody which offers a strange commentary on the interpretation of the story in terms of the crucifixion archetype.

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5. Ernest Hemingway, *The Old Man and the Sea*, Jonathan Cape London, p. 104-105. In further references to this text I will simply be writing the abbrev. E.H.O.M.S.
6. *Ibid*, p. 63.
7. *Ibid*, p. 117,

When Santiago sees the second shark coming, he utters the word "Ay", which has been exploited much for drawing an analogy between the old man and Jesus Christ, thereby to prove the presence of the "Crucifision" theme in the novel. Note, for example, Baker's comments on the word "Ay",

> "The old man's involuntary epithet (Ay), and Hemingway's *explanation of it. is fully in line with what had gone before.* Throughout the ordeal, Santiago has been as conscious of his hands as any crucified man might be. He speaks to them as to fellow sufferers, tells them to do the work they must do, and makes due allowances for them as if they were, what he once calls them "my brothers".[8]

The allusions to Christ, as I understand them, perform an ironic function rather than provide a genuine parallel case to that of the old man. Of course, the old man suffers a good deal and also feels the cut in his hands as intensly as the piercing of nails, and the mast on his shoulders can also give the image of crucifixion. But can we call Santiago a martyr ? And if we can, martyr for what cause ? The old man hooks a great fish, a bulk of matter, which will bring him good price in the market. First, he has to suffer to possess the great bulk of matter which should bring him a handsome price. Then, he has to suffer in saving his material property from the enemy sharks. We can adopt words from Eliot's *Prufrock* for describing Santiago and what happens to him, "I am no prophet—and here's no great matter".[9] Santiago is no Christ, and here is no great matter for any kind of martyrdom. To draw analogy between the suffering for new faith and the suffering for material gain is nothing more than a parody. The old man's references to his hands should not be surprising either. It is just his way of addressing everything as living being.

There is another aspect of Santiago's character which has been much made of by some of the critics, *i.e.* his love for the fish, birds and turtles. But if we carefully read the statements where he expresses his love for them in their contexts, the true nature of the equation that he has with them would be revealed to us. Consider, for example, the following lines :

"Fish", he said, I love you and respect you very much. But I will kill you dead before this day ends'"[10]

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8. C.B.H., p. 313.
9. T.S. Eliot : *The Waste Land and Other Poems,* Fabar and Faber, 24 Russel Square, London, p. 12.
10. E.H.O.M.S., p. 52,

The sense of the first sentence is appreciably modified by the ironical contract provided by the one following. Again the old man is shown contemplating the question of sin which is involved in his killing of the fish :—

> "......You did not kill the fish only to keep alive and to sell for food, he thought. You killed him for pride and because you are a fisherman. You loved him when he was alive and you loved him after. If you love him, it is not a sin to kill him. Or is it more ?"[11]

The question here (a clause to the previous sentence rather than an independent one) is ironic tag to the passage which exposes the self deception of the Old man. Why actually does the old man pour affection on the fish becomes clear in the following passage :

> "...I want to see him, he thought, and to touch and to feel him. He is my fortune, he thought. But that is not why I wish to feel him. I think I felt his heart, he thought. When I pushed on the harpoon shaft the second time."[12]

He loves the fish as a man would love his property, for "he is my fortune." It is the love of one's possession, and not the pure love that flows from one heart to the other which the old man feels for the fish. And then the medium for the flow of love between the hearts of the fish and the old man is the harpoon ! The irony is unmistakable. Therefore, there is nothing like Christ is Santiago, when he expresses love for the fish or the bird or the shark. These passages of love for the fish also work ironically as do the passages where there are allusions to Christ.

The old man is also not an 'ancient' man, a primitive being, struggling against primitive background as the general opinion goes; instead, he is very much modern, and his struggle is the struggle of a man devoid of positive faith. Here we can take up first of the three readings referred to earlier. We could give it a more limited and hence more precise form by saying that the story of Santiago is the struggle of the modern man who has lost the sense of good and evil. And since he has lost this sense, he depends on his body and mind. His belief in everything else is only perfunctory. In other words, it is the struggle of life of the man who belongs to the age of undirected scepticism and his defeat is the defeat of this uncontrolled secpticism, a reflection on the inadequate nature of human mind, and the inadequacy of material possessions in carrying the struggle of his life through.

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11. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

That modern man is morally disillusioned has found repeated expression in modern literature. In the fiction of Hemingway also, this disillusionment is expressed again and again. Almost all his heroes display this quality of mind. Fredrick Henry has this to say on the subject of moral ideals :

> "I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them...and had read them ..now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago, if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it Abstract words such as glory, honour, courage, were obscence beside the concrete names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates."[13]

Henry has seen different life in war times, different from what the books and the priest had told him. He has lost faith in moral ideals altogether. Only the solid physical objects are real, and nothing else is so. Life for him is "stockyards at Chicago." This is the emotional nihilism which results from loss of faith in good and evil. Jake Barnes also contemplates the question of morals :

> "...The world was a good place to buy in. It seemed like a fine philosophy. In five years, I thought, it will seem just as silly as all the other fine philosophies I've had. Perhaps that was not true, though."
>
> "Perhaps as you went along you did learn something. I did not care what it was all about. All I wanted to know was how to live in it. May be if you found out how to live in it you learned from that what it was all about."[14]

And then just after this,

> "...I liked to see him (Mike) hurt Cohn. I wished he would not do it though because afterwards it made me disgusted at myself. That was morality, things that made you disgusted afterward. No, that must be immorailty. That was a large statement. What a lot of bilge I could think up at night."[15]

The changing philosophies that Jake has had and the uncertain tone whenever morals are contemplated reflect his moral bafflement. Jake

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13. E.H. *A Farewell to Arms* (Penguin Books), pp. 143-44.

14. E.H. *The Sun Also Rises*, Pan Books, London, p. 112.

15. E.H. *The Sun Also Rises*, Pan Books, London, p. 113.

truly reflects the character of what Gertrude Stein called "the lost generation." Robert Jordan in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, is also found a victim of this state of moral blankness when all the bi words are phoney :

> " . How many is that you have killed ? I don't know. Do you think you have right to kill any one ? No. But I have to. How many of those you have killed have been real Fascists ? Very few. But they are all the enemy to whose force we are opposing force. But you like the people of Navarra better than those of any other part of Spain ? Yes. And you kill them ? Yes. If you don't believe it go down there to the camp. Don't you know it is wrong to kill ? Yes. But you do it ? And you still believe absolutely that your cause is right ? Yes.
>
> "It is right, he told himself, not reassuringly but proudly."[16]

Here irony is clearly stressed in the use of the word "proudly." The conscience of people like Jordan (People who are Hemingway heroes, and Hemingway heroes are men of the war-torn generation of twentieth century Europe and America) does trouble them, but such calls of conscience are distrusted by Himingway heroes. They must not indulge in day-dreaming. They bravely fight against it. They are always found struggling to keep their heads clear. We can see Jordan, Henry, Jake and the old man trying to keep away all sorts of indulgence in abstract thinking which bring them face to face with the moral aspect of their struggle. They distrust themselves whenever they are meditating on the substance of the moral terms because they are uncertain about them.

It is in this attitude of moral blankness, therefore that Santiago is a representative figure of the modern age, which has been called the age of "dispersion and dissipation",[17] the age in which man is no longer a sacred being who is to set himself as an end but a thinking-body who is to employ himself as means to achieve some material end. Moravia from whom this phrase has been adopted gives an intelligent analysis of the predicament of modern man. He says,

16. E.H. *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (Penguin Books), pp. 287-88.

17. Alberto Moravia : *Man As An End* (A Defence of Humanism, Literary Social and Political Essays, Translated from the Italian by Bernard Wall), Secker and Warburg, London, 1965, p. 56. Though I have quoted at length from the Essay *Man As An End*, I don't mean to suggest at all its relevance as an influence on Hemingway. The thoughts expressed by the Italian novelist in this essay are about the generation during and after the second world war. Since *The Old Man And the Sea* was written just after the second World War and since the novel concerns the same generation I find some relevance of Moravia's views to the world of the novel. Also, I have not tried to apply the views expressed by Moravia in this essay to the novel, to make them the formula with which to explain the novel.

> "The employment of man as means, and the setting up of the material and inhuman ends, are both signs of an extraordinary dispersion and dissipation in mankind. It is only when such dispersion and dissipation have taken place within mankind that man can set himself on a level with animal..."[18]

He goes on to say,

> "A common characteristic of these states of despair is that they force mankind to resort even more frequently and obstinately to those ways of life, and of understanding life, that can only lead to more despair. And those ways of life, and of understanding life, can be summed up thus; the predominance of action over contemplation.
>
> "There is a very close link between the worship of action and the use of man as means to attain ends that are not man, just as there is a very close link between despair and recourse to reason alone. And there is a very close link between despair and action, and between reason and action."[19]

Therefore, in such conditions when man has not set himself as the end and has become a means to something inhuman, he has only his mind and body to depend upon. The conscience may trouble him, but it is his mind and body that decide his course, they become his chief tools and the conscience is thrown in the background. In other words, he is not left a living-soul, but a thinking-body. And it is this thinking-body that the modern man is, and the Hemingway hero is. Right from the beining, the old man shows distrust of luck and strongly puts his faith in his mind and body and skill. During his struggle Santiage never invokes his soul, his spirit. He depends only on what is real and solid :

> "He felt faint again now but he held on the great fish all the strain that he could. I moved him, he thought. May be this time I can get him over. Pull, hands; he thought. Hold up, legs, last for me, head. Last for me. You never went."[20]

The spirit is never resorted to, for its presence is not certain, it is not believed in. The old man depends on the skill that he has acquired, rather than to depend on his luck :

> "It is better to be lucky. But I would rather be exact."[21]

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18. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
19. *Ibid.*
20. E.H.O.M.S., p. 91.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The old man has not caught any fish for eighty four days. On the eighty fifth day he starts on his journey "far out" to have a big catch. He is not prepared to accept what life has to offer him as a matter of routine. He is proud of his skill and strength. So, he goes "far out" and, as he himself calls it, "violates" his "luck". And it is his material weapons alone that he solely pepends upon for carrying his struggle of life through. In his comparison between himself and the fish also, Santiago finds his mind and skill as the only points of superiority over the animal :

> "...But, thank God, they are not as intelligent as we who kill them, although they are more noble and more able."[22]

Again,

> "I am only better than him through trickery."[23]

If we have to look for the display of the transitory nature of matter, of material strength, we should see the gradual loss of the weapons of the old man. First of all, he loses the harpoon with which he had fought against the first shark. When he is proceeding towards the inner part of the current, "he knows what could happen there." He feels discouraged at first because he is left unarmed now, but then :

> "Yes there is", he said aloud. 'I can lash my knife to the butt of the oars.' 'Now', he said. 'I'am still an old man. But am not unarmed."[24]

Then he loses his knife also, and he again has to face some sharks :

> "Now they have beaten me, he thought. I am too old to club sharks to death. But I will try it as long as I have the oars and the short club and the tiller."[25]

Then, gradually, he loses these weapons also, and is finally broken. He feels desperate. Inspite of his equipment, he could not save his material wealth, his fish. "What can a man do against them in the dark without a weapon."[26] And though he says, "A man can be destroyed but not defeated,"[27] he is both destroyed and defeated. "You're tired, old man', he said. 'You're tired inside'."[28] This being tired inside is his defeat. He is dead and broken now. "He knew he was beaten now

22. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
23. *Ibid*, p. 99.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

finally and without remedy..."[29] The old man acknowledges this defeat before the boy also. "They beat me, Manolin', he said, They truly beat me."[30]

He is physically destroyed, but he is not spiritually victorious either, as the critics who are the champions of "Crucifixion" theme have generally declared. His success is limited to his skillful hooking of the fish and the simillar killing of the sharks. But this kind of success is not spiritual, it is the success of a man who has accepted the ethics of action, of a man who believes in action at its mundane level. It is the success of a specialist, of a skilled man, of a man-as-means.

The struggle of the old man to hook the great fish and then to save it is therefore a vain pursuit after matter, and his defeat proves the vanity of human wishes. The journey of life without faith, the life devoid of the spiritual is a useless journey that ends into nothing. Regarding this futile journey, there is a very revealing passage in the novel. Santiago has finally hooked the fish and both are having a smooth sailing.

> "With his mouth shut and his tail straight up and down we sail like brothers. Then his head started to become a little unclear and he thought is he bringing me in or am I bringing him in ?"[31]

In his book, *Unto, This Last*, Ruskin, while debunking the popular definition of 'wealth' as 'having' or 'possessing', given by the political economists of the school of Utilitarianism, gives an interesting example, which I think, is an apt parallel to the situation of Santiago. The example is :

> "...Lately in a wreck of a Californian ship, one of the passengers fastened a belt about him with two hundred pounds of gold in it with which he was found afterwards at the bottom. Now, as he was sinking—had he the gold ? or had the gold him ?"[32]

So is the case of the old man. His remarks whether he is bringing the fish in or the fish is bringing him in is not ambivalent, but ironic. It is a comment on his own struggle, and it is here that the moral of the story lies.

The tragedy of the old man is heightended by the presence of the boy figure in the novel. His story is not only the story of a man who in his vain material pursuit is destroyed. Had it been only that the novel

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29. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
32. John Ruskin : *Unto this Last*, University Tutorial Press Ltd., London, p. 67.

would not have been so rich as it is now. It is also the story of a man who is isolated in the society. The boy figure pinpoints, providing a contrast, the absence of love and warm human relations in the society of men. The fishermen are busy measuring the length of the fishskeleton instead of looking after the old man when he is destroyed. If at all somebody shows concern for him, it is very casual like that of the proprietor of the Terrace who says to the boy, "Tell him how sorry I am".[33] The boy plays an important part in the total scheme of the novel. Let us, therefore, consider in detail the role played by the boy in the world of the Old Man.

Only Carlos Baker among the critics has discussed at some length the role of Manolin in *The Old Man And the Sea*. The rest of them have either neglected this aspect of the novel altogether or have just made passing references to it. Therefore, I will start the examination of this portion of the novel by examining first the views held by Baker on the subject.

> "The relationship between Santiago and the boy Manolo is of a special and memorable kind. In the light of the experiment in symbolic doubling which Hemingway tried in *Across the River and Into the Trees* the meaning of the other relationship becomes clear. In one of her aspects, Renata stands for Colonel Cantwell's lost youth. Maolo fulfills a similar purpose, and with greater success in that we don't have to overcome the doubt raised by the difference of sexes between the Colonel and his lady"[34].

If the boy stands for the youth of the old man himself and the old man's refrain to the boy is an invocation to "the strength and courage of his youth[35] as Baker would like us to believe, then why is not the boy remembered by the old man when he is finally to kill the fish ? Hemingway makes it clear at this stage that this moment is the peak of the old man's struggle. At this moment the old man simply 'gathers' his 'strength' and 'pride', whatever is left, and does not remember the boy. Also, if the boy is to serve as a source of strength to be invoked, why is there no reference to him when the old man is fighting the losing battle against the sharks even though the old man now tired needs more strength, for he is to struggle against the sharks as well as to do "the slave work" of pulling the fish ashore ? Therefore, the symbolic significance of the boy suggested by Baker seems to be imported into the book and does not seem to have emerged out of the text itself. At any rate it is a case of reading too much into the book.

33. E.H.O.M.S., p. 124.
34. C.B.H. pp., 304-305,
35. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

This would be clear if we examine some of the contexts where the boy is invoked by the old man and try to know the true nature of the invocations. When the boy's absence is felt for the first time by the old man,

"The fish moved steadily and then travelled slowly on the calm water,"[36]

And after the reference to the boy we find that the old man feels neither stronger nor more confident than before. He is just contemplating the possible course he should take,

> "I could make the line fast. But then he could break it. I must hold him all I can and give him line when he must have it. Thank God he is travelling and not going down."[37]

The second time when Santiago remembers the boy, he is not in actual struggle against the fish. He is thinking of baseball. But he warns himself against it saying, "Think of what you are doing"[38]. And immediately after this, he remembers the boy,

> "Then he said aloud, I wish I had the boy. To help me and to see this.
>
> "No one should be alone in their old age, he thought. But it is unavoidable. I must remember to eat in order to keep strong. Remember, no matter how little you want to, that you must eat him in the morning. Remember, he said to himself"[39].

The boy is remembered here as much "to see this", the big game of hooking a big fish, as to "help" him. And the boy is to help him as much in getting meals as in his business. He needs the boy not because he is not finding himself a match for the fish, but because "no one should be alone in their old age." The old man always needs the boy to overcome his sense of isolation, and not to kill the fish. He is a man devoid of home life :

> "Once there had been a tinted photograph of his wife on the wall but he had taken it down because it made him too lonely to see it and it was on the shelf in the corner under his clean shirt"[40].

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36. B.H.O.M.S., p. 42.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

The old man, therefore, is not happy while alone. Even the sight of the photograph of his wife could make him feel lonely. It is because of the boy that he has been able to forget his wife, and is able to forget loneliness. The boy does all the domestic work for the old man. He looks after Santiago as the latter's own wife might have looked after him. He instinctively understands the needs of the old man and meets them without being asked by him. See, for example, the following :

> "Keep warm old man', the boy said. 'Remember we are in September........"
>
> "When the boy came back the old man was asleep in the chair and the sun was down. The boy took the old army blanket off the bed and spread it over the back of the chair and over the old man's shoulders[41]".

And then after some time,

> "What have you got" ? he asked.
>
> 'Supper', said the boy. 'We are going to have supper' !
>
> 'I am not very hungry'
>
> 'Come on and eat. You can't fish and not eat'.
>
> 'Keep the blanket around you,' the boy said.
>
> 'You'll not fish without eating while I'm alive' [42]".

This passage clearly reveals the instinctive understanding and the domestic companionship that exit between the boy and the old man. It is strange that the old man never has to bother about his domestic life even when he has no family of his own. He has to go without a fish for eighty four days, and is left with nothing in the house, and yet he need not bother about his meals and other necessities. Even if things are to be borrowed, it is the boy who will do it for him. The boy's attachment is really exceptional. And this serves to stress by contrast the paucity of real human relations in the world of the novel :

> "Where did you wash ? the boy thought. The village water supply was two streets down the road. I must have water here for him, the boy thought, and soap and a good towel. Why am I so thoughtless ? I must get him another shirt and a jacket for the winter and some sort of shoes and another blanket[43]".

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41. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

The boy makes the home life of the old man, and to the extent that the old man seems to have forgotten even his wife. It is a rare and sentimental attachment.

Whenever the old man finds himself lacking in strength to match his enemy, it is not the boy he remembers but either the heroic incidents of his own youth or the heroic example of the brave deeds of DiMaggio :

> "As the sun set he remembered, *to give himself more confidence*, the time in the tavern at Casablanca when he had played the hand game with the great negro from Cienfuegos who was the strongest man on the docks. They had gone one day and one night with their elbows on a chalk line on the table......"[44] (Italics mine)

Here is a clear instance of the source of Sentiago's inspirational strength, and one can always understand the inspiration given by the memories of such brave fights. This case in particular has a great similarity *with the old man's fight against the fish which also runs for days and nights.* The invocation of the boy serves altogether a different purpose. The remembrance of the boy is a matter of satisfaction, and not that of inspiration. It is for love that the boy stands, and not for youth or strength. And the novel is not a "parable of age and youth" as Baker would like to name it, but a story which is an extension of Hemingway's favourite theme of love and war which finds more elaborate expression in *Farewell to Arms, For Whom the Bell Tolls, The Fifth Coulumn, and Across the River and Into the Trees.*

In the preface to *The Fifth Column*, Hemingway tells us something about Dorothy, the girl who makes the dream-world of Philip and who provides a contrast to the life of struggle in which Philip is involved. Hemingway says, "there is a girl in it named Dorothy but her name might also have been Nostalgia."[45] And if we make a study of the role of Dorothy in the play, it is in no way different from the roles of Catherine, Brett, Renata and Manolin in the respective novels they appear. If a comparative study of these characters is made, it reveals that they are not only similar figures serving a similar purpose, rather they seem to be various names, as it were, of the same figure. And on the basis of this identical nature of the roles of these characters, we could give one name for them all *i.e.*, "Nostaliga". And this Nostaliga is for home, for love, which is implied in Hemingway's statement about the woman as well as in the role itself that she plays. Therefore, it is this symbolic function which the boy serves in the novel, and it is in the light of this group of characters that the role of the boy

44. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

45. Ernest Hemingway, *The Fifth Column* (Penguin Books), p. 6.

should be studied and not in isolation. The Nostalgia of Santiago for the boy is the Nostalgia for love, for home, which have become things of the past for the old man who has accepted "the ethics of action." Love and peace belong to the man who sets himself as an end, and not to the man who is simply a means. Since his preoccupation is action. struggle and violence, home has been rejected in the interest of action as an agent of profit.

The boy also serves another purpose in the total scheme of the novel. It is Manolin alone who provides a sharp contrast to the background of isolation in which the old man has to fight the losing battle of his life, against the absence of any community feeling among people. The boy is of vital importance, if we try to make out the sharp ironic difference between the boy and the rest of the people in the novel. It is the boy alone who reminds us of positive human values in the world of the Old Man, otherwise the rest of the people have a very matter-of-fact attiude towards Santiago which is peculiar of the mechanized modern man.

On the one hand there are the parents of the boy who withdraw him from the old man's boat simply because the latter has been established as "unlucky". On the other hand is the boy himself who even after his withdrawal from the old man's boat continues meeting the old man like a love-mate. The boy looks after the domestic needs of Santiago. He purchases the lucky number and borrows food and money for him. He satisfies himself that the old man eats and sleeps well. In short, the warmth which is reflected in every gesture of his towards the old man stirs the reader's heart. When the old man returns physically broken from his sea journey the boy goes about crying to bring food and medical help for him. In fact, through out the novel, the scenes of Santiago-Manolin relation are moving and full of warmth.

The relation between the boy the and old man falls like a fine beam of ligh on the otherwise dark background of the novel. It provides a sharp contrast to those "fishermen" who are "around the skiff looking at what lashed beside it and one was in the water, his trousers rolled up, measuring the skeleton with a length of line",[46] while the boy "goes out very quietly to bring some coffee and all the way down the road he was crying."[47] The concern of everybody around is notewrothy. Whosoever meets the boy talks of the wonderful size of the fish, and no one shows any concern about the serious condition of the old man. This annoys the boy so much that at last he has to say,

"Damn my fish, the boy said and he started to cry again."[48]

46,47. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

Here is epressed a kind of concern which is deep and unfailing. Here is the natural flow of heart from one to the other. This offers an ironic comment on the contemporary society where there is prevalent only a casual, a salesman's concern of man with man and where there is complete absence of human sympathy and love which generates a haunting sense of isolation.

K. K. Shukla

PASSION VERSUS VOCATION : A STUDY OF AENEID IN HUMAN PERSPECTIVE

Among the outstanding books that give us the world view of ancient times, the *Aeneid* of Virgil occupies a position of rare distinction. It is a monumental gateway between the pagan and the Christian centuries. Before his magnum opus, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are the only complete books of the Western World. The two primary epics delineate a strange world. It is terribly disorderly because it is an age of chaos. There is war everywhere—war and violence. Pirates, savages and monsters press in upon the small world of human beings. Peace and law, though cherished as ideals, are practised only within narrow limits and even heaven is inhabited by a dynasty of angry, implacable and violent gods. As we step out of the Homeric world and familiarize ourselves with the perilous adventures of Aeneas, the Founding Father of Rome, not a few changes are noticed by us in the literary epic of Rome. One of the most remarkable changes, for instance, is found in the conception and the delineation of the protagonist himself.

In the *Iliad*, Achilles is fury incarnate. He races towards his own death like a meteor leaving a fiery track down the sky. He is young, strong, fearless yet proud. He joins the Achaean army and sails for Troy knowing he would never return. He has the choice between a long, peaceful life of obscurity and a short career of dazzling fame. To his honour, he makes the choice of the latter. When Agamemnon deprives him of his favourite mistress, Briseis, he is bitterly angry and swears to fight no more. Then, after the death of his friend, Petroclus, he fights with the pent up fury of many days. He is a blood-thirsty friend. He beats back the Trojans in a terrifying crescendo of slaughter, until he meets Hector. He kills Hector, strips his body, drags it behind his chariot and leaves it unburied for animals to eat. In the end, it is true, he redeems himself. But during the persistence of his dreadful fury he behaves like a dangerous wild animal. He is sleepless and half-mad with grief and anger and keeps Hector's body outside his hut to gloat over it.

Odysseus, the hero of the *Odyssey*, is wily, cunning and deceitful. Whereas Achilles preferred military fame and certain death to a long life spent in obscurity and retirement, Odysseus pretends to be insane when he is summoned to the war with the other princes of Greece. He is the sworn enemy of Palamedes who had discovered his pretended insanity on

that occasion. In his wicked pursuit of revenge, Odysseus has the meanness to bribe one of the servants of Palamedes. The servant digs a hole in his master's tent, and there conceals a large sum of money. After this Odysseus forges a letter in Phrygian characters, which Priam was supposed to have sent to Palamedes. In the letter the Trojan king seemed to entreat Palamedes to deliver into his hands the Grecian army, according to the conditions which had been agreed upon previously when he received the money. This letter, carried by means of Odysseus before the princes of the Grecian army, proves the death-warrant of Palamedes.

The central theme of the *Aeneid* is the hazards encountered by Aeneas in founding the empire of Rome. It is an admixture of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. However, in important respects, Virgil's Aeneas is the antithesis of either Achilles or Odysseus. Placed by the side of the frenzied Achilles and wily Odysseus, Aeneas the True does not fail to confirm two important rules of conduct : one, 'Frenzy of anger demeans the MAN in us' and the other, 'Be true' that is, loyal to the gods, to the homeland, and to family, friends and above all to your 'vocation' in life. Height observes that in essentials Virgil was a Christian soul.

> "He had, and embodied in his hero, a deep devotion to selfless moral ideals : his pious Aeneas is far more of an idealist than the angry Achilles, the clever Odysseus or even the patriotic Hector."[1]

When Virgil speaks of Aeneas the True we are apt to think of his care of his father whom he carried on his shoulders when Troy was in flames, of his devotion to his father's memory and of his touching encounter with his father in Book Six. But the appellation 'the True' with Virgil has much wider associations of meaning. It implies an attitude towards the individual, towards the family, towards the region and towards the imperial destiny of Rome. And finally Aeneas is 'true' in his respect towards the gods who have charged him with the mission and vocation of founding the proud battlements of Rome. Aeneas has an unshaken fidelity towards the gods, and in no way his piety appears more clearly than when the gods afflict him. He has a good deal to put up with from Juno.

> "He met many tribulations on his way both by land and on the ocean : high heaven willed it, for Juno was ruthless and could not forget her anger."[2]

But in spite of Juno's malignant fury in persecuting him, Aeneas is punctilious in propitiating her through rites and offerings. For soon after

1. Highet, Gilbert, *The Classical Tradition* (New York and London, 1949), p. 74.
2. Bk. I, p. 27. This and all subsequent references to the text are from *The Aeneid* translated by Jackson Knight in the Penguin Classics.

the prophecy of the old Tiber himself in Book VIII, Aeneas finds a shining white sow with her white litter whom he sacrifices !

'all to Juno, to Juno only, to Juno herself, the Supreme.'[3]

This piety towards gods and their high commands shows an essential ingredient of Aeneas' character. It is an analogue and foreshadow of Christian humility. This aspect of his character is far more important than his sagacity in political negotiations with Latimus and Evander or even his heroism on the plains of Latium. In so far as he is heroic, he is heroic as the first Displaced Person after Adam's exile from the Garden of Eden. He is a fugitive from a ruined city and an obliterated society. Unlike Odysseus,

> ".. he was not to have marvellous and exciting adventures with such occasional erotic episodes as left no canker on the conscience of that wayfarer. He was not to return at last to the remembered hearth-fire, to find an exemplary wife awaiting him."[4]

Aeneas' end is only a new beginning. He is, to some extent, like the Founding Fathers of the colonial America who later in the seventeenth century sailed across the roar of the Atlantic in order to found a brave new world of their dreams and aspirations. For like them, Aeneas is a man with a mission and for such people their vocation in life, their mission on this earth transcends all other worldly considerations. Aeneas is a man of destiny. Upon him depends not only the future of Rome, but, historically, through Rome the future of the whole of the Western World. His vocation, therefore, has placed upon him a prodigious responsibility. It is not a reason for self-glorification. Aeneas knows that he is acting as an instrument. He is guided by the deepest conviction of his destiny, but he is a humble man who knows that this destiny is something not to be desired and not to be avoided.

In presenting such a character Virgil was actuated by the ethos and practical necessities of his age. The writer of the *Eclogues* and the *Georgics*, who had helped to reawaken the love for field and orchard was now prompted by the court as well as by his inspiration to celebrate the greatness of Roman achievement and Roman purpose. In the beginning, Rome had been a tiny settlement surrounded by enemies. She could survive these threats to her security and existence by virtue of her proud, disciplined and strong will. Not only she survived but was led on by successive hardwon victories to world dominion. The process seems to have taken at least five centuries of almost continuous warfare. During

3. Bk. Viii, p. 203.

4. Eliot, T.S., *On Poetry and Poets* (London, 1956), p. 128.

that period the Romans achieved unparalleled success, apparently through unique merits of their own combined with a special share of divine favour and good fortune. The spectacular rise of Rome was a matter for wonder and a certain reverence to Romans themselves. When in later years of the republican period, a new access of scepticism threatened the old habits of loyalty, integrity and self-sacrifice, people looked back on their rich moral inheritance. They became increasingly interested in the origin of Rome and in the Roman 'myth'. Virgil has distilled and epitomized this myth in the immortal story of Aeneas. His poem which he wrote at the instance of the emperor Augustus and his chief minister Maecenas was primarily designed to show the essential virtues of Roman character and to make them popular. It, therefore, pictures its hero as reverent of the gods and falls in line with the Augustan reformation of morals and faith.

Extra-artistic considerations like these demanded a new kind of treatment, and when we turn from the *Iliad* to the *Aeneid*, it is clear that the whole outlook is different and that Virgil has a new vision of human nature and of heroic virtue. Homer concentrates on individuals and their destinies. The dooms of Achilles and Hector dominate his design. Their characters determine the action. Virgil, however could not do so. The restriction imposed upon his art prevented him from following the Homeric model. He was to write a poem whose first and foremost purpose was to glorify the Roman nation as a whole. Bowra observes that his chief concern :

> "...was less with historical events than with their meaning, less with Rome at this or at that time than it was from the beginning and for ever, less with individual Romans than with a single, symbolical hero who stands for the qualities and experiences which are typically Roman."[5]

From the very beginning Virgil knew that he was not writing a romance and that his work was not a mere telling of an entertianing tale. If at times his hero appears dull, uninspiring and behaving like an automation, it is because the real religion of the *Aeneid* is patrioism and its greatest god is Rome. Throughout the twelve books—in the councils of the gods, in the Carthagian episode, in the hero's converse with the underworld, in the endless conflics and cruelities on the plains of Latium—there is ever felt in the background the idea of the oncoming, divinely, ordered, irresistible greatness of Rome. In such a vast scheme, Aeneas is a mere instrument of divine forces at work. Virgil makes it abundantly clear that his special

5. Bowra, C.M., *From Virgil to Milton* (London, 1963), p. 34.

concern is the destiny not of a man but of Rome. In his invocation he writes:

> "I pray for inspiration, to tell how it all began, and how the Queen of Heaven sustained such outrage to her majesty that in her indignation she forced a man famed for his true heartedness to tread that long path of adventure, and to face so many trials."[6]

The primary concern of the poet is 'how it all began'; the second motif of the work is how Juno opposed the establishment of URBS AETERNA (The Eternal City) and persecuted the true-hearted Aeneas. The hero is therefore to be subordinated to the Roman nation.

The fundamental theme of the *Aeneid* is the destiny of Rome. Jupiter had willed it long ago. When the Trojan fleet is likely to be shattered by the stormy gales near Carthage, Venus shows her motherly solicitude for the safety of her son. Her lamentation moves the heart of her fathet, Jupiter, who in order to reassure her unfolds the chart of Roman destiny and asks her :

> "Spare your fears, Cytherean. You have your people's destiny still, and it shall not be disturbed. You shall see your city, see Lavinium's walls, for I have promised them."[7]

Aeneas is the chosen man of Rome's destiny. He is to carry out the will of the Almigthy, Jupiter. This high fore-knowledge has been communicated to Aeneas in his dream by the ghost of Hector :

> "But now Troy entrusts to you her sanctities and her Guardians of the Home. Take them with you to face your destiny and find for them the walled city, which one day after wandering you shall build to be great, like them."[8]

But in spite of Jupiter's promise, Aeneas is not to succeed in his mission so long as Juno chooses to thwart it. To frustrate the divine purpose of her husband, she uses Allecto and Juturna and through them she affects the minds of Dido, Amata and Turnus. The last three are active human agents of her nefarious designs. Out of these three, Dido and Turnus are manifestly her most powerful tools. Both of them are the embodiments of high passions through their demeanour and tragic ends do not fail to move the reader's heart. Dido is the queen of love and Turnus is made of the same stuff of which Achilles is made. Both of them are grievously wronged by Aeneas and Virgil has, perhaps, unwittingly invested their portraits with so rare a grandeur that even the image of Aeneas seems to suffer considerably by his comparison with them.

6. Bk. I, p. 27.
7. Bk. I, p. 35.
8. Bk. II, p. 60.

Dido is Virgil's most complete and most succsesful woman in the *Aeneid*. In her case Virgil conceives the story in a tragic spirit. He shapes it almost like an Attic tragedy. In fact he makes her misfortunes arouse a compassion and a sympathy which outweigh her faults. He uses every means to make her majestic, human and tragic. He dwells on her greatness of character and of her heart. When she first appears, she is a great queen and a great woman. She has founded and built Carthage. She has led a large company from Tyre to the waste shores of Africa where she is building a city so splendid that it must have recalled the temples and places which Augustus was building in Rome. The welcome which she gives to Aeneas and his companions is as warm as it is sincere. She makes no reservations in her offers of hospitality, invites the Trojans to stay in Carthage and promises to make no discriminations against them. She recalls the ancient ties between her own house and that of Aeneas, and shows what the ancient world would have thought a becoming modesty when she says that her own sufferings have taught her to succour the distressed.

> "My own acquaintance with misfortune has been teaching me to help others who are in distress."[9]

She gives orders for temple offerings in thanks to the gods. She is thoughtful of Aeneas' friends on the shore and sends them twenty bulls, a hundred fat lambs with their ewes, and a generous supply of wine. Her regal style displays itself in her feasts and her gifts that she gives to her guests and in the kindness which she lavishes on the boy Ascanius. When the banquet comes to its first pause and tables are removed she asks for a jewelled drinking bowl of heavy gold. She fills it with wine of full strength and before pouring it out as a drink-offering onto the table she offers a solemn prayer to Jupiter and Juno for strengthening the bond of friendship between her people and the exiles from Troy :

> "Jupiter, you who are said to have created the laws of hospitality, may it be your wish to make this day a fortunate day for the Phoenicians nnd for the exiles from Troy, a day to be remembered by our descendants. May Bacchus, giver of joy, and Juno the generous, grant their blessing."[10]

Her deportment so far has been absolutely impeccable. But she has a tragic fault. In the beginning of the Book IV we are told that she has taken a vow to be faithful to the spirit of her husband, Sychaeus. She violates it when she unites herself to Aeneas. But, in spite of Venus, machination through her son Cupid, Dido is not rash. When the 'rare

9. Bk. I, p. 47.

10. Bk. I, p. 50.

presence'[11], 'valiant'[12] heart and 'divine parentage'[13] of Aeneas have smitten her heart with love, she unlocks her secret to her sister, Anna. She advises Dido to marry Aeneas, not only because she does not want to see Dido 'sorrowing and pining'[14] through all her youth, but judged from the point of view of existing political situation also the marriage is highly expedient. However, She asks Dido first to solicit the favour of gods :

> 'You have only to pray to the gods for their blessing and ensure their favour by sacrifice......'[15]

As the story proceeds we learn that Juno approaches Venus with the overtures of peace :

> 'Surely it is better for us to collaborate in arranging a permanent peace, sealed by a marriage-compact.'[16]

She explains to Venus her ingenious plan which she has devised to bring Dido and Aeneas together when they would go out for hunting in a forest on the next day. Elaborating it to Venus, Juno observes further :

> Dido and Troy's chieftain will both take shelter in the same cave. I shall be there, and if I may be sure of your compliance, I shall assign her to him to be his own, and unite them in secure marriage. This shall be their *lawful wedding*.[17] (Italics mine)

To this proposal Venus raises no objection. To be precise, the text reads :

> 'She nodded her assent.........'[18]

Technically the approval of gods solicited by Dido has been accorded. Venus is the mother of Aeneas and Juno patronizes the Queen of Carthage. Both the goddesses have signified their consent. Her marriage with Aeneas, it may be noted, will be 'lawful'. In accordance with this plan, on the next day Dido and Troy's chieftain find their way to the same cavern. Earth and Juno, Mistress of the Marriage, give their sign and from the mountain peaks, the sylvan nymphs hail their union. Dido weds Aeneas with the approval of natural and heavenly powers. She justly

11. Bk. II, p. 97
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Iibd.*
14. Bk. II, p. 98.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Bk. IV, p. 100.
17. Bk. IV, p 101.
18. *Ibid.*

believes that her marriage is 'lawful' and real'. In this belief she never falters, and to it she appeals when she begs Aeneas not to leave her:

> "………if I was ever kind to you, or if, anything about me made you happy, please, if it is not too late to beg you, have pity for the ruin of a *home* (Italics mine), and change your mind."[19]

Why does then Aeneas abandon her ? Why is he so stone-hearted as to turn his deaf ear to all her entreaties for preserving the sanctities of his 'home'. Aeneas, the True, has always respected the will of the gods. He should know that his marriage with Dido was approved both by Venus and Juno and that it was lawful. It is true that Virgil never says that Aeneas is in love with her. But the reason assigned by Aeneas for rescinding the marriage contract is hopelessly untenable. He says :

> "Nor have I ever made any marriage-rite my pretext, for I never had such a compact with you."[20]

These words ring hollow in his mouth. They reveal an unfeeling and obdurate heart. One of the causes of the disintegration of Roman Empire in later times was that it had become a utopia of crime, intrigue and debauchery. Only a product of such a degenerate times might be exonerated from the charge of profligacy. It is astonishing to find the words of a philanderer in the mouth of pious Aeneas especially so when we have seen how devoted he was to his Trojan wife Creusa. Aeneas is, therefore, guilty of a moral lapse. If he was not to attach any sanctity to their marriage, why did he not speak out his mind on the day when he and Dido first consumated their love. He keeps his mysterious silence even after that episode though Dido cares no more for appearance or her good name. She ceases to take any thought for secrecy in her love. She calls it a marriage and she calls him her 'husband'.[21] But Aeneas does not protest. His absolute and continued silence as well as his behaviour on this point is not above impeachment. Aeneas, the True, is not honest in his dealings with Dido. It can be said in his defence that he left her because of a repeated command from the gods. But he does so in a manner which does not leave his moral image unsullied. The gods sent him to her court, forced Dido to fall in love with him, and made him leave her, but his manner and behaviour towards her was his own choice. It is she and not Aeneas who wins our sympathy. Her sufferings call out Virgil's most splendid poetry. In her dying hours we feel that she is more sinned than sinning.

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19. Bk. IV, p. 107.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*

Like Dido, Turnus is yet another major hindrance to the vocation o Aeneas. Dido was heart-strong : Turnus is head-strong. He is Virgil's supreme presentation of a heroic type. He too is an instrument of Juno and evokes our admiration and sympathy as does Dido. Like Aeneas, he is the son of a goddess and as brave as Achilles himself. The Cumaen sibyl points out this fact of Aeneas :

> "You will find there.. a new Achilles, again a goddess's son, already breathes in Latium;..."[22]

His sister, Juturna, is a goddess like Juno. In recompense for a stolen maidenhood, Jupiter has assigned to her the office of presiding over the pools and the roaring rivers'.[23] Thus Turnus is the scion of as noble a family as the son of Anchises and Venus. Besides, he is as much of a 'foreigner' in Latium as Aeneas. In her petition to her husband, Queen Amata emphasizes the foreign extraction of Turnus.

> "And besides, if the family of Turnus were to be traced right back to its origin, Inachus and Acrisus are his forefathers and Mycenae itself is his mother city."[24]

He is the prince of Rutuli and Lavinia is his affianced bride. When he hears from Allecto that the king refuses him his bride,[25] his immediate impulse is to fight for his rights and his honour. In that age of chivalry people preferred death to a life of shame and ignominy and Virgil takes pains to make Turnus live up to the heroic standards. Feeling that his pride was wounded, he turns furiously to his weapons and gives command to his young captains to prepare for the war. Turnus is a great warrior. He moves to and fro and towers by a full head above the rest. His presence strikes terror in the heart of Trojan army. When he attacks their camp he is like a hungry wolf circling round a sheepfold. When the 'holy ships'[26] of Trojans are metamorphosed into nymphs, the Rutulians feel their vigor paralysed. Messapus himself is struck with terror and his horses are in panic. Yet the confidence of Turnus does not sink. He raises their spirits and inspires them with confidence. He feels that his cause is just...... :

> "The demands of Venus and Destiny are well enough answered in the bare fact of the Trojans' arrival on the farmlands of fertile Italy. Besides, I have a destiny of my own : I am destined to

22. Bk. VI, pp. 149-50.
23. Bk. XII, p. 313.
24. Bk. VII, p. 186.
25. Bk. VII, p. 188.
26. Bk. IX, p. 828.

hack out from the roots by my own blade the nation of criminals who have stolen my bride away."[27]

On the battlefield he displays a rare prowess of arms. When a message is delivered that the enemy is offering an open entrance, he rushes to the Dardan Gate and fights like an angry lion. He kills Pandarus and Bitias who are the bulwark of the Trojan resistance. The streaming mass of the Trojan soldiery that encircles him within their own settlement does not strike his heart with dismay. He fights heroically and his anger and valor do not allow him to turn in flight.[28] Yet he is not savage like Achilles. When Pallas crashes down and bites the 'hostile earth with his blood stained mouth',[29] Turnus does not maltreat his dead body nor does he gloat in triumph over it. But, with a generous gesture he gives it back to the Arcadians :

> "I freely grant what honour a tomb may afford, what solace burial may bring."[30]

When Juturna tries to save him by taking his chariot away to the farther boundary of the plain, Turnus remonstrates with her. He knows that his end is approaching fast.

> "For what chances have I, now ? What fortune can any longer promise me life ?"[31]

Yet he does not turn his back on the foe. Instead he chooses to die a hero's death :

> "Spirits below, be good to me, since the High Powers above have withdrawn their favour. I shall come down to you a guiltless soul with never a taint of the coward's sin, for never will I bring disgrace on my exalted forefathers."[32]

Turnus does not bear the 'taint of the coward's sin' on his forehead. On the contrary, he is as brave and noble as a true hero should be. He fights for his honor and for his homeland. The climax comes and Turnus is killed. The poem ends not on a note of success or triumph but almost with a lamentation. In the Aeneid it is not of Aeneas but of Turnus that we are made to think at the finish.

More than any other male character, Turnus has a striking individuality. He has the lineaments and idiosyncracies of a true

27. Bk. IX, p. 229.
28. Bk. IX, p. 249.
29. Bk. X, p. 266,
30. Bk. X, p. 266.
31. Bk. XII, pp. 328-329.
32. Bk. XII, p. 329.

Homeric hero. Because he has the authentic spirit of heroism, he fights to the last. His decisions rise from the belief that in valiant resistance manhood really reaches its heights. He does not swagger, nor does he ever blaspheme. He grieves and at the dying hour his appeal to Aeneas is truly pathetic. It reveals a truly noble heart. He gives up his claim on Lavinia, his affianced bride for whom he is breathing his last. It is significant to note that Turnus fights a grim battle and even sacrificies his life for his fiancee while Aeneas forsakes and runs away from a lawful wife whom he married in the heat of passion.

The victory of Aeneas is complete. But it is highly problematic if he could have vanquished Turnus without *complete* divine help. He is the son of Venus. She coaxes her husband, Vulcan to manufacture a special coat of arms for her darling son. Jupiter had decreed the establishment of Roman Empire, maybe before the foundations of the world were sunk. Even Juno has to withdraw her opposition to his will because she has been forbidden'by him.[33] Obviously the dice is heavily loaded against Turnus. The combat is ill-matched. But he fights Aeneas because he would not besmirch the honour of his forefathers. He is brought low by the spear of Aeneas, and soon after we find Aeneas shouting and blustering over the fallen Turnus:

> "His *fury kindled* and, *terrible in his rage*, he said : 'Are you to be stolen hence out of my grasp, you who wear spoils taken from one whom I loved ? It is Pallas, only Pallas, who by this wound which *I now deal* makes sacrifice of you ; he exacts this retribution, you criminal."[34] (Italics mine)

Why does Aeneas bluster in his 'terrible' rage? He makes himself look ridiculous when he talks like a braggart. He deals a wound : He forgets that the success of his mission had been made known to him through many visions, omens, prophecies and his visit to the underworld. He seems to have forgotten that he was only an instrument for the accomplishment of the supreme will of Jupiter. If Turnus is rash, and courts his own death because of his high passion with which his mind has been afflicted by Allecto in a nightmare, Aeneas can also fly into a towering rage. Furthermore, Aeneas demean himself by calling Turnus a 'criminal'. He has wounded Turnus by his spear and literally adds insult to his injury. Jupiter, the Fates and Venus may rejoice at the prosperity of their preordained scheme, excessive Roman jingoism may applaud the triumph of Aeneas, but heart of a sensitive reader is shocked by the impropriety of Aeneas' conduct. In point of fact Aeneas himself is a 'criminal'. He has come to Italy leading a band of marauding sea-farers and he will

33. Bk. XII, p. 334.

34. Bk. XII, p. 338.

marry Lavinia now since he has killed Turnus and Latimus, her father, is in favour of her marrige with him. In our times he would have been called a pirate, a murderer and a seducer. Turnus has not committed any of these crimes. Does Aeneas call Turnus a 'criminal' because he has killed Pallas ? If killing a man on the battlefield were a crime and Turnus were to be called a criminal, then the insult recoils on Aeneas's head with all the more swiftness as he is now killing Turnus. It may be recalled that Turnus is not guilty of any such impropriety. He does not hector over the fallen pallas nor does he render his conduct reprehensible by using a scurrilous vocabulary for a Vanquished hero.

It seems unmannerly to find flaws in a work which Virgil did not live to polish and complete. But judged from the internal evidence of the book, it is demonstrably clear that Turnus has a code of honour which is definitely superior to that of Aeneas. He, together with Dido, provides the life-and-blood reality to Virgil's otherwise genteel epic. Virgil's story lacks the swing and energy of torrential Homes. His characters are almost all anemic except those whom Aeneas abandons or destroys. Dido is a living woman, gracious, subtle, passionate : Turnus is a simple and honest warrior. He has been betrayed by Latimus and doomed to an unmerited death by ridiculous gods. Both of them represent that heroic world in which people of honour, courage and endurance were held in the highest esteem. Compared with them he is dull, at times uninspiring, and has certain blemishes which call for unsavoury criticism. Perhaps it might have been one of the reasons why the poet himself was dissatisfied with his work. His self-appointed task was to create a man who should manifest in himself not only the virtues of the noblest Homeric hero but also the new idea of manhood which Augustus advocated and proclaimed as characteristically Roman. He worked for eleven years on this scheme. Undeniably his Aeneas has some noble qualities for which he deserves the highest accolabe of our praise. But great men reveal the sterling qualities of their head and heart under the trying situations of life. Accordingly, when we essay the character of Aeneas under the stress of love and war, we are inclined to say that his behaviour is not always irreproachable.

Dr. Ram Sewak Singh

R.K. NARAYAN'S *THE VENDOR OF SWEETS* : AN EXPLICATION

Mahatma Gandhi died in 1948, but his ideas continued to dominate the mind of politicians and social reformers till late in the 'fifties. It was in the wake of Indo-Pak hostilities and Chinese aggression that full implications of industrial development were realized. English regime spread over a century and a half had left India economically and morally depleted. Therefore when the question of forging a new India arose after independence in 1947 the perceptive leaders decided to put emphasis on agriculture to build rural economy and accelerate the process of industrialisation to catch up with the advanced countries. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. both lent helping hand by training our personnel for better handling of five-year plan projects as well as sending their own experts to guide our technicians. In technical matters India being underdeveloped and economically depleted had to look up to the west, whereas once India was set free from the colonial bondage the west looked up to the east for guidance in spiritual matters. Gandhi had been quite popular as an apostle of peace and non-violent freedom fighter, and had been hailed as the modern Buddha. It was a very interesting phenomenon : the west looking up to India for spiritual leadership and India depending on the west for technical advancement. But soon it was discovered that the young generation born and brought up in free India did not have any special preference for Gandhi's ideologies which were more abused by the followers than were outdated. In the name of Gandhi was practised corruption, and lessons of sincerity and sacrifice were thrown to winds. There prevailed a moral chaos : the old generation not ready to relinquish its privileged positions and the young generation not so popular with the masses to exericise any moral control over the destiny of the country. R K Narayan in his novel *The Vendor of Sweets* (1967) tries to recapture this moment of indicision and lack of leadership in the history of India. In his earlier novel *Waiting for the Mahatma* (1955) he had made an attempt at the translation of his memory of the pre-independence days into art when everyone in India had found themselves ready to die at the altar of freedom. The whole nation had stood as one man at the call of the Mahatma and set an example of supreme moral standards and sacrifice. But the same nation gradually discovered soon after independence that the followers of the Mahatma were morally depraved and involved in power-mongering. At this critical moment it was the demand of history that the nation disentangled itself from the idealogical quagmire and developed a new philosophy of life to meet the challenge of new times. The new outlook

had got to be western as Indian culture, was too outmoded to suit the purposes of an underdeveloped country. This was bound to create friction between the two views and spark off discussion as to whether the new was to be accepted at the cost of the traditional, or a convenient compromise was to be struck in order to retain the best of the traditional and introduce the new wherever necessary. It is this question that R.K. Narayan wants to answer in *The Vendor of Sweets.*

Jagan, a vendor of sweets had been a follower of Mahatma Gandhi and had courted imprisonment for the sake of his motherland like millions of others. He had tried to live like the Mahatma on nominal food, simple habits and the Gita. In the words of Narayan, 'He had the outlook of a disembodied soul floating above the grime of this earth. At fiftyfive his appearance was slight and elfish... His chin was covered with whitening bristles, as he shaved only at intervals, feeling that to view oneself daily in a mirror was an intolerable European habit. He wore a loose jibba over his dhoti, both made of material spun with his own hand; every day he spun for an hour, retained enough yarn for his sartorial requirements (he never possessed more than two sets of clothes at a time), and delivered all the excess in neat bundles to the local handloom committee in exchange for cash. Although the cash thus he earned was less than five rupees a month, he felt a sentimental thrill in receiving it, as he had begun the habit when Gandhi visited the town twenty years ago, and he had been commended for it. He ..shod his feet with thick sandals made out of the leather of an animal which had died of old age. Being a follower of Gandhi, he exclaimed, "I do not like to think that a living creature should have its throat cut for the comfort of my feet..." He had fitted only ten watt bulbs in the light sockets in order to benefit the human retina.' Even though his wife did not approve of his tanning the dead cattles hide for his shoes and his strict dependence on nature cure, she had succumbed to his oddities and died premature death leaving her son Mali to his care. For Jagan it was not difficult to live without his wife as he had simple food habits and believed in celibacy. With the the Gita in his hand he went on ordering his servants to look after the sweetshop, without bestirring himself except when it came to counting the cash after sales in the evening.

He had simplified his life to the extent of living without salt, sugar or anything that others cared for, and when he said, 'Conquer taste and you will have conquered the self' he put the net result of his experiments with life in one sentence. Contrasted with him is his cousin who enjoyed life at others cost without ever doing anything to maintain himself. A sort of liaison man he kept in touch with the town of Malgudi and knew what to do for whom. He was a patient listener to Jagan elaborating his interpretation of the Gita, and a confidant. Jagan's son Mail did not like his father's food habits and fussy nature. Without ever having bothered to think what the intentions and tendencies of his son were Jagan had been hoping that his son would step into his shoes. But one day Mali declared

he won't study any more. He had contempt for text-books and cared twopence for authority. Jagan could not follow the workings of his son's mind, but somehow he persuaded himself to help Mali become a writer if that was his ambtion. He had himself written a book on *Nature Cure and Natural Diet* and was sure it would rock the world once it was published by Nataraj Truth Printery. He was so much obsessed with his own discoveries of the efficacious medicinal effects of margosa leaves that he refused to see what marvels medical science has done to man, or what technological progress means for the world.

Mali came back to India after undergoing training in creative writing in the U.S.A. to set up a plant to manufacture machines for writing short stories. He was to be helped by his associates and his woman friend, Grace. Grace was intelligent, smart and enterprizing. She had resigned a thousand-dollar job for Mali's projects. She appreciated India and its surroundings, and wanted to give a helping hand to her lover Mali, as well as to her loving father-in-law Jagan, But as was bound to happen sooner or later she discovered to her chagrin that her lover depended for the success of his plans on his father's economic resources and that her father-in-law was too conservative a man to allow his son to squander his hard-earned money. She was nowhere. In case Mali's plans failed she was superfluous in India. But Jagan failed to understand why a woman needed anything else when her husband had a house and a steady income. Jagan's attitude is typically Indian where woman's role is subordinate to man's, whereas Mali educated in the west is diametrically opposed to this view and wants his wife to be true partner in his ambitions. To keep track of his wife was a pious duty of the husband, according to Jagan, whereas Mali found it foolish to subscribe to his father's outmoded ideas that 'wife must be with her husband whatever happens'. She had come to India to work with Mali on the project but Jagan found it hard to understand why she was to be rendered superfluous since 'this is a big house and she has enough work to keep her engaged for the whole day". Further what irked Mali most was his father's desire to make him a vendor of sweets. He had learnt valuable things in the United States at the cost of several thousand dollars, but was intrigued to think "why can't our country make use of my knowledge'. Jagan finally accepted his defeat : 'I have never been able to understand you at all. 'This creates tension and the father and the son live their own isolated lives in the same house. They lose contact with each other : Mali harping on his typewriter and Jagan on his spinning wheel, the two symbols of the two clashing generations.

The Vendor of Sweets presents the idealogical clash between the pre-independence and post-independence generations. Not only is Jagan to blame for his inability to understand the complicated new world, his son also fails to understand the genius of his country. Mali is young and

inexperienced and depends for his success on the collaboration of America, *i.e.*, Grace; but little does he realize that there is an inherent contradiction in his plans. What India needs today is a sound economy to meet the primary requirements of its teeming millions and not the short story writing automatic machines. There may be a sneaking suggestion that the five-year plans being over-ambitious cannot lead us anywhere. Jagan knows this and tells his cousin before going into the retreat, 'Open the shop at the usual hour and run it. *Mali will take charge of it in course of time* !' (Italics mine) And if his cousin met Grace 'to tell her that if she ever wants to go back to her country I will buy her a ticket. It is a duty we owe her. She was a good girl.'

'She was a good girl', Jagan knew, but his Indian conscience could not understand how unmarried she could live with her lover in the same room: 'She looked so good and virtuous; he had relied on her so much, and here she was living in sin and talking constantly about it all. What breed of creatures were these ! he wondered. They had tainted his ancient home. He had borne much from them...'. He looked upon himself as 'the polluter of family reputations', and no more necessary for his house : 'I have probably outlived my purpose in this house. At sixty, one is reborn and enters a new janma.' He left the house to enter a new life at the retreat near the crazy hair-dyer but not without taking the cheque book with him lest Mali should squander his money and disgrace himself. He is now indifferent to the world. May be chaos is necessary temporarily before real reconstruction starts. The young generation has been a fostered child, so it deserves some hardships to appreciate fully the meaning of hard-earned freedom. He was shocked to learn that his son had stolen money to pay for his trip to America, was living immoral life with an unmarried woman, and was thrusting his plans on his father without ever realising the latter's incapacity to shoulder his economic burden, and finally, was drinking liquor without his knowledge. He felt dazed and puzzled. He had not understood his son, but he was sure adversity and absence of Grace will teach him lessons. He said, 'A dose of prison life is not a bad thing. It may be just what he needs now.' Anyway, his cousin reminded him of the theory of indifference, and said, 'What is all your study of the Gita worth if you cannot keep your mind untouched by all this ? You yourself have explained to me that one should not identify oneself with objects or circumstances'. This did the trick, and Jagan once more felt superior to his circumstances. 'Equanimity is more important than anything else in life', reminded his cousin to him, and Jagan waited, 'That is what I am seeking but never attain'. How sad to think : We are blinded by our attachments'.........His mind was confused and vague, but his cousin cleared the fog by offering a practical solution to every problem that vexed his mind. He was a broken-hearted man and was not prepared to live this absurd life where every thing happening was contrary to his wishes. The roles were reversed with Jagan seeking

guidance from his cousin and finding in the white-bearded hair-dyer a savior. He was no more a peeping Tom for his son, a coward unable to alienate himself from his son's doings. He was a 'new personality', 'no longer the father of Mali, the maker of sweets, and gathererer of money each day. He was gradually becoming something else......'Yes, one enters a new life at the appointed time and it's foolish to resist this fact', was his ultimate decision.

Mali had grown for twenty years under the same roof of his father but how little they knew each other! There was an invisible barrier between them. Jagan remembered, he had never been harsh with Mali, and had always got him whatever he wanted. He had shown 'an almost maternal obsession about the boys feeding' and other requirements, but when it came to handing over his savings to his son he said, 'I don't want to give it to him to handle. It is not like my generation; we came under the spell of Gandhi and do no wrong'. It was this obsessive feeling that he could do no wrong that had made him impose the juice of bitter margosa leaves on the ailing wife, and later refuse to invest his money in his son's enterprising venture. His wife had yielded to his stubbornness but Mali did not, and Jagan himself had to hide in the retreat, maybe, with the cheque book in his bag.

Jagan is faced with two irksome problems : the loss of his authority over Mali despite his having been an ascetic, a devout Gandhian and a loving father to his son; and the corruption of his son by Grace and her country. Face to face with these problems he becomes reminiscential, and is lost in the glorious days of his youth. He had been an average student, but Gandhi's call to the Indian youth to shake off lethargy and fight for freedom and court arrest if necessary had relieved him from the boring class lectures. He had gone to jails after taking ceremonial leave—among cheering crowds. He had felt important and powerful like a prince while getting married to Ambika. But all this glory was gone, he was shorn of significance for the generation of Mali. He was superfluous, a fossil and he must leave the world to the care of those who were young and were the rightful owners. His sweet-bitter memories of married life with Ambika swept him off into a wondering mood as to why Grace had come to disgrace and corrupt his family. These pages decsribing the youth of Jagan make a fine reading as they mark a contrast with Jagan's present. He becomes sentimental, but girds up his loins to take a drastic step to disappear into the retreat even while his son was in jail. He had to suffer this in the same way as he had to suffer the sight of his dying wife writhing with pain. Before his foreign-qualified son he was nothing, and in the world where Grace and Mali talked casually about their sex relations, he had no constructive role to play. He would reprimand if not retaliate being a b eliever in non-violence, and retire but not surrender.

In whatever Jagan did was honesty reflected, and his preparedness to ,bnegate himself was an act of courage. But the keen eyes of the novelist lo not fail to see the contradiction Jagan is guilty of being too naive a ollower of the Mahatma. 'Conquer taste and you will have conquered very thing' was a dictum he had decided upon exclusively for himself; or others he had fine sweets made of pure ingredients. As he fussed ver what he should not eat, he fussed about what his son should eat. He ate to live', but one wonders why he regaled others with packet of sweets nade of pure stuff on nominal price ? He had inexplicable uneasiness oncerning any tax : 'If Gandhiji had said somewhere "Pay your sales ax uncomplainingly," he would have followed his advice'. He was honest the extent of keeping correct records of his sales till a fixed hour, but e could not help 'the cash that grew from out-of-hour sales at the counter nd filled the smaller jug .. like weeds flourishing in his backyard'. In he same way he believed in non-violence and detested to think that 'a ving creature should have its throat cut for my feet' but he suffered the houlish appearance of his wife with silly towel knotted around her head nd her dishevelled hair' suffering from splitting headache, but would not ive aspirin. He was so adamant that he saw her dead but did not relent nd change his mind as to the property of margosa, which in spite of its itterness, he called Amrita, the ambroisal that kept the gods alive.

But these contradictions were just insignificant so long as he was a roud follower of Gandhi. It was only after he had faced confrontation ith Mali that he had realized that his theories were no more unquestionble. Although he took the cheque book in his bag and retired to the etreat when he was badly needed by his son, he should be admired for is realization to have outlived his purpose and entering on his own the econd janma at the age of sixty leaving the stage for the younger generaion to grope its way and fend for itself. Irony being the main tool of .K. Narayan he presents no solution to the problem : Young, smart and nodern but inexperienced Mali has to learn from hardship, no doubt, ut Jagan too has to discard his arrogant attitude and appreciate the mands of his son's generation. Merely by sending Grace back to merica he would not be able to control Mali. Mali and Grace are more an partners in business deal intimate friends and their friendship would ow into marital union. Jagan has to accept Grace as his daughter-in-law nd save his son from ruination and help the new generation to come to own. India in the 'sixties awaits the return of Jagan from the retreat, ut for the present it is all agog with curiosity and suspense.

Dr. V. Rama Murthy

ROMANTICISM : A RETROSPECT

Since Irving Babbit's monumental attack on romanticism there have been both historical and value studies of the concept of romanticism. In the historical approach the critic has traced romanticism to Rousseau and Goethe. In the value study he has located it in Plato, Dante and even Jesus and Buddha, All these (including Babbit's attack) are the result of a long, though unsuccessful, attempt at isolating that elusive thing called 'romantic'.

Most of Babbit's strictures on romanticism are relevant-especially on occasions such as when he disapproves of Keats's cryptic identification of truth with beauty (Helen was beautitul but neither good nor true) and also when he calls Wordsworth's glorification of child as an abyss of absurdity (such a child is highly improbable not to say 'impossible' child). But one sees the height of babbitry in the comment he makes on Socrates. "Socrates himself was", he says, "perhaps, needlessly unconventional and also inclined to paradox-as when he suggested to the jury who tried him that as an appropriate punishment he should be supported at the public expense in the Prytaneum." Babbit would have considered in the same way Jesus Christ to be a needlessly unconventional man. More than ten times in his *Rousseau and Romanticism* he revels in accusing Rousseau of dodging the duties of a father. In all this Babbit displays not a sense of adherence to convention but a virtual slavery to it. For men like Babbit the most worshipful words are "decorum", "propriety", "tradition", "sanity", "sophistication", "moderation" etc.

If Babbit traces the theme of courtesan rehabilitated through love to Rousseau, defenders of romanticism have traced it back to Jesus Christ. The story of the Biblical prostitute would have been quite different if Christ had been as conventional as Babbit would have him. The name of Buddha has been very often mentioned by Babbit for his disparagement of romantics like Blake but it is well known that Buddha himself is one of the most unconventional of thinkers. He rejected the Vedic tradition and preached what he realised out of his own hard efforts.

A by-product of a discussion of this type is that in the ultimate analysis romanticism and classicism are not mutually contradictory. What is truly romantic is also truly classic. The distinction ususally made between them often exists on a much lower level than the one supposed by the critic. Great poets can never be classified either as romanticists or classicists, or by any other name. The distinction between the two

vanishes in artists like Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare. They seem to remain above all 'isms'. T.E. Hulume makes a stupendous effort and fails miserably in classifying Shakespeare as a classicist.[1] In the same way some critics have tried to dub Dante as a Christian romantic.

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to define or conceptualise what is qua romanticism. All attempts at this have failed. But one general and essential characteristic of romanticism seems to be its rejection of all that takes man away from his natural self. The romantic character rebelled against cant, hypocrisy and artificiality. It tried to overcome what was stale and staganant. It hated lifeless convention.

The romantics disapproved of conventional ideas of morality. Whatever stood in the way of their inner vision was considered immoral by them. Marlowe's Faustus had to struggle from under the repression of medieval orthodoxy and Goethe's Faust had to attack the dead certainties of the 18th century Enlightement. What was thought of as the lustful longing of the hero became sublime love. Coleridge and Wordsworth, finding the Church of England obsolete, thought of leaving for America and settling down there. Along with four others, they thought, they should engage a woman to accompany each one of them and these women should be common to the whole.[2]

If Wordsworth resented the monarchical and aristocratic government, Shelley looked forward to a moral, social and political anarchy. Babbit maintains that romanticism leads to anarchic individualism which will destroy civilisation.[3] But Shelley's advocacy of anarchism has its echo in the writings of Gandi, Thoreau, Marx, Tolstoy and others. Also Shelley's plea for moral anarchy finds support in the works of Plato. Dante and Thomas Aquinas. Revolution and romanticism have been, from the very beginning, interdependent.

Romantics, being always warm-blooded, hated the primacy of reason over feeling. To them Aristotle's 'golden mean' is nothing but 'golden meanness'. Sanity is, in the words of Emerson, "the hobgoblin of small minds." "I almost believe," wrote Friederich Schlegel, "that a wise self-limitation and moderation of mind is not more necessary than the inward, ever restless, almost voracious participation in life, and a certain feeling of sanctity of an abounding fulness."[4] "Mere sanity," says William James, "is the most philistine and at bottom unessential of man's attributes." Poe, a descandant of romanticism, said : I became insane with long intervales of horrible sanity.

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1. T.E. Hulme, *Speculations*, (Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 119.
2. See E.M. Todd's *Politics and the Poet*, (Methuen and Co., 1957), p. 103.
3. Irving Babbit, *Rousseau and Romanticism*, (Meridian Books, N:Y., 1955), p. 370.
4. Quoted by A.O. Lovejoy in *The Great Chain of Being*, (Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 305.

The remantics hated the pragmatic ways of the society and withdrew themselves into the night world, the 'anti-social' world. They intoxicated themselves with drugs and drinks to get a peep into the subrational world. "Man being reasonable," said Byron, "must get drunk. The best of life is but intoxication." They turned their minds to occultism, delirium, ghosts, nightmares, witchcraft, reverie, vampirism and other eerie and exciting phenomena. Beauty with some proportion of strangeness attracted them. Their poetry became consequently a bizarre universe of traumatic fixations, hypnosis, abulia, hedonism with a restless curiosity. Underlying all this, however, there was an itching for the infinite, an eternal search for the absolute. Their earthly longings were transmuted into a mystic vision of the after life. Eros was transformed into agape, the profane into the sacred.

The romantics have rejuvenated worn-out religion with humanism. Besides the macabre and the diabolical we find in their work the ideals of liberty, of humanity, of justice and of purity· Croce called their activity "a cosmic contemplation". If the choice were to be between religion and humanism they would choose humanism. Prometheus, Faust, Manfred, Ahab and even Satan symbolise the humanist struggle against a blind and merciless Fate. Prometheus helped mankind with fire and material comforts and Satan helped it with the fruit of knowledge—a more valuable thing than paradise. All the 'glorious rascals','beloved vagabonds', and 'sublime convicts' found in the romantic poetry are products of a profound sense of pity at human suffering. Even the godless communism, often called political romanticism, has at its basis the same profound humanitarian ideals.

In the *Birth of Tragedy* Nietzche has concluded that only as an aesthetic phenomenon is life eternally justified. The romantic hero also is an artist, a dedicated youth, exploring abstract aesthetic principles which represent a super reality, He lives dangerously and on the heights. He is an extremist who pays any price, even life itself, for his object. To him the devil is compromise. He does not shrink from realising the prohibited reaches of experience. His love of death is a sign of the youthfulness of his heart. For the thoughts of death occur more readily to young people than to older people. The romantic is also a great lover of reverie and dream. He loves Nature. That is what makes his poetry wild and exotic. "It is on the mountains, says Rousseau "in the depths of forests, on deserted islands that nature reveals her most potent charms."

Some critics have erroneously thought of romanticism as an anti-thesis of realism. It is not so. Realism has often been the complement of romanticism. We have such romantic realists like Byron, Pushkin, Balzac, Flaubert and T. S. Eliot. The poetry of the romantic idealists like Wordsworth and Shelley may be lacking in what Aldous Huxley has called the 'whole truth' (Arnold's 'absolute reality') but the

poetry of the romantic realists contains more than ordinary idealism. Babbit also seems to attack only that romanticism which has been reduced to an attitude. "My quarrel," he says, "is with the aesthete who assumes an apocalyptic pose and gives forth as a profound philosophy what is at best only a holiday or week-end view of existence."[5] A modern expression of this kind of attitudinizing can be found in Eliot's call to his fellow man to revive their faith in the Christian dogmas instead of the Charistian ideals !

George Steiner in his *Death of Tragedy* argues that romanticism has killed the tragedy. But in works like "Moby Dick", the plays of O'Neill and some Absurd plays romanticism lends a powerful support to tragedy. The failure of the English Romantics in producing a tragedy should be attributed rather to the shadow of Shakespeare than to romanticism.

George Steiner tries to relate what he considers as blemishes in *Faust* to Geothe's romanticism. This again speaks of Steiner's unconscious preference for the romantic pessimism of the Greek playwrights as against the romantic optimism of Goethe. Irving Babbit commits a similar mistake when he says:" When Euripides sides imaginatively with the frenzy of Dionysus as he does in his *Bacchae* though ostensibly preaching moderation we may affirm that he is falling away from what is best in the spirit of Hellas and revealing a kinship with the votaries of the God Whirl."[6] It is precisely Euripides's breaking away from Dionysus that has hastened the death of tragedy. All these accusations have been made against romanticism because the critics have mistaken what is a quality for a concept.

Most of the critics have inadvertently thought of romanticism as a concept or a philosophy. There is a philosophy of tragedy but there is no philosophy of romanticism. There cannot be a philosophy of romanticism. Romanticism is an elusive quality, at the most a temperament. It is like the perfume in a sweetmeat. That is why one finds it in comedy and tragedy, optimism and pessimism, in realism, symbolism and surrealism. It is also there in one's political as well as one's social life. It cannot be described in such neat phrases as 'daydream', 'Whirl', 'defiance of God', 'sentimentalism' etc. It is there in so many places and it is not there in so many other places and wherever it is there, a maked and live bosom throbs there in agony and in ecstasy.

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5. Irving Babbit. *Rousseau and Romanticism*, p. 289.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

LINGUISTICS

Jag Deva Singh

VERBAL FORMS IN HINDI

Verbs in Hindi are defined morphologically. The class of words that ends in one of the following inflectional suffixes is called verbs. The suffixes are :

I	ũ	ẽ
	e	o
	e	ẽ
II	iye	
III	na	
IV	t-	

Besides, the bare verbal stem is also used as a complete form in two environments : (i) as an imperative form for second person singular and (ii) as perfect participle where it takes gender-number suffix.

The above suffixes are added directly to the stem. Forms from the stem kaṭ-"to cut" will be as follows :

I	kaṭ-ũ	kaṭ-ẽ
	kaṭ-e	kaṭ-o
	kaṭ-e	kaṭ-ẽ
II	kaṭ-iye	
III	kaṭ-na	
IV	kaṭ-t-a, kaṭ-t-e, kaṭ-t-i, kaṭ-t-ī	
V	kaṭ	
VI	kaṭ-a, kaṭ-e, kaṭ-i, kaṭ-ī	

The suffixes of set (I) show distinction of person and number. There are three persons besides honorific/ap/and two numbers, singular and plural. There are, however, no overt elements in the suffixes to mark out these distinctions individually. The suffix in set (II) is employed for honorific/ap/ which otherwise takes third person plural forms. The suffix of set (III) is used for second person plural only. The suffix in set (IV) and the bare stem in (VI) admit gender/number marking suffixes. Forms in sets (I) and (II) are optionally followed by the auxiliary/g-/ which adds gender-number suffix. In case of (I) the auxiliary is inflected like an adjective to agree in number and gender with the subject. But in case of (II), the contrast in gender and number is neutralised. It occurs in its invariant form /g-a/. A few examples are : kaṭ-ũ g-a 'I shall cut'; we kaṭ-ẽ g-i 'They (fem.) will cut' ; tum kaṭ-o g-e 'You (pl.) will cut' ; ap (səb) aiye g-a 'Please, (all of you) do come".

It may be pointed out that certain stems are defective in inflection. e.g. /h-/ 'to be' is inflected only for (I), /sək-/ 'To be able' is not used as bare stem for imperative. /sək-/ also does not occur as initial member in a compound or complex construction (to be explained shortly). Nor does it occur as an independent form.

TO SUM UP: We have so far described verbal forms that are formed (i) by adding inflectional suffixes directly to the stems, *e.g.*, kaṭ-ũ etc. and (ii) by adding inflectional suffixes which in turn are necessarily followed by gender-number suffix and are inflected like adjectives, *e.g.*, kaṭ-a, kaṭ-t-e, *etc.*

We come across in the language such complex forms as/bhag jaya kərta hæ/ '(He) generally runs away'. To analyse such forms two lines of approach suggest to us. One, these may be treated as complex forms constituted of two or more inflected forms and syntactically behaving as one unit. The task of the linguist may be to describe them individually and state restrictions on their co-occurrence. For instance, the form given above may be analysed as constituted of four inflected forms. The first position is occupied by bare stem /bhag/, second and third positions are occupied by /ja-ya/and/kər-t-a/perfect and imperfect participial forms respectively from stems /ja-/ and /kər/ and fourth by an inflected form from stem /h-/ 'to be'.

The other line of approach is from the point of view of the inflectional suffix which is taken by the final member in the chain. The whole construction is, thus, treated as one inflected form from a compund stem or a phrase. A parallel example from the English language may be cited, namely, 'the king of England's hat', where the possessive suffix is construed with the whole phrase and not with the final member only.

Our preference is to treat such constructions as single infiected forms for the simple reason that such a treatment reveals the structure more transparently. Thus Hindi verbal stems will fall into two types, *viz.*, simple and compound Simple stems may be primary or derivative—derived from primary stems, called verbal roots, or formed from nouns, pronoun (only one) and adjectives. Compound stems, on the other hand, will be found to be constituted of two or more members characterized by such features of composition as internal juncture (to be marked by space in writing here), occurrence of non-final members with certain inflectional suffixes, their capacity of interruption by certain particles and having varying restrictions on their co-occurrence both among stems and suffixes.

The choice of non-final members is limited to a very small number of stems. These are given below, although no attempt has been made to exaust the list. Only their primary meanings are indicated here.

a-	come
uṭh-	rise
kər-	do
cəl-	go
cah-	desire
cuk-	pay off
choṛ-	abandon
ja-	go
ḍal-	throw
de-	give
dekh-	see
dıkha-	show
pəṭək-	throw
pəṛ-	fall
pa-	get
bən-	become
bæṭh-	sit
mər-	die
mar-	kill
mıl-	meet
rəkh-	keep
rəh-	live
ləg-	attach oneself to
le-	accept
sək-	be able
h-	be
ho-	become

The non-final members occur either as bare stem, with/without gender-number suffix or with imperfect participial or infinitive suffix. The imperfect suffix takes gender-number suffix to show agreement with the subject or the object as the case may be. The infinitive also takes gender-number suffix in certain cases while in other environments there is neutralisation of gender and number.

It may be noted that the main meaning of the stem is embodied in the initial member which position can be occupied by any simple stem except /h-/ and /sək-/. The succeeding members merely augment or modify the meaning contained in the preceding chain. The non-initial members lose their primary meanings in the construction.

Co-occurrence among members in a compound verbal stem is determined by two factors : (i) semantic compatibility and (ii) suffixal harmony. Semantic compatibility is a matter of usage and not a structural feature. It has to be recorded in a lexicon. As an illustration /ro pəṛ-/ and /bol uṭh-/ are accepted as semantically compatible while

/*so pəṛ-/ and /*dekh- uṭh-/ are not. Thus we shall seek suffixal harmony omong those members only which are semantically compatible. To illustrate suffixal harmony in /ro pəṛ-/ is between the bare stem/ -na : any suffix. /ro pəṛ-ũ, ro pəṛ-e, ro pər-t-a, ro pəṛ/ are acceptable while /*ro-ya pəṛ-ũ, *rot-a pəṛ-e *ro-t-a pəṛ-a/are not. Just to illustrate the problem and how it can be organized we shall give below a statement regarding compound stems involving two members. A detailed treatment of the problem will be attemped elsewhere. (Verb Morphology and Dhatupaṭh of Hindi).

I		II	
Stem	Suffix	Stem	Suffix
piṭ-, mar-, kha-. bəna- dəl-, kutər-, etc.	bare stem	cuk-, choṛ-, ja-, ḍal-, de-, pa-, bæṭh-, le-, sək-	any suffix
ro-, dɔṛ-, hə̃s-. cəl- uḍ-, khãs-, etc.	bare stem	cuk-, pəṛ-, pa-, le-, sək-	any suffix
any stem	bare stem + -a	kər-	any suffix
any stem	bare stem + -e	cəl-, ja-, rəh-	any suffix
any stem	bare stem + -a/-e/ -i	cəl-, ja-, rəh-	any suffix
any stem	-t -a /-e/-i	cəl-, ja-, rəh-	any suffix
any stem	-t -e	bən-	-t-, (-a)
any stem	-n -a	cah	any suffix
any stem	-n -e	de-, pa-, ləg-	any suffix
any stem	-n -a /-e/ -i	cah-, h-, ho-	any suffix

Examples :

kha cuk-a 'has eaten'
mar ḍal-o 'kill (him)'
ja sək-t-e 'if (they) could go'
phæ̃k choṛe 'just throw away'
kəṭ cuk-a 'has been cut'
dɔṛ pəṛ-e '(they) ran up'
pəḍh-a kər 'you should read'
bəḍh-e cəl-o 'go on advancing'
pəḍh-t-i rəh-t-i 'if (she) had continued studying'
ga-ye ja-t-i 'if (she) had continued singing'
uṭh-te bən-t-a to 'if it had been proper to get up......'.
bhag-n-e do 'let (him) run'
ja-n-a cah-t-e 'if they wanted to go...'
khərid-n-i hæ '...have to purchase'
am a-n-e hõ ge 'the mangoes may be coming'

We may give a few examples of compound stems involving three or more members. It may however be noted that here choice to fill non-initial positions is gradually limited to fewer and fewer stems. The final positions, for instance, is generally filled by one of the stems /kər-, cah-, ja-, de-, pər, rəh-, səh, ho-/, /kər-, ho-/ and /ho-/ in three, four and five member constructions respectively.

Stems having three members

tær sək-t-a h-æ 'can swim'
kər ḍal-e hõ g-e 'might have been done (pl.)'
kha le-n-e dij-ɪe 'let him eat'
ũgh-n-e ləg gə-ye 'began to doze'
bo-ya ja-t-a h-æ 'is sown'
a-ya cah-t-i ho g-i 'may be wishing to come'
kha-t-e reh-t-e h-æ̃ 'go on eating (pl.)'

Stems having four members

kər dɪ-ya gə-ya hæ- 'must have been completed'
pɪl-a dɪ-ya ker-t-a h-ũ 'I generally offer it for a drink''
səta-ye j-a reh-e h-æ̃ 'are being tormented'
bo-ya ja sək-t-a ho g-a 'could be sown probably'
kha-t-i ja rəh-i h-æ̃ '(they fem.) go on eating'
ləṛ-t-a rəh-t-a a-ya h-æ 'has been usually fighting'
kha liya kərte hõ ge 'may have been eating'
kha lene dɪya kəro 'Allow him to eat'

Stems having five members

pɪl-a dɪ-ya ja-t-a rəh-a h-æ 'has been offered as a drink from time immemorial'

kha le-n-e dɪ-ya a kər-t-a h-ũ 'I generally allow them to eat'

ʊbəl ja-n-e dɪ-ya kər-o 'let it boil'

phæ̃kwa diya jata rəha ho ga 'might have been made to be thrown away ever since'

phæ̃k dɪya ja cuka ho ga/tha 'must have been thrown away'.

K. Doraswamy

TYPOLOGY AND LEVELS OF LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE

Of the two major methods of comparison of languages—(1) the Genetic, and (2) the Typological—the genetic comparison has been very popular among linguists, because of its rigorous procedures and brilliant results obtained in Indo-European and a few other families of languages. It is, of course, 'the only method which is at once non-arbitrary, exhaustive and unique'.[1] It is non-arbitrary because there is no choice of criteria in this comparison leading to different and equally fruitful results. The only criterion adopted is to set up regular and systematic correspondences between languages on the basis of 'sound-meaning' resemblances of linguistic forms, in order to establish the genetic relationship existing between them. Exhaustiveness means that all languages can be grouped, by this method, into some family or other. By uniqueness is meant that no language can be assigned to more than one group.

However, genetic method has its limitations. It has not produced successful results in the case of languages for which recorded materials are not available. The prehistory of languages and also their reconstruction, beyond a particular point in time become more and more speculative and vague. The significant drawback of this method is that it does not compare the languages as wholes, *i.e.* the structures of languages in all their aspects; the comparison is partial and is limited to a part in phonology and a section in morphology and vocabulary. The mutual influences of languages (belonging to either same or different families) or of dialects, and the resultant change in structure of later languages from those of the earlier ones, cannot be properly interpreted by this method.

Typological comparison, on the other hand, has not earned the famed place the genetic method has occupied in linguistic studies. This does not mean that typological comparison is inferior, and efforts to continue research in this direction would be fruitless. It is true that linguists have yet to develop 'universally valid and acceptable criteria'[2] for a proper typological classification of languages. But it would be poor judgement to compare and assess the merits of the two methods of comparison, since the goals of the two disciplines are entirely different. Linguistic typology aims at classifying languages on the basis of structural similarities

1. Joseph H. Greenberg : Essays in Linguistics—Genetic Comparison.
2. Maurice Leroy : The main trends in modern linguistics ; Linguistic typology.

observed at various levels of linguistic structure without any regard for genetic relationships established on historical principles, or for areal affinities between languages spoken in a geographically contiguous area. Depending upon the innumerable variety of structural features present in languages, the choice of criteria for comparison becomes arbitrary. The nature of structural features being different at different levels of linguistic structure, the choice of criteria and the resulting classification differ from level to level. This implies that the number of possible classifications for any language would be too many and unmangeable. But the criteria, to be chosen at any level, must be of universal nature so that they would be applicable to a number of languages. 'The most useful typology is one which provides a maximum number of such universals.'[3]

As pointed out earlier, typological (structural) comparison can be done at any stratum of linguistic structure. Much work has, indeed, been accomplished by reputed scholars in the domain of phonology;[4] but the study, though reveals the manifold types of phonological systems of languages, has not been very useful. It is in this area that linguists tend to diverge in the criteria of relevance, and, as a result the number possible classifications for any language would be too many to serve any useful purpose.

We would like to make certain comments at this juncture. The main objective of this paper is to point out that relatively more useful typological classification can only be done at higher levels (at the level of morphemics and above) of linguistic structure. Illustrations, in support of this fact, are produced from Kannada and Hindi which belong to two different genetic groups. Through more divergences are observed in the morophological structure of these languages, with many structural features common to both of them at the level of syntax, the two languages appear to have sprung from a common source.

Language, as we know, is a complex system of 'Content-Expression' structures. This system enables one to produce 'an infinite range of speech events corresponding to the conditions imposed by thought processes'.[5] Correlated with the thought processes languages have universal properties or features which are expressed through a system of linguistic units,[6] and they are organized in a variety of patterns. The

3. Joseph H. Greenberg (Ed.) : Universals of language; Introduction.

4 Pioneering work in this field was done by the linguist prince N.S. Trubetzkoy. The other reknowned scholars are Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles F. Hockett.

5. Noam Chomsky : Cartesian Linguistics ; Creative aspect of language use.

6. The universal features are formal universals which belong to the content plane, and they refer to the grammatical relations. Grammemes would be a suitable term for them. The linguistic units are their representations at the expression plane, and they are listed in the lexicon.

linguistic universals corresponding to the universal patterns of thought, converge together to form a few fundamental structures at sentence level of languages. In other words, languages-genetically related or not-share many similar linguistic features at higher levels where the content aspect of language is predominant. The higher the level, the more dominant is the content aspect, and the simiarities of features are also many. That is why the basic structure of all languages at the sentence level appear to be almost same. The criteria of relevance are just very few, and languages can be grouped into fewer types. At the lower level of syntax where a variety of patterns with linguistic units are possible, the content aspect of language being more dominant than the expression aspect, the range of criteria for selection is wider, and, as a result, languages fall into a few more types, or belong to sub-types of the major types. At the morphological level, the content and expression aspects of language being equally dominant, the range for the choice of criteria is far wider than at the level of syntax, and languages, therefore, fall into several types of classes. It can also be said, that languages at this level are further sub-divisions of the types at the above level. At the level of phonology where the linguistic units are meaningless, though meaning differentiating representations, the content aspcct is almost nil, and only the expression aspect of language dominates. The choice of criteria for classification is so divergent that it would be difficult to group any two languages together. It is because, the linguistic universals found at this level are not-'formal', but 'substantive'[7] ones which are instances of a determined set. Even though the types of languages could be set up on the basis of the systems of vowels, consonants or syllables, they do not serve any meaningful purpose in linguistic studies. It is, thus, seen that typological comparison of languages will be more meaningful at higher levels of linguistic structure where the content aspect of language is predominant.

Morphological structure of languages is a profitable domain for typological studies. Many morphological features appear to be widespread among the languages of the world. Those common features shared by many languages turn out to be typologically significant and they form the basis for classification. Typological classification of languages along these lines began early in the 19th century. Languages were classified on the basis of word formation as belonging to "Isolating, Agglutinative and Inflectional" types. But the work of earlier scholars fell into disrepute due to their evolutionary and evaluatory views about the nature of language.[8] It was in the twenties of this century there was a major break-

7. Noam Chomsky : Aspects of the theory of syntax : Linguistic universals.

8. A. Von Schlegel (1808) believed that ihe affixing languages were the speech of the primitives, and existed in the early peried of human history; whereas the inflectional languages were those spoken by civilzed people, being developed from the earlier stage.

through in typological work. The credit of establishing morphological typology on a sound and firmer basis goes to Edward Sapir.[9] The scheme developed by him is definitely very exhaustive and more objective. Though Sapir has accepted the same types of classification of earlier scholars, the distinctive criteria have been defined with sufficient clarity and formal rigor. In selecting the criteria for classification, Sapir took into account both the expression and the content aspects of language, and devised the scheme in such a way that none of them would be ignored for the sake of the other.

In recent years Sapir's work has further been improved by Greenberg.[10] The scheme proposed by him is mainly the same as that of Sapir's with certain modifications. In place of Sapir's formulations based on intuition an attempt is made by Greenberg to be more scientific by 'defining each feature involved in his classification in terms of a ratio of two units each defined with sufficient formal rigor, and by a calculation of a numerical index based on relative frequency of these units over stretches of texts.'[11] He has also taken into account certain significant features which were implied in Sapir's scheme. Thus, Greenberg has developed a set of ten indices which would take care of all types of morphemes, their various patterns of combination, the technique of synthesis in word-formation, and the syntactic relation of words, in order to classify the languages of the world.

Below are given index values[12] for Hindi and Kannada in order to show how different the structures of these languages are at the morphological level, whereas at syntactic level the features of similarities group them into a single type. The index values for Sanskrit and Old Tamil are also given with a view to compare Hindi with Sanskrit, from which it is originated, and to compare Kannnda with Old Tamil which is a good representation of Dravidian from which Kannada has branched of. These comparisons will enable us to interpret the structural changes of later languages which have developed from the earlier ones.

A. Schleicher, influenced by Drawin's evlolution theory and by Hegelian dialectic, considered that languages, like organic matters, had their birth, growth and decay. He interpreted that types (of languages) as so many phases of development in the history of language.

9. E. Sapir : Language; ch. VI. Linguistic structures.

10. Joseph H. Greenberg : A Quantitative approach to a morphological typology of languages; IJAL. Vol. 26-3.

11. A.L. Kroeber : Typological Indices; Ranking of Languages IJAL. Vol., 26-3.

12. The index values for the ten indices, as proposed by Greenberg are worked out for these four languages taking stretches of texts consisting of about thousand words for each of them.

The values for Kannada and Hindi are taken from the unpublished M.A. thesis of Mr. J.S. Kulli who worked under my supervision at Annamalai University in 1966-67. The index values for Sanskrit and old Tamil are calculated by the author.

TABLE 1

	INDEX	Sanskrit	Hindi	Kannada	Old Tamil
1.	Morpheme index/ Synthesis M/W	2.68	1.72	2.71	2.54
2.	Index of Agglutination/Technique of Synthesis A/J	0.11	0.09	0.28	0.32
3.	Root index/Compounding R/W	1.46	1.13	1.27	1.09
4.	Derivation index D/W	0.64	0.29	0.21	0.22
5.	Gross Inflexion Index I/W	0.91	0.59	1.02	1.06
6.	Prefixal index P/W	0.18	0.08	0.03	—
7.	Suffixal index S/W	1.17	0.71	1.14	1.21
8.	Word order/isolation index O/N	0.15	0.29	0.18	0.19
9.	Pure inflexional/relational index PI/N	0.48	0.39	0.42	0 41
10.	Concordial index C/N	0.38	0.24	0.18	0.16

From the point of view of Sapir's classification and supported by Greenberg's index values, Hindi belongs to 'Analytic type' with less of synthesis of morphemes. On an average a word has less than two morphemes, and in the language monomorphemic words tend to occur more. (The percentage of monomorphemic forms being 37%). Kannada belongs to the 'Agglutinative Type', in which the number morphemes per word is more than two, but because of the easier isolatability of morphemes (simpler morphophonemics) it has more value for agglutination index. Compound forms are lesser in Hindi than in Kannada. Kannada abounds more in verb compounds than nominal. The same is true of Hindi. Since inflectional index is more in Kannada than in Hindi, it is natural for Kannada to have lower value for word order and concordial indices.

When we compare Hindi with Sanskrit, we notice that Hindi, though originating from Sanskrit, has become less synthetic and less fusional; *i.e.*,

the language tends to be more analytic.[13] Compounding, and inflectional categories have been reduced to a minimum, but word order is becoming significant.

Kannada, on the other hand, has maintained the same kind of agglutinative structure as of early Dravidian, of which Old Tamil is a good representative. Due to the influence of Sanskrit, Sanskrit compound forms have been much used in Kannada.

Typological work at the level of syntax has very little been done so far. Acceptable schemes and procedures for a useful typological classification have yet to be developed. Here again it is Greenberg who has given us some direction to carry out research in this domain. With his deep insight and imagination he has developed the concept of 'Basic order Typology'[14] which forms the basis of typological classification at the syntactic level.

Greenberg bases his classification on the following three assumptions. He arrived at these assumptions working on thirty languages, most of which are genetically unrelated and geographically non-contiguous.

1. Syntactic units such as Subject, Object and Verb are universal features found in all languages. Though languages may have variant orders of these units in sentences, a *single dominant order* persists in each of them. Of the six mathematically possible orders with these three units, only three of them, with the exception of those in which object occurs before the subject, are found to occur as dominant orders in almost all languages of the world. In other words, the three dominant orders are those in which the subject precedes the object. On this basis the languages of the world fall into three major types, VSO, SVO and SOV.

2. The second assumption is about the linking elements—the prepositions as against the Post-Positions. They represent the relationship existing between various syntactic units (words). These have very close correlation with the dominant orders above mentioned.

3. The third assumption is about the adjective and its relative position with the noun it qualifies. The adjective and noun construction is also very closely tied up with the dominant orders.

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13. In this respect the development in Hindi structure is parallel to some modern European languages like, English, French, Spanish, etc. They too tend to be more analytic than the highly synthetic and fusional languages of early Indo-European stock.

14. Joseph H. Greenberg : Universals of Language; Ch. Basic Order Typology.

On the basis of these three dimensions languages can be classified into twelve types as follows :

	I VSO	II SVO	III SOV
Po—, A-N			
Pr—, A-N			
Po—, N-A			
Pr—, N-A			

Research work carried out by Greenberg on several languages revealed that languages having VSO and SOV as dominant orders belong to extreme types. That is, the dominant VSO order is strongly correlated with the prepositions as linking elements, and has nouns followed by adjectives. Languages with dominant SOV order have only Post-Positions as linking elements, and have adjectives followed by nouns. Languages with SVO as their dominant order are mostly prepositional, and have predominantly nouns followed by adjectives. However, languages belonging to VSO type are not very common in the world.

Typological classification, based on the systematic order of the above mentioned syntactic units, is refered to by Greenberg as 'Basic order Typology.'

'From the point of view of 'Basic order Typology' Hindi and other Indo-Aryan languages, and Kannada and other Dravidian languages belong to the third type in which the dominant order is Subject-Object-Verb. Both Kannada and Hindi have post-positions.[15] but not prepositions. In the qualifier—qualified constructions both have adjective followed by noun.[16]

EX.,

		S O V
SOV :	Hin.	*Mohən* Gopal ko *kitab deta hæ*
	Kan.	*Mūhananu* Gōpālanige *Pustaka Koḍuttāne.*
		'Mohan gives the book to Gopal'.
PO :	Hin.	Us-*ko* yəh kitab dedo
	Kan.	avan-*ige* ī pustaka koḍu
		'Give this book to him'.
A-N :	Hin.	Wəh *accha ləṛka* hæ
	Kan.	avanu *ḷḷeya ohuḍuga*
		'He is a good boy'.

15. The case suffixes of Kannada are here equated as post-positions.

16. Demonstratives and numerals are also Considered as adjectives.

Hin. We *acchi kitabẽ* hæ.
Kan. avu *oḷḷeya* pustakagaḷu.

It is fascinating to note that though Kannada and Hindi belong to two genetically different families, their major syntactic structures appear to be similar. Variations are observed only in the selection of morpheme classes and sub-syntactic grammatical categories. As for example, adjectives in Hindi agree in Gender-number with the following nouns; whereas no such concord exists in Kannada. Variations of this kind group languages into sub-classes of the major type.

Languages having SOV as dominant order do not have any change in word order between declarative and interrogative sentences. Kannada and Hindi, as already mentioned, belong to this type.

Interrogative sentences are of two types.

(1) Sentences which require yes or no answers.

(2) Sentences with interrogative words.

In yes or no answer type of interrogative sentences, interrogation is signalled either by the use of particles or by intonation. Kannada makes use of particles, while Hindi, the intonation.

e. g., Kan : nīnu allige hōgidde-yā ?

Hindi : (Kya) $\overset{2}{\text{tum}}$ wəhā̃ gəye $\overset{3}{\text{the}}$ ↑
"Did you go there"?

In the case of interrogative sentences of the second type, the structure in Kannada and Hindi is the same. The word order between declative and interrogative sentences does not change. The interrogative words are substituted in places of those which are the answers, and they always occur before the verb.

e. g., Kan : *yāru* ūrige hōgiddāre ?
Hindi : *kɔn* śəhər gəya hæ ?
"*who* has gone to town ?"
Kan : nimma aṇṇa *ellige* hōgiddāre ?
Hindi : tumhara bhayi *kəhā̃* gəya hæ ?
"*where* is your brother gone ?"
Kan : avanu *ēnu* tinda ?
Hindi : usne *kya* khaya ?
"*what* did he eat ?"

Languages having SOV order appear to be very rigid in their behaviour. Since the verb almost always occurs in the final position of sentences, it follows that all adverb modifiers precede the verb. The conditional, purposive or volitional constructions, (subordinate clause) having subordinate verb, occur before constructions having the main verb. This is true of both Kannada and Hindi; *e.g.*,

Hindi (yədi) mæ śəhər *gəya* to tumhare liye kitab *le aũgá.*

Kan. nānu pēṭege *hōdare*, ninage pustaka *taruttēne.*
"If I go to town, I will get you the book".
(Compare the structure of Kannada and Hindi with that of English. We find that the order of subordinate and main clause in English is changeable.)

Hindi. Uske *bulane* pər, mujhe *jana pəṛa*
Kan. avanu *Karedudarinda*; nānu *hōgabekāyitu*
'Since he invited me, I had to go'.

While referring to successive actions by the same actor, all the verbs except the final one are used as adverbial participles in languages of the SOV order. Some languages of this type, (like Kannada) which do not have conjunctive words in their system, make use of adverbial participles only. Languages having conjunctive words, have the successive verbs as participles or as finite verbs joined by conjunctions.

Kan. Avanu laibrerige *hōgi*, Pustaka *tegedukondu*, manege
'he to library having gone, book having taken, house to
hintirugidanu,
returned'.

Hindi. Wəh ləibreri *jake*, kitab *leke*, ghər lɔt *agəya.*
or wəh ləibreri gəya, ɔr kitab leke ghər lɔt agəya.
"He went to the library, borrowed a book and returned home".

Languages of the SOV type which are also post-positional, have the auxiliary verbs occurring after the main verb in compound verb constructions. Only the auxiliaries are inflected for tense, mode and pronominal terminations. Kannada and Hindi have this feature. In prepositional languages (either of VSO or SVO type) the auxiliaries precede the main verb; and languages which do not have categories for person-number, may not have inflections for the auxiliaries. *e.g.*,

Main. *Aux.*

Kan. huḍuganu ellavannū *tindu-biṭṭ-iddanu.*
Hindi. ləṛkene səb kuch *Kha-liya-tha*,
"The boy *had eaten* everything".

The order of the three elements, *viz.* (1) The adjective, (2) the marker, and (3) the standard (to which a thing is compared) in constructions involving adjectives of comparison is closely correlated to

the dominant order of subject, object and verb in languages. Languages having SOV order, (Kan. and Hindi) which are also post-positional, have standard-marker-adjective order. *e.g.*,

St. M. A.

Hindi.	tumhara ghər *həmare-se choṭa* hæ.
Kan.	nimma mane *nammada-kkinta cikkadu.*
	"your house is smaller than mine".
Hindi.	yəh *sub-se acchi* kəhani hæ.
Kan.	idu *ada-kkinta oḷḷeya* Kathe.
	"this is a better story than that".

(The order of adjective-marker-standards prevails in languages of other types).

There are certain other morphological categories and features that are closely correlated to the 'Basic order types.' For example, the post-positional languages of the SOV type tend to be either exclusively or mostly suffixal. Kannada is exclusively suffixal, whereas Hindi is mostly suffixal (Prefixes in Hindi are mostly found in items directly taken from Sanskrit). Post-positional languages, in which both number and case categories are present, have those categories occuring after noun base; and the case always occurs in the final position. When the distinction of person number or gender-number is made in the verb, languages with such distinction always have tense/mode categories.

It is not our intention to enumerate exhaustively all the features which are significant for typological classification at the level of syntax. Our only aim is to point out how several features cluster together as satellites around a few major distinctive features to form constructions at higher levels of linguistic structure. On this basis, languages sharing these major features are classified into fewer types. We appreciate the genius of Greenberg who developed the scheme of 'Basic order Typology', according to which the languages of the world come under three major types. This classification is done at the top most level of linguistic structure (Sentence level), where the content aspect of language is most dominant, and the expression corresponds point to point with the thought processes. With the selection of certain other features as correlates of the three fundamental features, the constructions differ, and the three major types are divided to twelve subtypes. Further, with more and more selection of features (morpheme classes, categories, etc.), different kinds of constructions become possible to express the same concepts, and we have further subdivisions at the syntactic and morphological levels. In this way, the number of classes go on increasing with the selection of more and more features when, ultimately, we arrive at individual languages.

The same idea is implied in the theory of 'Generative-Transformational' grammar. The phrase structure rules of the 'deep structure' are mostly similar in all natural lauguages. It is the deep structure underlying the utterance that conveys the semantic content of the sentence. This structure is purely mental and consists of essential propositions of universal grammar.[17] Differences begin to emerge and diversifications are observed on the surface structure, *i.e.*, in the domain of transformations which convert the semantic content of the deep structure into various patterns of expression.

All the work hitherto accomplished in the field of typological studies is just a beginning. Systematic research has still to be continued in order to build an adequate theory and develop exact methods, so that work in linguistic typology will be more meaningful and rewarding.

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17. The first rule of the Phrase Structure grammar (deep structure) of most languages is $S \rightarrow NP + VP$, which means Kerne sentences of all languages consist of two propositions, the subject and predicate.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

D.C. Grover

A STUDY IN DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIC CATHARSIS

Democratic state has come to stay in modern time. A study, sponsored by UNESCO after the Second World War, reveals that "Probably for the first time in history, democracy is claimed as the proper ideal description of all systems of political and social organisation advocated by influential proponents."[1] It is the lesson of two world wars that democracy can stand the test. In both these wars, it was the totalitarian state that best organised all its resources, and when it failed to achieve a swift victory, it was the first to come to the end of them. However, this does not make democracy immune from the dialectics of catharsis, which overtake every phenomenon as it grows and develops. As ills creep in so does arise the need of purification, purging the effects of pent up emotions by bringing them to the surface of consciousness. A study in dynamics of democratic catharsis may reveal the presence of cobwebs in democratic system, and the need to remove them so that democratic values prove tenable to sustain the system. One must listen to the warning that "the breakdown of democracy comes when this community of values and interests disintegrates,"[2] and one must not forget that this disintegration follows from complacence in ignoring the dynamics of catharsis.

I. Judgement of History

Democracy has evoked different response in the course of history.[3] During the 19th century, it largely overcame its illrepute, and grew rapidly in public esteem. A tidal wave of popularity for democracy swept around the world during and after the First World War.[4] If one judges by history, it seems to be well-established that people have been far more interested in the substance of political and governmental decision than in the niceties of the procedures by which they are reached. The problem raised here is of the first magnitude for any political theory. For the moment it is enough to illustrate the nature of the problem. Would one prefer an improper court decision or a fair trial with a decision that goes against him ? A democracy that was anti-Semitic, imperialist, given to injustice,

1. Democracy in a World of Tensions, UNESCO, Paris, 1951, p. 527.
2. John Hallowell, 'Compromise as Political Ideal' in Ethics, Vol. LIV, 1943-44, p. 164.
3. W. K. Prentice, The Greek Political Experience, Princeton, 1941, pp. 193 ff.
4. James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. I, New York, 1921, p. 4.

or an aristocratic system that was tolerant, peaceful, just, and promoted 'true religion'.[5] A democracy with a low standard of living or a benevolent despotism with a high one ? These are obviously leading questions; they tend to play down concern with 'due process', and one need not seize either horn of dilemma, but no one ought to put demacracy as another name for Utopia, or take for granted that it will necessarily promote the aims which many individuals would like to promote.

II. Ideal and Reality

There is a strong tendency to identify democracy with every thing that is good. The distinction between democracy and good goverment must, however, be made for purpose of analysis. The tendency to identify the real and the ideal is quite understandable one and is common in other fields than political theory. Further, it can hardly be denied that for the most part political philosophers have started their enquiries with consideration of the end of the state, and only then have devised the form of government which seemed best calculated to promote these ends. Plato and Aristotle set the fashion, and they have been copied by most philosophers since.[6] The ends which men have thought government should promote are legions; from vague and ultimate objectives such as the good life, happiness, the development of personality, justrce, and the rights of man, to more apparently specific ends such as the preservation of domestic tranquillity, private property, national security, or a particular religion or economic system.

The analysis of democracy may be divided into two classes. One class refers chiefly to the form or method of government the other kind to the quality of life, the moral purposes, or the content of the political policies. "Democracy is a political method...for arriving at political... decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself."[7] One can then tentatively agree to call a democratic political system one which has characteristic principles of operation, both descriptive and normative. And a complete analysis of democracy will be one which lays bare and justifies the separate principles of both kind, and the system as a whole.

III. Dialects of Democratic Principles

This leads one to the dialects of democratic principles. One could begin with some of the older classic statements of democracy, or with contemporary versions to grasp the dialectics of democratic principles.

5. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, 1950, pp. 240 ff.

6. Ernest Cassirer, The Myth of the State, New Hevan, 1946, chs. V-VI.

7. Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

The original democratic system of Athens could be described in one phrase as rule by the people if people was construed narrowly to mean adult male citizens, comprising a small proportion of the total persons in a small state.[8] Such a principle was both accurately descriptive and quite workable, given the scale of operation. But the principle is neither descriptive nor feasible in any modern state. In Gladstone's words: "No people of a magnitude to be called a nation has ever, in strictness, governed itself; the utmost which appears to be attainable, under the conditions of human life, is that it should choose its governors, and that it should on select occasions bear directly on their action."[9] Or as MacIver puts it: "Democracy is not a way of governing, whether by majority or otherwise, but primarily a way of determining who shall govern and, broadly, to what ends......The people, let us repeat, do not and cannot govern; they control the governments."[10]

Democracy, then, as a political system must have identifiable features other than the people actually governing, to distinguish it from other methods of making policies. The problem is to separate the accidental features from the characteristics. The federal or unitary, presidential or parliamentary, unicameral or bicameral, and the kind of economic system with which the political system is associated are accidental variations.

The democratic principles can be cast in operational terms. One need not attempt, however, to solve the impossible problem of exact summation—of trying to canstruct a single index number which will register all the tests for democrcy. Some criteria are more important than others, and all are a matter of degree.[11] Each of the principles can also be cast in normative (moral) terms—for example, that political equality should prevail—and in this form they constitute the moral justification of democracy. They are moral beliefs for which a case can be made, and which may be traced further back until one lays bare the ultimates or postulates to which the principles commit man Considered in both operational and normative terms, the principles may thus fairly be described as making up a democratic political theory which both explains and justifies a democratic political system.

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8. J. O. A. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History, Berkeley, 1955, pp. 14, 21.

9. Mechael Goodwin, Nineteenth Century Opinion, (ed.), Harmonds Worth, Middlesex, 1951, p. 226.

10. R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government, New York, 1947, p. 198,

11. Russel H. Fitzgibbon. 'A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy', in Western Political Quarterly, IX, Sept. 1956, pp. 607 ff.

IV The Delimma of Majority

The dialects of democratic principle reveal the contradiction between legislative and popular majority. The normative defence of majority principle is frequently couched in terms of the popular majority, which seems a curious position if it is not tested conclusively whether a popular majority is actually in favour of many specific government policies.[12] Unfortunately, perhaps, politics is one of those fields where the matters on which scientific or verifiable generalisation can be made, 'are seldom of great moments. On the really important questions, there is not and there cannot be any final answer. The search for scientific statements about political behaviour can easily bog down in a methodological morass."[13] Policies emerge from the interaction between legislature. executive, interest groups, and public, with one influencing all others but none determining the outcome so that frequently the public approval is given only after the policy has been enacted or has been in operation for some time. "Tha majority is not a determined body......In a democratic context, the majority must always be discovered."[14] In saying that the popular majority is shifting it is in effect assumed that it is not a definable, specific, self-conscious social group or association. It is much more like a statistical grouping.[15] Any extreme form of the statement of the popular majority version is far removed from the actual rough-and-tumble of policy-making in democracy.

Closely connected is the problem of unanimity. It does solve one of the oldest problems in political theory. Concerned with the nature of political obligation, Rousseau was much agitated by this question, and led to favour direct against representative democracy.[17] Unanimity is so remote a contingency in any modern legislature that to recommend it as a normal principle for government, is quite fantastic. It is hopelessly confused and eminently unsatisfactory, as any such attempt must be, It is in effect a doctrine of veto by a majority of one. In Politics, it may be regarded as individualism run wild lacking the idealism of anarchism to justify it.

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12. Bryce, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 22.

13. D. E. Butler, The Study of Political Behaviour, London, 1958. p. 86.

14. R. M. Maciver, The Ramports We Guard, New York, 1950, p. 23.

15. Robert Bierstedt, "The Sociology of Majorities" in American Sociological Review, Vol. 13, 1948, pp. 700 ff.

16. Austin Rauney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System,
New York. 1956, p. 38.

17. Rousseau, The Social Contract, New York, 1913, BK. IV, Ch. ii.

The device of abiding by the majority decision was used, it appears, as a convenience, or alternative to unanimity, among groups of equals. For a long time, it continued thus, and settled into a routine, long before any moral or other substantial justification for it was evolved. There is some confusion caused by mixing the classic premises of Athens – the primary assembly-with quite different circumstances of the representative system.[18] However, the problem of minority remains.

In every democracy, there are some minorities that have no realistic hope of becoming a majority. This minority is "a group of people who, because of common racial, linguistic, religious or national heritage which singles them out from the dominant group, fear that they may either be prevented from integrating themselves into the national community of their wish or be obliged to do so at the expense of their identity".[19]

The cultural minority problem is particularly acute in the modern world, in ex-colonies, which have suddenly come to self-government and democracy. India with partition is a case in point. The secession of Pakistan was tha answer to Indian Independence; a solution which may always be the final refuge for national minorities, who want self-determination as a unit, not political equality of person with the majority.[20] Happy is the divided country that can work compromise devices, where majority is restrained enough to hold the allegiance of the minority. Multicultural states can live peaceably and to a large extent democratically, whether federalised or not, provided the right of seccession is not insisted on, the minority does not feel subject to tyranny; condition which seem easier to attain when political parties are inclusive, and not divided along cultural or communal lines.

The analysis does not exhaust minority question in entirety. The problem here is that of protecting democracy from an anti-democratic minority, a problem which has become especially acute in recent times because of fears aroused by communist and fascist parties.[21] The problems is not posed entirely by these groups but is raised by every minority which wants to spread doctrines or adopt practices which are contrary to the principles of democracy. Historically, the question has been posed as one of toleration. In founding his Leviathan, Hobbes thought it rational that a man should be contented with so much liberty

18. G. C. Lew's, 'An Essay on the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion', London, 1849, Ch. VII.

19. Jean Lal Pouce, "The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System" in Western Political Quarterly, June 1957, p. 318.

20. Lal Bhadur, The Muslim League: Its History, Activities and Achievements, Agra, 1954. pp. 202-203.

21. Arnold Brecht, Prelude to Silence, New York, 1944, pp. 98-99.

against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.[22] It would be imprudent, irrational even disastrous, to grant liberty to others if they would not reciprocate. But democracy rejects the stark Hobbesian alternatives of absolute power or anarchy. Locke, too, would give an absoluie and universal right to toleration only to those actions and opinions which did not concern politics and society at all; those which affected society could be prohibited by the magistrate, after due consideration for the peace, safety and the security of the people.[23] Mill, very close to advocating absolute freedom, in his denial of a distinction between liberty licentiousness, is no better guide to policy-makers.[24] However, it is generally admitted that the community has rights. "It can never concede to any of its members the right of behaving in such a way as to endanger its own existence."[25] One need not go so far as to hold that "Liberty in its very nature is limited by supreme law of self-preservation which inheres in a state as well as in individual."[26] To supress an anti-democratic movement may be logically impeccable, but it may also be psychologically and socially harmful in other ways. For instance, the general argument is often heard that "Democracy cannot exist on inherited and unexplained tradition. It lives in the freedom of nimble thought, and the discussion of principles is as vital to its life as the discussion of policies."[27] And the principles which may be challanged are those of democracy itself, just as a vote may be a vote of confidence in democracy when cast against an anti-democratic party. To extend the democratic freedom to all, including those who would abolish them, implies a large faith in the ability of the democratic system to survive, ultimately a faith in people. It is a venture which not all democracies are ready for especially if young or unstable, and one cannot blame them if in their prudence they bias policy against liberty in favour of security. An older and more stable democracy on the other hand, may be taking little risk in tolerating the intolerant and subversive party. One cannot ignore the apparent operation of majority rule. There is a real dilemma here because the only practical alternative to majority rule is some kind of minority government, which would be clearly "undemocratic".[28] It still appears true that democracy requires that "the ultimate choice, the final act of decision, be that of majority".[29]

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22. T. Hobbes, Leviathan,(ed.), Michael Oakshott, New York, 1947, Part II, ch. 21.
23. John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration : Humbly Submitted etc , (Works, 1727, Vol. II), pp. 248-249.
24. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, London, 1929, p. 79.
25. Thomas Murray Taylor, The Discipline of Virtue, Oxford, 1954, p. 49.
26. W. Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1948, p. 36.
27. Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory, London 1941, p. 4.
28. David Spitz, Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought, New York, 1949, p. 271.
29. Ibid., p. 107.

V. Coercion and Democratic Values

The democratic catharsis ensues from the conflict between coercion and democratic values. Democratic states are generally said to have free elections as against coercion exercised in despotic regimes. Without this confidence, there can be no confidence in representative government itself, and thus no popular belief in the legitimacy of the democratic state. Elections in democracy must be genuine contests.[30] The commonly used methods of preventing election from being genuine are stuffing of ballot box, bribery to the electorate and threatening voter's material and physical well-being. Under these circumstances, the behaviour of the electorate and the candidates will not meet the necessary standards of the democratic state.

A political system cannot be justified entirely by its constituent principles, but by values which emerge from the actual working of a system. All human relationships are viewed in the light of "value impregnated beliefs and notions",[31] which determine and shape them. Peaceful adjustment of disputes is the supreme democratic value. Life in any human society contains a perpetual conflict of interests and opinions. Democracy is unique in recognising the political expression of such conflicts as legitimate, and in providing for their peaceful adjustment. Ensuring peaceful change is another democratic value. This makes a strong appeal today than in earlier and more static times. "The greatest of all problems of government lies in the adaptation of traditions to changing time rapidly enough to clear with catastrophe."[32] Orderly succession of rules provides additional value as "a means of continuity, a principle of stability, a relief from the paralysing terror of revolution".[33] This is followed by the value of diversity. By maintaining an open society, democratic freedom gives flexibility and a wide variety of choice. This imparts real content to liberty, which has been recognised as a phenomenon of the highest factual and ethical importance in democratic society.[34] It is both necessary and sofficient for democracy.[35] Its existence depends upon the transitional state's further evolution towards democracy. People approve of law's coercive element as a check upon their own tendency towards disobedience.[36] "All the ties that hold men together in any society, all

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30. Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle, New York, 1953, pp. 62-63.
31. MacIver, The Web of Government, pp. 447-448.
32. Merroam, Ethics, Vol. LIV, 1943-44, p. 268.
33. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty,(ed.) Irving Dillard, New York, 1959, p. 76.
34. Frederick Watins, The Political Tradition of the West, Cambridge, Mass, 1948, ch. V.
35. James M. Burns & Jack W. Peltason, Government by the People, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957, p. 142.
36. A.D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State, New York, 1947, I, p. 206.

the needs and all the hopes that depend on their society for realisation, prompt them to law-abidingness".[37] The democratic system achieves harmony of ends and value for the time being, while keeping a way open so that a better harmony may be achieved in response to higher and more sensitive demands when they arise. Attainment of justice is the climax of democratic values. Its attainment is often regarded as the central core of political morality, and the defence of of democracy on this ground must be that it is the system best able to produce justice.

The pessimistic view about the future of democracy is based on the belief that its electoral process naturally selects politicians who are "soothing demagogues".[38] Democracy exhibits a declining capacity to govern,[39] which casts serious doubt on its continuing viability. What must exist for democracy to exist is one of the great problems of the age.[40] The cathartic note struck here is quite bewildering. Democracy "is begot by sedition, so it is nourished by arms : it can never stand without wars, either with an enemy abroad, or with friends at home. The only way to to preserve it is to have some powerful enemy near..... for the common danger of enemy keeps them in better unity than the laws they make themselves".[41]

However, its achievement must not be judged by reference to Utopia but by reference to feasible alternatives. In order to love mankind, one must not expect too much from them. And "fairly to approach institutions you must not hold them against the light that blazes in Utopia. You must not expect them to satisfy microscopic analysis, not judge their working, which is inevitably rough, awkward, clumsy, and second best by the fastideous standards of closest logic".[42]

Democratic catharsis, operating through concensus, maximizes amity, without which the gospel of justice loses force.[43] What guides, inspires and sustains modern democracy is conviction of upward and onward progress in the destinies of mankind. 'A great enthusiasm, a bright hope, or glowing faith are necessary if liberal democracy is to survive".[44] The

37. MacIver, The Web of Government, pp. 76-77.

38. Arnold J. Zurcher, "Democracy's Declining Capacity to Govern", Western Political Quarterly, VIII (1955), p. 536.

39. Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy, New York, 1953, chs ii, iv, pp. 28,42.

40. A. Wollheim. 'Democracy', in Journal of the History of Ideas, April, 1958, p. 237.

41. Karl Lawenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process, Chicago, 1957 p. 114.

42. John Morley, Oracles on Man and Government, London, 1923, p. 73.

43. Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, London, 1950, pp. 40, 390-91.

44. Nathaniel Micklem, The Idea of Liberal Democracy, London, 1957, p.129.

democratic procedure for coming to agreement provide for the possibility of concurrence in action "without the preliminary necessity of shared religion,......or political programme".[45] There is great value in safety valve, in being able to let off steam and to contribute to the debate and the politicking even though one is outvoted. It may be called a catharsis, a working off harmlessly burried feelings of aggression; it is opposed to intimidation—the very hall mark of anti-democratic belief.

45. Richard Makeon, Democracy, Scientific Method and Action', in Ethics, Vol. LV, July, 1945, p. 286.

J. R. Siwach

PRESIDENT'S RULE IN WEST BENGAL A CRITICAL STUDY

When the general election of 1967 was held, the Congress though had the largest strength, yet it ceased to command the absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly.[1] All the non-Congress political parties combined and formed a united front with Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee as their leader. The Governor invited the leader of the united front and appointed him as the Chief Minister. But as is the case ordinarily with all the coalitions, within a few months time there were stress and strains on the smooth functioning of the Government—not an unnatural thing with a combination of such a hetrogenous groups of political parties which have nothing in common except the hatred of the Congress rule. Finally a stage came when Mr. P. C. Ghosh, a senior Minister of Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee's Cabinet defected along with 17 members from the United Front on November 2, 1967 and thereby reduced the ruling party to 136 in a House of 280.[2] This created a picquant situation in west Bengal because the Congress party came out openly in support of Mr. P. C. Ghosh and requested the Governor to summon the session of the Legislative Assembly so that a formal vote of no confidence may be introduced against the Council of Ministers.

Ordinarily, immediately after Mr. P. C. Ghosh and others have defected, Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee either should have resigned or should have advised the Governor to summon the session of the Legislative Assembly so that he could demonstratively prove that he still had a majority with him. But this course of action was not adopted by the Chief Minister and he preferred to follow the examples of his counterparts in Bihar and Haryana. Mr. Mukherjee said that "if Bihar could take four months and Haryana three months to decide a similar question, where was the harm if West Bengal was given a few weeks to thrash out the issue."[3] In Bihar Mr. B. P. Mandal a senior Minister resigned from the Cabinet of Mr. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha and formed his own political party known as the Soshit Dal[4] consisting of 20-30 MLAs and claimed that he along with the Congress had the strength of 185 in a House of 310.[5] But the then Chief

1. The Congress had the strength of 127 out of 280. *The Tribune*, February 25, 1967, p. 3.
2. *Patriot*, November 23. 1967, p. 4.
3. *The Indian Express*, November 10, 1967, p. 1.
4. *The Statesman*. August 29, 1967, p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*

Minister of Bihar neither resigned nor did he advise the Governor to summon the session of the Assembly.[6] Similarly in Haryana, Ch. Devi Lal with the following of 6 MLAs Left the United Front headed by the then Chief Minister Rao Birendra Singh[7] and thereby created doubts about the majorty support of Birendra Singh's Government in the Legislative Assembly.[8] Rao Birendra Singh also neither resigned nor did he advise the Governor to summon the session.[9]

When the Governor of West Bengal. Mr. Dharam Vira was approached by the Congress along with Mr. P. C. Ghosh, he unlike his counterparts in Bihar[10] and Haryana[11] sounded the Chief Minister about the desirability of the immediate session of the Legislative Assembly.[12] In the first instance, the Chief Minister was not prepared to summon the session of the State Legislature but when he was asked again by the Governor,[13] he agreed to summon it on December 18, 1967.[14] But Mr. Dharam Vira insisted that the session should be summoned before November 30, 1967 at the latest.[15] When the Chief Minister refused to accept this advice,[16] the Governor dismissed the Chief Minister[17] Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee and installed Dr. P. C. Ghosh as a Chief Minister.[18]

Since Mr. P.C. Ghosh was keen to prove that he commands the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, therefore, he advised the Governor that the session of the Assembly be called on November 29 at I. P.M.[19] When the session of the Assembly began, Mr. B. K. Banerjee, the Speaker, adjourned the Assembly indefinitely[20] and declared that the dismissal of the "Ministry headed by Mr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee and the installation of a new Ministry headed by Dr. P. C. Ghosh, followed by the summoning of the Assembly was unconstitutional."[21] Then the Governor took the initiative in his own hands and on the advice of the Chief Minister,

6. *The Indian Express*, September 11, 1967, p 4
7. *Patriot*, August 8, 1967, p. 1.
8. *Idid.*
9. *The Tribune*, July 16, 1967, p. 1.
10. *The Hindustan Times*, September 13, 1967, p. 7.
11. *The Tribune*, November 1, 1967. p. 1.
12. *The Statesmen*, November 7, 1967, p. 1.
13. *The Indian Express*, November 15, 1967, p. 1.
14. *The Hindustan Times*, November 11, 1967, p. 1.
15. *The Times of India*, November 17, 1967, p. 1.
16. *The Statesman*, November 21, 1967, p. 1.
17. *The Hindustan Times*, November 23, 1967, p. 1.
18. *The Statesman*, November 22, 1967, p. 1.
19. *The Hindustan Times*, November 23, 1967, p. 1.
20. *Ibid.*, November 30, 1967, p. 1.
21. *Ibid.*

prorogued the Assembly.[22] The Assembly was again summoned to meet on February 14, 1968.[23]

In the meanwhile, the dismissal of Mr. Ajoy Mukherjee and the validity of the appointment of Mr. P.C. Ghosh as a Chief Minister of the West Bengal was challenged by Mr. P.L. Lakhan Pal, the Chairman of the All India Gantantra party, in the Calcutta High Court[24]. While delivering the judgement Mr. Justice B.C. Mitra "held that the Governor had absolute, exclusive, unrestricted and unquestionable discretionary power to dismiss a Ministry and appoint a new Council of Ministers under Article 164 (1) of the Constitution...It was held that Article 164 (1) provided that the Ministers should hold office during the "pleasure" of the Governor and this exercise of "pleasure" was not fettered by any condition or restriction. Withdrawal of "pleasure" was entirely at the discretion of the Governor. The provision of Article 164 (2) that the Ministers should be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State did not in any manner fetter or restrict the Government's power to withdraw the "pleasure" during which the Ministers held office. Collective responsibility contemplated in Article 164 (2) meant that the Council of Ministers was answerable to the Legislative Assembly of the State. The Constitution did not confer any power on the Legislative Assembly to dismiss or remove from office the Council of Ministers. The power to appoint the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers, on the advice of the Chief Minister and the power to remove the Ministers from office by withdrawing the "pleasure" contemplated in Article 164 (1) were conferred upon the Governor exclusively. This right was absolute...... The Governor had powers to appoint also under Articles 165 (1) and 310 which powers were conditional and restrictive and could be challenged in certain cases. But in exercise of powers under Article 164 (1) the Governors withdrawal of "pleasure" could not be questioned".[25]

But in spite of this judgement of Calcutta High Court when the Assembly met again on February 14, 1968 the Speaker stuck to his earlier stand and said :

> I am prima facie satisfied that the dissolution of the Ministry headed by Shri Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, the appointment of Dr. P.C. Ghosh as Chief Minister and the summoning of the House on his advice is unconstitutional and invalid since it has

22. *The Times of India*, December 1, 1967, p. 1.
23. *The Statesmen*, February 14, 1968, p. 1.
24. *The Times of India*, January 13, 1968, p. 6.
25. *The Statesman*, February 7. 1968, p. 1.

been effected behind the back of this House. Pending a full and proper examination of the matter, in exercise of the power vested in me under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure of this Assembly I adjourn the House sine die.[26]

When the Assembly had been adjourned twice, the Governor reported that:

> No useful purpose is likely to be served by attempting to summon the Assembly again after proroguing it as on the last occasion as there is every likelihood that the Speaker would continue to adhere to his past stand...It is, however, clear that it will be impossible to hold any session of the Assembly so long as the present Speaker continues to adhere to his view and does not enable the House to transact urgent and important business.[27]

After the Assembly had been adjourned twice, the President's Rule was imposed[28] and the West Bengal Legislative Assembly was dissolved.[29]

Now question arises as to how far was it constitutionally correct to use article 356 in this case ? According to Mr. B.K. Banerjee, the Speaker of West Bengal Legislative Assembly, President's Rule was the only solution.[30] Mr. N.C. Chatterjee a well known jurist also said that the West Bengal Speaker's ruling posed a first class constitutional crisis "which can only be resolved by invocation of article 356 of the Constitution as there has been a failure of Constitutional machinery.[31] Dr. H.N. Kunzru, President of the Indian Council of World Affairs and of the Indian School of International Studies agreed with this view when he said :

> The Speakers action in West Bengal had created a situation where, it seemed, the Government could not function in accordance with the provisions of ihe Constitution. It appeared that the only way out was for the president to assume all the functions of the Government of the State and declare that the powers of the State Legislature should be exerciseable by or under the authority of Parliament.[32]

26. *The Indian Express*, February 22, 1968, p. 6.
27. Dharam Vira, *The Statesman*, February 21, 1968, p. 1.
28. *Ibid.*, February 21, 1968, p. 1.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *The Tribune*, December 2, 1967, p. 7.
31. *The Statesman*, November 30, 1967, p. 12.
32. *The Indian Express*, December 12, 1967, p. 4.

However, there were persons equally imminent in the field of constitutional law who thought that Article 356 which was then being tipped as the hottest constitutional number to ease the political stalemate in West Bengal, did not provide the solution of this knotty and complicated problem. For instance, Gurmukh Nihal Singh who has held the office of Governor, Speaker and Chief Minister, Dr. A. Appadorai, Honorary Professor, Indian School of International Studies and Mr. A.S.R. Chari, Supreme Court Advocate did not think that it was a fit case for the application of article 356.[33] Even late Mr. Mehar Chand Mahajan, the retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court agreed with this view.[34]

Since the experts of constitutional law have expressed conflicting and diametrically opposite views, therefore, this question needs not only a detailed but also a critical and dispassionate examination. In order to know whether the constituational machinery has failed in West Bengal or not, it becomes imperative to define :

(i) What constitutes a constitutional machinery of the State and

(ii) What is the implication of the term "failure of the constitutional machinery" under article 356 ?

Constitutional machinery of the State has been created by articles 163 (1) and 164 of the Constitution and may be defined as a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions which is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. The failure of the constitutional machinery (as defined above) should ordinarily be declared by the President only on two grounds :

Firstly, when there is a break down of the constitutional machinery in the sense that none of the political parties is in a position to form a Government and the Governor reports the same to the President.

Secondly, when the constitutional machinery, in the opinion of the President, does not exercise its functions in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

The constitutional machinery failed in the first sense in Punjab, when after the resignation of Sardar Lachhman Singh Gill neither the Congress, nor the united Front was ready to form the Government.[35] Since the Governor had no alternative but to report to President's about the failure of the constitutional machinery, therefore, the President's Rule

33. *Ibid.*, December 15, 1967, p. 4.

34. *The Statesman*, December 10, 1967, p. 9.

35. Patriot, August 8, 1968, p. 1.

was imposed.[36] The failure of the constitutional machinery took place in the second sense in Haryana where the Government of the day was inviting persons from other political parties by offering them a place in the Council of Ministers. The Governor, therefore, reported that "there are good reasons to believe that the defections are being secured by not too honourable means,"[37] and as a result the President's rule was imposed on Haryana.[38]

Now question arises : did the constitutional machinery (as defined above) fail in West Bengal in either of the sense ? Answer seems to be in the negative because there was a legally appointed Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions. The doubts expressed by the Speaker about the legality of the appointment of Mr. P.C. Ghosh as Chief Minister were removed by the judgement of Calcutta High Court.[39] When a constitutionally appointed Government was in office and was prepared to face the Assembly in order to prove that it had a working majority with it, how can it be accepted that the constitutional machinery had failed in West Bengal ? In fact. it was not the constitutional machinery but the Central Government that failed in West Bengal. In a similar situation in Punjab, the Government of India adopted a different course of action by not imposing the President's Rule. Does it not amount to the acceptance of the fact that the President's Rule in West Bengal was perhaps uncalled for ? This seems to be all the more so because in other words it means that the Speakers, just by voilating the Constitution, can force the Central Government to impose the Presidential Rule. Since this is a dangerous practice, therefore, the Government of India retraced its stand in the case of Punjab.

Hence, it can be concluded that the imposition of President's Rule in West Bengal was perhaps not proper. This is also the view of Mr. Gurmukh Nihal Singh. He for instance, said that the invocation of article 356 was an unconstitutional remedy "so long as an alternative Government was possible and the Governor had maintained that it was—the question of imposing President's Rule or of dissolving the Assembly and ordering fresh elections did not arise".[40] The Governor Mr. Dharam Vira's contention that Mr. P.C. Ghosh Ministry has lost the majority support in the Assembly[41], though had some basis but still it may be asked as to why was the Government not allowed to test its strength on the floor of the House particularly when the Assembly was

36. *Patriot*, August 24, 1968, p. 7.

37. *The Tribune*, November 22, 1967, p. 3.

38. *The Statesman*, November 21, 1967, p. 1.

39. *Ibid.*, February 7, 1968, p. 1.

40. *The Indian Express*, December 15, 1967, p 4.

41. *Patriot*, February 16, 1968, p. 8.

in a session ? Even if the Government had lost the majority suppor was it proper to impose the Presidenti's Rule ? Answer seems to be in the negative because if it was a fact, then the Governor should hav invited the leader of the opposition to form the Government again, afte the resignation of Mr. P.C. Ghosh.[42]

There was hardly any justification for the imposition of the President's Rule, simply because Mr. P.C. Ghosh has a doubtful majority in the Legislative Assembly. No doubt this would have been the fal of the Ministry for the second time after the general election—but ther what about Bihar ?[43] If the fall of a Ministry twice is the criteria of imposing President's Rule, then Bihar should have also gone the way of West Bengal. In Bihar also, like West Bengal there have been defections and counter defections from the ruling party. If Mr. P.C Ghosh had really lost a majority in the Legislative Assembly (a contention which should have been tested on the floor of the House particularly when the Assembly was in session) then just as after the fall of the Government of Mr. B.P. Mandal, Mr. Bhola Paswan, a defecting congress leader was appointed as a Chief Minister of Bihar, the leader of the opposition in West Bengal Legislative Assembly should have been invited to become a Chief Minister.

Moreover, it may also be asked : when did the Governor come to know that Mr. P.C. Ghosh had lost the support of the majority ? Was it only after he had addressed the joint session of both Houses of West Bengal Legislature or before ? It is clear that he had this knowledge on February 13, when WBPCC President, Dr. P.C. Chunder confirmed tha 12 Congress MLAs have resigned from the Congress.[44] Then question arises : if the President's Rule was to be imposed simply because Mr. P.C. Ghosh has lost the support of the majority then why did the Governor not submit this report as soon as he came to know that Mr. Ghosh does not have a majority in the Legislative Assembly ?

This might have saved the Governor from the botheration o addressing a joint session of the State Legislature and all that happened in the West Bengal Legislature would have been avoided This in fact would have been more appropriate after Messers Ajoy Mukherjee and Joti Basu had requested the Governor not to address the

42. *The Statesman*, February 21, 1968, p. 1.

43. In Bihar also the Ministry has fallen twice. They were the Ministries of Mr. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha and Mr. B.P. Mandal. The third Ministry of Bhola Patwan was installed in office.

44. *The Statesman*, February 13, 1968, p. 1.

joint session of the Assembly and the Council on February 14, 1968.[45] At that time the Governor said :

> I had certain constitutional obligations and they had to be discharged. Merely a danger of incidents could not deter me from discharging my constitutional obligations.[46]

If the Ministry was in a minority and when the Governor knew this, why did he take the risk of addressing the State Legislature, is the question which remains mysteriously unanswered. If the sequence of the events of West Bengal is critically analysed, it will be found that the President's rule was imposed not on the ground that Mr. P.C. Ghosh has lost the support of majority because Mr. Ghosh was demanding that he should be allowed to test his strength on the floor of the House.[47]

In fact, article 356 was imposed not because the Government of Mr. P.C. Ghosh was in a minority but because :

(i) the Speaker gagged the Assembly by adjourning it sine die twice and prevented it from functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution[48] and he was likely to repeat this process if the Assembly was summoned again after proroguing[49] it. The Government of India was unable to find out any other method of removing the Speaker except by imposing the President's Rule and

(ii) If the Ministry of Mr. P.C. Ghosh had been retained in office, there was a fear of agitation and bloodshed.[50]

The imposition of President's Rule on these grounds cannot be justified because it implies the "acceptance of a situation in which a single individual is able to hold up the entire constitutional machinery."[51] It was perhaps because of this reason that in the first instance the official circles of the Government of India were not prepared to consider the situation of West Bengal a "break down of the constitutional machinery as envisaged in the Constitution."[52] Even the Home Ministry at the initial stages was of this view.[53]

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45. Mr. Dharam Vira, *The Indian Express*, February 22, 1968, p. 6.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Patriot*, February 16, 1968, p. 8.
48. Y.B. Chavan, *The Indian Express*, February 17, 1968, p. 1.
49. Dharam Vira, *The Statesman*, February 21, 1968, p. 1.
50. Report of the Governor to the President *Patriot*, February 16, 1968, p, 8.
51. *The Indian Express*, February 16, 1968, p. 7.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Patriot*, February 16, 1968, p. 8.

Hence, it can be concluded that the imposition of the President's Rule in West Bengal was somewhat unfortunate if judged purely from a constitutional point of view and it would have been better, had some other solution been found for dealing with the recalcitrant Speaker, who by voilating the Constitution succeeded in achieving his declared object of forcing the Central Government to impose the Presidents Rule. In fact, it was a mistake on the part of the Governor to say that no useful purpose was "likely to be served by attempting to summon the Legislative Assembly again after proroguing it as on the last-occasion as there is very likelihood that the speaker would continue to adhere to his past stand". If it was to be so then the Governor should have used the powers given to him by the constitution. This is exactly what the Governor of Punjab did when a similar situation arose there. He issued an ordinance in the exercise of his powers under article 213 (1) to invoke article 309 laying down the procedure that the Legislature should adopt for the disposal of financial business before it. The ordinance provided that until the completion of business, the House shall not be adjourned unless a motion to that effect has been passed by a majority of the members of the House.[54] This implied that the power of the speaker to adjourn the House under Rule 105 of the Rules of procedure was taken away from him as far as the conduct of the financial business in the House was concerned. The ordinance also provided that "any adjournment of that House in contravention of the provisions of clause (A) shall be null and void and be of no effect.[55] By issuing a similar ordinance, the Governor of West Bengal could have ensured the conduct of the financial business introduced by the Ministry. Had the financial business introduced by the Ministry been approved, it would have been considered as a vote of confidence in the Ministry. It appears that the imposition of the Presidents Rule in West Bengal is nothing but a murder of a patient simply because the doctors were unable to diagnose his disease—a crime not only legal but also a moral. In fact, the use of article 356 in this case is like giving prizes to those who have no respect, not only for a Parliamentary democracy but for any constitutional order. When one defaulter gets a prize, others try to follow his footsteps and it was perhaps because of this reason that the Speaker of Punjab tried to copy the conduct of his counterpart in West Bengal.

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54. The Tribune, March 14, 1968, p.I.
55. Patriot, March 14, 1968, p.I.

P.N. Mital

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA

When the British North America Act of 1867[1] (which brought the Canadian federation into existence), and the Commonwealth of Australia Act of 1900[2] were passed, the role of judicial interpretation in the growth and working of a federal system was firmly established. Though the federal idea could be traced to the Achaean League of ancient Greece, and the Defensive League of Uri, Schweez, and Unterwalden in 1291 (the germination of the Swiss Confederation), yet it found its true and full fruition in the Constitution of the United States, framed at the Old Brick State House, Philadelphia in 1787. Other federal systems have benefited immensely by the American experience in the art of federal government, and have in their own way tried to adopt its strong points and ward off the weaknesses. The principle of Judicial Review enunciated by C.J. Marshall in Marbury v. Madison in 1803[3] has not only guided the course of American federalism, but has had its impact upon other federal systems including those of Canada and Australia.

Of course, the function of the judiciary to interpret the laws is recognised in all systems, unitary and federal; however, in a federal system its implications are more meaningful and far-reaching. The term federation has been derived from the Latin term 'Foedus' meaning treaty or agreement; and etymologically the 'Compact' idea is predominant in a federal system. A federal system is an attempt at a harmonious compromise between national unity and autonomy of units. Professor Dicey, enunciating the requisites for a successful federation stressed on three factors ; Supremacy of the Constitution; Distribution of Powers; and, Supremacy of the Judiciary.[4] It is the supremacy of judiciary which reflects : itself in the principle of judicial interpretation, the court of law acting as the guardian of the constitution and striking a balance between national unity and state autonomy by declaring laws ultra vires if they are not in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution.

The Founding Fathers of the Canadian Confederation were greatly influenced by the American federal experience, but they showed great

1. 30 Victoria, Chapter 3 (29th March, 1867).
2. 63 & 64 Victoria, Chapter 12 (9th July, 1900).
3. (1803)1 Cranch (U.S.) 137.
4. A.V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (London Macmillan and Co., 1959), part I, Chapter III.

discrimination in not only what they adopted, but also in what they avoided from their system. Sir John Alexander Macdonald, though a great admirer of the American Constitution as 'one of the most skilful works which human intelligence ever created' was fully alive to the 'great source of weakness which has been the cause of the United States'. The Canadian Fathers showed a keen desire for a federation with a centralist bias. Sir John Macdonald, speaking about the broad Canadian pattern, remarked: "In framing the Constitution, care should be taken to avoid the mistakes and weaknesses of the United States' system, the primary error of which was the reservation to the different states of all powers not delegated to the General Government. We must reverse this process by establishing a strong Central Government, to which shall belong all powers not specially conferred on the provinces."[5] In the Confederation Debates, he reiterated his point of view: "We have strengthened the General Government. We have given the General Legislature all the great subjects of legislation. We have conferred on them, not only specifically and in detail, all the powers which are incident to sovereignty, but we have expressly declared that all subjects of general interest not distinctly and exclusively conferred upon the local governments and local legislatures, shall be conferred upon the General Government and Legislature".[6] This is evident from the comprehensive range of the exclusive powers of Parliament enumerated in Section 91 of the Constitution embracing 29 subjects, and more so by the endowment of the federal Parliament with a residual authority in matters beyond those assigned to the provinces by the provision "to make Laws for the Peace, Order and good Government of Canada .." The Exclusive Powers of the Provincial Legislatures have been enumerated under Section 92 of the Constitution apparently covering a modest field of 16 subjects. Among the Concurrent Subjects enumerated were Immigration and Agriculture where both the Dominion Parliament and the Provincial Legislature were empowered to legislate, with overriding power, in case of conflict, left to the Dominion.[7]

Inspite of what appeared to be a rather clear distribution of powers between the Dominion and the Provinces the peculiar role of the judiciary characteristic of a federal system could not long be put off; and, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council prior to 1949, were consistently called upon to act as an umpire between federal authority and the provinces. As Brady points out both the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, "faithful to the traditional rules of statutory interpretation, have been concerned with the literal meaning of the words in the British North America Act without historical facts or the intentions of the Fathers of

5. Sir John A. Macdonald quoted in Robert MacGregor Dawson's *The Government of Canada* (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 34.
6. *Confederation Debates*, 1865, p. 33.
7. Section 95, BNA, 30 Victoria, ch. 3.

the Confederation".[8] Professor Dawson's observations on the developments of the Canadian Constitution also point to this fact.[9] This extreme reliance on the literal meaning of the words is the pedestrian method of interpretation going by denotation, and is so different from the practice pursued by the American Supreme Court which has tended to squeeze the language dry and then recharge the words with new content keeping up with the new needs. Speaking about the American Constitution, Professor Brogan holds : "Almost from the start, it was put into the care of a priesthood, the lawyers, who, from time-to-time, have opened the Sibylline Book, and told the multitude what was the judgment of the ancestors on situations which it is highly improbable that the ancestors had ever foreseen."[10] The earlier interpretations of the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council attached great importance to the general power of the Dominion. This trend was notable in the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Russell v. the Queen[11] in 1882, which read : "Their Lordships having come to the conclusion that the Act in question does not fall within any of the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the further question whether its provisions also fall within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in section 91. In abstaining from this discussion, they must not be understood as intimating any dissent from the opinion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and the other judges, who held that the Act, as a general regulation of the traffic in intoxicating liquors throughout the Dominion, fell within the class of subject, "the regulation of trade and commerce", enumerated in that section, and was, on that ground, a valid exercise of the legislative power of the Parliament of Canada." But the trend of interpretation deviated from this course with the dominance of Lord Watson, and later his great admirer Lord Haldane on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. However, this is nothing unusual. If we look to the history of Court decisions in the United States of America, we find that the trend of the Marshall Court which handed down decisions in Marbury v. Madison[12], Mc Culloch v. Maryland,[13] Gibbons v. Ogden,[14]

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8. Alexander Brady, *Democracy in the Dominions* (Toronto : The University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 44.
9. Robert MacGregor Dawson, *The Government of Canada* (Toronto : The University of Toronto Press. 1960), pp. 158-59.
10. D. W. Brogan, *Government of the People* (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1933), p. 15.
11. (1882), 7 A. C. 829.
12. (1803) 1 Cranch (U. S.) 137.
13. (1819) 4 Wheaton (U. S.) 316.
14. (1824) 9 Wheaton (U. S.) 1.

and, Brown v. Maryland,[15] was so different from the Taney Court,[16] which followed a different course evident in the Dred Scott[17] and other cases.

In Russell v. the Queen the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee upheld the general power of the Dominion. However, in Tennant v. Union Bank[18] and Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, Canada and Ontario[19] the judgement of the Judicial Committee interpreted the sub-section in such a manner as almost to place the real residuary power in ordinary times of peace within the words "property and civil rights in the province".[20] Lord Watson complained that "to attach anyother construction to the general power which, in supplement of its enumerated powers, is conferred upon the Parliament of Canada by Section 91 would, in their Lordships' opinion, not only be contrary to the intendment of the Act, but would practically destroy the autonomy of the provinces".[21] Lord Haldane was a great admirer of Lord Watson, and like a true disciple, tried to follow his foot-steps. In the Snider case in 1925, he contended that the residual power of the Dominion could not be employed to encroach upon the "property and civil rights" power of the provinces except in the case of an extraordinary national emergency. Delivering the judgement Viscount Haldane observed : "It appears to their Lordships that it is not now open to them to treat Russell v. the Queen as having established the general principle that the mere fact that Dominion legislation is for the general advantage of Canada, or is such that it will meet a mere want which is felt throughout the Dominion, renders it competent if it cannot be brought within the heads enumerated specifically in S. 91.. .. No doubt there may be cases arising out of some extraordinary peril to the national life of Canada, as a whole, such as the cases arising out of a war, where legislation is required of an order that passes beyond the heads of exclusive Provincial competency. Such cases may be dealt with under the words at the commencement of S. 91, conferring general powers in relation to peace, order and good government, simply because such cases are not otherwise provided for. But instances of this, as was pointed out in the judgement in *Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press* (1923 : A.C. 695) are highly exceptional."[22]

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15. (1827) 12 Wheaton (U. S.) 419.
16. Roger B. Taney was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for a long time (1836-1864), and is known for reversing the trend of the Marshall Court.
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) 19 Howard (U.S.) 393.
18. (1894) A.C. 31.
19. (1925) A.C 396.
20. Section 92, 30 Vict. Chapter 3.
21. Tennant V. Union Bank (1894) A.C. 31.
22. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, Canada and Ontario (1925) A.C. 396.

This trend of enlarging the scope of the "Property and Civil rights" in Section 92 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has come to be criticised as frustrating the intentions of the Fathers of the Confederation. But as Brady has pointed out "... in all justice to the Judicial Committee probably did no more than what the majority of Canadians in the earlier period desired. They gave judicial expression to the upsurge of provincialism, evident from the early eighties to the decade after the First World War, and associated with the rapid growth of land settlement, the varied exploitation of natural resources, and the steady expansion of secondary industry, particularly in Ontario".[23]

The decade of the thirties opened with two significant developments: the series of rulings was a departure from the Haldane interpretation, which had stressed provincial powers, and the Dominion's abolition of appeals in criminal cases had been upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. But as held by Pierson "Hardly had this mollifying policy appeared when the problem of depression and unemployment brought about a renewal of controversy along another line; this was the result of the Committee's disallowance of much of the economic recovery legislation of 1934-5 belatedly enacted by the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Bennett".[24]

This invalidation of a considerable portion of the Bennett programme brought a storm of criticism against the Judicial Committee, despite the fact that in a majority of cases it had simply affirmed decision of the Supreme Court. In 1935 a special Committee of the Canadian House of Commons had been appointed to draw a draft amendment to the British North America Act. While the O' Connor Report did not assert that the Fathers of the Confederation had intended to set up a unitary system of government, it did maintain that their intent to create a strong dominion government had been thwarted by the Judicial Committee. The bill was passed to abolish appeals on December 10, 1949.

Professor Pierson has pointed out that "For over eighty years the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had played its role as a moulder of the Canadian constitution through its interpretations of the British North America Act. It had drawn a line, not altogether clear at times, between dominion and provincial powers; in so doing it had made an early ruling that residual power belonged to the Dominion rather than to the provinces. But in certain stages of its work, under the influence of Lord Watson and Lord Haldane, and again in 1930s, it had offset this earlier action by a series of rulings stressing provincial powers to the point where amendment of the British North America Act seemed little short of a

23. Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

24. C.G. Pierson, Canada and the Privy Council (London : Stevens and Sons Limited, 1960), p. 59.

necessity. Nevertheless, its total record became one of superior achievement; some would go so far as to declare it the highest record of any judicial body in the world in rulings on constitutional law. But certain aspects of Judicial Committee accomplishments did not go unchallenged in Canada; in the end, appeals were abolished."[25]

True to a federal pattern, the process of judicial interpretation has played an almost equally important part in the Commonwealth of Australia. According to Brady, "In Australia, no less than in Canada and the United States judicial interpretation has profoundly influenced federalism by developing and unfolding the Constitution, and by clarifying the distribution of power relative to the swift change in political and economic circumstances".[26] Although structurally Australia has followed the American precedent by having a dual system of Courts... .....federal and state, yet it has leaned towards the Canadian precedent by investing state courts with federal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the federal High Court is both original and appellate. As an appellate tribunal, the High Court is intended to be Supreme within the Commonwealth, but a party to a dispute under the state laws may appeal from a state Supreme Court either to the High Court or to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. What is of great importance in the Australian pattern is the shutting of appeals to the Privy Council on constitutional matters by the constitutional provision that on questions involving the distribution of legislative power between Commonwealth and States, the appeal is permitted only with the consent of the High Court.[27] This is highly meaningful and places the High Court in an unassailable position in matters of constitutional interpretation. As Brady has aptly remarked, "It reflects the hostility of Australian nationalists at the turn of the century to an external court and the sturdy conviction of those who drafted the act that a federal constitution is best understood by jurists who live under it and daily witness its operations."[28] What Canada was able to accomplish in 1949, Australia provided for, in effect, with the inception of the Australian Commonwealth. May be, the course of Privy Council decisions in Canada induced Australia to take this course from the outset.

Brady has drawn attention to the two major periods of constitutional interpretation made by the High Court: from 1901 to 1920, and from 1920 to the present. In the earlier period the Court was dominated by Justices, viz., Griffith, Barton, and O' Connor, who had played important roles in the federal movement. These justices were deeply influenced by the methods of judicial interpretation followed in the United States, and leaned heavily upon American precedents in a number of famous cases.

25. Pierson, *op. cit.*, p. 95,
26. Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-57.
27. Section 74 (63 & 64, Victoria, Chapter, 12).
28. Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

The doctrine of the immunity of state instrumentalities which was first enunciated in the United States in Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County[29] under Marshall's obiter dicta of characterizing 'the power to tax as the power to destroy' was adopted in Austrialia in cases such as D' Emden v. Peddler[30] (Justifying immunity from Commonwealth Control in State Trading), and the Railway Servants' case[31] (Implied prohibition).

But with 1920, when the original justices were no longer in majority, there was sharp change in the attitude of the Court. The doctrine of immunity of state instrumentalities was reversed in the Engineers' case[32] of 1920. According to Brady, "The fresh interpretation of the Constitution by the High Court after 1920, resulted in a shift from American precedents to those of the Council; in other words, to those which commonly govern Canadian cases."[33] This, however, does not mean that in its earlier decision the High Court was hostile to any expansion of federal power and there was a volte face in 1920s. Justice Isaacs, delivering the opinion of the Court, observed: "D'Emden v. Peddler, 1, C.L.R. was a case of conflict between Commonwealth law and State law. The Commonwealth law (Audit Act, 1901) made provision as to how public moneys of the Commonwealth were to be paid out : written vouchers were required for all accounts paid (Sections 34 (6) and 46). The irresistible construction of the Act is that these vouchers which the law requires for the protection of the Commonwealth Consolidated Revenue Fund, are to be under the sole control of the Commonwealth authorities. A State Act making it offence to give such a voucher except on a condition imposed by the State Parliament, namely, a tax in aid of the state revenue, was, so far, manifestly inconsistent with the Commonwealth law. Section 109 of the Constitution applies to such a case, and etablishes the invalidity to that extent of the state law. The decision rests on the supremacy created by Sec. 109, and is sound. So far as any observation in that case can be regarded as favouring a reciprocal doctrine creating invalidity of Commonwealth legislation by reason of State constitution of legislation, that observation must be considered as unwarranted by the Constitution, and overruled".[34] The Court continued to recognize the basic distribution of power as the essence of federalism. H.V. Evatt has pointed out that "there is neither a tendency towards, nor yet away from, Commonwealth supremacy over the states. The Constitution itself stands".[35] Of course with modern social and economic developments requiring

29. (1842) 16 Peters (U.S.) 435.
30. (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91.
31. (1906) 4 C.L.R. 488.
32. Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd. and others (The Engineers' case) (1920) 28 C.L.R 129.
33. Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
34. 28 C.L.R 129.
35. H.V. Evatt, "Constitutional Interpretation in Australia", *University of Toronto Law Journal*, III, no. 1, 22.

Commonwealth action, the old clauses received new meaning and the Court was more disposed after World War I to take a broad view of these terms in the national interest. This was by no means a sell-out to the federalising influence, and the Court struck the Federal Banking Act of 1945 in the City of Melbourne v. The Commonwealth[36] in 1947. Justice Dixon wrote the opinion of the Court and held, "Under a Unitary Constitutional system there is no legal difficulty in giving effect to such a policy or in carrying it as far down the line of public authorities as may be desired. But it is otherwise in a federal system. State and Federal Government are separate bodies politic and *prima facie* each controls its own moneys. To enable the Parliament of the Commonwealth to deny to the States the use of any bank but the Central bank of the Commonwealth and thus to guide the collections and disbursements of the states into and through an account of that bank, there must be found in the Constitution a definite legislative power of sufficient amplitude...In my opinion sec. 48 of the Banking Act is void because an inseverable part of it is directed to control or restrict the Executive Government of the States in the use of banks for the conduct of their banking business." According to Professor Sawer, "Since 1967, there has been some revival of the earlier tendency to draw restrictive rules from a general political theory of federalism." The conflict between Section 92 and Section 51 has left in dispute many frontiers of authority, and proposals for constitutional reform have been frequent.

However, increasing modern social and economic complexities have tended to make the action of the Commonwealth decisive in Australian affairs almost in a non-legal or extra-constitutional fashion. Alfred Deakin said in 1902 almost prophetically : "As the power of the purse in Great Britain established by degrees the authority of the Commons, so it will ultimately establish in Australia the authority of the Commonwealth. The rights of self-government of the states have been fondly supposed to be safeguarded by the Constitution. It left them legally free, but financially bound to the chariot-wheels of the Commonwealth. Their need will be its opportunity."[38] The institution of Special Grants, the Loan Council, and the Premiers' Conference all indicate towards Co-operative Federalism and the assumption by the Commonwealth of a firmer grip upon the economy and finances of the nation. In the absence of formal constitutional amendments due to consistent refusal of the electors to agree to any fundamental change in the constitution in popular referendum has, according to Professor Beasley, as quoted in Sawer's Federalism, "imposed a very heavy obligation on the High Court to ensure that the interpretation of the constitution does not become equally rigid".[39]

36. (1947) 74 C. L. R. 31.

37. Geoffrey Sawer, ed., *Federalism* (Melbourne : F. W. Cheshire, 1952), pp.222-23.

38. Quoted in W. Murdoch, *Alfred Deakin*, p. 234.

39. Sawer, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

Of course the federal experience in the Dominion of Canada and the Australian Commonwealth has many similarities, yet as Brady has summed up : "The federal system of Australia, aside from contrasts in the distribution of legislative power, differs from that of Canada in being less deeply rooted in social diversity, and without the difficulties of dual cultures, bilingualism, and significant racial minorities. Here federalism has operated in a peculiar environment, the most favourable among the English-speaking federations, and hence it has contributed richly and quickly to that integrated political life which is everywhere the purpose of federal government".[40] The Canadian and Australian constitutions present a fascinating study as to how judicial interpretation may change the pattern of federal-state relations. Australia started in 1901 with a comparatively less strong centre than Canada, but the impact of economic conditions and adroit handing of the situation by the Australian High Court had a cohesive effect on a rather 'decentralized' federation. There has been an obvious shift from classical to co-operative federalism to suit the complexities of the twentieth century in the last three decades. Miller holds that this financial dependance of the states upon the federal sanction has been "largely due to the interpretation of the High Court" and as such "Judicial interpretation has been a major factor in changing the working of the federalsim," extending the constitution in directions which its framers did not contemplate.[41] On the other hand, in Canada, the 'barbed-wire defence of property and civil rights' in the wake of Lord Watkin's and Lord Haldane's influence made national action difficult. Thus the influence of judicial interpretation in the growth and working of the Canadian and the Australian constitutions has been rather tremendous. Geoffrey Sawer, speaking about the Australian system said : "The Australian politician has to consider not only the possible view of the electorate, of the state parliaments and of the federal parliament. He also has to consider the possible view of the High Court on a proposed measure and this last view might be the most difficult of all to predict."[42] This equally holds good of Canada.

40. Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

41. Miller, J. D. B., *Austalian Government and Politics* (London : Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1959), p. 150.

42. Geoffrey Sawer, *Australian GovernmentToday* (Carlton : Melbourne University Press, 1949), p. 5.

Shri Ranbir Singh

IMPACT OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ ON THE WORKING OF GRAM PANCHAYATS IN HARYANA–A CASE STUDY

For this study I have taken a small village, Jyotisar. It is nearly two miles west of Kurukshetra University on the Kurukshetra Pehowa Road. The Bhakra Canal flows in its east and the Sarswati, the sacred rivulet in the North. The village has got great religious and historical significance as Lord Krishna gave his sermon of Gita here. It is the holiest of the holy places in India which attracts a large number of pilgrims from all parts of India.

The total population of the village is 1967, 1817 Hindus and 150 Sikhs The castewise break up is Rains (325), Brahmins (338), Bajigars (200), Ahirs (200), Chamars (150), Balmlkies (50), Banias (35), Jat Sikhs (50), Gujjars (39), Baddis (60), Majhbi Sikhs (100), Gadarias (50), other backward and scheduled castes (350).[1] The village has a middle school with about 200 students, 150 boys and 50 girls.[2] About 20 students including two girls are studying at the Kurukshetra University.[3] A religious organisation named the All India Hindu Mission[4] has its branch headquarters at this village, and a great deal of philanthropic work is done by them. The mission runs an Ayurvedic dispensary, a small students home and a Sarai.

In this paper, I have endeavoured to present a case study of this village to ascertain the impact of the Panchayati Raj[5] on the working on Gram Panchayats[6] in Haryana. For this purpose I have collected data pertaining to the working of the village Panchayat Jyotisar for 5 years (1957 to 1962) and have compared it with the data of the Post-Panchayati Raj period of 5 years, i.e., 1962–67.

1. Vide Figures supplied by the Social Education and Panchayat Officer, Thanesar.
2. Vide information given by Headmaster, Government Middle School, Jyotisar.
3. All of them are at the undergraduate level.
4. The All India Hindu mission was started in 1925. The Jyotisar branch was set up by the late His Holiness Swami Satyananda, a retired Sessions Judge.
5. Three tier structure of the Raj was established by the Punjab Panchayat Samities and Zila Prishads Act 1961. It was inugurated by the late Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru on October 2, 1961.
6. For the evolution of the Gram Panchayats here, see *Report of the Study Team on Panchayati Raj in Punjab*, (Chandigarh : Government Printing Press, 1967), pp. 317 and Shrinivase shastry, *Indian Journal of Public Administration* Vol. VIII, No. 4, p. 460.

Pre-Panchayati Raj Period

Two elections to the Gram Panchayat were held during the pre-Raj period. Since the village was very small two other tiny villages, Raogarh and Mundkhera were combined to form one unit and had one Panchayat. In the first election held in 1957, the Sarpanch, (Rain) and 6 Panchas, (Rain, Rahbari, a Harijan, a Bajigar and a Carpenter (Backward Class) were elected. The Sarpanch and 3 Panchas belonged to Jyotisar, 2 from Rao Grah and one from Mundakhera. In the year 1960, fresh elections were held. A Sarpanch Rain and 4 Panchas, (a Rain, a Gujjar, a Brahmin, a Bajigar) were elected, and a lady member was co-opted. None of the sitting members could be re-elected. Thus two teams held office during the first phase i.e., the Pre-Raj period, 1957–62.[1]

Besides administrative and civil and criminal powers, the Punjab Gram Panchayats Act 1952 empowers Panchayats for execution of such functions as sanitation and conservancy, maintenance of roads, bridges etc., maternity and child Welfare Centres, promotion of agriculture, supply of water, organising voluntary force etc.[2] Achievements of both the panchayats during the pre-Raj period are construction of the primary school building, installation of hand pumps, construction of a well for drinking water, construction of Haryana Welfare Centre, pucca pavement of village streets, construction of 3 culverts and organisation of the Young Farmers Club.

1. Source : the Panchayat Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Jyotisar.
2. Vide information collected by a survey.

TABLE I

Statement of Income 1957-62

Year	*Income from Gaon Shamlat*	*Recovery of House Tax*	*Grants in aid*	*10% spare in l and Revenue*	*Voluntary contribution*	*Misc.*	*Total*
1957-58	681.12	1322.50	2037.50	84.71	382.00	158.41	4666.24
1958-59	1051.50	617.00	582.00	79.00	15.00	4543.95	6888.45
1959-60	—	414.00	1368.00	—	292.00	116.53	2190.53
1960-61	881.53	1141.00	3600.00	249.86	336.75	447.88	6657.02
1961-62	792.00	3118.00	2000.00	10.00	318.00	69.23	6307.23
Total	3405.62	6612.50	10187.50	423.57	1800.00	5326.00	26709.77

TABLE II

Statement of Expenditure 1957-62

Year	*School Building*	*Provision of drinking water*	*Pavement of street*	*Pay of Secretary*	*Other civic amenities*	*Misc.*	*Total*
1957-58	1668.17	625.64	226.28	157.50	563.80	906.60	4167.99
1958-59	746.56	—	—	192.00	—	2.14	940.70
1959-60	26.25	1296.59	1315.12	96.00	—	44.98	2778.94
1960-61	5822.11	1205.99	—	96.00	247.2	825.40	8196.80
1961-62	67.77	—	—	246.00	2008.17	2781.72	5232.72
Total	8320.86	3128.22	1541.40	687.70	2818.99	4540.84	21317.15

The performance of the civic functions was satisfactory. But the developmental functions were neglected as practically nothing was done for the promotion of agriculture, 'the education in family planning techniques, promotion of cottage industries and subsidiary industries.[9]

The total income of the Gram Panchayat from all the sources was Rs. 26709.33 against the expenditure of Rs. 21,317.15. The Grants-in-aid from the Government was the major source of revenue, the recoveries from the House Tax and the income from the village common land (the Gaon Shamlat) figured the next. The contributions from the statutory share of 10 percent land revenue and the voluntary contributions have not been much. The school building and other civic amenities, the pavement of streets, were the main heads of expenditure. The provisions for drinking water came the next. These villages remained under the Jyotisar Gram Panchayat till 1960.

Post-Panchayati Raj Period

The Panchayat elected in 1960 continued in office till 1963 when a fresh election was held and a new Panchayat replaced it. All except sitting Sarpanch (Rain), failed to get re-elected and 5 Panches (a Chamar) (Harijan), a Brahmin, a Bajigar, a Rain and a Majhbi Sikh (Harijan) were elected. A Harijan lady was coopted by the Panchayat.[10] *This reflects increased political consciousness amongst the rural masses.* In this election especially in the case of the Sarpanch, personal integrity, the caste factor and the support of Harijan were the deciding factors. The election of the Sarpanch and 2 Harijan Panches and the cooption of the Harijan lady proves the capacity of the Harijan (who hold the balance in the evenly divided factions which cut across the cast barriers both vertically and horizontally.

The introduction of the Raj widened the[11] horizon of the village politics as the Sarpanches and the Panches were given the right to elect and to be elected to the higher bodies of the Panchayati Raj. Those who were elected to the Panchayat Samities and the Zila Prishads were afforded opportunity of being associated with procedure of planning and leaving the methodologies operative at the higher levels.[12] Financial, administrative and technical supervision of the Block Panchayat Samities and the Zila Prishads.[13]

9. Vide records of the Gram Panchayat, Jyotisar.
10. Source : The Secretary Gram Panchayat.
11. The Conclusion reached after interviews with a large number of people.
12. Details, see The Report of the study Team on Panchayati Raj in Punjab, op. cit., p. 22.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

TABLE III

Statement of Income 1962-67

Year	*Income from Gaon Shamlat*	*Recovery of House Tax*	*Grants in aid*	*10% share in land revenue*	*Voluntary contribution*	*Misc.*	*Total*
1962-63	591.07	575.00	10.00	82.28	6.00	515.40	1780.75
1963-64	2332.87	564.00	200.00	39.51	10.00	567.43	3713.81
1964-65	1529.72	400.00	505.00	19.10	179.12	6.73	2639.31
1965-66	2599.25	289.00	400.00	—	3.00	991.27	4346.01
1966-67	1065.00	—	—	—	2.00	14.70	1081.70
Total	8117.91	1829.00	1115.00	140.89	200.12	2095.53	13,560.58

TABLE IV

Statement of Expenditure 1962-67

Year	*School building*	*Provision of drinking water*	*Pavement of streets*	*Pay of Secretary*	*Other civic amenities*	*Misc.*	*Total*
1962-63	19.85	21.00	—	240.00	—	3368.80	3659.90
1963-64	7612.25	—	—	240.00	—	294.31	8146.56
1964-65	1343.61	—	413.54	264.00	—	78.40	2099.39
1965-66	1279.68	—	—	336.00	400.68	2739.40	4756.76
1966-67	223.24	5.00	—	—	—	159.04	387.28
Total	3478.63	26.00	413.54	1070.00	400.68	6633.79	19,048.89

The Gram Panchayat, during the second phase 1962-1967, claims the following achievements to its credit: the construction of the middle school building, upgrading of the school to middle standard from the primary level, construction of the flying platform and the pavement of streets and a revenue contribution towards the Jawans Welfare Fund.[14] A comparison of the achievements during 1957-62 period and the 1962-67 period, presents a dismal picture of the progress in the working of the Gram Panchayat, Jyotisar after the introductions of the Panchayati Raj. The record of the discharge of the civic functions does not compare favourably. Whereas, there is no improvement on the development front as practically little has been done to improve the economics status of the people by the Gram Panchayat.

The financial position of the Gram Panchayat, during 1962-67[15] tells the same *sordid* story. The income of the Gram Panchayat had a steep fall to Rs. 13560.89 against the income of Rs. 26,709.77 during the period 1957-62. This can be explained by the fact that in 1960, two villages, Rao Garh and Mundakhera, were excluded from the Gram Panchayat, Jyotisar and the principal of the financial viability was completely forgotten. The decline in the flow of the Government grants, the fall in the recovery of the House Tax and the hesitation of the Gram Panchayat to impose new taxes to avoid unpopularity has added to the deterioration of the financial position.

The logical deduction from the comparison of the working of the Gram Panchayat, Jyotisar, during the pre-and the post-Raj period is that Gram Panchayat have become no more effective than they were before the establishment of the Raj.[16] They have not become more conscious of the need and urgency of planned and programmed development.[17] The Gram Panchayats have not emerged as administrativaly efficient and financially sound institutions at village level as a usual of the introduction of the Raj.[18] Dr. Tharner's forecast that to approach the goal of rural development through the agency of existing village Panchayats would be an exercise in frustration, has come true.[19] But the malady is too deep and too complex too be solved by the Gram Panchaysts. Never the less, the Panchayati Raj has generated great political consciousness. Judged from the political angle, this is a no mean achievement.

14. The information provided by the B.D.P.O. and varified by personal survey.
15. See Table No. III.
16. The Report of the Study Team on P.R. in Punjab, p. 21.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
19. For Dr. Thorner, see Ralaph M. Retzlagg, Village Government in India, (Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 7.

This calls for a revised thinking and a realistic approach through :

Proper planning; Development and harness natural resources; Financial independence for programme; Administrative assistance for overcoming obstacles and bottlenecks.

Surendra Chopra

INDIAN PRACTICE OF CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS

The origin of the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* can be traced from Roman Law where every contract carried with it the implication that the contract was binding as long as the conditions remain the same. Similar doctrine is enshrined in the English law of frustration of contract.[1] It has come under the rubric of International Law through Municipal Law. *Rebus sic stantibus* is one of the most controversial problems of International Law. There is a good number of publicists who have defended this doctrine, others have warned against the use of this doctrine on flimsy grounds which might impair the sanctity of treaties. Grotius, in cautious terms points out that the change of circumstances did not affect a promise unless it was "patently clear" that the original circumstances were part of the consideration of the contract.[2] Bynkershoek[3] and Vattel[4] too were rather cautious in making a general statement of the doctrine. But the later publicists, specially Germans, boldly asserted the right of the states to repudiate treaties on the bases of the principle *rebus sic stantibus*, in case the treaties conflicted with the welfare of the people.[5] Oppenheim, however, is of the opinion that : "Vital changes of circumstances may be of such a kind as to justify a party in demanding to be released from the obligations of a treaty which cannot be abrogated by unilateral notice.[6]"

II

India invoked the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* in connection with the quasi-legal obligation imposed by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan's (UNCIP) resolutions of 13 August, 1948 and 5 January, 1949. Part I of the resolution of 13 August, 1948 enjoined both the parties (a) to issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within 4

1. J.L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, Oxford, Fourth Edition 1949, p. 286.
2. *De jure belli acpacis*, English Translation, Book II, Chapter XVI, §XXV.
3. *Droit des gens*, English Translation, Book II, § 296.
4. Volkerrecht, § 98. For the development of the principle see Lauterpacht. *British Yearbook of International Law*, 1927, pp. 94-107.
5. Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law*, Third Edition, New York, Appleton Century-Crofts, 1948, p. 455.
6. L. Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise*, Vol. I, edited by H. Lauterpacht. London, Longmans Green and Co., Eightth ed. 1955.

days after these proposals had been accepted by both Governments, (b) to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, (c) to let the commanders-in-chief of the forces of India and Pakistan to confer regarding any necessary local changes in the present disposition which may facilitate the cease-fire. In Section D, the resolution stipulated the appointment of military observers and in Section E it called upon both the Governments to appeal to their respective peoples "to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." Part II of resolution enjoined Pakistan to withdraw its troops, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It called upon both the states to "re-affirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement both Governments agreed to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such expression will be assured."[7]

This resolution imposed obligations on Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir and on both India and Pakistan to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby a fair and impartial plebiscite could be held. Meaning thereby that India was obligated to hold a plebiscite after the Pakistani troops clear off the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. Paragraph II of the resolution of 5 January, 1949 clearly stipulates that a plebiscite will be held when it "shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements" stipulated by Part I and II of the resolution of 13th August, 1948 "have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed.[8]"

India has invoked the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* in respect of these quasi-legal obligations on the ground that vital changes concerning Kashmir have taken place. Pakistan consolidated her position in the territory which was left to her after the cease-fire. It withdrew irregulars and tribals who had been lured into fighting by Pakistan by dangling Kashmiri wealth and women before them and marched regular forces to occupy the positions, held by irregulars. The Indian Government could invoke the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*, as early as 1949 because the above act of Pakistan upset the conditions under which India accepted to conduct a plebliscite. Mr. Menon argued that Pakistan had entered into military alliances and had armed itself to the teeth.[9] Military aid from the U.S. increased the power potential on Pakistan's side in

7. S/1100, 13 August, 1948, para 75.
8. S/1196, 5, January 1949.
9. See Surendra Chopra, "Kashmir in the United Nations", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXV, Nos. 3-4, 1964, p. 131.

violation of the UNCIP resolutions, posing a grave threat to the security of India. India had accepted the UNCIP resolutions when these conditions did not exist. As a result of these alliances, Pakistan had turned small landing strips in various parts of occupied Kashmir into large bases with American aid.[10]

Mr. Menon also pointed out that the conditions in Kashmir had undergone rapid social and economic changes[11] Rejecting Mr. Menon's contention that circumstances had changed Mr. Tsiang, the Nationalist Chinese representative, said that he could not see much change, "certain things", according to him had changed, "but basic features of the problem have not changed. I believe the principle of a solution should not change and cannot change."[12] The Cuban delegate in another meeting of the Security Council, rejected Mr. Menon's assertion that circumstances had changed. He said that in law the following conditions must be present. First, the situation must not have changed on account of any act of the defendant, second, as a result of the acts or phenomena which take place, it must be physically impossible to carry out the judgement, that is, the situation must have changed in such a way that the judgement of teh court—he was referring to private law—could not be enforced.[13] . Cuban delegation's assertion could not hold water. India went to the Security Council not as a defendant but in the capacity of a plaintiff and then the analogy of private law in this connection is clearly out of place. Mr. Sobol ov, the Soviet representative, however, supported India's contention and accused the Western powers for not being prepared to recognise the vital changes in Kashmir.[14] Mr. Nehru had earlier pointed out in a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan that :

> Recent developments in regard to military aid to Pakistan from the United States had already created a new situation which obviously affected the Kashmir issue as well as other issues. The whole question of demilitarisation of Kashmir had to be considered in the light of this new development which meant further militarization of Pakistan.[15]

Mr. Gunnar Jarring who was requested by a resolution sponsored by the U.S.A., the U.K., and Australia to Visit the sub-continent and bring

10. For full text of the speeches of Mr. Menon, see S/PV 762, 23 January, 1957, pp. 1-39, S/PV 763, 23 January, 1957, pp. 1-52 S/PV 764, 24 January, 1957, pp. 1-96.
11. *Ibid.*
12. S/PV 765, 24 January, 1957, p. 15.
13. S/PV 768, 15 February, 1957, pp. 20-21.
14. S/PV 770, 18 February, 1957, pp. 38-39.
15. India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Kashmir, Meetings and Correspondence between Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan* (July 1958-October 1954), p. 54. For detailed account of the impact of Military alliances on Kashmir see Surendra Chopra, "Pakistan, Pacts and Kashmir". *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1965, pp. 223-232.

about a solution of the intractable problem, came to India and Pakistan in March 1957. Mr. Jarring recognised India's assertion that circumstances had changed, in the following words :

> In dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively, as I have, during the period just ended, could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia.[16]

This assertion was a complete vindication[17] of India's stand in the Security Council. The Jarring Report was received with a mixed reaction in India.[18] The Pakistani press, however, attacked the report violently.[19]

Jarring Report was debated in Security Council in September 1957. Mr. Noon subjected Mr. Jarring's views concerning change of circumstances to scathing criticism. He. said :

> No change of any kind which should render the holding of a plebiscite impracticable has taken place in Kashmir. The basic factors which existed nine years ago exist today. The change, if any, in occupied Kashmir are the creation of India itself and have been brought about in direct defiance of the directives of the Security Council. India surely cannot plead the length of its aggressive stay in Kashmir as an excuse for not honouring its international agreement.[20]

Referring to Mr. Jarring's analysis of the situation pointed out above,[21] Mr. Noon pointed out that the changes did not have even the "remotest connection" with the plebiscite pledge. According to him what Pakistan and India might do in the wider field of International relationship had no relevance to Kashmir.[22] Mr. Sobolov, the Soviet representative appreciated Jarring's emphasis on the changed circumstances. He pointed out :

16. S/3891, 29 April 1957, para 20.
17. *The Hindu*, 1 May, 1957. Also see *Statesman*, 1 May, 1957. It highlighted editorially Jarring's emphasis on changing political and economic factors and the changing pattern of power relations.
18. *Ibid.* Also see *Times of India* and *Hindustan Times*, 1 May, 1957.
19. See *Times of Karachi*, 2 May, 1957, *Morning News*, 2 May, 1957, *Dawn*, editorial "All for Hatred", May, 1957.
20. S/PV, 791, 24 September, 1957, p. 4.
21. Supra n. 16.
22. S/PV, 791, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

Considering these circumstances, it would, of course, be unrealistic to be guided by recommendations and proposals put forward in connection with the Kashmir question many years ago.[23]

Referring to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the report, Mr. Sovolov, said that they were in accord with the Soviet view point on Kashmir and added that the "Security Council has not yet shown any sign of taking these conclusions into account".[24]

It is a pity that the views expressed by Jarring who is a person of eminent international juristic stature, concerning the changed circumstances, were not given due consideration by the members of the Security Council. Jarring's mediatory efforts were followed by Dr. Frank Graham's efforts. He too did not fail to recognise the changed circumstances and expressed his doubts if the U.N. representative could reconstitute the *status quo* which existed ten years ago.[25]

Circumstances have further changed since the Indian representative invoked the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* in the Security Council in 1957. A part of Kashmir became a victim of Chinese aggressive imperialism. Aksai-Chin area of Ladakh was clandestinely occupied and a road through the territory built to connect the two Chinese colonies of Sinkiang and Tibet.[26] China is dangerously looking southwards. The massive Chinese attack on India in 1962—Kashmir being one of the targets of attack—has put the whole situation in a new perspective. Moreover, Pakistan has entered into a border agreement with China demarcating the borders between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Chinese colony Sinkiang, surrendering about 2700 square miles of Indian territory. This adjustment on the border has enabled the Chinese to have listening post south of the traditional border and the acceptance of Karakoram range as the border instead of the Keun-lun range jeopardised Indian claim to Aksai-Chin which China has occupied.[27]

It may also be pointed out that the Pakistani tirade against India and the cry of Jehad which Pakistan kept on mounting and the Pakistani misadventure of sending over 5000 infiltrators into Kashmir in August 1965 and the subsequent Pakistani attack has further strengthened the contention that circumstances have undergone vital changes.

23. S/PV 793, 5 November 1957, p. 2.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
25. S/3984, 31 March, 1958.
26. India, Ministry of External Affairs, *White Papers* I—V.
27. For details see Surendra Chopra, "Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement", *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1968, pp. 220-237 and the sources cited therein. Also see Surendra Chopra, "Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", *Kurukshetra University Research Journal* (Arts and Humanities), Vol. 1, No. 2, 1967, pp. 425-430.

III

The doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* does not appear to have acquired total acceptance by any arbitral tribunal, Permanent Court of International Justice or the International Court of Justice. In the case *The Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*,[28] decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1932, France maintained that the circumstances had so changed that it was difficult for France to continue with the free zones and pleaded that the court would be justified in holding the provision of Art. 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, lapsed. The court maintained that the French failed to prove that the changes they had in mind called for repudiation of the above article. But it did not reject the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*. Again in the *Corfu Channel* case judge Alvarez, in his dissenting judgement maintained :

> We are familiar with the well established doctrine in international law of the clause known as *rebus sic stantibus*, according to which a State may refuse to execute a treaty if the conditions which prevailed at the time of signature have substantially changed. That doctrine is so just that it has begun to find its way into private law. But the power of the court to remodel international law is merely the application in every branch of that law of the doctrine of the clause *rebus sic stantibus*, the principle at the root of it is the same; it is a principle of social justice.[29]

Judge Alvarez, expressed similar views in his dissenting opinion in the *Advisory Opinion on Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations*[30] and *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's Case*.[31] From the practice of the International tribunals it appears, "in almost all cases in which the doctrine, *rebus sic stantibus* has been invoked before an international tribunal, the latter while not rejecting it in principle, has refused to admit that it could be applied to the case before it."[32]

There are innumerable examples of state practice in respect of the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*.[33] A significant example of repudiation of international obligation on the bases of essential change of circumstances was declaration of withdrawal from the treaty of Paris of 1856 by Russia during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. The treaty had imposed certain

28. P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 22, 1929 : 1932.
29. I.C.J , Reports, 1949, p. 41.
30. I.C.J., Reports, 1950, p. 17.
31. I.C J., Reports, 1952, p. 126-7.
32. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 940.
33. For a brief survey of state practice see Foster, *The Practice of Dimplomacy*, (1906), pp. 299-305. Also see Kaufmann, *Das Wesen des Volkerrecht und die clausula rebus sic stantibus*, (1911), pp. 12-37 as cited in Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, n 3, p. 939.

restrictions on Russia in respect of maintaining men of war in that sea. It had also neutralised the sea. Russia maintained that material change in circumstances was brought about by the Union of Danubian states and the marked changes in the quality and character of men of war. Great Britain protested. But at the close of the Franco-Prussian War, the great powers acquisced in the Russian stand according to a treaty signed at London in 1871.[34] Not very far back Big Powers pleaded in 1954 for wriggling out of their obligations under the Potsdam agreement on similar grounds.[35]

There is an important question yet to be answered by International jurists and state practice. Is invocation of *rebus sic stantibus* tenable in case of resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations ? There is no conclusive answer. The United Nations resolations are merely recommendatory and are not regarded as having legal force behind them. They have at best quasi-legal authority. Applying the analogy of treaties to quasi-legal obligations, it may be asserted, if treaties can be revoked when there occurs a vital change in circumstances and a party can justifiably withdraw from a treaty, a party having undertaken obligations in accordance with a U.N. recommendation can also, if there is a material change in circumstances, invoke the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus.*

Conclusion

Summing up it may be pointed out that even though International Courts have not upheld the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* in any case in which this doctrine was invoked, yet the court has not rejected this doctrine. In the case of *The Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex,* the court simply stated that France could not prove that there was a material change of circumstances justifying the invocation of *rebus sic stantibus.* State practice during the last century proves that states have resorted to this practice whenever there had been a material change of circumstances. International jurists, also uphold this doctrine, though unanimity in this respect does not exist.

India, however, seems to be justified in withdrawing from the obligations it undertook by accepting the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August, 1948 and 5 January 1949. The flaw in Indian practice of the *clausula rebus sic stantibus* is not in its invocation but in the delay in invoking it. India could have, and justifiably so, invoked this doctrine in 1949 when immediately after the cease-fire declaration, Pakistan instead of withdrawing her troops progressively, withdrew irregulars and sent regular troops

34. For details see Holland, *European Concert in Eastern Question* Oxford, 1885, pp. 220-270.

35. For details see documents cited at fn. 10.

to man the positions held by irregulars. The UNCIP was quick to note the change in circumstances when it submitted the *Third Interim Report*, so did Gunnar Jarring and Dr. Frank Graham.

In view of the fact that Pakistan has consolidated its position in the occupied areas of Kashmir, has entered into military alliances, hence changing the balance of power, that Pakistan has changed the character of small landing strips in occupied Kashmir by converting them into large bases with the help of United States and has surrendered 2700 square miles of Indian territory to China and that Kashmir has made rapid progress in the social and economic fields go to prove that the situation in and around Kashmir has undergone vital change justifying India's contention.

HISTORY

D. Awasthi

SIR JOHN WALTER SHERER'S PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE ON THE REVOLT OF 1857-A STUDY

The uprising of 1857 was indeed a fortunate occurrence. It was a new and bold approach to an age-old problem. History records resistance of various degrees and kinds to invaders from the north, but before 1857 a mass uprising of a whole army aided by the people against an alien rule had never happened. The uprising was unprecedented not only in India but also anywhere in the world. There had been internal revolutions like the one in France, and there had been frightful wars between sovereign/nations or power-drunk rulers, but they were different from the 'Indian Mutiny' in the sense that the uprising here was entirely an attempt at ejecting a foreign power. A subject race had taken up arms against a powerful alien ruler who was firmly entrenched in the country's soil. For the time being, no doubt, the Indian people were laid low both moraley and physically, but their faith in the nobleness of their cause remained unshaken and within two decades the spirit of freedom began to reassert itself. Those of the sepoys who revolted, suffered for the love of their own form of faith and worship sacrificing themselves for their principles. The innocent persons who were mercilessly put to death in retribution paid the price of their life for being the citizens of a subject nation.

The magnificent heroism displayed by our freedom-fighters has won a chorus of praise from a number of historians. It has been suggested that "not one single element that goes to make up a world drama or a great world epic is wanting. Scene succeeds scene with dramatic swiftness : figures heroic who would not have done despite to an Homeric stage; figures tragic and pathetic such as only the genius of a Shakespeare could adequately present; figures half-divine and wholly demoniac such as only Milton could have called up from the vasty deep of his almost inspired imagination; all these move across the stage".[1]

An Englishman had conceived the idea of writing an epic on the events of the revolt. This gentleman was making a tour of India in search of historic and pre-historic antiquities. His idea was to write the the sotry of the 'Mutiny' in verse and to make it a work comparable to the ancient epics of India. He was also thinking of composing his work

1. Oswell's *Sketches of Rulers of India*, Vol., I p. xxiii.

to cover both the ancient and modern history of India, but was overtaken by death before the completion of his proposed task.[2]

Since the momentous events of 1857-58 an immense amount of literature has grown round their causes and results Still on account of sharp divergence of opinion on this matter, an impartial account of those events is a historical necessity. The group of British historians like Raikes, Reese, Kaye, Malleson, Alfred Lyall, P.G. Scott, Mrs. Coupland and a host of others, who acted as advocates of British rule rather than impartial judges of the events, has described it as a conflict between civilization and barbarism, or called it a Hindu-Muslim conspiracy; and thus they have denounced the rebels as *goondas* or *budmashas*. The other group comprising Indian historians like Dr. S.N. Sen, Dr. Tara Chand, Dr. S.B. Chaudhuri, V.D. Savarkar, Ashok Mehta *etc.*, has designated it a national rising or the war of national independence. Even Benjamin Disraeli was of the opinion that the uprising was "no sudden impulse, but was the result of careful combinations, vigilant and well-organized, on the watch for an opportunity ..decline and fall of empires are not affairs of greased cartridges...such rebellions are occasioned by adequate causes."[3]

Stipulating a code of conduct for impartial historians Dr. R.P. Tripathi recommends objectivity and fairmindedness. In his opinion "History should be viewed in the totality of knowledge, in the perspective of the globe."[4] When the conflicting accounts of a historic occurrence obscure our vision, it is our bounden duty to strive for the obtainment of the basic facts and present our unbiased views without any manipulation of the original data.

The issue of 1857 has been muddled up by the confusion arising out of the clash between patriotic fervour on the one hand and chauvinistic zeal on the other. It is beset with a host of difficulties peculiar to a nation in bondage. During the rule of alien masters there was a deplorable lack of enterprising historians and with a few notable exceptions no one was prepared to incur the odium and displeasure of the rulers. When the spectre of fear stalks a land, the pen of historian is held captive by dismay. The repressive political atmosphere fails to beget a historical account of unimpeachable accuracy. There is no gainsaying the fact that English writers have written distinguished books on Indian history and the Revolt of 1857, but on account of their unfamiliarity with the social and political complex of India as well as some of the reasons adverted to above, a throughly objective account of the historic event cannot be expected from them. Not only the magnitude of task was overwhelming, quite a few of them did not share the faith and aspirations of the

2. *Ibid.*, loc.cit.
3. Sethi, R. R. and Grover, B. L., *Studies in Modern Indian History*, p. 173
4. Cited in Misra, *A.S.*, *Nana Saheb Peshwa*, p. 6.

Indian people. It was perhaps on account of some of these reasons that the late Professor Huxley was of the opinion that the works on Indian History written by English authors were not "trustworthy".[5] In the words of Professor Goldwin Smith "each nation in the main, writes its own history best; and it best knows its own lands, its own institutions, the relative importance of its own events, the characters of its own great men. But each nation has its peculiarities of view, its prejudices, its self-love, which require to be corrected by the impartial or even hostile view of others".[6]

The task of the historian presenting an objective account of 1857 Revolt is evidently an arduous one for it is not easy "to separate the true from the false, the cartain from the uncertain and the doubtful from that which cannot be acepted". Although the existing accounts of 1857 are the product of deligent researches conducted in the past, the subject seems to evince enormous potentiality for further investigation. During the course of my personal investigations in this inexhaustible subject, I came across a number of private letters of John Walter Sherer, G.S.I., in the Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Allahabad. The letters addressed to his wife, Louisa,[7] and some friends abroad, give revealing details of conditions obtaining in the North-Western Provinces during the period of Revolt by the valiant freedom-fighters against the British in 1857.

Sherer was a member of Bengal Civil Service and had come to India in 1846. He began his service career as Assistant Magistrate of Agra in the same year. In 1850, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces Sir James Thomason, whose father Thomas Thomson had been an intimate friend of Sherer, appointed him Assistant Secretary to his Government. Sherer also acted as Registrar of the old Sudder Court, and later became Joint Magistrate of Aligarh. His Report on the condition of lands bordering the Jamuna Canal which he submitted in 1856 after undertaking an intensive tour of Panipat, Karnal, Rohtak, Najafgarh and various other places is quite important and well-known. This Report was very much appreciated and finally approved by John Colvin, James Thomason's successor. It may not be out of place to mention here that Sherer completed his Report in the house of his father-in-law at Kandharee Bagh, Agra. While he was still busy in drafting the Report, he came to know about the possibility of a revolt by the native infantry. One day as he was talking to his father-in-law and a Colonel of the Native

5. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

6. Smith, G., *Lectures on the Study of History*, pp. 37-38.

7. Louisa was the daughter of Mr Harrington, a Judge of the old Sudder Court at Agra during 1856-57.
For details see: Sherer, J. W., 'Daily Life', p. 2.

infantry, his mind seems to have been assailed by the possibility of the impending disaster. He has quoted in his 'Diary' that :-

"The subject of the cartridges quite new to him (Sherer), and the colonel said if the materials for greasing them were such as suspected, and biting them was insisted upon, the Sepoys would certainly not obey orders. "And", he added, "though John, Sepoy seems such a quiet fellow in the lines, on such matters as his caste, his religion, or his women, if he gets off his head, there is no violence or cruelty he would not commit".[8]

During Colvin's regime Sherer was appointed as Magistrate and Collector of Fatehpur-Hassua, a district between Kanpur and Allahabad. The days preceding his departure from Agra to Fatehpur seem to be charged with dramatic tension. An entry in Sherer's personal 'Diary' records that before he could take charge of his new magisterial responsibility, he was told by the Government Secretary that he had little or no experience in managing a district. The Government Secretary further told him about the "Mohomedan Deputy Collector Hikmut Oollah, at Futtehpore, and recommended him to lean on him as a man of complete acquaintance with that part of the country, intelligent, tried, and entirely to be trusted".[9] Soon after the assumption of reins of administration Sherer noticed the famoûs *Chapati* Campaign started by Indian revolutionaries. He must have sensed the trouble that was brewing in the offing for the next entry in his personal 'Diary' reads as under :

"We had the celebrated "*Chupattis*" in cur district; but I am almost inclined to think more has been made of them than was their due. The village watchmen received them, and forwarded them, or similar ones, elsewhere, as they were requested to do; but all agree that the watchmen had no definite idea of what was meant. If the transmission of these cakes was only intended to create a mysterious uneasiness, that object was gained. But if the affair was signal for united action, it failed altogether, and ended in a bungle, for no united action took place. And it must be remembered that the circulation of *Chupattis* is a superstitious practice not unknown in Central India, resorted to, we are told, in the hope of passing on epidemics".[10]

The Revolt broke out while Sherer was at Fatehpur and these unpublished letters afford a view of his dramatic flight from Fatehpur to

8. Sherer, J. W., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

Banda,[11] Nagode, Mirzapur and Allahabad. Beside giving an account of his own condition, they also throw interesting sidelights on the Muslim conspiracy at Banda, the story of British torture, the feeling of revenge in the Indians, the seige of Kanpur and Lucknow, *etc.* After his escape from Banda, Sherer started acting as head of the Civil Department supplying information to the soldiers, generals and the Governor-General. In one of his letters to his wife on June 13, he wrote:

"Tell Frank to mention to one of Lord Canning's Secretaries that Fatehpur was lost on tenth June and fell into the hands of an influential band of Mohammedan conspirators, headed by the Deputy Magistrate and Collector of the district. They have opened the Jail and got possession of the treasure—nine[12] lakhs. A titular Nawab has been set up but the Deputy[13] Collector is the principal manager. All the European residents have escaped to Banda except Mr. R. Tucker, the Judge."

After the seige of Kanpur was over, Sherer was appointed the Collector of Kanpur. Though his tenure of office was very short, the first hand information contained in his 'Diary' presents a graphic picture of the post-revolt days in Kanpur. He writes:

"We passed through some streets till we reached the principal thoroughfare—the Chouk—at the head of which stood the Kotwalee, a two-storied building with arches in front, forming a balcony above. Here we (Sherer and Bews) dismounted, ascended to the upper story, and were almost immediately surrounded by a crowd of people, many of them Bengalees. They professed themselves delighted with our return; but were rather afraid of the soldiers and thought that, if measures of retaliation were taken, the innocent might be confounded with guilty. We said that as far as we knew, no indiscriminate punishment was at all likely to be inflicted; and told them the best way of showing their loyalty would be to offer their services for useful work. Bengalees are always ready to write; and one of them improvised paper, inkstand, and a table, and commenced writing placards somewhat as follows: "This house belongs to one Mokerjee, very loyal subject. Please not to molest." I was requested to

11. Sardar Khan, the Deputy Magistrate of Banda, who had personally come with boats on the opposite bank of the river Jamuna to pick up Sherer and some other Europeans, had successfully managed to cross over to Banda. Mutiny Narrative, N. W. P. Agra, Fatehpur District, pp. 3-5.

12. This is a reference to Khakreru treasury. It was looted at 8 p.m. on May, 18, by Ali Bakhsh, Amin Baksh, Imad, Faqir Bakhsh, Bua Brahman, Amin, Saadat Qalandar, Sami Ullah, Lal Brahman, Thakur Din, Aman Bakhsh, Mata Din. Yaqin Shah, Mosam Shah, Iman Bakhsh etc. *Fatehpur Mutiny Basta* No. 2, File No. 27: "Loot of the Khakreru Treasury."

13. Hikmat Oollah was the rebel Deputy Collector of Fatehpur who, within a week after the overthrow of the English from Fatehpur, started issuing *parwanahs* in which he, as Sherer says, "assumed the style of Chukladar of Futtehpoor." Mutiny Narrative, N.W.P. Agra, Fatehpur District, pp. 3-5.

sign these, and they were supposed to be talismans, which, when presented to the excellent Thomas Atkins, would assuage that warrior's angry disposition. Fortunately for all parties, Atkins was not permitted to roam into the city; and my talismans were never put to a rude practical test."[14]

It was perhaps during his stay at Kanpur that the pets of Nana Saheb—a monkey and a squirrel—were brought to Sherer's 'Camp' from Bithoor. His own account about them is as under :

"Henry Willock accompanied the expedition to Bithour, and brought back two of the Nana's pets, a Wandaroo monkey, and a squirrel quite as big as a small rabbit. The monkey became well-known in camp and ultimately reached the Zoological Gardens in London, where I afterwards called upon him. The costly squirrel was made over to me; but whether owing to undue excitement, or perhaps change, or perhaps change of food—for ignorant of his habits I could only ask, in a helpless way, like the gentleman in "Dombey", whether "something temporary could not be done with the teapot"—he died—poor, beautiful creature".[15]

Though Sherer has given an account of the Revolt of 1857 in four of his books—"Daily Life during the Indian Mutiny, Personal Experiences of 1857", "Havelock's March on Cawnpore 1857—A Civilian's Notes", "Some Accounts of the Mutiny and Subsequent Events at Cawnpore" and "Memoirs of the Mutiny"—yet he has somehow omitted therein some of the facts and figures which he has mentioned in his letters to his wife and friends. For instance, in letters from Allahabad, dated July 2 and 3, Sherer tells his wife, "Martial law is being carried out in the strictest way. The Munsiff of the city has been hung";[16] again, that "Retribution is going on in a very fearful way. Fourteen men were hung here yesterday and fourteen the day before and houses were burnt down at once."[17] Curiously enough these brutalities do not figure any where in the works of Sherer on the Indian Mutiny.

14. Sherer, J.W., *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.
16. Letter from Sherer to Louisa, Allahabad, July 2,1857, U.P. State Archives, Allahabad.
17. Letter from Sherer to Louisa, Allahabad, July 3,1857. U.P. State Archives, Allahabad.

EDUCATION

Prof. Uday Shankar

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF DELINQUENCY

Delinquency is essentially a social malady caused by environmental factors in the particular community. Delinquency could rightly be called a "Home Industry", as the basic foundations of this social disease are laid, to begin with, in the home and later, whatever other social factors there may be for the explanation of anti-social or delinquent acts, these work more to make explicit what has been implicit or dormant. There cannot, however, be any other real basis to understand delinquent acts than on the basis of their determinants. It appears, therefore, essential to understand what those possible social deterimants are which are responsible for the various types of delinquent acts on the part of young boys and girls.

It may be said, to start with, that by delinquent acts is understood all such criminal activities such as Stealing, Burglary, Pick-Pocketing, Violence, Truancy, Tresspassing, Sex Crimes, Arson etc. on the part of young boys and girls in their teens, which if committed by grown up adults would have made them liable for prosecution and legal action according to the law of the land. Crimes of this type are called delinquent acts when these are committed by minor boys and girls in their teens, which otherwise, are of the same gravity as when committed by adults.

The problem of juvenile delinquents is not a simple problem to be treated lightly, as it involved thousands and thousands of children and not just a few.

In a survey conducted by the Union Ministry of Education and published in 1954, it was made out that there were 40,119 juvenile offenders who were tried in the courts in the various States in the Indian Union (excluding U.P.). But these figures are extremely nominal and indicated only a small fraction of the magnitude of anti-social acts committed by young offenders.

Figures available from other countries about the young delinquents are also far less than the actual number of the delinquents going about in streets, schools, homes or elsewhere in the population. In U.S.A., for example, the number of delinquents is reported to be many times as great as the estimated 1% of the teen agers who are brought before the uvenile courts each year. In U.K. it was estimated some time back that

there were, 1,25,000 children deprived of normal home life. About 1,00,000, were involved in cases which were more or less like crimes and there were 23,000 divorces, leading to many children becoming homeless and thus making them anti-social. In this country also with a population of about 50 Crores, the number of children showing anti-social behaviour or committing various crimes, as mentioned above, should be not a few thousand but a few million.

These type of children who are likely and who actually commit anti-social acts are both actual delinquents and potential delinquents, that is to say, some of these children commit crimes and are caught and are produced before courts, whereas quite a few of them escape being apprehended by the police and some of them even having been apprehended are let off due to a number of reasons. Apart from these actual delinquents whether caught or released, there is a host of potential delinquents who go about in the population and who on finding an opportunity or being thus circumscribed would be quite disposed to commit criminal acts.

This makes it necessary to explain the meaning of delinquent character. Delinquent character formation is of the type in which there is no stable system of values built up. In other words the super-ego or conscience is of a very nebulous nature. Delinquent character formation is essentially characterized by this lack of inner check or what ordinarily is called conscience. When there is no fear outside and there is no check within, one is likely to commit crimes of any order easily. This is exactly what happens in the case of young delinquents.

This nebulous and weak super-ego or system of values (generally called as conscience) is built up by the process of what in psychology is called "introjection" i.e. to say by building up in the mind of the child the image of the moral and the social values of parents, guardians or other elders with whom the child lives in close relationship, and the system of values as held dear by these elders shapes the contents of the system of values or super-ego of the young. For this process of introjection or of imbibing the values of elders there has to be identification between the youngsters and the elders and there has to be a social climate of friendliness, sympathy, love and affection between the children and the elders without which the process of identification and consequently of introjection becomes very difficult and not quite possible. Such an atmosphere of sympathy, confidence, trust, respect and of love and affection is the precondition for the youngster acquiring the system of values of elders or for the building up a stable super-ego. Many potential deliquents who have not yet committed any crime but who are quite disposed to the committing of crimes are such children who have such character formation in which the super-ego or the system of values is very feeble. This explains the position that there is such a large number of

potential delinquents in addition to the actual delinquents who, have been so declared or dealt with by courts and who are similar to the potential delinquents in their character formation.

When the social conditions in the home environments are such as do not allow the formation of a stable super-ego, the lack of which is the basic condition of delinquent act, it is quite apparent that the social climate in the home is basically responsible for the genesis of delinquency. When we talk of social determinants of delinquency we have to refer to these social conditions essentially in the home which stand in the way of proper identification and introjection of the elders, may be parents, step-parents, uncle or aunt.

These social conditions of love and affection, acceptance, recognition, encouragement, friendliness and sympathy, in the presence of which stable super-ego formation takes place, are not available in the homes where the child is an orphan or mother or father have divorced or in the event of one parent having died the other brings in another marital partner, thus creating the step-child and step-parent situation. In some homes the child may be born to the unwilling parents, and thus he may not be wanted. In some other homes due to employment of parents and other conditions the child may be neglected. Also the treatment meted out by some unthinking parents may be that of nagging, fault-finding, punishing or of any other form of maltreatment. There are a number of such social conditions which are at the root of delinquent behaviour. It may be worth-while to examine some of these more important social factors in some greater details.

These comments that follow are largely based upon the results of the closer study of 140 delinquent children in the District Jail and in Childrens' Home at Delhi undertaken by the writer some time ago. As modern psychology has shown, the most important factor for the child's healthy development is affection and sense of security. Many times the child does not develop a stable system of values if the social climate in the home is such as does not allow the necessary dose of love and affection. Also the child is quite confused if there is inconsistent disciplining by weak and whimsical parents who sometimes are indulgent and sometimes are restricting, severe and harsh. In such a situation not only the super-ego in the child grows defective and weak but the self or the ego, also remains crippled, always looking to others for help. Such children feel insecure, as there is no consistent relationship between them and the parents. They have no appreciation of their powers and weaknesses in relationship with the external reality and they have not learnt to subordinate their pleasure seeking impulses to more abiding or lasting gains. The result is that such a confused and insecure child having been the victim of inconsistent discipline comes in clash with the world outside leading to the aggressive and anti-social behaviour patterns.

Like want of calm, liberal and democratic type of discipline, severity and harshness within the home also contributes to the formation of latent delinquents. With very rigid and dominating parents who maltreat, the child acquires a degree of severity in himself and such a dominated child out-worldly is courteous, obedient and quiet but deeper still he is troubled and rebellious Not having much freedom in thought and action and having been mostly nagged and criticized, he does not develop confidence, initiative and resourcefulness.

Some parents have very indulgent and passive attitude towards children as towards personal property. These too anxious and indulgent parents do not allow children to exercise their hands and limbs and do every thing for them. They do not allow them to play in the streets with other children with the fear that some harm may be done to them as if every dog bites and every cow is a bull. Such anxious and nervous treatment and making so much fuss on minor ailments makes children feel that they are weak, sick and not quite allright and that there is something wrong with them. This fosters a sense of inadequacy, lack of confidence and they almost feel to lean on others for ever and to walk on crutchs, as it were, as they have not been made to learn how to walk on their own feet. These children do not grow with steady super-ego and have even a weak ego and these could easily be exploited by more aggressive companions to relapse into acts of delinquency.

In the study taken up by the writer it was found that a large majority of delinquents were the victim of maltreatment by parents, step-parents, guardians or other elders they had to live with. It is no use citing many examples here of such cases of maltreatment which resulted into delinquent behaviour. In a case, for example, of an orphan boy who ran away from his home because his elder brother beat him, as he had lost a goat while grazzing them in the forest, the boy went to a town where after spending some days with scanty food, he was caught by the police when he tried to run away with the clothes of a bather on Jumna Ghat in order to sell them away to buy some thing to satisfy his hunger. There are so many cases of youngsters running away from home because of bullying, beating and harash treatment by step-parents, aunt or uncle, elder brother or other adults with whom the child is forced, by circumstances, to live.

Some children leave the home and play truant because of jealousy towards the step-brother or sister or towards their own younger brother or sister, as they feel "dethroned" when the interest of parents shifts to the young child. In some cases the jealousy or hostility was also against authority of some elder member who deprived them of certain rights and privileges and the anti-social acts were committed to wreak revenge and to express their deep resentment towards such high-handedness. There was the case of a strongly built boy who was living with his uncle, as

his parents had died. This uncle of his wanted to get rid of him in order to be the sole master of the boy's share in the joint family property and so he maltreated him even by depriving him of proper food. The conditions becoming intolerable the boy left home with whatever ornaments of his aunt he could collect and for some time he lived by selling the ornaments. Ultimately not finding any means to live on, he tried to break-open the Post Office not only to get some money to live on but also to wreak revenge, in his own way, on cruel society which could not protect his legitimate rights. He was, however, apprehended by the police in the attempt and was serving a sentence in the District Jail, when he was interviewed by the author.

In some cases delinquent behaviour is caused by the social conditions in a broken home. The broken home may be due to divorce, re-marriage, as this is more common in America and other European Countries and not so much in India. However, the genesis of delinquency in a broken home lies not so much in the separation, divorce or re-marriage by parents but by the condition of neglect, tension, insecurity, confusion about the future and the break in the normal life and the routine the child was used to. A child separated from or deserted by the parents is like undergoing an operation when he feels as if he is cut off from the parent as the limb is cut off from the body. The life of the child in such cases of desertion ceases to be truely human and if it dees not actually become atrophied physically like the cut off limb, his normal growth is drastically interfered with. Such children failing to have persons even as substituting the parents, are emotionally starved and are easily driven to a life of crime or anti-social acts.

Similar is the fate of many neglected, rejected or unwanted children. Some children are left by widow mothers going away with some body else or by widower fathers having another wife. Quite a few of such cases in the study made by the writer were such as were left on the Delhi Railway Station or in a crowded bazaar.

Quite a few of the youngsters who were found to have indulged in anti-social acts play truant from home because they find the home environment dull, monotonous and un-interesting with no new experiences and with no scope of satisfying the natural urge for adventure. Children long for security, recogniton, new experience and adventure. Some childeren play truants from homes of this type and fall in bad hands and are obliged to indulge in criminal activities. In the study made by the writer quite a few of the delinquents came from hilly areas as the dull environments in the hilly areas like Gharwal, Tehri, Almora, Kangra, failed to satisfy the curiosty, sense of adventure and some bright ones at least, finding the work there boring easily are attracted to a life of adventure and fun on the plains. On the suggestion of some companion

they run away from homes. Such youngsters not always finding jobs are obliged to think of robbery. pick-pocketing and such like activities. There are some cases of delinquent behaviour caused mainly by boredom, lack of freedom, independence and opportunities of new experiences in the outer world.

In some offenders the chief precipitating cause of their delinquent behaviour was their lack of adjustment in the school. Some children in schools are not given the work in the class according to their ability. Children in this country, as all know, are put together in schools and are not placed in the grade suited to their capacity and needs. Such children not making adequate progress are frustrated in their sense of achievement which deepens their sense of inferiority and guilt. On top of that the harsh treatment on the part of the un-understanding teachers adds insult to injury and such children, feeling completely demoralised, become desparate and play truant. School failure is highly correlated with the incidence of delinquency. In most of Indian schools teaching is made worse by dominance of the class teacher who rules his Kingdom, as it were, with a rod and his will is law. Class-room procedures are here generally autocratic and the chief virtues in children are considered to be orderliness, silence and conformity to rules. Learning difficulties of children and their backwardness, in some cases, cause behavioural problems leading to anti-social acts which arise not only from the lack of understanding and the wrong choice of subjects but also due to wrong handling and approach to children by teachers and the faulty methods of teaching.

Of course in many cases of delinquent behaviour in the school there is no doubt about the anti-social character formation with which the child goes to school. Lack of adjustment in the school serves as a precipitating cause. In a normal child the control over his impulses goes on imperceptably even when in the school and the ego gets strength through intellectual achievement and the super-ego also gets stronger by new identifications with other personalities in the body of teachers or heroes read in books. But in a child with anti-social character formation developed from early days in the home, there is hardly any wish to be good nor is there any energy in him to make progress in studies. The community life in school does not offer him any pleasure and his school life is mostly of frustration and he plays traunt and commits some offences. Such children are ruled by momentary pleasures and they have not learnt to forego timely pleasures for some more abiding gains in the future. So it is found that in many cases high or low intelligence as such or the bad treatment of the teacher or the faulty methods of teaching as prevalent in most of our schools are secondary causes which help in bringing up the latent anti-social character formation developed in close contact with parents and other members of family. To trace the genesis of delinquency, therefore, one has ultimately to go to the early developmental history of the child in the home.

Some time parents and guardians argue and protest that their child or ward committed the delinquent act because of the influence of bad companions and they try to protest that the child was allright and that he just got into bad campany. Of course, bad companionship acts as an important factor in the explanation of the delinquent behaviour, but it is more a precipitating cause and the potential delinquency is already built up in the child's mental make-up and bad company only serves as a catalytic agent, as such a child is easily influenced by suggestions from companions for rebellious and anti-social acts.

Some children commit crime themselves but in most cases delinquent activities are committed by children in companionship with others. Gang formation is a usual adolescent phenomenon to find opportunity for amusement and advanture and to escape from certain adversities of life. Delinquents too usually have their companions in their anti-social acts. As they are usually of weak ego formation they are afraid of committing offences all alone and feel secure if there is somebody else siding with them. Many truants from home or school have their companions or instigators. It was estimated in the study conducted by the writer that about 60% of the offenders had companions in their anti-social activities of one sort or other. Other authorities also quote percentage of companionship for delinquent acts to the extent of 80 to 90%. Companionship even encourages the committing of crimes. A single individual is afraid of falling in a false situation and is often aware of the consequences if caught but in a company of others one feels reassured that if caught he would not be the only one punished and he even gladly follows the criminal practice subconsciously even to give expression to his stored up aggression and rebellion. His anti-social character formation is only waiting for a compananion who helps in changing the latent delinquency into manifest delinquency.

Such a child with anti-soical character formation on finding a job usually cannot and does not carry on with it for long as he is not able to bear the inconvenience of doing his duty as an employee. Such people with delinquent charactor formation live more on the "pleasure principle" as called by Freud. They live from moment to moment seeking fleeting gratification of impulses and they cannot put up with the un-pleasantness of duty required for the job. Such individuals must have satisfaction there and then as so many mouth fulls and in many cases such youngsters come in clash with the employer, leave the job in a fit of anger arising out of the un-pleasantness in doing the duty which to them is unbearable and frustrating in their momentry pleasure. Such youngsters shift from job to job and thus being often out of job they easily follow the road of anti-social behaviour. They want easy money and the quick gains and thus begin to steal and to wreak revenge even against his employer and they even try to rob him. Thus un-employment or un-congenial working conditions, as some form of social factors, also add to the incidence of delinquency.

Ill treatment by the employers, hard work, lack of leisure, loneliness in the absence of other companions help in bringing up the implicit, anti-social tendency into explicit delinquency. The percentage of such cases, is, however, small yet bad working conditions and un-employment serve as precipitating or secondary causes.

Dr. S. P. Ahluwalia*

WOMEN EDUCATION IN HARYANA, 1947-1966

A STATISTICAL SURVEY

"If education had to be limited to men or women, the opportunity should be given to women, for then it would most surely be passed on to the next generation."

University Education Commission, 1949

Long past are the days when womens' education was regarded as a sin, they were confined into the inner corner of the home, and their education was considered as an "unnecessary expenditure and luxury".

In India, with the spread of male education the need of female education is being more generally realized. Before Independence it suffered both in quality and quantity, as a consequence 'the progress of womens' education remained very slow and halting during the last century and a half. Gradually, it has been recognized that education is the right of both the sexes not the privilage of one.

Education is a "social process" which enables the individual to enjoy good life and to contribute something for the betterment of society. Thus education of women is nesessary not only to make them better wives and mothers but also so that, "they might be conscious of their own position in society and to discharge their duties to themselves as well as to the people at large".[1]

Thus education of women occupies a place of paramount importance in the whole edifice of education as it is necessary for happy family life and for the betterment of nation. It does not concern with the education of a girl or woman only, "it is the education of a mother and through her of her children".

Position of Women in Haryana

Haryana, the region of greenery and vegetation, had always been attracted by the invaders. As the result of countless repeated invasions and incursions, women of this territory were confined to the inner parts of

* The authors express their gratefulness to Director, Economics, and Statistics. Haryana State and Director, Public Instructions, Haryana State who supplied relevant data for this study

1. J.C. Bagal, *Womens' Education in Eastern India* (Calcutta : The World Press, 1956), p. 4

the homes. This gave rise to child marriage, purdah-system and a variety of other prejudices, Even now, these customs like child-marriage and purdah-system persist in many parts of the State.

Moreover, Haryana is the land of fields and agriculture is the main occupation of the people of this region. The inhabitants of this state do not mind in engaging their daughters in the fields. Thus a girl of 8 or 9 years becomes an assert to the family, as she is helpful both at home and in the fields. This might be one of the causes for unsatisfactory condition of womens' education in the state.

But the arrival and settling down of the people who came from West Pakistan as a result of partition in 1947 has created radical changes in the way of thinking and living of the people of Haryana. They gradually have realized the importance of getting their wards educated as family partners, members of society and citizens of the nation.

Women Education in Haryana since Independence

Women education did not receive impetus from the rule of East India Company. The education of the tender sex was largely neglected. for, perhaps, the alien rulers did not stand in need of lady clerks.

With the national awakening womens' education was rightly advocated. But a little that was done in this direction was not adequate. But Mrs. Annic Besant and Lord Curzon made creditable efforts for the expansion and popularity of womens' education.

With the arrival of independence, the gloomy days women's education passed away. Freedom brought with it redical changes in improving the condition of women's education, Free and compulsory education for the age-group 6-14, provision of mid-day meals and milk, programme to provide increased number of trained women teachers, stipends and scholarships to girls coming to schools, provision of hostel facilities, residential quarters for women teachers in rural areas and transport facilities, also the provision of rural allowance to women teachers working in far-off and remote areas, are some of the schemes that have strengthened women education.

The importance of women's education has been recognized, and it is useful that progress of women's education should be watched with care and caution. The data presented in the succeeding pages is too limited to make any precise conclusions, however, an attempt has been made to study the trends in some selected aspects of women's education in the State, as are revealed by the statistics.

Education of Women in Haryana

District-wise Survey :

(a) Progress of Women Education in Ambala District

Tables I and II present in a summary from the increase in number of institutions and enrolment therein over the years, 1956-57 to 1966-67.

It is evident from the data given in Table I, that the total number of primary schools in Ambala District increased from 713 in the year 1956-57 to 1024 in 1963-64. Of the total number of primary schools in 1956-57 only 11·92 per cent were meant for girls, and it rose to 30·71 in the year 1961-62.

The total number of middle schools in Ambala District increased by 86% during the period of one decade i.e., from 1956-57 to 1965-66. Hardly 28·00 per cent of middle schools were meant for girls and even in the newly formed district 27·25 per cent are girls' schools.

The total number of High/Higher Secondary schools in Ambala district increased by almost 67·80 percent in ten years between 1956-57 to 1965-66, while the percentage increase for the same period, in case of girls' schools at this level was 104·96 per cent. But still the percentage of girls' schools was 44·94 only.

Many interesting points emerge from the figures given in Table II. Some of these are enumerated here.

In the year 1956-57, out of 100 students studying in primary schools, 58 were girl-students. In 1965-66, amongst 1,00,660 the total number of students, 34,291 were girls, and it was only 34·07 pet cent of the total enrolment. This shows that the problem of primary education is therefore, mainly the problem of bringing girls to schools.

At the middle stage, also, comparatively girls are more backward in education than boys. The figures of the year 1956-57 indicate that girls constituted not even one-third of the total enrolment. However, it is a matter of satisfaction that girls' enrolment has been increasing at a faster rate than that of boys. The percentage of annual increase in the year 1963-64 being 33·14 in case of girls as against 6·94 in case of boys.

In High/Higher Secondary Schools in Ambala district the number of girls' schools rose from 2,206 to 29,264 in the period of ten years between 1956-57 to 1965-66. But the percentage of girls to total, during the same period of time, did not show rapid increase.

TABLE-I

Number of Schools in Ambala District[1], 1956–57 to 1966–67

Year	Primary Schools			Middle Schools			High/Higher Secondary Schools		
	Total No. of Schools	Schools for Girls —	% of Girls Schools to total	Total No. of Schools	Schools for Girls	% of Girls Schools to total	Total No. of Schools	Schools for Girls	% of Girls Schools to total
1956-57	713	85	11·92	50	15	30·00	59	21	35·59
1957-58	675	89	13·19	68	15	26·06	65	16	24·62
1958-59	663	97	14·63	71	27	38·03	75	24	32·00
1959-60	667	127	19·04	73	30	41·09	71	32	45·07
1960-61	669	179	26·76	76	34	44·74	75	35	46·67
1961-62	785	241	30·71	95	49	15·68	80	41	50·63
1962-63	1009	251	24.87	92	31	33·69	82	41	50·0
1963-64	1014	—	—	90	31	34·44	80	38	47·50
1964-65	980	—	—	92	30	32·61	81	41	52·62
1965-66	982	—	—	93	26	27·96	89	43	44·94
1966-67[2]	592	—	—	62	17	27·25	64	29	45·31

1. Pre-organized Ambala.
2. Re-organized Ambala.

TABLE-II

Number of Scholars in Ambala District[1], 1956-57 to 1966-67.

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary Schools		
	Total No. of Scholars	No. of Girls Scholars	% of Girls to total	Total No. of Scholars	No. of Girls Scholars	% of Girls to total	Total No. of Scholars	No. of Girls Scholars	% of Girls to total
1956-57	32,045	18,653	58·21	12,103	3,287	27·16	39,328	2,206	5·61
1957-58	56,937	22,384	39·32	15,546	6,208	39·90	50,038	21,091	22·16
1958-59	68,898	25,420	36·89	18,553	7,217	38·89	40,176	13,343	26·43
1959-60	71,330	25,409	35·62	20,832	7,603	36·49	75,510	25,742	34·09
1960-61	74,195	28,902	38·95	22,341	8,209	36·69	85,704	30,686	36·97
1961-62	1,01,573	29,454	28·98	37,962	8,806	23·17	86,260	29,449	34·14
1962-63	1.03,520	30,107	29·08	39,621	9,380	23·68	88,363	30,751	34·80
1963-64	1,04,860	37,680	35·94	41,402	2,489	30·14	85,794	28,913	33·70
1964-65	1,08,035	33,782	31·37	38,716	15,327	39·59	84,626	28,783	34·01
1965-66	1,00,660	34,291	34·07	40,037	16,123	40·25	85,760	29,264	35·29
1966-67[2]	53,738	17,378	32·68	24,968	8,947	33·84	57,228	16,981	29·67

1. Pre-organized Ambala.
2. Re-organized Ambala.

(b) Progress of Women Education in Hissar District

The increase in number of different types of educational institutions is shown in Table III.

A Cursory look at Table III indicates that there was no significant increase in the number of girl's schools in the Hissar District, during the specified period of time. Due to the implementation of the provision of free and compulsory education in the year 1960-61, the number of primary schools of girls rose to 115, but after-wards the number decreased and had only 9·63 per cent schools out of the total number of schools in the year 1965-66.

The number of middle schools has increased steadily during the last ten years in the Hissar District but there is decrease in the percentage of middle schools for women to total, as it came down from 19·74 per cent in 1956-57 to 18·11 per cent in the year 1966-67.

The number of high/higher secondary schools in the Hissar district rose from 55 to 104. Of this increase women's schools increased by about four times. Further the proportion of women's school to total, for almost all years, has steadily increased from 11·00 to 12·50 percent. There is, thus, greater need for concentrating efforts on increasing girls schools and students so as to provide sufficient women teachers for primary schools.

(c) Progress of Women Education in Gurgaon District

Tables IV and V present, at a glance, the development of education of women in the Gurgaon district :

An examination of Table IV reveals the fact that there was no rapid increase in the number of primary schools. The percentage in these years, remained between ·46 to 1·92 only. The same is true in the case of women also.

TABLE-III

Number of Schools in Hissar District, 1956-67 to 1966-67

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Sec. School		
	Total No. of Schools	Schools for Girls	% of Girls to Total	Total No. of Schools	Schools for Girls	% of Girls to Total	Total No. of Schools	Schools for Girls	% of Girls to Total
1956-57	875	87	9·94	76	15	19·74	55	3	5·45
1957-58	863	87	10·08	91	15	16·94	65	5	7·69
1958-59	867	85	9 80	100	15	15.00	68	7	10.29
1959-60	889	110	12·37	107	21	19·62	69	8	11·59
1960-61	887	115	12·97	111	22	19·82	75	9	12·00
1961-62	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1962-63	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1963-64	881	77	8·74	112	20	10·71	75	8	10·67
1964-65	872	84	9·63	120	21	17·50	80	10	12·50
1965-66	872	84	9·63	126	27	21·43	82	10	12·10
1966-67	910	—	—	143	26	18·11	104	13	12·50

TABLE–IV

Number of Schools in Gurgaon District, 1956-57 to 1966-67

Years	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of Schools	*Schools for Girls*	*% of Girls to total*	*Total No. of Schools*	*Schools for Girls*	*% of Girls to total*	*Total No. of Schools*	*Schools for Girls*	*% of Girls to total*
1956-57	822	81	9·98	75	12	16·00	63	N.A.	—
1957-58	837	83	9·92	87	12	13·79	67	6	8·95
1958-59	832	89	10·70	93	13	13·98	76	9	11·84
1959-60	841	100	11·89	97	16	16·49	77	9	11·69
1960-61	N.A.	N.A.	—	100	16	16·00	80	11	13·75
1961-62	878	146	16·63	N.A.	N.A.	—	79	10	12·66
1962-63	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1963-64	827	27	3·50	113	14	12·30	83	13	15·66
1964-65	836	27	3·23	117	14	11·97	83	13	15·66
1965-66	833	27	3·24	116	14	12·07	82	13	15·85
1966-67	836	13	1·56	117	14	11·97	83	13	15·66

A new trend in the field of education especially at primary level is to be noted, that is the efforts are being made to convert all primary schools in Co-educational schools. This is indicated by the fact that primary schools for women decreased from 81 to 13 only during the specified period.

It is evident that the number of middle schools increased by 56% during the period of one decade, between 1956-57 to 1966-67, while in case of girls schools increase was 16.67% only. The percentage of girls' Middle school has decreased in the total number of middle schools as from 16.00 percent in 1956-57, it has come down to 11.97 percent in 1966-67.

During the given years, the number of high/higher secondary schools for women rose from 6 to 13, but still it is 15.66 per cent of the total number.

Some interesting points emerge from the data given in table V. A few of them are :

There is significant increase in the number of scholar in primary schools, during the specified period of time. The number of women scholars rose from 5.726 in 1951-52 to 11482 in 1960-61, but the percentage of women scholars to total has come down from 20-20 to 18.01 percent during the given years.

TABLE-V

Number of Scholars in Gurgaon District 1951-52 to 1960-61

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary Schools		
	Total No. of Scholars	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*
1951–52	23,340	5,726	20.20	20,009	1,594	7.97	12,156	19	.16
1956–57	52,761	8,694	16.47	24,442	4,222	17.27	22,340	20	.09
1957–58	53,515	6,939	12.97	20,594	4,281	20.79	21,946	436	1.99
1958–59	57,439	7,944	13.83	27,088	2,283	8.43	24,266	3,161	13 03
1959–60	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1960–61	63,757	11,482	18.01	10,671	2,741	27,22	31,221	4,608	14.76

At middle stage, the number of women students between 1951-52 to 1960-61, almost doubled, the rate of percentage increase was approximately the same in both cases. During this period, the percentage of women students ranges between 7.97 and to 27.22.

As is natural, with the increase of number of high/higher secondary schools and general desire and demand for women education, the enrolment at this stage rose significantly i.e. from 19 in 1951-52 to 4,608 in 1960-61. But the number of women scholars is 14.76 per cent only of the total enrolment.

(d) Progress of Women Education in Jind District

Tables VI and VII show in a tabular form the growth in the number of institutions and students therein during the years 1950-51 to 1966-67.

TABLE-VI

Number of Schools in Jind District, 1950-51 to 1966-67

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of Schools	*Schools for women*	*% of women schools to total*	*Total No. of Schools*	*Schools for women*	*% of women Schools to total*	*Total No. of Schools*	*Schools for women*	*% of women Schools to total*
1950-51	64	3	4.69	14	—	—	7	1	14.29
1951-52	70	3	4,29	14	—	—	7	1	14.29
1952-53	73	3	4.10	15	—	—	7	1	14.29
1953-54	164	3	1.83	18	—	—	7	1	14.29
1954-55	185	11	5.95	21	3	14.29	9	1	11.11
1955-56	191	12	6.28	23	3	13.04	11	1	9.09
1956-57	236	12	5.09	23	3	13.04	12	1	8.33
1961-69	232	14	6.03	24	2	8.33	18	2	11.11
1963-64	229	16	6.88	24	2	8.33	20	3	15.00
1966-67	N.A.	N.A.	—	40	2	5 00	22	4	18.55

It is clear from Table VI that the total number of primary schools increased by about four times during the given period. The percentage of women schools to total number of schools went from 4.10 to 6.88 in the years 1950-51 to 1963-64.

The district has only 2 middle schools to for women as against 40 in total. It is 5.00 per cent of the total number of middle schools.

The number of high/higher secondary schools in the Jind district rose more than three times during the period of sixteen years, between 1950-51 to 1966-67. In 1950-51, there was only 1 school for women in the whole district of Jind and this number rose to 4 in the year 1966-67.

TABLE-VII

Number of Scholars in Jind District, 1950-51 to 1956-57

Year	Primary			Middle			Higher/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of scholars	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*
1950-51	7091	114	1.60	564	—	—	3171	286	9.32
1952-52	7579	106	1.53	570	—	—	3348	316	9.44
1952-53	7907	150	1.89	660	—	—	3452	338	9.79
1953-54	14537	144	1.06	720	—	—	3843	366	9.52
1954-55	14660	306	1.09	1185	365	31.87	4692	337	7.18
1955-56	15572	330	1.99	1474	414	27.18	5710	342	5.97
1956-57	19492	338	1.73	1662	445	26.77	6542	361	5.52

A reflection on Table VII makes it evident that between 1950-51 to 1956-57 the total number of scholars rose by about 12400, while the increase in case of women scholars was only 224. The disparity between the number of scholars i.e., of boys and girl students is revealed by the Table VII as throughout the given period, the percentage of more than 1.03 per cent. *i.e.*, women students to total did not raise above from 1.06 percent to 2.09 percent.

The total number of students at high/Higher secondary stage in the district increase by 3172, while in case of women students the increase is 75 only. The percentage of women students to the total number of students indicated a downward trend, as it came down from 9.32 per cent in 1950-51 to 5.52 per cent in 1956-57.

(e) Progress of Women Education in Karnal District

Tables VIII and IX present in a concise, from the development of women education in the Karnal district over the years 1956 to 1957.

TABLE-VIII

Number of Schools in Karnal District 1956-57 to 1966-67

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of schools	*Schools for women*	*% of women schools to total*	*Total No. of schools*	*Schools for women*	*% of women schools to total*	*Total No. of schools*	*Schools for women*	*% of women schools to total*
1956-57	785	77	9.80	74	11	14.86	N.A.	N.A.	—
1957-58	775	76	9.80	91	11	12.08	N.A.	N.A.	—
1958-59	766	72	9.39	100	16	16.00	N.A.	N.A.	—
1959-60	816	114	14.14	101	17	16.83	N.A.	N.A.	—
1960-61	868	188	21.65	103	17	16.65	N.A	N.A.	—
1961-62	N.A	N.A	—	N.A.	N.A	—	81	N.A.	—
1962-63	N.A	N.A	—	N.A	N.A	—	82	17	20.07
1963-64	858	—	—	115	18	15.65	85	19	23.35
1964-65	863	—	—	117	18	15.47	86	19	22.05
1965-66	942	—	—	124	18	14.51	103	19	18.44
1966-67	942	—	—	128	18	14.06	103	19	18.44

A close look at Table VIII shows the percentage of primary schools for women in the Karnal district improved from 9.80 in 1956-57 to 21.65 in 1960-61, with the implementation of the provision of free and compulsory education in 1961. The Government is trying its best to convert all primary schools to co-educational schools, and in near future there will be no separate primary school either for boys or for girls in the district.

During the period under review, the total number of middle schools increased by about 91 per cent, and in case of girl's the increase was 80 per cent. Table VII also reveals that there is no significant increase in the percentage of women's middle schools to total.

TABLE-IX

Number of Scholars in Karnal District, 1956-57 to 1960-61

Year	Primary			Middle		
	Total No. of Scholars	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of Scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*
1956-57	53,189	8,580	16.13	17,818	3,137	17.65
1957-58	52,831	8.067	15.26	20,380	3,277	16.07
1958-59	55,206	7,858	14.23	23,52:	3,539	15.04
1959-60	58,814	10,640	18.09	26,150	4,024	15.38
1960-61	62,022	12,010	19.36	24,319	3,066	12.60

At primary stage in the Karnal district girls are more backward than boys as they constituted only about one fifth of the total enrolment of the year 1960-61. It is however, gratifying, that girls' education has been progressing at a faster rate than that of boys as the percentage of annual increase in 1960-61 being 12.85 in case of girls as against 5.62 percent of boys.

It is evident from Table IX that there has been no rapid increase in enrolment at middle stage, in the total enrolment as well as that of women students. Not more than 17 per cent of women students have been studying in middle schools during the given period of time.

(f) Progress of Women Education in Mahendaragarh District

Tables X and XI present at a glance, the growth of institutions and enrolment therein over the years 1951 to 1967.

A careful study of table X highlights the increase in number of schools in the Mahendragarh district during the years under review. The number of primary schools increased by 338 out of which 82 schools were of women. Of the total number of primary schools, not more than one-fifth schools are meant for girls.

TABLE-X

Number of Schools in Mahendragarh District, 1951-52 to 1966-67

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of schools	Schools for women	% of women to total	Total No. of schools	Schools for women	% of women to total	Total No. of schools	Schools for women	% of women to total
1951-52	90	3	3.33	46	—	—	11	—	—
1956-57	355	3	0.85	54	3	5.55	27	2	7.41
1957-58	350	2	0.57	57	2	3.50	29	3	10-34
1958-59	353	2	0.57	55	1	1.82	30	4	13.33
1959-60	351	2	0.57	54	N.A.	—	31	5	16.13
1960-61	349	2	0.57	48	N.A.	—	36	5	13.99
1961-62	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1962-63	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1963-64	419	84	20.05	71	2	2.82	39	5	12.82
1964-65	421	84	19.95	67	2	2.96	40	5	12.50
1965-66	422	84	19.90	77	3	3.89	42	5	11.90
1966-67	429	85	19.81	80	3	3.75	45	5	11.11

Between the years 1956 and 1967 to total number of middle schools increased by 48.15 per cent, while there ha been no increase in case of middle schools for women. The percentage of women's schools to total number is 3.75 only.

During the period of sixteen years the number of high/Higher Secondary schools multiplied four times an that of girls five times. The percentage of girls high/higher secondary schools to total remained 7.41 to 16.13% only.

It is evident from Table XI that at the primary stage, the total enrolment maintained its rising trend, bu the women enrolment, between 1956 to 1960, touched a low ebb. Why ? the reason is not known.

The total number of students in middle school increased by 12,345 during the given period, of which abou 3,000 increase was in the number of women students. The percentage of women students to total for the most o years, has not been more than 4 per cent.

TABLE-XI

Number of Scholars in Mahendragarh District, 1951-66

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of scholars	*No. of women scholar*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholar*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholar*	*% of women to total*
1951-52	5,118	287	5.7	9,014	—	—	1,839	—	—
1956-57	15,147	37	0.24	7,480	325	4.34	7,985	777	9.73
1957-58	16,117	41	0.25	7,331	203	2.77	8,609	971	10.12
1958-59	17,885	35	0.20	8,569	120	1.40	9,436	1041	11.03
1959-60	17,318	64	0.38	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1960-61	32,878	3,407	10.36	8,832	263	2.98	14,203	1,445	10.17
1965-66	41,426	8,705	21.23	21,359	3125	14.63	25,303	3,776	14.84

The progress in the enrolment of classes IX to XI has been by about 24000, of which about 3,500 increase was in the number of women students. The percentage of women students to total has improved from 9.73 14.84, during the given years.

(g) Progress of Women Education in Rohtak District

Tables XII and XIII depict the progress made in the field of women education in Rohtak District over the years 1951 to 1967.

TABLE-XII

Number of schools in Rohtak District, 1951-66

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of schools	*Schools for women*	*% of womens' schools to total*	*Total No. of schools*	*Schools for women*	*% of women schools to total*	*Total No. of schools*	*Schools for women*	*% of women schools to total*
1951-52	389	90	23.30	109	7	6.52	46	3	6.52
1956-57	717	116	14.79	70	17	24.29	75	8	10.66
1957-58	692	108	15.60	98	27	25.55	78	9	11.54
1958-59	700	122	17.43	107	29	27.10	82	12	14.63
1959-60	704	126	17.43	107	29	27.10	83	13	15.66
1960-61	694	126	18.16	121	33	27 27	88	14	15.90
1961-62	717	157	21.90	121	33	27.27	94	16	17.02
1962-63	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—	N.A.	N.A.	—
1963-64	633	97	15.32	121	29	23.96	88	14	15.90
1964-65	655	100	15.27	126	30	23.80	88	10	11.36
1965-66	658	103	15.65	150	30	20.00	116	23	19.83

A scrutiny of Table XII indicates that primary education in Rohtak district expanded with a good speed. The total number of schools rose by about 67 per cent while in case of girls the increase was 14 per cent only. Also, the percentage of womens' schools to total has decreased from 23·30 to 15·65 during the specified period.

Between 1951-56 the total number of middle schools increased as anticipated. The increase in case of boys is much more than that of girls. Middle schools for women showed downward trend after the year 1961-62. as the number from 33 to 30.

The percentage increase, at high/higher secondary stage, in women's schools of Rohtak district is much more than that of boys, as its indicated by the data of years 1955-62. The percentage of women schools to total has improved from 6·52 per cent to 19·83 per cent.

TABLE-XIII

Number of Scholars in Rohtak District, 1951-61

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of scholars	*No of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% of women to total*
1951-52	30.594	9,279	29·98	25,152	1,739	6·91	20,258	1,103	5·45
1956-57	62,379	10,813	15·73	21,251	4,229	19·90	24,743	2,356	9·52
1957-58	62,239	9,840	15·65	28,921	5,784	19·99	29,214	2,985	9·88
1958-59	62,669	10,211	16·30	29,668	5,888	19·85	34,824	7,982	22·92
1959-60	65,952	11,140	16·92	29,015	6.100	21·02	32,941	5,809	17·63
1960-61	87,954	15,626	17·77	27,132	7,135	26·30	37,460	7,531	20·10

A careful look at Table XIII shows that in Rohtak district there has been continuous increase in the total number as well as in women students at primary level. The total enrolment increased by about 57,000 of which about 6,000 increase was in enrolment of women students, thus increase in case of girl students has been even less than one-ninth of the total increase.

The number of women students in middle schools has increased rapidly that is it increased from 1739 to 7135. The percentage of women students to total has varied from 6·91 to 26·30 per cent during the year under review.

As it is natural, with the increase in number of high/higher secondary schools, the enrolment, at this stage, also increased. The increase was of about 17,000 of which about 6,000 were women students. The percentage of women students to total has improved from 5·45 to 20·10 per cent during the given period.

Over-all Position of Women Education in the Haryana State

Tables XIV and XV present in a summary for the growth of women education in the Haryana state over the years, 1956 to 1967.

TABLE-XIV

Number of Schools in Haryana State, 1956–67

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of schools	*Schools for women*	*% 2 to 1*	*Total No. of schools*	*Schools for women*	*% 2 to 1*	*Total No. of schools*	*Schools for women*	*% 2 to 1*
1956-57	4,503	416	10·22	413	73	17·68	275	35	12·68
1957-58	4,428	457	10·32	507	82	16·17	311	40	12·86
1958-59	4,415	479	10·89	544	101	18·57	338	57	16·86
1959-60	4,494	691	15·38	560	118	21 07	340	68[a]	20·00
1960-61	4,563	755	16·55	582	127	21·82	365	75	20·55
1963-64	4,522	650	14·37	645	117	18 14	377	79	20·96
1964-65	4,555	634	13·92	663	117	17·65	390	81	20·77
1965-66	4,586	671	14·64	710	120	16 90	431	97	22·51
1966-67[b]	4,228	593	14·03	724	111	15·33	445	88	19·78

(a) Figures included of Ambala are of the Pre-organised district. Excluding the high/higher secondary schools of Karnal District.

(b) Figures included of Ambala District relate to Re-organised District.

From a careful and close study of Table XIV some interesting points emerge. They are :

There has been no significant increase in the number of primary schools as it simply rose from 4,503 to 4,584 during the period of ten years between 1956-57 to 1965-66. In 1966-67 their number was reduced to 4,228, this might be due to the re-organisation of Ambala District. During the specified period the number of primary schools for women rose from 416 to 593. The schools meant for women did not have any remarkable increase in percentage as it remained between 10·22 per cent to 16·55 per cent to the total number of primary schools.

The total number of middle schools increased from 413 to 724, while the girls' schools increased from 73 to 111 only. The percentage of women's middle schools to total kept a rising trend upto 1960-61. After it shows a downward trend and came down from 21 82 to 15 33, between the years 1960-61 to 1966-67.

There has been a good increase in the number of high/higher secondary schools. The total number of schools increased by 61·23 per cent during the period of eleven years that is between 1956 to 67, while the increase in case of women's schools was 151·43 per cent during the said period. But the percentage of women's schools to total varied between 12 68 percent to 22 51 per cent.

TABLE-XV

Number of Scholars in Haryana State[1], 1955-56 to 1960-61

Year	Primary			Middle			High/Higher Secondary		
	Total No. of scholars	*No. of women scholars*	*% 2 to 1*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% 2 to 1*	*Total No. of scholars*	*No. of women scholars*	*% 2 to 1*
1955-56	2,11,572	46,735	22·09	83,855	15.027	17 93	90,180	4,422	4·90
1956-57	2,15,521	46.747	21 69	83,094	15,200	18·05	94,396	5,359	5·66
1957-58	1,41,639	47,271	19·56	92,772	19,753	21·29	1,09,807	15,483	14·10
1958-59	2,62,097	51,468	19·64	10,740	19,047	17·73	1,09,002	25,527	23·42
1959-60	2,70,853	54,678	20·18	1,11,654	20,130	18·03	1,42,153	35,753	25·15
1960-61	3,20,806	71,427	21 95	93,295	21,414	22·95	1,68,588	44,270	26·25

1. Excluding the figures related to Hissar and Jind Districts. Excluding the figures of Karnal district relating to high/higher secondary schools. Figures related to Ambala are of the pre-organized district.

A study of Table XV highlights the following points :

The number of scholars in primary schools increased from 211572 to 320806 while the women scholars increased from 46,735 to 71,427. The percentage of women scholars to total had a rising trend as it arose from 21.69 per cent to 21.95 per cent, from the year 1956-57 to 1960-61.

The total number of scholars in middle schools increased upto the year 1959-60, but in the year 1960-61 the number came down from 1,11,654 to 93,295. But throughout the period, the number of women scholars increased continuously and the increase to the tune of was of about six thousands. The percentage of women scholars to total varied between 17.93 per cent to 22.95 per cent during the given period of time.

There has been a rapid increase in the total number of scholars in high/higher secondary schools, but it was also in the case of women scholars, as it rose from 4,422 to 15,483 only from 1955-56 to 1957-58, but in the year 1960-61 it camedown to 44,270. But a notable thing is that the percentage of women scholars to total kept a rising trend as from 4.90 in 1955-56 it increased to 25.25 in 1960-61.

Some Notable Trends

Since the day of Independence in 1947, the education of women has been progressing rapidly in India. This had a definite impact on women education in Haryana. Through careful and cautious steps, the gaps, disparities and inadequacies at all stages of women education are gradually being met. There is increase in the number and percentage of institutions as well as in the number and percentage of women scholars in all districts of the Haryana State.

Of the total number of primary schools, the percentage of girls varied from 10.22 to 16.55 per cent. From 10.22 per cent in 1956-57, to total number of primary schools, it rose to 16.55 in 1960-61. But after this, it showed a downward trend, perhaps, because under the provision of free and compulsory education, instead of separate girls' schools, the state Government is trying to convert all primary schools to co-educational ones. And in the coming years, perhaps, it would be difficult to have any single sen primary schools, for boys and girls separately.

The percentage increase in women enrolment, relatively speaking is much more at primary stage, less in middle schools and least at high/higher secondary stage.

It is evident that the percentage increase in the case of women enrolment is much more than that of boys, but still the girl's education tends to lag behind, It is, perhaps true of all stages of education in all the district of the Haryana State.

Taking in view the expansion of women education, of the seven districts of the state, the data for years under review revealed that Ambala, Karnal and Rohtak districts had a high percentages of women schools and scholars at primary level, whereas the two districts wise Jind and Mohindragarh had a lower position and percentage.

At middle school stage, again, Ambala, Rohtak and Karnal have attained high percentage in case of women schools and scholars, yet Jind and Mahendragarh districts have a much lower position. Likewise, the findings at the level of the high/higher secondary schools also reveal the same story.

From the foregoing description, it is evident that Ambala and Karnal are educationally forward districts while Jind and Mahendragarh districts are backward ones in the Haryana State. Further, Ambala district is educationally foward and Jind is educationally most backward district of the Haryana State. Educational backwardness, it is believed may have some impact on economic backwardness of the different districts and of the newly emerged state of Haryana.

Strengthening Women Education in Haryana

The present paper was concerned mainly with studying in details the progress of women education in newly-formed Haryana state during the period of two decades that is from 1947 to 1966. However, it seems justifiable, to give some suggestions which may prove useful for strengthening the education of women in Haryana, a state busy in educational reconstruction and improvement.

The need of education of the fair sex has been increasingly realized during these years of Independence. There is good increase in the number of institutions, in enrolment teachers, and in expenditure made for the progress of women education. Inspite of these facts, the percentage of girls and women in educational institutions has not much improved.

The education of women, it is distressing to note, is in somewhat sad state in Haryana. It tends to lag behind that of boys. The disparity between the education of boys and girls is marked feature in Haryana as in India in general. Thus, women education should be treated as a major problem and special measures should be adopted to tackle this problem, on almost a war-footing. Great efforts are needed if it is desired to realize the ideal of "Free, Compulsory and Universal Education' for all.

Furthermore, schools should be opened in adequate number in rural as well as in urban areas. Strong incentives should be given to girls and to the lady teachers who are willing to work in rural and remote areas. To meet the problem of shortage of trained women teachers some incentive in the form of special allowances may prove

useful. The provision of part-time employment for women if practised, may deliver the goods by easing the situation,

Public opinion should be educated to make older people realise the need and importance of the education of women. For this, social guides should be appointed and adult education programmes should be implemented and expedited. It is relevant that an intensive programme for educating mothers should be launched. In order to motivate the parents to send their daughters to schools, especially in the rural areas, the provisions of part-time education, productivity-oriented education, and education for practical life must be strengthened.

It is a hard fact that the financial allocation made for the expansion of women's education is not very adequate. It is desired that the state Government should provide more finances for strengthening women education programmes. To lessen the burden of the state Government local bodies and private agencies should render some substantial help in the matter. The major source of expenditure on school education, it is evident are the funds made available by the Government. The next source of meeting the expenditure is from fees and the like. Before the provincialization of schools, the District Boards and Municipal Boards were good contributory sources. But after the year 1957 with the introduction and implementation of provincialization of schools, these sources have almost dried up and become insignificant. They must be revised revitabsed now.

Women in modern age must find their true-selves and assert themselves. No effort should be spared to carry the torch of education to women, in the interest of our growing democracy. It is necessary that women not in Haryana alone but in India in general must find and understand their true role, where they will not be either the slaves of men or competing with them, but can stand with them in their life's work as a complementary force, partners in serious thought and companions in weal and woe.

Here, it is desirable to quote the words of R.K. Mukherjee;

"Let us now, under Free Republican India and a constitution which guarantees equality of opportunity to all its citizens irrespective of caste, creed or sex, recapture some of these forgotten ideals of ancient Indian womanhood and revive the institutions for social service and spiritual administration so that they may fulfil their special mission in applying their healing and human touch to suffering mankind"[1].

Haryana being a new and forward-looking state must take a lead in this direction. It must come forward with all its resources to make the people see that education is not the privilege of one sex, but is equally the right of both, men and women.

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1. R.K. Mukerjee, *Women of India*, (Delhi : Publication Divn., 1958), p. 8.

FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

1.	Place of Publication	..	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
2.	Periodicity of its Publication	...	Biannual
3.	Printer's Name	...	Shri T. Philip
	Nationality	...	Indian
	Address	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
4.	Publisher's Name	...	Dr. Vinay Mohan Sharma
	Nationality	...	Indian
	Address	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
5.	Editor's Name	...	Dr. Vinay Mohan Sharma
	Nationality	...	Indian
	Address	...	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra
6.	Name and address of individuals who own the magazine and partners or share-holders, holding more than one per cent of the total capital	...	The paper is owned by the Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra

I, Vinay Mohan Sharma, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated 30-9-68

Signature of Publisher
VINAY MOHAN SHARMA

1160—Research Journal—250 Books—30-9-68—K.U Press, Kurukshetra.